Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001897
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60811/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4 September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

G I
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Murphy, instructed by MBM Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 August 2026

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of Uganda born in 1978. He appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Alis (the judge) dated 27 January 2026 dismissing his appeal against the refusal of his protection claim on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
2. The appellant entered the UK on a Tier 5 charity visa on 13 March 2020. He claimed asylum on 8 March 2021 and his application was refused on 12 April 2024. The respondent did not accept the appellant would be at risk on return to Uganda because of his imputed political opinion, namely his support of the National Unity Platform (NUP) and opposition to the ruling regime.

The judge’s decision
3. The paragraphs in the judge’s decision are incorrectly numbered from [36] onwards. After the subheading “FINDINGS” the numbering re-starts at [26]. References to paragraph numbers below are from the paragraphs after “FINDINGS” and correspond to those in the decision.
4. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal (FTT), the respondent accepted that if the appellant’s account was credible he would be at risk on return. The judge accepted the appellant’s account that he had participated in political activities during the 2011 elections, including acting as a polling agent for an opposition presidential candidate and that he was abducted by security operatives, detained for several days, and subjected to serious physical torture, including the removal of fingernails and assaults to intimate parts of his body. The appellant was released without charge and warned as to his future conduct, after which he sought to keep a low political profile.
5. The appellant stated that between 2018 and 2020, he trained security personnel for the opposition movement known initially as People Power, later the NUP. The appellant accepted in his oral evidence that he experienced no further problems whilst in Uganda and the judge concluded that there was no evidence his activities between 2018 and 2020 came to the attention of the authorities. The judge found the appellant was of no interest to the authorities prior to coming to the UK.
6. It is the appellant’s case that, following his departure from Uganda and the elections in 2021, the authorities began to take active steps against him through his family. He claimed that security operatives attended his home, detained and interrogated his wife in 2021, and accused him of financing opposition activity from abroad and of training youths to destabilise the state. His wife continued to receive threats and his family were under surveillance.
7. The judge did not find the appellant’s account of the events summarised at [6] above to be credible for the following reasons. The appellant failed to establish a link between his alleged activities in the UK and what happened to his family in Uganda. The appellant failed to provide evidence of the two phone calls he claimed to have received in the UK, one seeking money and one inviting him to play a leading role in the party. There was no statement or email from the appellant’s wife and reliance for what happened to her was based on third party evidence: an email from the appellant’s sister-in-law and the witness, Ms Merry. At [34], the judge concluded:
“I accept the evidence of Ms Merry to the extent that I accept this is what she was told. Whether the events happened for the reason claimed is a matter for me to decide after considering the totality of the evidence. Ms Merry described in her oral and written evidence that she was told about the Appellant’s wife being detained because he had been involved in training NUP personnel. She also stated that the Appellant’s children had left home to live with their grandmother for safety reasons. She did not give evidence that she had any personal knowledge of what may have happened but simply reported what she had been told. As I said above that is different to personally witnessing what happened.”
8. The judge made the following relevant findings:
“36. I was provided with some documents to do with the Appellant’s sister but no documents to do with his wife. There was a letter from an advocate, but this did not relate to his wife. The fact the Appellant and his wife told Ms Merry about what had happened does not mean the events described took place. Ms Merry’s original letter (page 82 of the original bundle) referred to her (and her husband) discovering she had been detained. It was then, according to this document, that the Appellant shared his activities with Ms Merry. Her account of events was not based on what she learnt from the authorities but based on what she was told initially by the Appellant and later by his wife. Her understanding why the children were removed was again based on what she had been told rather than any independent source. I remind myself this is a witness who regularly travelled to Uganda. Other supporting letters in the supplemental bundle did not assist me in deciding whether the events took place as claimed. Letters dealing with the Appellant’s mental health issues made no reference to these events with only a brief reference to the Appellant’s wife.
37. I have to be satisfied to the lower standard of proof that the Appellant would be at risk were he to be returned. I do not find the evidence presented to me satisfied this low standard of proof. Whilst the Appellant maintained his wife’s issues related to his activities I am not satisfied that this has been demonstrated. I do not accept his arrest in 2011 would place him at risk now (15 years later) and I do not find his work in Uganda between 2012 and 2020 had brought him or his wife to the attention of the authorities. The Appellant’s wife may have been detained but the reason for that remained unclear. It may be linked to the sister, NF, (see page 8 of the supplemental bundle) although that seems unlikely given the claim was his wife was detained in 2021.
38. The failure to mention a visit on 3 January 2026 in his statement dated 15 January does raise concerns about the reliability of that evidence despite that account being confirmed by Ms Merry. As I stated before I accept Ms Merry is a truthful witness and gave evidence on what she was told as against what she actually knew.”

Grant of permission
9. Permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Canavan on 20 May 2026 for the following reasons:
“2. Although the grounds of appeal appear to have been prepared by a legal representative, they are not drafted in the way outlined in Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal, Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150. The grounds make generalised submissions as to why more weight should have been placed on the evidence given by a third party witness who had spoken to the appellant’s wife in person about the fact of her detention and ongoing problems.
3. Many of the judge’s findings were likely to be open to him to make on the evidence. The appellant relied heavily on problems experienced by his wife in Uganda since he came to the UK. It was open to the judge to note that there was no witness statement from the appellant’s wife even though it would be reasonable to expect one to be prepared. Neither the appellant’s own statement or that of Ms Merry set out any meaningful detail about the incidents. Beyond stating that his wife was detained and questioned in January 2021, there is no information as to where she was taken, by whom, for how long, what happened when she was detained, or how she came to be released. Nor was there any detail as to when any further incidents of questioning took place.
4. Nevertheless, it is just arguable that, having accepted that Ms Merry was an honest witness who said that she met the appellant’s wife in Uganda on several occasions, and as recently as 2025, her evidence was supportive of the appellant’s account. It seems to be an arguable Robinson obvious point that the judge also failed to consider the credibility of this aspect of the account in light of the background evidence relating to Uganda. I note that the incidents described in January 2021 and January 2026 both coincided with elections in Uganda. Given that the background evidence indicates that political violence and intimidation is a feature of recent elections this was material to an assessment of the credibility of this aspect of the account.
5. Although the judge framed his conclusion as one relating to the credibility of the account [39] (sic). In fact, it seems to have proceeded on the basis that the appellant’s wife might have been detained [37]. His conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to show why she was detained might well be found to be sustainable on closer consideration of the case, given the notable absence of evidence from the appellant’s wife, but the grounds merit more detailed consideration at a hearing.”

Conclusions and reasons
10. In her letter of 5 September 2024, Ms Merry stated:
“We were aware that the presidential elections were due in 2021 and decided to not plan a trip to Uganda as expected due to the volatility of the country. [The appellant] was in daily contact with his wife and children when unexpectedly he could not reach her on the 9th January 2021. He expressed his concern to me as this was very unusual. As the situation unfolded and we discovered that his wife had been detained he shared his involvement with training the personnel of the People Party, a political party that opposed the party in power led by President Museveni. I had previously known that he had served in the army in Iraq. His wife has been repeatedly questioned by the police as they believe that he is funding political activity in Uganda. Sadly, this could not have been even possible as he has only ever had expences (sic) to cover his food and travel in the UK. I understand that such is the pressure from the police that his children have had to be removed to stay with their grandma since their mother did not wish for them to be living in fear in their family home. Not only this but she is unable to get work in a school now as her husband is under investigation.”
11. In her statement dated 16 January 2026, Ms Merry stated:
“In January 2021, [The appellant] became deeply concerned when he could not reach his wife on 9 January 2021, which was highly unusual. He later informed me that his wife had been detained by the authorities in Uganda. He explained that he, and she indirectly, had been involved in training personnel for the People’s Party, a political party opposed to the ruling government led by President Museveni.
…
I met and spoke with his wife again in April 2025 at their church in Kampala and she confirmed that the children could not live with her due to the constant threat from the police raiding their home.”
12. At [26] of the decision after the subheading “THE APPELLANT’S CASE” the judge summarised Ms Merry’s oral evidence:
“Ms Merry adopted her statement and confirmed she had no personal knowledge of the Appellant’s problems but had visited his wife in Uganda and spoken to her on a number of occasions. She confirmed that the Appellant’s wife had told her about the detention, visits and threats and she had real concerns about how the Appellant would be treated in Uganda.”
13. I am not persuaded by Mr Murphy’s submission that the judge failed to give anxious scrutiny to the appellant’s claim or to make a clear finding on whether the appellant’s wife was detained and for what reason. The evidence before the judge was insufficient to show that the appellant’s wife had been detained because there was no evidence from the appellant’s wife. The judge gave cogent reasons at [34] for why he attached little weight to Ms Merry’s evidence, notwithstanding he accepted her evidence. Ms Merry’s evidence was based solely on what she was told by the appellant and his wife and she had not witnessed the events she described. The judge stated at [38]: “As I stated before I accept Ms Merry is a truthful witness and gave evidence on what she was told as against what she actually knew.” It was open to the judge to attach less weight to her evidence for that reason.
14. The judge considered all the evidence before him and gave adequate reasons for why the appellant had not discharged the burden of proof to the lower standard. Contrary to Mr Murphy’s submission, the judge did state why he rejected the appellant’s and Ms Merry’s evidence of the reasons for the detention of the appellant’s wife at [37]. In summary, the appellant was of no interest to the authorities when he left Uganda in 2020 and there was insufficient evidence to establish a link between his activities in the UK and his wife’s arrest. There was no evidence, save the assertions by the appellant, of the phone calls he claimed to have received in the UK and no evidence that his activities in 2018 and 2020 had come to the attention of the authorities because there was no statement from the appellant’s wife as to the reasons for her detention. There was no link between his wife’s detention and the appellant’s activities in Uganda in 2018 to 2020 or his activities in the UK.
15. There was no explanation for the lack of evidence from the appellant’s wife. This is evidence which the appellant could reasonably have obtained. He was in contact with his wife and Ms Merry visited the appellant’s wife in 2025. The judge noted the appellant’s oral evidence at [20] (after the subheading “The Appellant’s Case”) and found that that the appellant’s credibility was further undermined by his failure to mention a visit by the authorities to his family in Uganda on 3 January 2026 in his statement of 15 January 2026.
16. The appellant’s grounds and submissions fail to have regard to the whole of the judge’s decision, in particular the oral evidence at [17] to [23] (after the subheading “The Appellant’s Case”). They disclose no material error of law.
17. Having considered Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2], the weight to be attached to the evidence is a matter for the judge and his findings were open to him on the evidence before him. The judge’s reasoning adequately explains why he dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The evidence was insufficient to establish, to the lower standard, that the appellant’s claim to be at risk on return to Uganda was credible.
18. I conclude there is no material error of law in the judge’s decision dated 27 January 2026 and I dismiss the appellant’s appeal.

Notice of Decision
Appeal dismissed
J Frances

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 August 2026