Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001929
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/68352/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

3rd September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PAUL LEWIS

Between

MA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:

For the Appellant: No appearance
For the Respondent: Mr. Tan Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 24 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Order Regarding Anonymity

Anonymity was ordered by the Upper Tribunal. No application to discharge was made. It remains in force in the terms below.

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Background and matters in issue
1. The appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, entered the UK in 2022 on a student visa. In 2023 he claimed asylum based on his political opinion. He appellant said he was a member of the Islami Chhatra Shabir [the ‘ICS’] and at risk of persecution from an opposing political faction, the Awami League, who were part of the Bangladeshi government at the time the appellant made his asylum claim. Although there has been a change in government in Bangladesh, removing or diminishing the role of the Awami Leage, the appellant maintains he is a risk of harm if returned to Bangladesh.
2. The appellant’s claim was refused by the respondent in March 2024. His appeal against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal Judge [the ‘judge’] was also refused in a decision promulgated on 12th February 2026.
3. Permission to appeal against the judge’s decision was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Aldridge on 17th April 2026 on three grounds, below.
The hearing
4. The appellant did not attend the hearing. We were satisfied, pursuant to Rule 36 The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 [the ‘Rules’], that the appellant had been properly notified of the hearing. A previous listing of this matter had been adjourned because of the appellant’s ill-health. We were satisfied that the appellant had not contacted the Tribunal to indicate any reason for his absence now.
5. Applying Rule 38, we were satisfied that it was in the interests of justice to proceed. We reminded ourselves of the Overriding Objective including the need to avoid delay.
6. We considered the appellant’s grounds of appeal. The respondent, who had not filed a Rule 24 response, provided focussed oral submissions after which we dismissed the appeal. These are our reasons.
The Grounds
Assessment of documentation
7. The appellant relied on a document purporting to be an arrest warrant. At ground (1), it is submitted the judge reversed the burden of proof, requiring the appellant to prove the ‘genuineness’ of the warrant. The judge’s reasons are criticised as effectively requiring corroboration or formal identification of the warrant.
8. At [18], the judge found that the appellant had not discharged the burden upon him to ‘prove that this warrant is genuine’. The judge’s findings were based on the text of the warrant and a lack of provenance as to how the appellant obtained it.
9. Mr Tan reminds us that the respondent did not allege the warrant was fabricated, simply that it was for the appellant to establish the documents he produced were reliable. The judge did no more than apply the principles deriving from the decision in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 at [38].
10. At [21] the Judge took proper account of the objective evidence. The respondent’s review referred the judge to Country Information Note: Bangladesh Documentation (November 2024) – [the ‘CPIN’] including that ‘document fraud is endemic in Bangladesh and that careful consideration should be given to all documents provided.’
11. Whilst is it unfortunate that the judge used the word genuine, rather than reliable we are satisfied with reference to the issues in the case and the judge’s assessment as a whole, that he did not reverse the burden on the appellant. He simply undertook an appropriate assessment of the evidence. There is no merit to this ground.
Speculative reasoning
12. At ground (2) it is submitted that the judge’s reasoning was inadequate in three ways:
(i) The judge gave weight to the significant delay between the appellant joining ICS in 2014 and the first reported problems giving rise to his asylum claim in 2023. It is submitted that the judge fell in error by so doing: There was no proper reason why escalation or targeting could not have been delayed.
(ii) The judge placed too great a weight on minor discrepancies in the appellant’s account.
(iii) Judge’s conclusion(s) that the appellant could have applied to withdraw the arrest warrant was conjectural.
13. Mr Tan submits the judge’s decision, when taken as a whole, is properly reasoned. At [15] the appellant was not clear as to who he feared; at [16] the judge made appropriate findings about the absence of threat for a prolonged period and what might now have triggered interest in the appellant; at [17] the judge took account of inconsistencies as to dates in the appellant’s account.
14. These issues whether minor or otherwise were all matters the judge was entitled to consider and did so. The judge did not give inappropriate weight to the nine year delay: he simply took this into account alongside the other evidence before him.
15. The appellant’s skeleton argument does not identify specific to passages in the judge’s determination. We have considered the judge’s reasoning as a whole. The decision is brief but adequate. We agree with Mr. Tan: The judge properly considered the appellant’s and objective evidence in the round.
16. Similarly, the judge was referred to the CPIN and the background evidence referring to the ability to apply to withdraw warrants.
Risk on return
17. At ground (3) it is summitted that the judge failed to properly assess whether the appellant was at risk on return from the Awami League even though the Awami league were not in government. It is submitted that the judge impermissibly conflated credibility findings with an objective assessment of risk.
18. There is no error of law. At [19] the judge expressly refers to ‘objective’ or background evidence. This included House of Commons Briefing papers as to the political situation in Bangladesh provided by the respondent.
19. The judge considered the submission that the appellant may nonetheless be at risk and rejected it as having ‘no evidential basis’. The appellant’s skeleton argument and our analysis of the evidence does not identify the evidential basis upon which the judge might have reached an alternative finding. There is no error of law.

Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the Judge does not contain an error of law. The appeal is dismissed.

Paul Lewis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28th August 2026