Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002013
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/65537/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

25th August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE D. CLARKE

Between

IM
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr B Ali, Solicitor Advocate, instructed by Aman Solicitors Advocates.
For the Respondent: Ms Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant and any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

INTRODUCTION
1. The Appellant, a citizen of Syria, appeals against the Decision of First-Tier Tribunal Judge (“FTIJ”) S Taylor, promulgated on 11 January 2026 (“the Decision”), dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the SSHD’s decision dated 12 November 2024 (“RFRL”), refusing his application for entry clearance under the Appendix Family Reunion (Protection) route dated 29 April 2024.
BACKGROUND
Decision of FTIJ Taylor dated 11 January 2026
2. At paragraph [3] the FTIJ summarises the issues in the RFRL as follows:
(a) The appellant applied for entry clearance on the basis that he was the child of the sponsor, who had protection status in the UK. The respondent considered Appendix Family Reunion and the best interest of the child under S55 of the 2009 Act.
(b) The respondent did not accept the appellant’s claimed age, as his photograph suggested that he was older than the claimed age of 16 years and three months. The appellant’s three documents of identity, his passport, his birth certificate and a civil family record, had not been verified.
(c) The respondent sent a request and a reminder requesting further evidence to support the date of birth, and on 1st November 2024 a Family Book, dated 14th December 2021, was received. As no further evidence of date of birth was received, the respondent considered that the documents were issued on information provided by the appellant without supporting evidence. The documents were not accepted as supporting evidence of date of birth.
(d) The application stated that the appellant was the child of the sponsor but the submitted DNA concluded that the sponsor and appellant were siblings. As the appellant was not the child of the sponsor, the application was refused.
(e) The respondent considered that there were no exceptional circumstances and that the refusal was consistent with article 8 ECHR. The sponsor left Syria in 2014, while the appellant remained in Syria with his family, the appellant had not demonstrated that he was dependant on the sponsor, or that the sponsor was his sole of main carer. No evidence of regular contact between the parties had been submitted. There was no evidence submitted to any more than usual emotional ties between the parties. The respondent did not consider that the relationship engaged article 8 ECHR. The respondent found no compelling or compassionate factors on which to grant leave to the appellant.
(f) The respondent concluded that the wishes of the parties were not outweighed by the need for proper immigration control. The appellant had other routes to gain permission to enter the UK if he wished.
3. At paragraph [7] the FTIJ records the Appellant’s concession that he could not meet the immigration rules and that the appeal was being advanced “on the basis of article 8 ECHR and exceptional circumstances only”.
4. In dismissing the appeal, the FTIJ made the following findings of fact:
13. The appellant has applied for entry clearance on the basis that is a child of the sponsor, he submitted a DNA test which demonstrated that he was not a child of the sponsor but was a sibling. It was accepted that by the appellant’s representative that he could not succeed in his appeal under the Rules, as he is clearly not a child of the sponsor.
14. The appellant wished to continue with his appeal, notwithstanding that he could not succeed under the application, on the basis of article 8 ECHR and exceptional circumstances. However, I find that the credibility of the application is fundamentally undermined by the appellant claiming in his application that he was a child of the sponsor when he clearly was not. This inaccuracy in his application has been compounded by the clear admission made by the sponsor, in his written statement prepared with the help of his solicitors, that the application was deliberately false. The sponsor has made two further attempts at explaining why the application was on a false basis, both of which contradict his statement, which only serve to compound the unreliability of his evidence. In his statement, the sponsor clearly states that he had been informed by a member of the community that the best way to sponsor the appellant was by claiming that he was a dependant child. It is therefore clear from the sponsor’s own statement that he has deliberately submitted an application on the basis that the appellant was his child, knowing that it was not true. In his oral evidence, the appellant stated that the application was completed by a friend and that he did not know that it was on the basis that the appellant was his child, this is in clear contradiction to his written statement. In giving instructions to his representative, he stated that the application was as a child because the sibling relationship was not available on the drop-down menu, this is yet a third explanation for the application being as a child which only damages the credibility of the sponsor even further.
15. I have found that the sponsor is not a witness of truth, on his own admission, and this finding permeates the reminder of the application and appeal. With regard to article 8, the sponsor is not the parent of the appellant, and the relationship between siblings, on its own, does not necessarily engage article 8 ECHR. The sponsor states that he came to the UK in 2014, so he had not been in a family unit with the appellant for over a decade. As I have been invited to consider the application outside of the Rules, I have to consider the appellant has he is at the date of hearing, when he is a few days short of his 18th birthday, rather than the date of the application. He claims that the ties with the appellant are greater than usual familial emotions, but he has provided no documentary evidence that he financially supports the appellant. He states that he is in contact with the appellant, which would not of itself engage article 8 ECHR, and the only claimed evidence is a few pages of un-translated WhatsApp, which carry no evidential value. I am not satisfied that article 8 is engaged in this appeal, as no family life has been significantly demonstrated between the parties.
16. I make a similar finding with regard to the application on the basis of exceptional circumstances. Even if the appellant’s age is accepted, he is now almost eighteen years of age, and he has not shown that his circumstances are different from any other eighteen year old in Syria. It is clear from international media that the position in Syria is volatile, but given the lack of the sponsor’s credibility, I do not accept his evidence that his parents have disappeared. The letter signed by the Municipal Chief of the city, appears to have been signed by relatives of the appellant at the request of the parties, and provides no evidence has to how they are aware that the sponsor supports the appellant and that there is no-one else to support him. Apart from general concerns about the appellant living in a volatile country, the sponsor has given no evidence of specific threats against the appellant, or given supporting evidence about his claimed concerns about his mental health. He is a citizen of the country, he speaks the language and will have local links and local knowledge. I have not accepted that the appellant has no other support in Syria, and in any event, he is otherwise a healthy youth of almost eighteen, I do not find that the refusal is unduly harsh and I find no other exceptional circumstances which would warrant his entry to the UK on that basis. For similar reasons, I find that the decision is consistent with the best interest of the appellant under S55 of the 2009 Act.
Grounds of Appeal and Grant of Permission
5. In grounds of appeal settled by Aman Solicitors Advocates dated 22 January 2026, the Appellant advanced three grounds of appeal in his application to the First-tier Tribunal for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal:
Ground One: Failure to take relevant evidence into account
2. The learned FTTJ determined that the Appellant/sponsor had been dishonest [14] but failed to have regard to the application form submitted by the Appellant/sponsor [SB/473]; where it was stated:
“[the Appellant] is applying to join his brother a refugee in the UK because his parents were missed since 2020 , he lives with me and my husband (his brother) is the main sponsor for him.”
3. The application form explicitly stated that the sponsor and the Respondent were brothers and not father and son. The FTTJ’s finding of dishonesty [14] is based on a fatal failure to have regard to material evidence such that, both, the negative finding of fact and the determination as a whole is unsustainable.
Ground Two: Unfairness
4. The Respondent’s refusal [SB/462-466] did not raise dishonesty and indeed the Respondent referenced [SB/464] that the Appellant had applied to join his brother by quoted verbatim [SB/473] the application being on the basis of the Appellant and sponsor being siblings.
Ground Three: Grounds One and Two all pervasive
5. Grounds One and Two render the FTTJ’s decision [15-16] under Article 8 and outside the immigration rules unsustainable. The FTTJ statement in the first sentence [15] and the third sentence [16] are explicit attestations of this by the FTTJ. Under The Respondent was obliged to and did consider the Appellant’s case on the basis he was not the child or spouse of the sponsor.
FRP 5.1. The applicant must be the child of a person (P) who has protection status or of P’s partner.
…..
FRP 7.1. Where an applicant does not meet the requirements for a partner under FRP.4.1. or for a child under FRP.5.1. to FRP 6.2., the decision maker must consider, on the basis of the information provided by the applicant, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would make a refusal of the application a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR, because such refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family member, whose Article 8 rights it is evident from the information provided would be affected by a decision to refuse the application.
6. On 7 April 2026 FTIJ Farmer granted the Appellant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal without restriction. In so doing, FTIJ Farmer noted that the three grounds of appeal arose out of the same issue and reasoned that,
[5] […] The judge found that the credibility of the application was fundamentally undermined by claiming in his application he was the child of the sponsor when he clearly was not. It is said this inaccuracy was compounded by the clear admission made by the sponsor that the application was false because he was the brother. The judge took a very poor view of the credibility and found that the sponsor was not a witness of truth and that permeated the remainder of the application and the appeal.
6. However, this fails to recognise that on the face of the application it is clearly stated that the brother is the sponsor and that was stated at the outset […..] I find the failure to refer the passage stating that the brother was the sponsor is a material error of law given the clear indication that it is credibility that led to a refusal of the article 8 claim.”
7. There was no rule 24 reply.
8. The matter now comes before me to determine whether there is an error of law in the Decision of the Judge pursuant to s.12(1) of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. If I find an error, I must then determine whether the error is material, such that the Decision should be set aside. If the Decision is set aside, I must decide whether to remake the Decision in the Upper Tribunal or remit the appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal, pursuant to s.12(2) of the 2007 Act.

ERROR OF LAW HEARING
Preliminary Matters
9. At the outset of the hearing Mr Ali indicated that he had the stitched hearing bundle before him consisting of 420 pages (“SB”). However, Ms Everett indicated that whilst she did not have the SB, she did have all necessary procedural paperwork along with the FTT bundles and was therefore ready to proceed.
10. I then raised with Mr Ali that it appeared that the SB, which had been prepared by the Appellant’s representatives, did not contain the RFRL under appeal at the FTT or the Respondent’s Review dated 13 August 2025. Mr Ali then downloaded the necessary documents from the MyHMCTS portal and indicated that he was ready to proceed.
11. In the absence of a rule 24 response, I first invited Ms Everett to summarise the SSHD’s position in relation to the grounds before me. In reply, Ms Everett confirmed that the appeal was opposed; noted that the Review before the FTT did not take any issue with relationship; indicated that this may have resulted in unfairness; but indicated that nonetheless she would argue that the FTIJ was entitled to place weight on the application form claiming that the Appellant was the child of the sponsor.
12. I then heard submissions from Mr Ali followed by Ms Everett.
DISCUSSION
13. In summary, under ground one the Appellant argues that the FTIJ failed to have full regard to the application form for entry clearance, which clearly stated that the Appellant “is applying to join his brother a refugee in the UK”. As such, it is argued that the finding that the sponsor is not a witness of truth because the application was made as the child of the sponsor, is unsustainable. Under ground two the Appellant says that the adverse credibility finding is in any event unfair because the SSHD did not argue dishonesty. Under ground three the Appellant argues that the cumulative effect of grounds 1 and 2 fatally undermines the Article 8 ECHR assessment.
14. As set out above, the FTIJ at [14] finds that “the credibility of the application is fundamentally undermined by the Appellant claiming in his application that he was a child of the sponsor”. The FTIJ finds this “inaccuracy” is compounded by an admission in the sponsor’s WS “that the application was deliberately false.” The FTIJ then finds “two further attempts at explaining why the application was made on a false basis” contradictory to the WS.
15. In terms of the WS, the FTIJ notes that the WS explains that the sponsor “had been informed by a member of the community that the best way to sponsor the appellant was by claiming that he was a dependant child” - which the FTIJ characterises as a “clear admission” that the application was deliberately false.
16. The FTIJ then records the sponsor’s oral explanation that the application was submitted by a friend and that he did not know that the application was submitted on the basis that the Appellant was a child of the Sponsor - which the FTIJ finds to be a “clear contradiction to his written statement”.
17. The FTIJ then records that the Appellant’s instructions to his representative were that “he stated that the application was as a child because the sibling relationship was not available on the drop-down menu” – which the FTIJ finds damages the Sponsor’s credibility even further.
18. As such, the FTIJ finds at [15] in the light of the representation in the application form and the purportedly inconsistent explanations for making such representations, that “the sponsor is not a witness of truth” and that this “finding permeates the remainder of the application and appeal”. The FTIJ then finds that there is no family life between the parties and at [16] further finds that “given the lack of the sponsor’s credibility, I do not accept his evidence that his parents have disappeared”.
19. Notwithstanding that the Appellant’s application for entry clearance was made under the “child of someone in the UK with protection status (family reunion)” route, as argued in the grounds, I find that the visa application form at SB [366] clearly discloses that the Appellant “is applying to join his brother a refugee”.
20. In Volpi 2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2(iii)] Lewison LJ confirmed the following well-settled principle,
An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it. The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial.
21. As I indicated to Ms Everett at the hearing, it appeared to me that the FTIJ’s adverse credibility finding at [14] is predicated upon the application form singularly presenting the Appellant as the child of the sponsor,
the “credibility of the application is fundamentally undermined by the appellant claiming in his application that he was a child of the sponsor”.
22. In submissions, Ms Everett did not seek to persuade me that the FTIJ referred to the disclosure in his determination and when I asked her if it was her case that the FTIJ did have this disclosure in mind, she stated “maybe not”.
23. I find the FTIJ reasoning at [14], which proceeds on the singular basis that the application form was restricted to a representation of a child parent relationship, to be compelling evidence of a failure by the FTIJ to take into account the sibling disclosure, in circumstances where I find it clear that the FTIJ did not acknowledge the existence of the disclosure.
24. When considering the relevance of the sibling disclosure, I am mindful of the Presidential guidance in QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 00033 (IAC), which states,
The greater the apparent cogency and relevance of a particular piece of evidence, the greater is the need for the judicial fact-finder to show that they have had due regard to that evidence; and, if the fact-finder's overall conclusion is contrary to the apparent thrust of that evidence, the greater is the need to explain why that evidence has not brought about a different outcome.
25. I find that it was incumbent upon the FTIJ to explain why the sibling disclosure did not bring about a different conclusion to his adverse credibility finding that the sponsor was not a witness of truth.
26. When reaching this conclusion, I am mindful that the FTIJ also suggested that the Appellant had given three inconsistent explanations for making an application as a child of the sponsor.
27. As I indicated to Ms Everett, I see no reason why the three purported “explanations” are mutually exclusive in circumstances where there was disclosure in the application form: that is, a friend simply told the sponsor that an application as a child of the sponsor was best; that the drop down menu did not include a sibling relationship; and that the sponsor did not complete the application and did not know upon what basis it was made.
28. In reply, Ms Everett conceded that in the light of the sibling disclosure, the three explanations given were not mutually exclusive or inconsistent as found by the FTIJ.
29. Given that there was disclosure in the application form, I can find nothing in the Decision to explain how these descriptions of the application process could rationally undermine the sponsor’s credibility as a witness of truth. I find the FTIJ’s interpretation of the sponsor’s knowledge of the application process as incredible explanations for making an application as a child of the sponsor, to further reinforce my conclusion that the FTIJ did not take into account the truthful disclosure of the sibling relationship in the application form.
30. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the FTIJ materially erred by failing to take into account the sibling disclosure because this error directly informed the FTIJ’s conclusion that the sponsor was not a witness of truth. I find that this adverse credibility finding fatally undermines the sustainability of the decision as a whole because the FTIJ clearly acknowledges at [15] that this finding permeates the remainder of the appeal.
CONCLUSION ON ERROR OF LAW
31. For these reasons I find that the Decision of FTIJ S Taylor contains a material error of law such that it must be set aside in its entirety with no findings of fact preserved.
DISPOSAL
32. Whilst there is no rule 15(2A) application in the SB, Mr Ali indicated his intention to submit further evidence and invited me to remit the appeal to the FTT. Ms Everett confirmed that she remained neutral on remittal. Having regard to the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I am satisfied that the fact finding required in the remaking of this appeal is extensive and accordingly I find it appropriate in all the circumstances to remit this appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo.

NOTICE OF DECISION
1. The Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge S Taylor involved the making of a material error of law.
2. I set aside the Decision of Judge S Taylor in its entirety, with no findings of fact preserved.
3. I remit this appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo by any Judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge S Taylor.

D. Clarke
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 August 2026