Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001863
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57050/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 8th of July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVIES

Between

FD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Malik of counsel, directly instructed by the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr S Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Procedural matters
1. On 24 June 2026, Mr Walker was granted permission to attend the hearing remotely, and therefore attended by CVP. There were no issues in relation to connectivity.
Background
2. The Appellant is a national of Albania, born in 2005. He claimed asylum on 20 August 2022. His claim was refused on 4 March 2024. On 20 December 2024, a positive “conclusive grounds” decision was made to the effect that the Appellant was a victim of human trafficking.
3. An appeal against the refusal of asylum and humanitarian protection was heard on 12 December 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Shergill (“the Judge”). The decision, dismissing that appeal, is dated 24 December 2025.
4. On 2 April 2026 permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Le Grys.
5. I am required to determine whether there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. I am grateful to the representatives for their assistance.
The grounds of appeal
6. The grounds of appeal are summarised as follows:
(1) The Judge erred in recognising the Appellant as a “vulnerable witness” on account of his status as a victim of trafficking, but did not take that positive “conclusive grounds” decision (and associated credibility finding in relation to trafficking) into account in reaching a conclusion on other aspects of the Appellant’s credibility;
(2) Having reached an allegedly unlawful conclusion as to the Appellant’s credibility, the Judge’s conclusion as to family support available to him was tainted by the unlawful credibility finding;
(3) The Judge is alleged to have operated under a misdirection as to the Appellant’s status as a member of a particular social group, reliance being placed on the case of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC).
(4) It is further alleged that the Judge’s assessment of whether sufficiency of protection was available to the Appellant was in error.
Discussion
7. The Judge did not consider that a psychological report produced by Peter Thorne and dated 4 October 2024 could be given any more than “little weight” [22] as the report failed to comply with guidelines for such reports. Nonetheless, the Judge was willing to accept that the Appellant should be treated, for the purposes of adjustments to the hearing procedure, as a “vulnerable witness” on account of his status as a victim of trafficking [26]. The grounds do not seek to challenge those adjustments, or the Judge’s procedure.
8. The Judge identified significant discrepancies between the various sources of the Appellant’s evidence in particular in relation to his contact and relationship with family members such that his account in that regard was found to lack credibility [46]. It is notable, however, that in making that assessment, the Judge was:
…mindful that the appellant was found to have been credible in relation to the past history of trafficking. I have set out my observations as to why due allowance for his age at the time; or the benefit of the doubt as a vulnerable witness does not apply. [44]
9. I shall deal with Grounds 1 and 2 together, as they are interlinked. These grounds assert that the Judge erred in failing to consider, in evaluating the Appellant’s credibility, the positive credibility finding implicit in the conclusive grounds decision regarding his having been trafficked. The grounds of appeal assert that the Judge limited consideration to vulnerability on medical grounds. This is said to have impacted the Judge’s evaluation of the Appellant’s account regarding family support in Albania.
10. Paragraph 44 of the FtT decision demonstrates that the Judge took into account that the trafficking aspect of the Appellant’s account was credible and also considered whether there were vulnerability related factors that could account for the apparently different accounts that had been presented. The Judge was not satisfied that there was a “plausible explanation” for the discrepancies [41].
11. He was not, however, required to accept the entirety of the account, particularly in the face of apparently conflicting evidence regarding the Appellant’s contact and relationships with family members. A witness can be credible in relation to one aspect of an account, but lack credibility in relation to another.
12. The Judge was entitled to conclude, on the basis of all the evidence, and having expressly noted the positive credibility finding implicit in the positive conclusive grounds decision, and taken into account the Appellant’s status as a victim of trafficking, that there were significant credibility issues in relation to other aspects of the Appellant’s account.
13. I find there to be no material error of law in relation to the Judge’s approach to credibility. In terms of the finding of family support, the Judge was entitled to conclude that family support would be available to the Appellant. The decision is to be read as a whole, and in doing so, it is apparent that the Judge did not (as alleged) reverse the burden of proof regarding family support.
14. Turning to ground 3, the Judge considered that the case of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC) and analysed the Appellant’s argument that he was part of a particular social group on account of his having been trafficked. The Judge drew a distinction between the Appellant’s situation and that upon which TD was based [52 and 58]. I note the analysis also at [67].
15. In any event, the Judge correctly identified the importance of support networks when evaluating risk on return: see [53]. In relation to that issue, the Judge properly assessed the factual matrix in terms of family support available to the Appellant, as well as looking at structural support such as the availability of employment and noted that the Appellant is in a different position now, having attained majority and matured, to that which existed at the time of his earlier trafficking [52 and 54]. I can find no material error of law in this analysis.
16. Ground 4 concerns the Judge’s assessment of sufficiency of protection for the Appellant. The Judge correctly considered the approach in TD, which was that there was, in general, sufficiency of protection [59]. The Appellant’s expert report was considered in relation to this issue, in particular at [61]. The Judge then went on to consider the totality of the evidence regarding sufficiency of protection at [66-74]. The Judge at [70] accepted that there are limitations to state protection, but was not satisfied that that there was, overall, insufficiency of state protection in relation to risk from non-state actors.
17. In the alternative, the Judge was satisfied that internal relocation was available to the Appellant, noting that he had spent three months in Elbasan and that he has family support available to him. I find these conclusions to be grounded in the evidence and the Judge’s findings (particularly as regards family support), and to have taken into account the accepted account of past trafficking.
18. The common thread that runs through the grounds of appeal is challenge to the Judge’s findings regarding the availability of family support to the Appellant in Albania. This is a finding of fact which I consider to have been properly open to the Judge and lawfully made. I take into account that the Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated the need for judicial caution and restraint when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, it was noted that judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. I further take into account that appellate courts should not rush to find misdirection simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693.
19. I conclude that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision.

Notice of Decision
(1) There is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision
(2) The appeal is dismissed.

Siân Davies

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 July 2026