Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001963
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51652/2024
LP/09653/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Ó CEALLAIGH KC

Between

NM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Muzenda, Legal Representative
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 23 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The appellant is a national of Zimbabwe who seeks protection in the United Kingdom. On 18 January 2024 the respondent refused her application. She appealed that decision, and her appeal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Latta in a determination dated 1 February 2026.

2. The appellant appealed that decision and permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge C R Cole. The matter now comes before me to determine whether the determination of First-tier Tribunal Judge Latta contains a material error of law.

3. The parties agreed before me that the determination contains an error of law and that it must therefore be remitted. In the circumstances there was no need for me to consider the appellant’s application under Rule 15(2A) to adduce further evidence.

Grounds of appeal

4. Permission to appeal was granted on all grounds. The key reason for the grounds of permission to appeal was as follows:

“The reasoning is brief, which is to be commended. However, in my judgment the reasoning is arguably not sufficient. The credibility assessment is arguably insufficient and fails to deal adequately with material matters…There is arguably a lack of sufficient assessment as to risk on return as the wife of an opposition MP (a fact which appears to have been accepted)… The application of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 as detailed in Ground 1 is muddled to say the least.”

5. Permission to appeal was granted on all grounds.

The hearing

6. While Ms Everett initially indicated an intention to rely on the respondent’s Rule 24 response, she conceded following the appellant’s submissions that there was a clear error and that the matter had to be remitted. The ground on which she conceded was Ground 1: Misapplication of the Legal Test under s32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.

7. The basis of the respondent’s acceptance that there was an error of law was a matter referred to in the grounds obliquely but expanded on by Mr Muzenda before me. I can well understand why the respondent initially defended this appeal as the grounds certainly lacked clarity, but I equally consider that having had the matter spelled out before me Ms Everett was right to concede that there was an error of law. Had the drafting been as clear as Mr Muzenda’s submissions the respondent might well have taken a view on this case earlier.

8. The FTTJ did not consider the appellant’s risk on return as a result of her political activities. While the case was largely put on the basis of risk arising from her husband’s activities, it was also squarely put on the basis of the risk arising from her own political activities which were extensively described. This risk is detailed in her witness statement and expressly relied on in her skeleton argument. It just does not feature in the tersely expressed determination. As Ms Everett accepted, this is a material error and it features “just about” in the grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal at paragraph five of Ground 1. This matter was not only a central plank of her case but also relevant to some of the FTT’s other credibility findings – for example on whether or not her home was targeted.

9. As noted by FTTJ Cole granting permission the fact that the reasoning in the determination is brief is to be commended. However as FTTJ Cole also noted, the determination does not deal with material matters. It is very thin considering what was in issue, and simply does not deal with other important aspects of the evidence such as the family being in hiding and travelling in blacked out cars to hide their identities. It is difficult to conclude that the appeal has had the anxious scrutiny required (R (YH) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 116 at [24]).

10. In the circumstances the appeal must be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. The parties agreed that the nature of the error was such that no findings can be preserved.

Notice of Decision

The determination of First-tier Tribunal Judge Latta of 1 February 2026 did involve the making of a material error of law. It is set aside and the matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing with no findings of fact preserved.

Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 July 2026