Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2026-001925
(PA/66537/2023)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 25 June 2026 On 18 August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANBURY

Between

ZM
(anonymity direction MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Janjua of counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Leqointe, a Home Office Presenting Officer (HOPO)

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is the appellant’s appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Nixon (she) (the judge) to dismiss the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal (FTT). The judge refused the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his asylum, protection and/or human rights claim.
2. The appellant was given permission to appeal by Judge of First-tier Tribunal Khan on 17th April 2026 who found there had been an absence of consideration of all the evidence presented to the FTT.
Background
3. The appellant, a citizen of Pakistan, applied for asylum/international protection on 7th January 2022. The basis of the appellant’s claim was that he was an evangelical Christian who would be targeted for blasphemy if he returned to Pakistan.
4. This was refused by the respondent on 11th December 2023, who considered that there was sufficiency of protection and internal relocation would be available to the appellant. The respondent carried out a review of the case on 17th October 2024 but expressed the view that the appeal could proceed on the evidence already submitted. Details of the claim and the respondent’s consideration of it appear in the decision at paragraphs 1-7. The judge noted that the CPIN on Pakistan and Christians, dated April 2024, highlighted that they were unlikely to face persecution. She also had regard to the Upper Tribunal’s decision in AK and SK (Christians: risk) Pakistan CG [2014] UKUT 00569 (IAC). She concluded, having reviewed the evidence, that the first information reports (FIRs) that had been provided as part of the appellant’s case were evidence to which little weight should attach. As to private life, the judge was satisfied that the criteria for interfering with the respondent’s decision, based on private life, was not met as there were no significant obstacles to reintegration into the appellant’s own country. The appeal was therefore dismissed.
The hearing
5. The following documents were provided to the UTIAC in advance of the hearing:
(i) A composite bundle containing 1029 pages;
(ii) A skeleton argument on behalf of the appellant.
6. At the hearing I heard the following submissions on behalf of the appellant:
(i) Mr Janjua said there had been a failure to consider the evidence in the round. The judge omitted reference to large parts of the evidence, which was to the effect that Christians are prevented from exercising their faith yet alone proselytising in Pakistan. The judge had ignored numerous Facebook pages as well. If this evidence were considered, the appellant would have been found to be at risk on return;
(ii) He described the decision of the judge as being supported by inaccurate or incomplete findings. Paragraphs 19 to 20 of the judge’s decision had specifically mentioned that as a Christian the appellant alleged he would face persecution. The appellant had provided full documentary evidence to support his case. They included the document at page 904, which suggests that the appellant was subject to legal proceedings in Pakistan. Mr Janjua said this and other documents were not covered by the judge in her decision. He said there was a clear risk that his client would be persecuted if he returned to Pakistan, and it was not clear to him or his client how the judge could take the matters covered in those documents into account if she had not referred to them;
(iii) The judge was said to have failed to refer specifically to the cases of HJ (Iran) and WA (Pakistan). The appellant pointed out that he was an evangelist Christian, believing in the teachings of Jesus. He would be unable to follow those teachings and openly observe his religion in Pakistan;
(iv) Mr Janjua made a number of references to the interview. For example, he referred to question 22 of the interview at page 952 of the composite bundle. He felt that his life was in danger and he was aware of at least two police complaints having been filed;
(v) It was suggested that the interpreter had misinterpreted some of the evidence. I understand the point to be that the appellant spoke adequate English and was able to interrupt the interpreter during interview to point out that there were some interpretive disagreements. Mr Janjua suggested that this may have led to some questions not being adequately resolved by the judge which may have been wrongly thought to be credibility issues;
(vi) Mr Janjua mentioned a number of specific documents which, he said, supported the appellant’s sur place activities. He specifically mentioned those documents that might have an effect on his future risk on return.
7. On behalf of the respondent, it was submitted that:
(i) The case had been subject to careful review and that the original decision had been a sound one;
(ii) Given that the appellant’s credibility had been referred to in in the refusal letter and rejected it was not incumbent upon the judge to itemise each and every document or matter which damaged the appellant’s credibility. In the light of his adverse credibility finding, the judge did not have to deal with all the religious activities alleged;
(iii) There was no need for the judge to specifically refer to individual documents. The respondent had carried out a detailed review which had been cited to the judge. This made specific reference to a number of the documents which the appellant criticised the judge for not taking into account;
(iv) The judge could be assumed to have understood the evidence and not to have misrepresented or misunderstood the evidence or the law. The fact that she had not referred to HJ (Iran) or WA (Pakistan) was not material as he had plainly engaged with the substance of those decisions;
(v) Ms Leqointe referred to the well-known case of Volpi [2022] EWCA 464, in which the Court of Appeal repeated the well-established principles on which an appeal court or tribunal will interfere with the decision of the court or tribunal below. At paragraph 2 the court said:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
(vi) An appeal court was not required to agree with the decision of the FTT nor was it required to itemise everything that was before the judge and confirm it had been taken into account. In reference to the case of Volpi, there had to be compelling reasons for interfering with the decision. No such compelling reasons existed here.
8. Mr Jenjua responded to the respondent’s submissions by repeating his submission that there was an error of law. He said that there was a failure to consider the evidence in the round and a failure to pay sufficient attention to the case law as well as the evidence, including that which I have summarised above.
9. I gave the decision at the conclusion of the hearing.
The issues
10. The principal issue here is whether the appellant’s case, that he was not allowed to practice his religion in Pakistan, was fully considered by the judge in her decision. In considering that question, it is necessary to ask:
(i) Whether the judge adequately applied HJ (Iran) and WA (Pakistan), which involved considering the extent to which the appellant would be able to practice his faith freely and openly or whether he would be unable to do so through fear of persecution from the authorities if he returned to Pakistan?
(ii) Whether the judge had dealt with the entirety of the evidence, including the suggestion that the appellant had been proselytising in the UK and, if not, whether the tribunal may have come to a different conclusion if these sur place activities were more fully considered?
(iii) Whether the interpreter had misinterpreted some of the evidence causing procedural fairness?
Conclusions
11. I have considered carefully the evidence that was before the judge. The judge rejected the appellant’s credibility and the analysis of the evidence and conclusions has to be seen against that background.
12. I am satisfied, having considered paragraph 9 of the judge’s decision onwards, that the judge applied the correct legal test to the evidence before her. Having summarised the law, she asked: whether the appellant would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return, whether there would be an adequacy of protection, or whether it would be possible for the appellant to internally relocate.
13. The judge went on later to analyse succinctly why she rejected the case. In her findings at paragraph 18 she said, "I have taken into account all of the documents before me in the appellant’s bundle and the documents on behalf of the respondent in completing the review." She reminded herself of the burden of proof and found that there was no reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant would ne persecuted or a real risk of suffering serious harm. She paid careful regard to the CPIN, objective evidence, because given that the appellant’s account had been questioned, objective evidence might be particularly important.
14. I am satisfied the judge was aware of the relevant law, even though she did not expressly refer to HJ (Iran) and WA (Pakistan). I am satisfied that she was aware of those cases and she took them into account when considering the case.
15. As far as the other criticisms of the judge are concerned, she did take account of the appellant’s evidence that he had carried on activities in the UK which might bring him to the attention of the authorities at paragraph 20 and following. It is true that she did not make mention of the Facebook page entries, of which there were a large number. She was not satisfied, however, that the activities in the UK would cause the problems on return.
16. The appellant had stated that there was not an equivalent to street evangelism in Pakistan as in the UK. It is unlikely, therefore, she considered, that he would engage in such activities or come to the attention of the authorities. She accepted the evidence of the appellant in relation to his Christianity as such, and that of Pastor Chughtai, and that the appellant had been on the streets of Walsall with his church group, calling himself an evangelist. However, his role was regarded by the judge in paragraph 20 as handing out leaflets, reciting a memorised script and so forth. She did consider there was a degree of embellishment in the appellant’s account. She specifically referred to the case of RT (Zimbabwe) and ors v SSHD [2012] UKSC 38 in which it was decided that an appellant is not expected to hide his evangelist Christian beliefs. However, the judge concluded that the appellant would be able to continue to preach evangelist Christianity without issue if he returned to Pakistan.
17. As far as the possible interpretative errors are concerned, if there were any queries about the way the case had been interpreted during the evidence, I was surprised that they were not referred to the judge for consideration or the tape listened to identify the passages concerned. I understand the point to be made that the appellant spoke adequate English and was able to interrupt the interpreter during interview to point out that there were some interpretive disagreements. I do not understand any interpretative question to affect the judge's assessment of the facts. In my view the judge fully considered all relevant matters before her as they were put. Having rejected the credibility of the appellant’s account and said that he had not mentioned his claim at the first opportunity, she was persuaded by the objective evidence that it was sufficiently safe for the appellant to be returned to Pakistan.
18. As far as the documentary evidence is concerned, there was reference to a number of documents, including page 904 in the composite bundle, which consists of an alleged update on legal proceedings against the appellant from Zahid Nazir, Advocate High Court, at Nazir Law Associates, dated 21 July 2025. This suggests that the appellant’s case remains active and that the police have asked that he attends for interview. There were a number of other documents which Mr Janjua referred to, which he says were not covered by the judge in her decision. However, it was not clear to the judge, and it is not clear to me, why the FIRs should necessarily be considered reliable. I take on board that the lack of paper FIRs, for example, would not necessarily be a good reason for rejecting them. However, the judge specifically referred to Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UIIAT 00439, which said that the matter of weight to attach to documentary evidence is a matter for the court or tribunal considering that evidence. Here, I have concluded that the judge was entitled to give little weight to the documents which her attention was drawn. She was entitled to conclude that other documents were not central to the appellant’s case.
19. Therefore, my conclusion overall is that the judge was entitled to reject the appellant’s case. Although she can be criticised for not mentioning some documents and mentioning others, and she can be criticised for not mentioning the cases of HJ (Iran) and WA (Pakistan), I am not persuaded that those were sufficiently material errors for me to decide that that was an error of law which the Upper Tribunal should interfere with.
Decision
The appeal against the FTT’s decision is dismissed.

Signed Dated 31st July 2026.

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Hanbury