The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001959
UI-2026-001960

First-tier Tribunal No: EA/02606/2024
HU/00037/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3 November 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McWILLIAM

Between

ADRIAN PAWEL BILASZEWSKI
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms C Warren, Counsel, instructed by TMC solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting officer

Heard at Field House on 22 September 2026


DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Poland. He appealed against a stage one deportation decision dated 2 September 2024 and a stage 2 deportation decision incorporating the refusal of a human rights claim dated 27 November 2024. He was granted permission to appeal by the UT (Judge Neville) against the decision of the FTT to dismiss his appeal under Article 8 ECHR. The FTT found that the appellant was a “persistent offender” and that any interference with his rights under Article 8 was proportionate when weighed against the public interest in deportation.
2. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in 2006, aged 18. He returned to Poland in 2008. He came back to the UK in 2010. He has lived in the United Kingdom ever since. His father and siblings also reside in the United Kingdom. The appellant lived in Aylesbury and in due course started his own construction business. In 2012, he met his partner, K, and the couple had a child, A, born in 2020. K has resided in the United Kingdom since the age of 10 and has settled status. The appellant was granted settled status on 3 February 2021. K and A are Polish citizens.
3. On 6 January 2024 the appellant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of three driving offences: using a vehicle while uninsured, dangerous driving and driving while disqualified. A custodial sentence of 33 weeks and a consecutive sentence of 7 weeks were imposed, but both sentences were suspended for 18 months. He was disqualified from driving for two years. During the period of the suspension, the appellant reoffended and, on 6 May 2024, he was convicted at Buckinghamshire Magistrates’ Court of the same three offences. On 9 August 2024 the appellant was sentenced at Reading Crown Court for the further offences and the suspended sentence imposed in January 2024 was activated. A total sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment was imposed, which the appellant has served. A total disqualification from driving period of 36 months was imposed. The appellant will need to pass an extended driving test.
The decision of the FTT
4. The first issue for the judge was whether the appellant is a persistent offender. It was the respondent’s case that the appellant met the definition of “persistent offender” so as to fall within the definition of “foreign criminal” in s.117D(2) of the 2002 Act. The appellant's case was that he is not a persistent offender with reference to Chege (“is a persistent offender”) [2016] UKUT 2 and SC (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2018] EWCA.
5. The judge stated as follows:
“27. In Chege the Upper Tribunal was essentially concerned with the question of whether the status of persistent offender, once gained, could be lost. However, it also gave general guidance on the meaning of the term ‘persistent offender’, which is not defined in the 2002 Act. The following general guidance, as subsequently approved by the Court of Appeal in SC (Zimbabwe) at [25], can be derived from the case:
(i) The question of whether a person is a persistent offender is a question of mixed fact and law and falls to be determined as at the date of hearing [11]:
(ii) Persistence requires by its very nature some continuation in the behaviour concerned, although it need not be continuous or even regular [51];
(iii) A persistent offender is someone who keeps on breaking the law, and that status might endure even if he does has not offended for some time [53];
(iv) The question of whether someone fits the description of persistent offender will depend on the overall picture and pattern of his offending and each case will turn on its own facts [53];
(v) Repetition of itself is not enough to show persistence and there must be a history of repeated criminal conduct carried out over a sufficiently long period to indicate that the person is someone who keeps on re-offending [54];
(vi) Persistence may be shown by the fact the person keeps committing the same type of offence, but it may equally be shown by the fact he has committed a wide variety of offences [54].
28. The following passage was also approved by the Court of Appeal and is, I believe, also helpful for the purposes of this appeal:
“55. We agree with Judge Whalan that it is unnecessary that the offences be committed within what Mr Mackenzie described as “a reasonably short” space of time. Indeed, the longer the period over which the offending occurs, and the greater the number of offences, the more likely it may be that persistence is established. The offences must be sequential (i.e. not properly regarded as part of the same incident), otherwise the necessary characteristic of repetition will be absent. The time over which they are committed will of course be a relevant factor. Sporadic instances of isolated offending over a course of several years are unlikely to suffice. On the other hand, the facts may demonstrate that although he has committed very few offences, the offender’s experience of the criminal justice system has provided him with insufficient deterrence and that he is plainly someone who is going to keep on re-offending.
56. Mr Mackenzie submitted that offending twice over a period of time would never be enough to establish persistence. However we are not prepared to put a gloss on “persistent” by finding that it necessarily implies that three sequential offences is a minimum requirement. Whilst it is perhaps unlikely that only two sequential offences would be regarded as sufficient to demonstrate persistence, it is not impossible.
57. In order to answer the question whether someone is a persistent offender, the decision-maker (be it the Tribunal or the Secretary of State) must consider the whole history of the individual from the commission of the first offence up to the date of the decision and ask themselves whether he can properly be described as someone who keeps on committing criminal offences. Factors to be taken into account will include the overall pattern of offending, the frequency of the offences, their nature, their number, the period or periods over which they are committed, and (where relevant) any reasons underlying the offending, such as an alcohol or drug dependency or association with other criminals. This is in line with the guidance given in the Immigration Directorate Instructions, Chapter 13, version 5.0 (dated 28 July 2014) to which Mr Malik referred, which states that a persistent offender is “a repeat offender who shows a pattern of offending over a period of time”. The guidance goes on to say “this can mean a series of offences committed in a fairly short timeframe, or which escalate in seriousness over time, or a long history of minor offences.”
58. If the person concerned has been out of trouble for a significant period or periods within the overall period under consideration, then the length of such periods and the reasons for his keeping out of trouble may be important considerations, though of course the decision maker is entitled to bear in mind that the mere fact that someone has not been convicted for some time does not necessarily signify that he has seen the error of his ways. It may simply mean that he has paused in his offending. It is the overall picture of his behaviour that matters.
59. If during those periods of apparent good behaviour the person concerned was serving the custodial part of a short sentence or was too unwell to go out and commit the kinds of offences he is generally prone to commit, there may be an explanation for the hiatus in offending which is not inconsistent with his being properly regarded as a persistent offender. Likewise, if he had a very strong incentive not to commit further offences, such as being subject to a community order, or a suspended sentence, or he is on bail, or he has been served with a notice of deportation, the fact that he has committed no further offences during that period may be of little significance in deciding whether, looking at his history as a whole, he fits the description.
60. On the other hand, we agree with First-tier Tribunal Judge Whalan that an established period of rehabilitation may lead properly to the conclusion that an individual is no longer a persistent offender. Depending on the particular facts and circumstances, a former drug addict who has ceased shoplifting to feed his habit after a period in rehabilitation, and who has been out of trouble for a significant period of time thereafter, might not be capable of being termed a “persistent offender” because when his history is looked at in the round, it can no longer be said that he is someone who keeps on offending.”
6. The judge at §32 said that having considered the unchallenged PNC record in the submissions of the representative that,” albeit this might be a finally balanced decision”, the respondent had shown that the appellant is a persistent offender for the purposes of section 117D (2) (C) (iii) of the 2002 Act and he is therefore a “foreign criminal”. The judge set out his reasons for the finding §33-§ 37. They read as follows:
“33.The two groups of identical offences were committed on 13 November 2021 and 5 May 2024 respectively. There has been no offending since then. In the period with which I am concerned (November 2021 to date), there was only one repetition. It is rare that only two sequential offences could be regarded as persistent offending: Chege, [56]. However, on each occasion the appellant committed three offences of the same kind. This must be a greater indicator of persistence that the repetition of a single offence. I note that persistence may be shown by the fact the person keeps committing the same type of offence: Chege, [54].
34. I take into account the fact the appellant had a strong incentive not to re-offend after the November 2021 offending because he was the subject of a suspended sentence. However, he nonetheless re-offended and thereby breached the terms of the suspended sentence. I note that, at the time of the second group of offences, the appellant had relatively recently become a father and this life-changing event had not altered his behaviour.
35. I have noted the length of time since the appellant last offended and what was said about his rehabilitation. However, there is no independent evidence to displace the opinion of the offender manager who completed the OASys assessment in September 2024 that the appellant poses a medium risk of harm. I note the appellant’s statements regarding his determination not offend. However, I am unable to find that there has been a period of rehabilitation sufficient to establish the appellant is no longer a persistent offender. The respondent commenced deportation action in September 2024, so this has been hanging over the appellant’s head for almost the entire period since he was released from prison. As such, the fact he has not re-offended is less significant than it might otherwise have been: Chege, [59].
36. Finally, I bear in mind that the mere fact the appellant has not been convicted for some time does not necessarily signify that he has seen the error of his ways: Chege, [58]. My confidence that the appellant has now learned his lesson and will keep to his promise not to drive or re-offend was undermined by certain aspects of the evidence. As such, I do not accept he is rehabilitated. The appellant is a self-employed builder and presumably needs to travel around to various places to work, transport machinery and tools, and collect materials and supplies. In cross-examination, asked about the second group of offences, the appellant maintained that he only drove his wife’s car while she was asleep because his driver was away in Poland. He told me he had to go and see a customer about a job, but he did not explain why he had not used public transport on that occasion. In contrast, K told me the reason the appellant had used her car was to drop someone at the airport. She did not appear to know the appellant had a driver, even though the appellant had said she knew about him and he was able to use her car. I conclude the appellant was seeking to present a false justification for his decision to use K’s car on 5 May 2024. Deciding to take someone to the airport while disqualified from driving implies a very low resistance to the temptation to drive.
37. Looking at the overall picture of the appellant’s offending, I find he is a persistent offender.
7. The judge found that the relationships that the appellant has with K and A are genuine and subsisting relationship. The judge considered whether Exception 2 applied in respect of K at § 41-51. The judge found that there would be “relatively little hardship for the appellant and K to resume their lives in Poland”. He noted that K was born in Poland before she relocated to the UK at the age of 10. The judge concluded that it would not be unduly harsh for K to relocate to Poland with the appellant. The judge concluded that it would not be unduly harsh for K to remain in the United Kingdom if the appellant was deported.
8. The judge made discrete findings about the child's best interests §59-§63. The judge said that it must be in the child's best interests to retain the stability of having both parents around them and to continue to have their extended family on both sides living close by to continue the relationship they have with them. The judge accepted that it would not be in A's best interests should K decide to remain in the UK; however, he found that should the family return together to Poland, A's best interests are sufficiently protected.
9. The judge then went on to consider whether there are very compelling circumstances in the context of s.117C (6) of the 2002 Act. The judge at§ 74 said as follows:
“The centrepiece of the appellant's case is his child, and I have already considered their best interests above. I accept it is not in their best interests for the family to be split and that their best interests are best preserved by their continuing with the arrangements currently in place. However, for the reasons already given above, the impact would be limited on their best interests do not carry predominant weight in this appeal. I have taken into consideration the loss of their immediate ties with family members in the United Kingdom and the presence of extended family in Poland. However, as said, their ties with relatives in the United Kingdom can be preserved through visits and there is no reason to believe relocation would cause any significant harm at all to the child”
The grounds of appeal
10. The appellant no longer relied on ground one.
11. Ground 2: The FTT failed to take into account relevant authority on persistence, in particular the finding at §56 of Chege (“is a persistent offender”) [2016] UKUT 00187 (IAC). The appellant can only reasonably be seen to have “repeated” offending on two occasions – first in January 2024, and then again in May 2024. Given that the FTT’s position was that the question of persistence was “finely balanced”, the failure to have regard to this observation in SC must amount to a material error of law.
12. Ground 3: While the judge was entitled to find that that the “go” scenario insofar as the K is concerned would not be unduly harsh, the same approach is not lawful when assessing A’s best interests or when assessing whether there are very compelling circumstances in the context of s.117(6) of the 2002 Act. When assessing A’s best interests or the very compelling circumstances test the FTT is required to consider the “real world” likely future scenario in the event of the appellant’s removal. That scenario was, according to the evidence, that K and A would remain in the UK, and therefore be indefinitely separated from the appellant.
13. In assessing A’s best interests, the FTT’s decision is difficult to follow. At §61, the FTT considers the “stay” scenario and finds as follows; “I accept this would be contrary to their best interests, but this does carry predominant weight because they would be capably looked after by K with the support of other family members. K or other family members could take them to visit the appellant in Poland. This would involve a cost, but Poland is not so distant as to make this prohibitive or impractical.”
14. When assessing the very compelling circumstances test, especially at §74, the FTT, does not consider the remain situation. The judge considered only the “go” scenario.
Conclusions
15. The respondent relies on a response under Rule 24. It is her position that there is no error of law. I heard oral submissions from the parties. I will engage with these in my conclusions.
Ground 2- conclusions
16. There is no challenge to the judge’s self-direction. The judge said that it was important to keep in mind that the respondent only relies on post-transition period offending. The judge did not consider pre-Brexit offending. There is no challenge to the approach taken by the judge.
17. The grounds say that the judge did not take into account relevant authority on persistent offenders, particularly §56 of Chege. It is contended that the appellant can only reasonably been seen to have “repeated” offending on two occasions first in January 2024 and then again in May 2024.
18. Ms Warren in submissions focused on § 33 of the decision of the FTT and the use by the judge of the word “rare” which she contended did not properly reflect what was said in Chege at § 56 (Whilst it is perhaps unlikely that only two sequential offences would be regarded as sufficient to demonstrate persistence it is not impossible). Ms Warren contended that the Tribunal did not explain the justification in this case for finding that the appellant who had committed only two sequential offences is a persistent offender.
19. Mr Terrell draw my attention to the grounds of appeal which he said were not a reasons challenge which is how Ms Warren had framed her submissions. He contended that the judge did not apply a different test or threshold with regard to Chege and SC. He cautioned against semantic debate.
20. The judge correctly set out the guidance in Chege and SC and there is nothing to support that he did not apply it. He was cognisant of what the court said about offending twice over a period of time and that it was perhaps unlikely that only two sequential offences would be regarded as sufficient to demonstrate persistence. The use of the word “rare” by the judge in § 33 reinforces this. While the case law does use the word “rare” it reflects what was said in Chege and endorsed in SC. The judge did not fail to have regard to the case law.
21. While Ms Warren contended that the judge did not justify why he found that two sequential offences were sufficient, I agree with Mr Terrell that the grounds are not cast as a reasons challenge. In any event, there is no merit in the submission. The judge was aware that there were two sequential offences and the implications of this. However, when deciding the issue, he took into account that there were two groups of three of the same offences. This was a matter to which the judge was entitled to attach weight. The judge referred to § 54 of Chege where the court said that persistence may be shown by the fact that a person keeps committing the same type of offence. The judge also attached weight to the OASYs assessment in September 2024 in which the appellant was assessed as posing a medium risk of harm. The judge when considering the length of time since the appellant last offended noted that the respondent commenced deportation action in September 2024 so that it had been hanging over the appellant's head for almost the entire period since he was released from prison. With reference to § 59 of Chege the judge said that the fact that the appellant has not reoffended is less significant than it might otherwise have been. The judge also attached weight to the appellant and his wife's evidence and concluded; “the appellant was seeking to present a false justification for his decision to use [his wife’s] car on 5 May 2024”. The judge accepted K’s wife's evidence that he had taken her to the airport while he had been disqualified from driving and concluded that this “implies a very low resistance to the temptation to drive”. The judge justified his decision giving a number of reasons, all of which were open to him on the evidence and are in accordance with the guidance in Chege.
22. The question of whether somebody is a persistent offender is a question of law and fact to be determined at the date of the hearing. Each case is to be determined on its own facts. The judge considered the whole history and assessed the case on its own facts. He reached a permissible conclusion.
Ground 3- conclusions
23. In submissions Ms Warren relied on what the judge said at §61 to support a lack of clarity in the judge’s decision. Miss Warren contended that the judge had not properly considered the “stay” scenario and the impact of this on A and had not factored any findings relating to this into the assessment of very compelling circumstances. Ms Warren contended that there was no assessment of unduly harsh in the context of A.
24. Mr Terrell contended that §61 contains an obvious typographical error. He said the judge considered both the “stay” and the “go” scenario with reference to §61 and §62. Moreover, the judge considered the best interests of the child at § 59- §73. He contended that the findings at §47-§49 relating to K can clearly be understood as impacting on the child. The “stay” situation was not left out of the very compelling circumstances assessment; however, § 74 is aimed at the best scenario for the family and that is the “go” situation where the family will stay together.
25. I do not find that the ground is made out. There is no challenge to the judge’s self-direction (§ 15 and § 22-§26). It was agreed that the appellant could not meet the requirements of Exception 1 because he has not resided in the UK for more than half his life. At § 24 the judge directed himself in relation to the best interest’s assessment relating to A and reminded himself that a primary consideration is not the same as the primary consideration, still less a paramount consideration. It was agreed that A was not a qualified child and therefore Exception 2 did not apply to him; however, it did apply as far as K is concerned. Whether or not the effect of the appellant's deportation would be unduly harsh on K was assessed at length at § 41-§51. Within this assessment, the judge recognised the obvious overlap between the impact on K and A: see § 44, § 45, § 46. The judge said that he treated with caution the claim that A struggled with the Polish language and said that it was more likely than not that they already have the foundations to be fully bilingual. The judge considered that A had lived their entire life in the UK. There were many reasons given by the judge why the impact of the “go” or the “stay” scenario would not be unduly harsh on K.
26. When considering the “go” scenario the judge took into account that K is Polish and was educated there until she came to the UK at the age of 10. She has family in Poland. She visits every year and stays with relatives. While the judge accepted that the family wished to remain in the UK (indeed K’s evidence which was not challenged was that she would not return to Poland with the appellant), he found that there would be relatively little hardship for the appellant and K to resume their lives in Poland and therefore it would not be unduly harsh for her to relocate with the appellant.
27. The judge also considered at § 49 whether it would be unduly harsh on K to remain in the United Kingdom should the appellant be deported and found that it would not be on the basis that K is evidently educated, resourceful and capable in that she managed the child alone while the appellant was imprisoned. The judge also found that she had some family support and could top up her income with Universal Credit if she needed to.
28. While Exception 2 applied only to K, the impact on K and the child are intertwined and this was clearly recognised by the judge when assessing the impact on K. However, at § 50 the judge specifically said that he would consider the best interests of A and the impact of the appellant's deportation on him at § 59 - § 63. These paragraphs focus solely on A and the judge considered both the “go” and the “stay” scenario. The judge noted that there was no evidence from an independent social worker. He took into account that A was aged 5 and concluded that it must be in their best interests to retain the stability of having both parents around them and to continue to have their extended family on both sides living close by in order to continue the relationship that they have with them. The judge took into account that their education had only just begun in the UK and was at the very early stages and that there was no reason to believe that they would have a particular difficulty in adapting to the Polish education system
29. At §62 the judge said that should K choose to accompany the appellant to Poland the child would retain the presence of both parents in their life and although they would lose the benefit of the extended family being around them and they would have to adjust to a new life in another country, at their age the most important people in their lives are normally their parents. The judge took into account that the child has Polish nationality as does his parents and would enjoy the benefits of that citizenship where the state provides education healthcare and Social Security. The judge said that in the “go” scenario the child's best interests are sufficiently protected.
30. The thrust of Ms Warren’s submissions was that when considering very compelling circumstances, the judge did not factor into the assessment the “stay” scenario and the impact on the child. There is no substance in this. The judge considered the “stay” scenario throughout his decision in relation to both K and A. The judge accepted that the “stay” scenario would be contrary to the child's best interests. It is quite clear that the sentence in §61 on which Ms Warren relied to support that there is a lack of clarity in the findings of the judge contains a typographical error and that the judge intended to insert the word “not” between the words “does” and “carry” so that the sentence reads “I accept this would be contrary to their best interests, but this does not carry predominant weight...”. Any other interpretation would not make any sense and would be contrary to the judge’s self-direction and what he said at§ 74.
31. The judge said at § 63 that the findings in relation to the best interests of the appellant's child would be carried forward to his overall assessment proportionality. Again at§ 67 the judge said that he had carried forward his findings on the best interests, and duly harsh and very significant obstacles to integration when considering very compelling circumstances. There was no need for the judge to repeat his findings. There is nothing to support that he did not factor them into the assessment of very compelling circumstance. At § 74 the judge accepted that the centrepiece of the appellant's case is his child and again said that it would not be in their best interests for the family to split. It it is a misrepresentation of the decision to say that the “stay” scenario was not considered in the context of very compelling circumstances.
32. It is contended that the judge did not look at the “real world” facts because the uncontested evidence was that K and A would remain in the United Kingdom. However, the argument is misconceived. In Sicwebu v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 550 the real-world fact was that the appellant's wife was to give birth imminently to the couple's third child and would remain in the UK as distinct from the facts of this case were the appellant and his family may decide and are entitled to decide that K and A will remain in the UK; however, it is open to them and wholly feasible for them to return to Poland as a family together which the judge considered to be in the child’s best interests.
Notice of Decision
33. There is no error of law in the decision of the FTT to dismiss the appellant's appeal


Joanna McWilliam

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 October 2026