Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001881
UI-2026-001566
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63145/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

25th August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STAMP

Between

XB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms M Elahi, Counsel instructed by Fairland Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the Fist-tier judge dated 25 January 2025 on the basis that it contains an error of law. The judge dismissed the appeal against the respondent’s refusal to grant her protection claim.
2. The appellant, aged 31, an Albanian national had been a victim of modern slavery and trafficking by way of exploitation by a gang in Albania from July 2022. Additionally, she had been the subject of domestic abuse by her father’s family.
3. The appellant managed to escape from her situation in August 2022 by hiding at a friend’s house and entered the UK on a visitor’s visa on 4 September 2022 and claimed asylum on 14 March 2023.
4. The respondent refused the appellant’s claim for protection on 18 April 2024: whilst it was accepted that the appellant was a victim of modern slavery and domestic violence, the respondent did not accept that she would be at real risk on return given there would be sufficient protection from persecution on return to her home country.
5. The judge dismissed the appeal and found that the appellant could return to Albania and avail herself of the protection of the authorities. Further the judge did not accept that the appellant had established any family life in the UK which would engage Article 8 of the ECHR.
6. The appellant sought permission to appeal on 8 February 2026 on three grounds, the first two relating to the judge failing to take account of material evidence and country guidance and a third relating to the judge’s conclusions on whether the appellant had a relationship such as would have triggered Article 8.
7. Permission to appeal was granted on the first two grounds on 24 March 2026 by First-tier judge Michaels. Subsequently a renewed grounds of appeal was made on 7 April 2026 to this Tribunal on the third ground which was refused by judge Sheridan on 16 May 2026.
Submissions
8. Ms Elahi relied on her grounds of appeal and her skeleton argument. Ms Elahi sought confirmation that the grounds of appeal were sufficiently broad to cover challenge to the judge’s findings on sufficiency of protection or if not, permission to amend the grounds. I confirmed that no amendment was necessary.
9. Ms Elahi submitted that the judge failed to properly apply the country guidance set out in TD & AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092. First, the judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s mental health was not severely impaired was not justified by the objective evidence – in particular the letter from her therapist and the traumatic experiences she had endured as a victim of trafficking and domestic abuse.
10. Additionally, the judge misapplied the “area of origin” factor set out in TD & AD by ignoring the evidence that the appellant was trafficked in the area where her mother lives and that traffickers have since located her mother. Further, organised crime groups have links in the two cities where the appellant grew up.
11. Further, the judge unfairly concluded that there was a support network available to the appellant and ignored the impracticalities of her living with her mother or father. Nor is help available from her extended family as they consider the appellant has brought shame on them. TD & AD explicitly recognises that trafficked women would have “considerable difficulty” in reintegrating into their home areas.
12. Finally, paragraph 17 of the grounds of appeal sets out other factors set out in the ASA which the judge failed to take into account in her decision.
13. The second ground is that the judge unfairly concluded that there was “no evidence” other than the appellant’s assertion, that the trafficking gang would be able to locate her. The judge failed to take into account the newspaper reports of the extensive network of the trafficking gang and previous UT decisions, identified in the ASA, which accepted that Albania being a small country it was plausible that individuals can be traced by their family connections and that internal relocation is problematic for victims of trafficking.
14. Mr Parvar relied on his Rule 24 reply. On the first ground, the appellant has not shown that no reasonable tribunal could have rationally reached the same conclusion given the judge had clearly considered the medical evidence and came to a logical conclusion. On the issue of the judge’s treatment on the area of origin, TD & AD was concerned with appellants from Northern Albania and whether this impacted on risk of return. The judge, identifying that the appellant was not from an area that put her at additional risk, had correctly applied the test intended by the Tribunal. On the support network, the judge identifies that the trafficked gang had located the appellant’s mother but this was seven months after she left and there had been no subsequent contact. Additionally, the judge identified the level of the appellant’s education, her work experience and the absence of any children in coming to her decision.
15. On the second ground, the judge considered the claimed police connections of the gang in conjunction with the appellant’s credibility on this issue. Similarly, the judge considers the willingness and ability of the gang to locate the appellant given their single approach to her mother and her conclusions on this issue were fair and considered.
Discussion and Decision
16. The issue which I have to determine is whether there is an error of law in the First-tier’s tribunal decision. If I conclude that there is, I then need to consider whether the error requires me to set aside that decision in whole or part. If I set aside the decision, then I must determine whether it should be remade in this Tribunal or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
17. In light of the grounds focussing on the judge’s failure to give adequate reasons and taking into account material evidence my starting point are the Court of Appeal’s dicta in R(Iran) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 that for the failure for a judge to give reasons to amount to an error of law the appellate court must find that it cannot understand the original judge’s thought process when making material findings. Additionally, the court held that for there to be an error of law on the basis that the decision was unreasonable or irrational it had to be such that no reasonable tribunal which addressed its mind to the issue could have come to the same conclusion.
18. I am also guided by the recent Court of Appeal decision in MN Vietnam v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485 at paragraph 35 which requires an appellate court in reviewing a First-tier tribunal decision in this chamber to make a “straightforward down to earth reading “ of the decision to identify whether there is room for genuine doubt over what had been decided rather than taking an overly forensic approach and interpreting the decision as if it were a contract or statute.
19. It is also worth noting that TD & AD’s starting point, in light of the protections introduced in Albania for trafficked victims, is that there is in general a Horvath-standard of sufficiency of protection but recognised that it would not be effective in every case and the particular circumstances of any the appellant had to be considered. The judge expressly referred to this principle in paragraph 20 and reviewed the appellant’s individual situation in that light.
20. Turning to the first ground, Ms Elahi’s submission was that the judge had irrationality concluded that the appellant’s mental health was not “particularly impaired” for the purpose of applying the criteria of TD & AD despite her being a victim of trafficking and the evidence that she had been diagnosed with anxiety and depression, a letter from her therapist that she had PTSD, her evidence of attempted suicide in 2023 and her evidence that she did not feel able to her leave house for 12 months on arrival in the UK.
21. The starting point is the consideration given to the mental health in TD & AD. In paragraph (h) of the headnote provides that one of the factors to be taken into account is “The victim of trafficking’s state of health, particularly her mental health”. The relevance of mental health is further set out in paragraph (e) which, in summary, says there is a reception and reintegration programme in place for victims of trafficking which include the provision of accommodation shelters which provide support and protection for such victims. That paragraph concludes:
“Unless the individual has particular vulnerabilities such as physical or mental health issues, this option cannot be generally be said to be unreasonable; whether it is must be determined on a case by case basis”
Additionally, mental health could be taken into account in determining the risk of being re-trafficked in paragraph (h) and the ability to live independently after leaving a shelter in paragraph (f).
22. The context in which the appellant’s mental health was to be assessed was explicitly recognised by the judge in paragraph 22 where she concluded that her mental health impairment was not such that would deny her access to the protections set out in TD & AD. The judge considered the medical evidence both in paragraphs 21 and 22 but also in paragraph 28 where she noted that the appellant had been admitted to hospital for taking a large quantity of antidepressant but having been assessed by a psychiatric medic who had no concerns about her emotional well-being. Further, the appellant had denied any current thoughts of suicide or self-harm at that time. I do not accept Ms Elahi’s contention that the references to the appellant’s mental health in paragraph 28 were confined to the Article 8 claim – clearly, she would have had the entirety of the medical evidence in mind in coming to her conclusion in paragraph 22, when considering her decision as a whole.
23. The judge, at paragraph 7, acknowledged that the appellant was a vulnerable witness and implicitly recognised that any victim of trafficking would struggle with their mental health and expressly referred to the appellant’s anxiety and depression which had been treated with medication. None of the evidence before the judge attempted to explain how the state of appellant’s current mental health would result in the protection and reintegration programme not being adequate for her needs or her being at a heightened risk of being re-trafficked or her ability to live independently. Accordingly, I find that the judge dealt fairly with the entirety of the medical evidence and there made no error of law.
24. The second issue is whether the judge properly took into account the appellant’s “area of origin” as set out in paragraph (h) in TD & AD. Ms Elahi’s submission is that the judge incorrectly applied the factor as treated it as a question of whether the appellant came from an area of Albania that put her at enhanced risk “because of cultural aspects”. This was not the correct test as the reference in paragraph (h) is just to area of origin and the judge should have considered the ability of the traffickers to locate the appellant if she returned to be near her mother.
25. I do not find this submission persuasive, even if I accepted it at face value, the judge considered those matters which Ms Elahi suggests should have been taken into account in this factor later on in her decision in paragraphs 23 and 24 and which are the subject of the second ground of appeal. In any event, I accept that the submission of Mr Parvar that the case of TD & AD was concerned with whether the victims of trafficking were from Northern Albanian and whether this puts them at additional risk if returned to that area. Paragraph 52 of that case makes it clear that there are additional risks for trafficked women if their home area is based in Northern Albania given their social isolation, abandonment by family and employment exploitation. The case of AM and BM (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] UKUT 80 which was the country guidance which preceded TD & AD and which introduced the factor of the area of origin, similarly dealt with a situation where one of the appellants was from Northern Albania. Accordingly, I conclude when read in the context of these cases the reference to the “area of origin” was shorthand for an area of origin from which an appellant, as a victim of trafficking, would be at particular risk if returned due to cultural sensitives and the judge made no error of law in treating the reference as such.
26. In terms of a support network, the judge concluded at paragraph 28 that the appellant did have the emotional support of her mother, who she speaks to weekly and, indeed, it was her mother that financially supported relocation to the UK. TD & AD introduced the additional factor of the support network available to an appellant but leaves it to the judge to consider the nature of the support which is considered to be adequate in light of all the circumstances and the protections which have been put in place for trafficked victims. Ms Elahi submits that financial support and the ability of the appellant being able to live with her mother is key in determining whether the support network was sufficient. It is up to the judge to decide what level of support is appropriate and that the judge places little weight on the inability of the appellant to live with her mother, putting aside her findings on whether this was actually the case, is justifiable given the provision of shelters for those victims returning back to their own country. Nor does the judge assume that the appellant’s father or his relatives would be part of any support network, she implicitly considered the emotional support of one parent sufficient in the circumstances. Accordingly, I find no error of law in the judge’s treatment of the evidence on this issue.
27. The final element of this ground is based on the material evidence set out in paragraph 17 of the grounds that the judge did not properly consider as part of her decision given that paragraph (h) of the headnote of TD &AD specifically states that whether there is sufficiency of protection will depend on all the individual circumstances of the appellant and not just those listed in that paragraph. Ms Elahi submitted that the judge failed to give proper reasons for her failure to take this additional evidence into account. I note that the skeleton argument presented to me on this issue appears to be more extensive than the permitted grounds and I confine my decision to those grounds.
28. At the outset it is worth noting that the judge specifically recognised that the factors set out in that case were not exhaustive when she said at paragraph 20:
“The country guidance case sets out 7 criteria which are not exhaustive but are significant in assessing a particular appellant’s vulnerabilities”.
29. Furthermore, in paragraph 25 the judge makes a point of saying that she has reviewed the skeleton argument and grounds “in great detail” as to why protection in Albania would not be available but concludes that those arguments mainly relate to general issues with the Albanian system for the elimination of trafficking or its systems to deal with corruption and as such arguments as to why the guidance in TD &AD were wrong and hence gave little weight to them.
30. It is clear that the judge does not need to address every piece of evidence before her or, indeed, every argument raised by counsel and paragraphs (i) and (iv) of paragraph 17 of the grounds relating to the generalised risk of re-trafficking rather than the position in Albania. Accordingly, the judge was legitimately take the view these do not add anything of substance to specific country guidance included in TD & AD. Paragraphs (ii) relating to the reach of the traffickers, the reference is made in the grounds to footnote 2 of page 6 of the ASA which is a hyperlink to various newspaper reports. This Tribunal in the Secretary of State v Harsh Lata [2023] UKUT 00163 has made it clear that it is not for a first-tier judge to “trawl through papers to identify which what issues are to be addressed”. If this evidence was material to the appellant’s case it should have been clearly put rather than rely on a hyperlink in a footnote and the judge’s failure to consider this evidence cannot result in an error of law on her part. Paragraph (iii) relating to the police being in collusion with the traffickers is essentially part of the second ground of appeal and was rejected by the judge on grounds of relevance or credibility. Paragraph (v) relating to the challenges of finding employment in Albania, the judge was legitimately able to conclude that, notwithstanding those challenges, the fact that the appellant had previously been in employment and that she was highly educated meant that employment as a factor was not one which materially increased the risk of persecution or diminished the sufficiency of protection on return to her home country. Again, just because the judge did not specifically refer to evidence given by the appellant on this issue did not mean it was not properly considered and there were rational grounds for the judge to conclude as she did.
31. The second ground is that the judge failed to take into account evidence that the trafficking gang would be able to find the appellant on return given the prominent reach of the gang and the evidence in other cases and international reports given the small size of Albania and the fact that victims of trafficking are capable of being located.
32. The judge’s concluded that there was no evidence, other than the appellant ‘s assertion, that the traffickers would be able to locate her and did not consider it a real risk. The judge stated that she had not been trafficked into the UK by the gang and had not been contacted by them following her arrival in the UK. Additionally, whilst the traffickers had approached the appellant’s mother this was once only in April 2023 and no subsequent attempt at contact had been made. Further the judge rejected the appellant’s evidence of collusion between the police and the traffickers on the basis of her asylum interview that she was constantly moved from place to place by the traffickers to avoid detection by the police. The judge concluded that notwithstanding the geographical reach of the traffickers that the appellant would be able to take advantage of the protection of the Albanian state.
33. Ms Elahi’s submits that because the judge was not asked to assess the appellant’s credibility in relation to the core aspects of her protection claim, that she should take her evidence of the risk of her traffickers locating her at face value. That does not follow, the judge was clearly able to take her own view on the appellant ‘s evidence so far as whether there was sufficiency of protection.
34. Ms Elahi referred to paragraph 20 of the grounds in further support of evidence that the judge did not properly take account of in coming to her decision. Paragraph (i) is a repetition of part of the first ground which I have already dealt with. Paragraphs (ii) and (iv) are evidence that, given the size of Albania, it makes it possible for traffickers to track down victims on return but in neither case does it relate that evidence to the country guidance in TD & AD or the judge’s findings that the traffickers had shown no real attempt in discovering the whereabouts of the victim. Ms Elahi suggested that the judge overlooked AM and BM as authority for proposition that internal relocation is unlikely to be effective for victim of trafficking but, given the judge’s conclusions on the sufficiency of state protection, relocation became unnecessary.
35. The judge was able to legitimately conclude on the basis the evidence before her that the risk of the traffickers locating the appellant was not a real risk and I find no error of law.

Notice of Decision
For the reasons set out above, I find there are no errors of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and I decline to set the decision aside

Mark Stamp

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 August 2026