Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001901
First‑tier Tribunal No: PA/66090/2024
LP/02685/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

7th September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

HR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Bandegani, Counsel instructed by Luqmani Thompson
For the Respondent: Mr Tufan, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No‑one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt against the decision of First‑tier Tribunal Judge Mensah (“the judge”), dated 5 June 2025.
2. The appellant is a national of Iran. She arrived in the UK on 22 February 2023 on a visit visa.
3. On 5 May 2023, the appellant claimed asylum. It is her case that she was forced to marry as a child, and her husband had been physically abusive in the past. She says that her husband married a second wife without her agreement and wanted to bring that second wife to live in the family home with the appellant. The appellant says that she sought advice from a lawyer in Iran and she drafted, with the help of her two friends, a complaint about her husband’s behaviour and an objection to the second marriage. She claims that her plan was to visit her younger son in the United Kingdom and, on her return to Iran, to file the complaint. However, her friends decided to file the complaint while she was in the United Kingdom, and they were then arrested and held in detention. As a result, the appellant claims that she cannot return to Iran because she will be arrested for making the complaint.
4. In a decision dated 22 May 2024, the respondent refused the appellant’s protection on human rights claim.
The Appeal to the First‑tier Tribunal
5. The appellant appealed against the refusal of her protection and human rights claim and the appeal came before the judge on 12 May 2025. The appeal was heard in the virtual region. This means that it was heard remotely via Cloud Video Platform rather than in person face to face. The appellant was represented and gave oral evidence using a Farsi interpreter.
6. In a decision dated 5 June 2025, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal, having rejected her account.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, submitting that the judge made the following errors:
Ground 1: Errors in the credibility assessment.
(i) The judge erred by finding that the country background evidence undermined the appellant’s claim that she had prepared a complaint objecting to her husband’s second marriage.
(ii) The judge erred in her consideration of the appellant’s immigration history.
(iii) The judge erred by speculating that the appellant accessed medical treatment for free under the NHS.
Ground 2: The assessment of the appellant’s case was undermined by being conducted virtually.
Ground 3: The appellant’s previous solicitor failed to prepare to the extent that the appellant has not had a fair first hearing.
8. In a decision dated 20 March 2026, the First‑tier Tribunal refused permission to admit the application as it was out of time.
9. In a decision dated 21 May 2026, the Upper Tribunal granted permission to appeal. The Upper Tribunal was satisfied that the appeal to the First‑tier Tribunal had, in fact, been admitted in time. The Upper Tribunal granted permission on the following basis:
“The first ground of appeal which complains about the FTTJ’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility is arguable. Whilst credibility is a factual issue, it is arguable that the assessment included a mistake of fact as identified at (i) in the grounds and adopted an unfair procedure as identified at (ii) and (iii).
Grounds two and three relate largely to complaints that are made about how the appellant’s solicitor pursued the appeal. It is difficult to see how these grounds identify an arguable error of law in the FTTJ’s decision. However, I do not restrict the grounds of appeal as the grounds are ultimately linked in suggesting an unfair procedure.”
10. The respondent submitted a response under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 opposing the appellant’s appeal and the appellant submitted a reply under Rule 25 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
11. At the hearing I heard submissions from Mr A Bandegani on behalf of the appellant and Mr Tufan on behalf of the respondent.
Discussion
12. I am satisfied that the judge materially erred in law in her assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
13. In rejecting the appellant's account, the judge stated the following:
“Reading of the thrust of that evidence is to confirm that it is neither a crime or punishable for a man to take another wife in Iran and no court permission is required of the same. Certainly, the evidence does not say men are in fact facing any criminal or other barriers to such marriage and does not source any such action being taken. If such action was being taken, I would have expected that to have been showed by the country evidence. The appellant’s core claim makes little sense in the context of Iran and the country evidence. Whatever her views or objections, it appears she would not have been able to prevent the marriage and her complaint would have carried no weight given her position as a woman. This goes to the core of her claim and is a negative feature.”
14. I am satisfied that the judge’s summary does not accurately reflect the appellant’s case. It was not the appellant’s case that she could stop her husband’s second marriage nor that it was a criminal offence. It was her case that she was entitled to object to that second marriage, in particular because it was her husband’s intention to bring the second wife into the matrimonial home after their long marriage. It also is the appellant’s evidence that the complaint was prepared following legal advice.
15. The judge was entitled to consider the country background evidence and assess the appellant’s account in line with it, but I am satisfied that either the judge mischaracterised the substance of the appellant’s claim. The judge considered that this aspect went to the core of the appellant’s claim. Accordingly, I am satisfied that it was material to the judge’s assessment of the appellant's account.
16. I am also persuaded that the judge erred in her consideration of the appellant’s immigration history.
17. The judge addressed the appellant’s immigration history at [29] to [30] of the decision. The judge concluded at [50] that the evidence indicates that the appellant has sought to relocate to the United Kingdom to join her children and grandchildren here without going through and meeting the immigration rules.
18. The judge found at [29] that it was clear from that the appellant’s visa application form that the appellant had previously applied for a visit visa from Istanbul in 2019, which had been refused, and had applied again from Abu Dhabi, which had been granted. The judge therefore concluded that the appellant is someone who has been trying to gain entry to the United Kingdom for some three years before she entered. The judge noted that she points to no history of entry and exit from the United Kingdom, so the first time she actually entered the United Kingdom is on the first successful visit visa being issued. It states the appellant clearly stated the terms of the visa meant she entered the United Kingdom should be doing so with the stated intention to return.
19. At paragraph [30], the judge considered that the appellant had not given an accurate or honest account of her immigration history. The judge concluded that the fact she had been so well travelled and did not seek to remain in any of the other countries in which she spent time underpins or suggested a lack of any fears of her husband prior to the claimed interest in her or her friend’s lodged complaint.
20. Firstly, I am satisfied that the judge acted with procedural unfairness by not raising this to the appellant or her representatives prior to the hearing. This was not an issue taken by the respondent in the refusal letter.
21. Secondly, I am satisfied that the judge misunderstood the appellant’s claim. It is the appellant’s claim that it is only once she arrived in the UK that the risk arose.
22. I am therefore satisfied that the judge erred in that respect of her consideration of the appellant’s immigration history.
23. Finally, I am satisfied that the judge erred in speculating that the appellant had accessed medical treatment “for free under the NHS” in the UK.
24. At [32] the judge noted that the appellant disclosed various medical conditions in her screening interview for which she says she was seeing a doctor in Iran and in receipt of medication. The judge also noted that the appellant did not rely on the same for any claim before her. The judge recorded that she set this out because “sometimes individuals who claim asylum seek to try and create a second claim at some later stage based upon their medical condition/s and family connections” and noting that the appellant had the opportunity to raise such matters in this appeal and had chosen not to do so.
25. I am satisfied that the judge considered irrelevant matters and that this impacted on her assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
26. For the above reasons, I am satisfied that the judge erred in her assessment of the appellant’s credibility and that the decision must be set aside in its entirety. Accordingly, I don’t go on to consider grounds 2 and 3.
27. I am satisfied that no findings of fact can be preserved and that it should be remitted to the First tier Tribunal because credibility is in issue and significant findings of fact will be re-made.
Notice of Decision
28. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains material errors of law. Accordingly, it is set aside in its entirety with no findings of fact preserved.
29. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing to be heard by a different judge.

G. Loughran

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 September 2026