Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-001994
First-tier Tribunal No: EU/50896/2024
LE/00424/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

18th August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STERNBERG

Between

ASMA BEGUM
(NO ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No attendance or representation
For the Respondent: Mr. Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House in person on 5 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, who is a citizen of Bangladesh, was granted permission to appeal the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Monson (‘the Judge’) who dismissed the Appellant’s appeal by a determination dated 19 December 2025, following a hearing which took place at Taylor House on 1 December 2025 at which the Appellant’s son and daughter and law gave evidence. That appeal challenged the Respondent’s decision of 22 December 2023 to refuse the Appellant’s application for an EU family permit as a close family member of an EEA national, or their spouse or civil partner made on 20 September 2023.
2. First-tier Tribunal Judge Dhanji refused permission to appeal on all grounds on 7 April 2026. Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick granted permission to appeal on grounds 1 and 2 on 24 May 2026 and refused permission to appeal on grounds 3 and 4. In granting permission, Judge Ruddick noted that ground 2 turned on assertions regarding the oral evidence given at the hearing but not placed in evidence before the Tribunal. Judge Ruddick set specific directions dated 29 May 2026 requiring that within 14 days the Appellant was to file and serve any evidence in her possession of the evidence that was given at the hearing before the Judge such as a witness statement from counsel who appeared for the appellant at that hearing or counsel’s note of the evidence given at that hearing. The Respondent was then given the opportunity to respond to that evidence and confirm whether it was accepted, disputed or could not be confirmed. The directions further provided an opportunity for the parties to attend the Upper Tribunal to listen to the recording of the proceedings below to seek to resolve that issue and if there was still a dispute thereafter to identify what parts of the recording of the hearing below should be played at the error of law hearing.
3. The Appellant and her representatives did not comply with those directions at all. No note or evidence of the evidence given before the Judge was filed or served. The Respondent served a rule 24 response dated 15 June 2026 noting that nothing had been served in compliance with the directions set and making submissions on the two grounds on which permission to appeal had been granted.
4. The hearing took place before me on 5 August 2026. Mr. Simpson appeared in person for the Respondent. The Appellant did not appear and was not represented. I satisfied myself that she had been properly sent notice of the hearing by a letter dated 7 July 2026 and that she had been warned that the hearing could proceed in her absence if she did not attend. There was no explanation provided in advance of the hearing as to why she was absent and was not represented. Nor had the Appellant or her representatives lodged a composite hearing bundle as required by the Tribunal’s directions which had been chased by the Tribunal’s administration. I put the matter back until after 10:30 to allow the Appellant or a representative to attend in case they were running late but no one attended. At the start of the hearing I confirmed with the Respondent that I had all the relevant documents. I then heard submissions from Mr. Simpson for the Respondent. As I note above, no composite bundle had been filed in accordance with the Tribunal’s directions. However, I had received a copy of the bundle of evidence filed with the First-tier Tribunal running to 304 pages, the Judge’s judgment, the Grounds of Appeal and the decisions on permission to appeal in advance of the hearing together with the Respondent’s rule 24 response. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision, which I now give.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. To understand the Appellant’s challenges to the Judge’s decision, I summarise that decision with as much brevity as I can. At [1]-[4] the Judge set out their introduction, summarised the applications made by the Appellant and the applicable law including the regulations creating a right of appeal and the burden and standard of proof and the evidence they received. The Judge summarised the relevant background at [4]-[7] including that the Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh, her application for an EUSS family permit as the close member of a family member of an EEA national, her sponsor is her daughter in law who is a Romanian national who married her son in the UK on 12 August 2022 and the evidence the Judge received of that relationship and of money transfers from the Appellant’s son to her in 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2023.
6. The Judge summarised the Reasons for Refusal letter of 22 December 2023 and the Respondent’s first review of 24 April 2025 at [8]-[11]. In those documents the Respondent noted that the Appellant’s son’s birth was registered in July 2022, 36 years after his birth. He provided evidence of some money transfers to the appellant but not had not shown that she collected the funds. The Respondent was unable to determine that the Appellant could not meet her essential living needs without financial or other material support from her relevant EEA citizen sponsor or their spouse. In the review of 24 April 2025, the Respondent maintained the refusal decision, accepting there was evidence of further money transfers between June 2023 and January 2025 but noting a significant break in money transfer evidence between September 2020 and June 2023. It was unclear how the Appellant had supported herself after that; money transfers were more regular after the current application. Nor was there evidence of the funds being received or collected by the Appellant. Even if those sums were paid to her it did not demonstrate she was financially dependent on the EEA sponsor.
7. At [12]-[13] the Judge set out the post-review evidence relied on by the Appellant, summarising her statement of 29 September 2025 which states she is wholly dependent on her son and daughter in law. She had recently undergone a heart operation, her older son was the only one of her children earning money, her other children are studying and cannot support her. The Judge summarised the Respondent’s second review at [14]-[22]. That document accepted that the Appellant and her son were related as claimed. There was still a lack of evidence of her domestic circumstances. There was further evidence of money transfers between 2020 and 2024. Her bank accounts show her former spouse’s name and periods of inactivity on the account; only four of the money transfers matched the bank statements. There was no evidence to show she had recently undergone heart surgery
8. At [23]-[31] the Judge summarised the hearing itself which was a hybrid hearing with the representatives appearing in person and the Appellant’s son and the sponsor giving evidence remotely by CVP. The Judge set out the evidence called at the hearing from the Appellant’s son and daughter in law and summarised the submissions of the parties.
9. The Judge set out their findings at [32]-[44]. The sole issue is whether the Appellant has discharged the burden of proving that, having regard to her financial and social conditions or health, she cannot meet her essential living needs in whole or in part without the financial or other material support of the relevant EEA citizen or their spouse. She relies on a schedule of regular payments from March 2023-January 2025 including the pattern and regularity of payments exceeding her expenditure. The period leading up to the cut-off date of 31 December 202 and prior to March 2023 is less clear; there were reasonably frequent payments. The Appellant is only required to show continuous dependency from the date of application. The bank statement evidence shows significant periods of inactivity, not consistent with the Appellant receiving regular payments from her son paid into that account. There was no challenge to the second review’s conclusion that only 4 transactions in the account match money transfers for which there is evidence.
10. Importantly, the Judge found that the main weaknesses in the Appellant’s case emerged in the oral evidence. The Appellant says in her statement that she has been wholly reliant on her son from 2019 when her husband left her, but her son’s evidence was that he has been supporting the family since 2009 and that his father left over 10 years ago, in around 2015. Further there is a conflict of evidence between the Appellant and her son and the sponsor as to her current domestic circumstances. Her evidence was that her other three children were students. However, her son’s evidence was that his middle brother has not been a student since the age of 14 due to health issues and has never worked and his youngest brother has not been a student since the age of 18 or 19 and was working recently. His sister recently married and is no longer part of the household. The position relating to the Appellant’s youngest son is supported by medical evidence. The medical evidence does not show that the Appellant recently underwent a heart operation, she did undergo an angiogram in May 2021. There is a lack of transparency about how the money sent to the Appellant is spent. The implication of the son’s written evidence is that it is all spent on her medical bills and other essential needs but his oral evidence implied the money sent is used to fund his brother’s medical needs. That does not in itself show the Appellant is not reliant on her son to meet her essential living needs. However, the Judge concluded that the Appellant has not been sufficiently reliable and transparent about her domestic circumstances to discharge the burden of proof on her.
11. The appeal was therefore dismissed.
Grounds of Appeal
12. The appellant was granted permission to appeal on two grounds of appeal:
a. The Judge fell into material error by failing to consider central documentary evidence of the Appellant’s circumstances; and
b. The Judge failed to engage with the oral evidence explaining gaps in the material provided and cash remittances.
As I have noted at [2] above, both the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal refused permission to appeal on grounds 3 and 4 so I say no more about those grounds.
The Law
13. The Appeal comes before the Upper Tribunal to decide first whether there is a material error of law in the judge’s decision, and if it does, to re-make the decision or to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
14. As the appellant seeks to overturn the judge’s findings of fact on issues in controversy between the parties, the approach I should take is set out by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74; [2024] 1 WLR 1626, by Underhill LJ at [50]-[51]:
50. … I should recapitulate the approach that should be taken in considering whether the FTT made an error of law. At para. 72 of his judgment in HA (Iraq) (but with reference to the appeal in AA (Nigeria)) Lord Hamblen said:
"It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently – see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account – see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out – see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope."
51. Mr Malik relied on that passage but added some further points by way of amplification. The only one that I need mention is that in AA (Nigeria)1 in this Court Popplewell LJ said, at para. 34:
"Experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so."
15. I set out further relevant authorities in my decision below.
Ground 1
16. The Grounds of Appeal assert that the FTT correctly identified the sole issue was whether the Appellant had demonstrated that she could not meet her essential living needs in whole or in part without material support from the relevant EEA sponsor or spouse. The Judge accepted that the Appellant’s son sent remittances regularly, the monthly amount sent covered the appellant’s asserted average monthly expenditure but nevertheless dismissed the appeal on the basis that the Appellant had not been sufficiently reliable and transparent about her domestic circumstances. That conclusion is said to be legally flawed because the Tribunal failed to engage at all with the documentary evidence addressing domestic expenditure including rent receipts and grocery and household purchase receipts relied on and indexed in the Appellant’s bundle and drawn to the FTT’s attention. The decision does not assess that evidence and does not consider its authenticity, consistency, weight and whether it corroborated the Appellant’s account. That was a failure to consider a material consideration and a failure to give adequate reasons. A proper consideration of that evidence could have realistically led to a conclusion that the Appellant’s essential needs were met through dependency and the appeal being allowed.
17. Mr. Simpson relied on the rule 24 response and submitted that there is no evidence to confirm that the rent and grocery receipts were drawn to the Judge’s attention at the hearing. Nor was an Appellant’s Skeleton Argument provided to the Judge to assist in clarifying the issues. In accordance with the Upper Tribunal’s decision in The Secretary of State for the Home Department v Harsh Lata [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC) at [26]-[28] there cannot be an error of law from a failure to take into account a point that was never raised for consideration unless the point is Robinson obvious. There is no direct reference to receipts in the decision. What was this evidence? There are grocery receipts in the bundle before the Judge at pp.108-112 and rent receipts from p.114 onwards. These all date from 2023, all of that material comes from 2023. The Judge came to a reasoned decision on those receipts. There was no material error on the part of the judge who assessed all of the evidence called in the round.
18. In assessing this ground, I note that it seeks to overturn the judge’s findings of fact on an issue in controversy between the parties, the judge having heard the sponsor and the Appellants’ brother give evidence and be cross-examined and having assessed the documentary evidence on which the Appellants’ rely.
19. Therefore, the approach I should take is set out by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74; [2024] 1 WLR 1626, by Underhill LJ at [50]-[51] set out at [14] above.
20. In general terms, I agree with the Respondent on this ground. First, the judge gave clear and reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s claim that she was dependent on her son as claimed. Those reasons for rejecting the claim turned on matters that arose from the oral evidence, rather than a detailed assessment of the documentary material provided by the Appellant. The Judge’s findings on the issue of dependency were expressed clearly and concisely and reveal no error of law.
21. Second, applying the Upper Tribunal’s decision in Lata, as approved by the Court of Appeal in AL v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 370, in particular at [89]-[91], it is an Appellant’s responsibility to put all her arguments before the FTT. The FTT is not required to comb through the documents and evidence in search of potential points for either party. The Appellant had the opportunity to identify the documents relied on in support of this ground in a skeleton argument for the hearing before the FTT. There is nothing to show that she did so. Nor is there any evidence from the Appellant to support the assertion that these documents were drawn to the Judge’s attention or specifically relied on at the hearing to support the point that is now made. I consider that the Judge cannot now be criticised for not considering a case which the Appellant has not shown she advanced at the hearing before the FTT. It is correct that the issue of dependence was squarely before the Judge and the Judge’s determination addressed that issue. However, absent anything to show that the documents relied on in support of this ground were, in fact, drawn to the Judge’s attention in support of the Appellant’s case on dependency, no material error of law can arise from the fact that they are not explicitly referred in the Judge’s decision.
22. Third, I accept the Respondent’s submission that the Judge’s decision on the sole and central issue in the appeal turned primarily on their assessment of the oral evidence which they heard and which they were best placed to assess. Therefore, even if the documents relied on in support of this ground had been drawn to the Judge’s attention, as the Appellant asserts, any error of omission by not referring to them in the judgement would not be material. To put it another way, given the Judge’s findings on the inconsistencies in the Appellant’s evidence, even if these documents had been explicitly cited, the Judge’s overall decision would have been the same.
23. I reject this ground.
Ground 2
24. The written grounds of appeal assert that the Judge failed to engage with oral evidence at the hearing regarding remittances sent by the Appellant’s son to her and evidence given in response to questions from the Respondent’s representative and the Judge. It is said that this amounts to a failure to consider material evidence.
25. The Respondent submitted that the Appellant has not complied with the directions set by Judge Ruddick. No evidence has been provided on the oral evidence that was given at the hearing. The Judge made findings about that oral evidence and considered all of the material evidence and found it to be inconsistent.
26. I reject this ground of appeal as unarguable. The decision granting permission to appeal gave the Appellant the opportunity to put in written evidence as to the questions asked and the answers given at the hearing before the Judge to establish what evidence was given at that hearing. The directions set by Judge Ruddick also permitted parties to meet and to listen to the audio recording of the hearing in the event that there was disagreement about the evidence given at the hearing and for extracts from that audio recording to be played at the error of law hearing if appropriate. The Appellant did not avail herself of any of those opportunities.
27. Accordingly, there is no evidential foundation whatsoever to establish that there was oral evidence given at the hearing before the Judge to establish the matters which the Appellant asserts were given in evidence in answer to questions from the Respondent’s advocate and from the Judge.
28. There can be no suggestion in these circumstances that the Judge did not assess critical evidence on this issue. The Appellant has not established that that any such evidence was actually given despite being given ample opportunity to establish that an evidential foundation.
29. For these reasons, I find that ground 2 does not give rise to any error of law.
Notice of Decision
30. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision did not involve the making of an error of law.
31. The appeal is dismissed.

D Sternberg

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 August 2026

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:
2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).
3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).
4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).
5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.
6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email.