Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001946
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/02053/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

EUGERT PULAJ
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Fripp, instructed by M. Reale Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Albania born on 7 June 1989. He appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Abdar (the judge) dated 15 January 2026 dismissing his appeal against deportation and the refusal of his human rights claim.
2. The appellant entered the UK illegally from Ireland in 2019. On 26 April 2024, the appellant was convicted of possession with intent to supply class A drugs. On 11 June 2024, he was sentenced to 28 months’ imprisonment. On 16 October 2024, the respondent refused the appellant’s human rights claim and made a deportation order.
3. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal (FTT), the judge found that the appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with Ms P Sarmiento (PS), a Romanian national with settled status in the UK, which was formed when the appellant had no leave to remain. PS has a daughter (CS) who also gave evidence before the FTT. The judge found PS and CS to be credible witnesses and accepted their evidence.
4. The judge found that the appellant is supportive of PS and assists her to cope with her diagnoses of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and mixed anxiety and depressive disorder. The judge found that the appellant and PS have a close relationship and his deportation would interfere with their family life at [24].
5. The judge then went on to consider the public interest at [25] to [33] and attached significant weight to it given the appellant’s immigration history, the index offence and the second offence committed whilst the appellant was on licence.
6. In considering the exceptions to deportation, the judge made the following findings:
“36. I find that the Appellant will face difficulties on return to Albania, particularly due to the Appellant’s medical condition. However, the Appellant was first diagnosed in 2007 in Albania and I do not have evidence before me to find that the Appellant will not have access to treatment for the condition in Albania.
37. The Appellant’s family have migrated to Italy and the Appellant confirmed in oral evidence that the Appellant’s family home remains in Albania and I have no reason to find that the Appellant will not have access to that home on return. In these circumstances, I find that Ms P Sarmiento has the option and choice of accompanying the Appellant to Albania where they will be able to support each other, as is the position in the UK. I also do not have any evidence of Ms P Sarmiento’s common prescription medication not being available in Albania.
38. Similarly, Ms C Sarmiento, would also be able to visit the Appellant and Ms P Sarmiento in Albania and maintain contact whilst apart, as is the position between Ms P Sarmiento and her eldest daughter, Karen, who is settled in Switzerland with her partner.
39. There is no doubt in my mind that exercising such an option is not the preferred choice and it will not be without difficulties. However, on the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that it would be unduly harsh.
40. The alternative is for Ms P Sarmiento to remain in the UK subsequent to the Appellant’s removal and continue their relationship with modern means of communication and with Ms P Sarmiento visiting the Appellant in Albania. Again, I accept that it is not desired option for the Appellant or Ms P Sarmiento. However, in my view, it is not unduly harsh in all of the circumstances.
41. Therefore, the Appellant does not satisfy Exception 2 under s.117C(5) of the NIAA 2002. The final consideration is under s.117C(6) of NIAA 2002 and Mr Fripp contended that the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test is also met without any further particularisation.
42. In consideration of all the factors discussed above and including the applicable factors detailed at §51 to §59 of HA (Iraq), and the respective weight to be attached to each into consideration, on balance, I do not find there to be any ‘very compelling circumstances’ to outweigh the public interest in the Appellant’s deportation. Accordingly, the appeal falls to be dismissed on the Article 8 ECHR ground of appeal.”
Grounds
7. The appellant appealed on the grounds that the unduly harsh test was potentially met on the evidence before the judge and he failed to give adequate reasons to demonstrate why it was not. The judge accepted the evidence from PS and CS that the emotional support provided to PS by the appellant was substantial and irreplaceable. Secondly, the judge failed to consider the low risk of reoffending when assessing whether there were very compelling circumstances capable of outweighing the public interest.
8. Permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Blum on 19 May 2026 on the grounds that:
“There is an arguable dearth of adequate reasoning in the judge’s conclusion at [40] that it would not be unduly harsh on the appellant’s partner for her to remain in the UK, or for her to relocate to Albania with the appellant [39]. Whilst the judge was aware of the partner’s diagnosis [23], and whilst the extracts of the partner’s evidence upon which the grounds rely ([3] of the grounds) may ultimately prove to be incapable of supporting a finding of undue harshness on the particular facts, at this stage I am just persuaded that the judge arguably needed to do more by way of reasoning and active engagement with the evidence.”
Submissions
9. Mr Fripp submitted the judge accepted the appellant was in a genuine and subsisting relationship with PS but failed to address the detailed evidence of PS’s vulnerability and her dependence on the appellant. The judge’s reliance on modern means of communication did not address these concerns when considering whether it would be unduly harsh for PS to remain in the UK without the appellant. The judge accepted the close relationship in respect of his finding on family life, but he did not adequately address this issue when considering the statutory test. The judge failed to adequately deal with PS’s vulnerability and her settled status in the UK.
10. Mr Fripp submitted that, on the facts, the appellant’s deportation would be unduly harsh given the vulnerabilities of the appellant and PS, their mutual dependence and the inadequacy of modern means of communication. The judge mentioned the OASys report but did not consider the low risk of re-offending in his analysis of the appellant’s case. Having accepted PS’s vulnerabilities and dependence the judge failed to explain why the appellant’s deportation is not unduly harsh.
11. Mr Nappey relied on the rule 24 response and submitted that ground 1 was a disagreement with the judge’s findings and an attempt to re-argue the appeal. The judge considered all relevant factors including mutual dependence and the appellant’s support of PS. The judge’s finding that it would not be unduly harsh for PS to go to Albania with the appellant was open to the judge on the evidence before him.
12. Mr Nappey submitted that the judge’s reasons at [40] were short but were not material given his clear and sufficient reasons from [34] to [39] that the unduly harsh test was not met. The judge considered the nature of the relationship and took into account PS’s vulnerability and medical history at [21] to [24]. He took into account all relevant evidence and gave adequate reasons for why the appellant’s deportation is not unduly harsh.
13. Mr Nappey submitted that it was apparent the judge considered the OASys report in coming to his conclusion at [42] because he had regard to all relevant factors in accordance with HA (Iraq). The judge did engage with the core of the appellant’s claim. The low risk of re-offending was not a weighty factor in the proportionality exercise and was not material to the demanding test in section 117(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (NIA Act 2002). There was no material error of law in the judge’s decision.
14. In response, Mr Fripp submitted that the judge had not demonstrated he had taken into account relevant matters and that they formed part of his analysis, notwithstanding any reference to them elsewhere in the decision. This is a section 117C(3) case and the judge had to demonstrate he had considered all matters collectively in his analysis of very compelling circumstances.
Conclusions and reasons
15. It is accepted the appellant is a foreign criminal and a medium offender for the purposes of section 117C of the NIA Act 2002. The appellant did not challenge the judge’s findings on the weight to be attached to the public interest at [25] to [33] and Mr Fripp accepted that the judge clearly knew the appropriate test and applied it. Mr Fripp submitted the judge did not adequately address the detailed evidence of PS’s vulnerability and dependence on the appellant and he failed to factor into his analysis the close physical and emotional support the appellant provides to PS.
16. It is apparent from reading the decision as a whole that the judge took the appellant’s case at its highest and found that he provided significant support to PS. The judge took into account the appellant’s medical condition and PS’s diagnosis of ADHD, anxiety and depression. I am not persuaded that he is required to repeat his findings at [21] to [24] in his analysis at [36] to [42]. It is apparent from those paragraphs that the judge considered the matters relied on in [3] of the grounds. The judge considered the appellant’s and PS’s mutual dependence in finding that they could continue to support each other in Albania at [39]. The appellant and PS could continue their family life in Albania and the judge’s finding that it would not be unduly harsh for them to do so was open to him on the evidence before him.
17. The judge’s reasons at [40] are brief, but any lack of reasoning is not material given the judge adequately explained why it would not be unduly harsh for the appellant and PS to continue their family life in Albania and, on the particular facts of this case set out in the witness statements of the appellant, PS and CS, it would not be unduly harsh for them to do so.
18. I acknowledge that reasons for a decision will always be capable of having been better expressed and I should not subject the judge’s decision to a narrow textual analysis: Volpi and Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464. I am of the view the judge could have expressed himself better, but that in itself does not give rise to an error of law.
19. The judge considered the OASys report and referred to it in his findings on the weight to be attached to the public interest. Any failure to refer to the low risk of re-offending in his assessment of very compelling circumstances did not mean the judge had not taken it into account. In any event, the failure to specifically mention it at [42] did not give rise to a material error of law because, on the facts of this case, it is not a factor capable of tipping the balance in the appellant’s favour and outweighing the significant weight to be attached to the public interest.
20. I conclude that there was no material error of law in the judge’s decision dated 15 January 2026 and I dismiss the appellant’s appeal.
Notice of Decision
Appeal dismissed

J Frances
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
7 August 2026