The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002016
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66478/2023
Case No: UI-2026-002020
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64886/2024
Case No: UI-2026-002018
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64889/2024
Case No: UI-2026-002019
First-tier Tribunal No: PA64888/2024
Case No: UI-2026-002017
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64890/2024


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Decision & Reasons Issued:

4th November 2026


Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON

Between

EK
SM
LK
NK
TK
(ANONYMITY ORDERS MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms D Revill of Counsel, instructed by Shawstone Associates
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellants.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellants appeal with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Wass promulgated on 1 December 2025, in which the Appellants’ appeal against the decisions to refuse their protection claims was dismissed. The Respondent’s decision in relation to the First Appellant is dated 8 December 2023 and in relation to the Second Appellant is dated 9 May 2024; with the Third to Fifth Appellants dependent on the Second Appellant’s claim (although it also refers to the First Appellant as a dependent on this claim despite his separate claim and decision). There are a number of additional appeal references applicable to these appeals, generated because of the split permission to appeal decisions, which are UI-2026-001688, UI-2026-001690, UI-2026-001693, UI-2026-001695 and UI-2026-001698. A composite bundle was prepared, although it did not contain all of the relevant material for all Appellants, instead containing those primarily relevant to the Second to Fifth Appellants only. The remaining relevant documents were accessible during the hearing (and after) from the First-tier Tribunal case management system and courtesy of Ms Ahmad who provided some of the documents by email shortly before the hearing.
2. The Appellants are nationals of Georgia. The First and Second Appellants are husband and wife, the remaining Appellants are their minor children. The First Appellant sought entry clearance to the United Kingdom as a Tier 5 (Temporary Worker) Seasonal Worker on 26 June 2021, which was refused on 8 July 2021. He then left Georgia on 10 August 2021 and travelled to the United Kingdom without entry clearance, arriving on 22 August 2021 and claimed asylum on the same day. The Second to Fifth Appellants left Georgia on 7 July 2022, arrived in the United Kingdom on 10 July 2022 and claimed asylum the same day.
3. In essence, the First Appellant’s protection claim was based on a fear of return to Georgia on the basis that he had received adverse attention for supporting the LGBT community (which he did not claim to be a member of himself). The First Appellant stated that he attended an LGBT demonstration on 5 July 2021, during which he was assaulted by people opposing the demonstration and at which the police did not protect him. He claimed that there was a further attack in the middle of July 2021 at his farm, which may have been because of his brother’s participation in local elections of the LGBT demonstration.
4. The Respondent refused the application the basis that she did not consider the First Appellant to have provided a credible claim, because he had given inconsistent evidence without reasonable explanation and his claim lacked detail. For example, the First Appellant had been unable to provide details of who organised a demonstration he claimed to have attended; how many people participated in it; who he was targeted by and why he would have any profile as an LGBT community supporter having attended only one event. The First Appellant’s further claim to have been attacked on his farm was considered to be lacking in detail, with no date provided and no information about the people who he claims assaulted him. The Respondent also considered the First Appellant’s credibility to have been damaged by section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.), Act 2004 for failing to claim asylum in a safe country on route to the United Kingdom. The Respondent did not accept that the First Appellant was at a real risk of persecution if returned to Georgia because there was a lack of any evidence of any influence of the people he feared and no reason why the police would be unwilling or unable to offer protection to him, such that there will be a sufficiency of protection available and also the option of internal relocation. For these reasons the protection claim was refused. The Respondent also refused the First Appellant’s claim on private and family life grounds and considered that there were no exceptional or compassionate circumstances to warrant a grant of leave to remain outside of the Immigration Rules. The First Appellant claimed to have suffered from tuberculosis in the past and to have a problem with his vision, however, treatment would be available on return as needed.
5. In essence, the Second Appellant’s protection claim was based on a fear of return to Georgia from members of the Georgia Dream party because of her own and her brother-in-law’s support and political activities for the Gakharia for Georgia party. The Second Appellant claimed that she had been verbally threatened several times in Georgia and she fears that she will be hurt and/or the Third to Fifth Appellants kidnapped.
6. The Respondent refused the Second Appellant’s application on the basis that it was not accepted that either she or her brother-in-law were members of the Gakharia for Georgia party; nor that she had been of any adverse attention from the Georgia Dream party. The reasons for this were that the Second Appellant had given inconsistent evidence without reasonable explanation and there was a lack of detail in her claim. The Respondent had been unable to verify the Second Appellant’s brother-in-law’s membership or role in the Gakharia for Georgia party, nor has she supplied any evidence of the same. The identity of those who the Second Appellant claimed had threatened her, was considered to be no more than speculation. Further, the Respondent noted that the Second Appellant had remained in Georgia for some 10 months after the first threat, which was inconsistent with her claimed fear, as was the lack of any threats against any other family members in Georgia. The Second Appellant’s credibility was also considered to be damaged by section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 because the Second Appellant did not claim asylum in a safe third country on route to the United Kingdom. In any event, the Respondent relied on the Georgia Country Policy and Information Note on Political Parties and Affiliation from December 2023 which held that in general, protesters, journalists, supporters and members of opposition political parties, and/or their family members, are unlikely to be subject to treatment that is sufficiently serious, by its nature or repetition, to amount to persecution or serious harm. For these reasons the asylum claim, humanitarian protection claim and any claim under Articles 2 and/or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights was refused. The Respondent also refused the claim on family and private life grounds both under the Immigration Rules and outside of them.
7. Judge Wass dismissed the appeal in a decision promulgated on 1 December 2025 on all grounds. I return to the detail of that decision where necessary below, but in summary, the Judge found the Appellants’ claims not to be credible and that they would not be at risk on return to Georgia. In respect of the First Appellant, the First-tier Tribunal found his credibility to be damaged by (i) an implausible account of why he applied for entry clearance in 2021; (ii) an account of attending an LGBT march which was inconsistent with background country evidence in the CPIN ‘Georgia: Sexual orientation and gender identity and expression’ version 2.0 September 2024 (the “CPIN”) that did not go ahead; (iii) an inconsistent account of who attacked him at the LGBT protest; (iv) inconsistent accounts as to threats and risk from his brother’s involvement in opposition politics in Georgia and as to an attack on 12 July 2021; and (v) by failing to mention any threats to wider family members and his membership of the Gakharia for Georgia party. The Second Appellant’s credibility was also found to have been damaged by (i) her inconsistent account as to who the First Appellant was attacked by at the LGBT protest; (ii) inconsistency and implausibility of her claim to be at risk due to her brother-in-law’s political activities; and (iii) by failing to mention any threats to wider family members. The documentary evidence relied upon was given little weight and although the expert’s credentials were accepted as was his report as to political harassment; his report was inconsistent with part of the Second Appellant’s claim about lawful employment and political activity. For these reasons the protection appeals were dismissed and for the same reasons, the appeals on humanitarian protection grounds were also dismissed. The Appellants did not pursue an appeal on Article 8 grounds and there were therefore no findings or decision on private and/or family life.
The appeal
8. The Appellants appeal on the following five grounds, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in:
(i) failing to have regard to material matters when deciding to admit evidence adduced late by the Respondent;
(ii) making irrational findings on objective evidence regarding the First Appellant’s attendance at Pride;
(iii) adopting a procedurally unfair approach by failing to put her interpretation of the objective evidence to the First Appellant;
(iv) making a material error of fact as to the consistency of the First Appellant’s evidence on the attack at his farm; and
(v) making a material error of fact as to the consistency of the Second Appellant’s evidence with the expert report.
9. In relation to the first ground of appeal, it was submitted on behalf of the Appellants that the Judge failed to exercise her discretion to admit late documents lawfully and in accordance with the decision in Maleci (Non-admission of late evidence) [2024] UKUT 00028 (IAC), which adopted the approach of the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for the Home Department v SS (Congo) and others [2015] EWCA Civ 387. There were three material elements to consider, first the seriousness or significance of the failure; secondly whether there was a good reason for the default; and thirdly the importance of procedural rigour. Ms Revill submitted that the First-tier Tribunal had failed to expressly consider any of these factors and on the facts, the breach was significant as the evidence was uploaded the evening before the hearing; there was no reason given at all for its lateness and that breaches of procedural rigour should not be overlooked in accordance with paragraphs 1.2, 4.2, 5.1 and 5.3 of the Practice Direction dated 1 November 2024. These were matters which would have justified the evidence being excluded and the failure to have regard to them led to procedural unfairness which impacted on the outcome of the appeal, notwithstanding the Appellant’s ability to give instructions and evidence on it because the evidence was used to form the basis of an adverse credibility finding. Ms Revill submitted that the mere fact that there is no detriment or disadvantage to a party by admitting late evidence does not mean that the evidence should be admitted without considering the need for procedural rigour.
10. Ms Revill submitted that if an error was found on this ground, it would be material taking into account this adverse credibility finding holistically and as a matter of principle, if there is procedural unfairness to a party by admitting late evidence, there is prima facie an unfair hearing and any decision based upon it becomes written in water. Further, if an error of law was found and the appeal needed to be re-made, Ms Revill submitted that it would not be inevitable that the late evidence would be admitted and it would make the Practice Directions redundant if a party could simply get round reliance on late evidence through such a process and to do so would undermine the system, showing that a failure to comply with directions would not be serious or have consequences.
11. In response, the Respondent’s position is that in accordance with the Practice Direction, the late admission of evidence is a matter for the Judge and in these appeals, the appropriate factors were considered and it was open to the Judge to admit the documents given that the late evidence was brief, went to a core issue in dispute, noted that the documents were relevant to the issue of credibility and allowances were made to ensure the First Appellant could respond to the evidence and no adjournment was sought. In these circumstances, it was open to the Judge to find that it was in the interests of justice to admit the evidence. Ms Ahmed submitted that this ground of appeal was a matter of form over substance and there was nothing to suggest the Judge had not properly considered all relevant factors, even if not expressly stated. In any event, the decision expressly records matters relevant to seriousness and the lack of reason for lateness, as well as the lack of detriment to the Appellant and an overall consideration of what was in the interests of justice. Ms Ahmed submitted that even if the First-tier Tribunal erred as a matter of process, it would not be material to the outcome of the appeal in the absence of any prejudice to the Appellants. Finally, if the matter were re-heard in the future, there would not be any basis upon which admission of the evidence could now be opposed as there would likely be additional evidence from both parties in any event.
12. Ms Ahmed also noted that in the course of these appeals, the Respondent was not the only party in breach of standard directions. The Respondent had filed her review for the First Appellant’s appeal before he had filed his bundle as required, which was in fact not filed until over a year after the review on 22 August 2025. The Respondent’s late evidence followed the First Appellant’s very late bundle and after the deadline had originally been missed, the Respondent expressly reserved her position in relation to any further evidence and could not practically be under a continuous obligation to monitor for late evidence from the Appellant. Ms Ahmed was however unable to specifically state whether the further three pieces of evidence relating to the entry clearance application were actually in response to anything in the First Appellant’s own late evidence, or if so, what.
13. Ms Revill stated that the First Appellants’ own failure to comply with directions for an extended period of time was (a) not relied upon by the Respondent or the First-tier Tribunal, and (b) the Respondent’s conduct was worse in any event. She did accept that there was no substantive unfairness at the hearing in admitting the late evidence, but that the First Appellant was still a victim of unfairness because it was evidence relied on against him.
14. In relation to the second ground of appeal, the First-tier Tribunal relied on paragraph 9.4.1 of the CPIN which although stated that the event on 5 July 2021 was cancelled, it did not go so far as to say that it was cancelled before the event had started nor that cancellation prevented any gathering taking place. The following paragraph in the CPIN referred to 53 victims being identified, suggesting that activists and supporters had gathered before the violence that led to the cancellation; which was consistent with the First Appellant’s claim and not, as found, contrary to it. Ms Revill submitted that the only rational interpretation of the CPIN was that the march started and then stopped, which his consistent with the First Appellant’s account.
15. In the alternative, the third ground of appeal is that there was in any event a procedural unfairness because the Judge had not put her interpretation of the CPIN evidence to the First Appellant to respond to and fairness had required the point to be raised.
16. Taking these grounds together, the Respondent’s position is that there was no misunderstanding of the CPIN evidence which referred to the organisers stating that taking to the streets could not take place and the conclusion that this was contrary to the First Appellant’s claim was a rational finding. Fairness did not require anything specific to be put to the First Appellant on the interpretation of the CPIN in circumstances where this formed part of his own case and he had clearly been referred to it. The issue of credibility had been squarely raised by the Respondent and ultimately, the burden is on an appellant to prove their case.
17. In relation to the fourth ground of appeal, it was submitted on behalf of the Appellants that contrary to paragraph 38 of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, the Appellant did not say in interview that the demonstration had not been mentioned, only that he was not asked why he participated in it (question 92) and in paragraph 37, not that his brother was not mentioned at all, but that the First Appellant did not think the attack was because of his brother. On the facts, there was no inconsistency.
18. In response, the Respondent relies on a combination of interview questions and answers, as well as the First Appellant’s oral evidence to support the findings in paragraphs 36 to 38 of the First-tier Tribunal decision. In particular, there is reference to question 92 in which the First Appellant was not asked about why he participated in the demonstration, his response was, “they just insulted me” and at question 75 the First Appellant was asked about how he knew the incident was related to the demonstration to which he said he was called “gay”. The First Appellant’s written evidence that those who beat him knew he had attended the LGBT pride event was inconsistent with his oral evidence that those who attacked him did not tell him why they were beating him and said only, “how dare you, who are you, who are you and your brother to do what you did” and elsewhere in his evidence, the First Appellant stated those who beat him did not say it was because of his brother or the demonstration attended. In these circumstances, it was open to the Judge to find inconsistencies in the account.
19. In relation to the final ground of appeal, it is again submitted that on the facts there was no inconsistency as found in paragraphs 49 to 50 of the First-tier Tribunal decision because the letter referred to was from a colleague, not the Second Appellant’s employers and not therefore from someone who was in a position to dismiss her for political reasons.
20. I asked Ms Revill whether the status of the colleague who wrote a letter in support was relevant given that the Second Appellant’s claim was that she had in any event been specifically threatened due to her political opinions. She noted that this was not the point relied upon by the First-tier Tribunal and would not mean that this ground of appeal was immaterial to the outcome.
21. In response, the Respondent notes that the expert does not make the distinction the Appellants now seeks to draw and there is nothing to suggest the colleague who was aware of the political connections was in confidence with the family and concealed it in order to protect the Second Appellant’s employment. The expert’s evidence was unequivocal and it was rationally open to the Judge to conclude that the Second Appellant’s claim was inconsistent with it.
22. At the end of her submissions, Ms Revill accepted that not all of the adverse credibility findings against the Appellants had been challenged, however that did not affect the materiality of the grounds. Further, she submitted that if an error of law was found in relation to only one of the adult Appellants, that would be relevant to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human rights. Ms Revill accepted that the First-tier Tribunal made no findings on Article 8, but submitted that it could not be a material error on its own if at least one Appellant succeeded in a protection claim. When pushed to confirm whether an appeal was actually pursued on Article 8 grounds, Ms Revill stated that although not in the list of issues identified in the Appellants’ skeleton argument, it was raised orally (and there would be no objection to a transcript being obtained to confirm, although Counsel can be trusted on this point) and in paragraph 2 of the application for permission to appeal and there was no need to raise it as a separate matter as on its own it would not be material.
23. Ms Ahmed confirmed that from the papers, Article 8 had not specifically been pleaded by the Appellants in any of their appeals and it was not possible for her to tell the extent of any submissions made orally before the First-tier Tribunal. Any application now to amend the grounds of permission to appeal for a lack of findings on Article 8 would be opposed given how late this arises only at the end of the Appellants’ submissions, without any opportunity for the Respondent to consider or check how this was raised and would itself lack procedural rigour. The guidance in Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC) would clearly be engaged in these circumstances and it would be wrong to seek to open an Article 8 point now.
Findings and reasons
24. The first ground of appeal concerns the admission of late evidence from the Respondent by the First-to Tribunal. In relation to this, the decision records as follows:
“9. The Respondent sought to adduce items (f) to (h) which had only been uploaded the night before the hearing. Ms Larkai accepted that the documents could have been provided before and were not but submitted that the documents were relevant to the issues of the claim and that it would be in the interests of justice to admit them. Ms Revill opposed their admission. She submitted that the Respondent had been in possession of the documents since 2021 and no reference had been made to them before. No adequate explanation had been given as to why they had been uploaded at such a late stage.
10. Notwithstanding their late service, I considered that it was in the interests of justice to allow their admission. The documents were relevant to the issue of credibility which was the key issue to be considered at the appeal hearing. Ms. Revill had indicated in her submissions that she had been able to take instructions on the documents but I made clear that time would be allowed for further instructions to be taken and questions could be asked in examination in chief about the documents, given that the opportunity had not been given to address them in a witness statement.”
25. Whilst these two paragraphs are relatively brief, they are in my view sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate that the Judge had properly considered, as a matter of their discretion, whether to admit the late evidence. It is clearly recorded that the documents were significantly late, that there had been no reason given for the lateness but that in the Judge’s view, they were relevant and it was in the interests of justice to admit them. In particular, the Judge considered whether there would be any prejudice to the Appellants in doing so and took practical steps to ensure that sufficient time and opportunity was given for instructions to be taken and evidence given in relation to them. I do not consider that the lack of any express reference to procedural rigour or the Practice Directions identifies an error overall in the exercise of discretion in this case, nor that it resulted in any actual procedural unfairness.
26. In the cases relied upon by Ms Revill, there a clear indication of the importance of procedural rigour by parties to litigation in the immigration context and generally, for and I do not in any way detract from the importance of the same when finding that there was no error of law in this case. The importance of those matters does not however prevent late evidence being admitted by a Tribunal and although the importance of procedural rigour could have been reiterated to the parties expressly, in substance it made no difference whether there was express reference to this or not by the Judge when exercising discretion to admit the evidence or not. The admission of late evidence, in all the circumstances of these appeals, was properly open to the Judge to do and there is nothing to suggest he did not have in mind all of the relevant factors when considering the same.
27. In this particular appeal, I would also note that the failure to comply with directions and serve documents on time to the First-tier Tribunal was not solely limited to the Respondent and that the First Appellant delayed in filing his own appeal bundle for a period of over a year, which led to the Respondent’s review being undertaken without access to his appeal documents until relatively shortly before the hearing. If procedural rigour is important as a factor, the compliance of both parties with this is equally important and it would be a relevant consideration that both had failed to comply in different ways. I would note that similarly, the Appellants have failed to provide a complete composite bundle required for the present hearing, the one filed and served missing key relevant documents to the First Appellant which needed to be accessed separately by the parties at the hearing. In these circumstances, it is somewhat ironic for the Appellants to rely so heavily on the importance of procedural rigour and compliance with directions when they have failed to do so themselves and in circumstances where they accept that there was no actual unfairness at the hearing.
28. The first ground of appeal is one of form over substance in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision rather than any error of law which could materially affect the outcome of the appeal. The Appellants accept that there was no unfairness at the hearing itself, in that they were able to respond to the late evidence, both in their own oral evidence and in terms of being able to give instructions to the representative. I do not accept in these circumstances that the mere fact that this evidence was ultimately counted against the First Appellant’s credibility, creates any overriding procedural unfairness as claimed. It seems clear that the matter of principle pursued in this ground of appeal, would not cause any concern whatsoever if the late evidence supported the Appellants’ claims, or was neutral as to their credibility. In any event given the range of other adverse credibility findings against both the First and Second Appellants, the admission of the late evidence and findings made in relation to it, could not have made any material difference to the outcome of the appeal.
29. The second and third grounds the appeal, both concern and issue of whether an LGBT demonstration or march took place on 5 July 2021 or not. The second ground turns on the Judge’s interpretation of paragraph 9.4.1 and following of the CPIN which stated as follows:
“9.4 State response to Pride events
9.4.1 On 5 July 2021, the BBC reported on the violence by far-right protesters against LGBT activists that led to the gay pride event being cancelled:
‘LGBT activists in Georgia have cancelled a gay rights event after their office was stormed by far-right protesters. Journalists and activists were also attacked ahead of the planned march in the capital Tbilisi, local reports say. We cannot risk human lives and take to the streets, which are full of violent attackers,” Tbilisi Pride announced. The attacks have been condemned by number of embassies, who called for authorities to stop the violence.
‘Activists had organised five days of Pride events, but in a statement on Monday, Tbilisi Pride said local authorities had “not only failed to secure safety of the queer community and our supporters but actively hampered us from exercising the right of assembly” ahead of the planned march. At least 20 journalists were reportedly injured in the violence, while an LGBT rainbow flag was burned in the street.
9.4.2 Democracy and freedom watch, a Tbilisi based online newspaper published by the Georgian NGO Journalists for the Future, reporting on democracy and freedom in the Republic of Georgia, noted in a September 2021 article:
‘Ombudsman Nino Lomjaria said 53 people have been identified as victims of the July 5 [anti-LGBTQ rally] gang violence and 27 people have been prosecuted. However, no one has been prosecuted for organising the violence. “Two months have passed since the violent events of July 5, but the Georgian Prosecutor’s office has not launched a criminal prosecution against any person on charges of organising group violence. The Public Defender has studied the videos disseminated by the media and believes that the publicly available evidence reaches the standard of […] to initiate criminal proceedings against two persons for organising and also for publicly inciting violent acts,” said the statement issued by Nino Lomjaria, the ombudsman of Georgia.”
30. The two sources referred to in these paragraphs were footnoted within the report, which provided hyperlinks. The first was the BBC News article, the first part of which was quoted within the report and specifically refers to violence ahead of the planned march (my emphasis). The second was an article from Democracy and Freedom Watch, much of which was quoted within the report and which named an individual who is said to have announced violence against persons participating in the Tbilis Pride events and journalists, and accusing him of directly leading the group violence, including attacks in front of Parliament, as a break-in at the offices of Tbilisi Pride as a youth activist group “Shame”. This article does not directly refer to the cancellation of the march, nor the sequence of events.
31. The First-tier Tribunal’s findings in relation to this evidence and the credibility of the First Appellant’s account of his participation in the march were as follows:
“28. I find that the first Appellant’s evidence is not consistent with the objective evidence. The Appellant stated in his substantive interview at Q.57 […] that the event was a “demonstration held by LGBT people, pride. They were just celebrating, asking to have freedom of speech, and rights.” The First Appellant stated during cross-examination that he was stood next to the LGBT protestors and estimated that there were as many as 10,000 people in attendance. I do not find this to be consistent with the evidence relied upon by Ms Revill in the CPIN – Georgia: Sexual Orientation and gender identity and expression at 9.4.1. That paragraph makes clear that although there was a gay rights event planned as part of pride, it was cancelled after the LGBT activists office was attacked ahead of the planned march with the statement “We cannot risk human lives and take to the streets, which are full of violent attackers” Tbilisi Pride announced.” The objective evidence also noted that journalists and activists were attacked ahead of the planned march. I find that this damages the first Appellant’s credibility.”
32. The findings made by the First-tier Tribunal in relation to the march planned for 5 July 2021 for Tbilisi Pride were entirely consistent with the evidence and sources relied upon in the CPIN quoted above. The sources refer to the violence being ahead of the planned march and it being cancelled in response to that. There is nothing in any of those sources that suggest that any part of the march went ahead, let alone that 10,000 people participated in a march which was cancelled. There is nothing to suggest any violence during the march itself, as opposed to immediately before it which led to its cancellation. It was rationally and lawfully open to the First-tier Tribunal to find that the First Appellant’s account of attending the march and being attacked during it (on which there are separate, unchallenged, adverse credibility findings) was not credible. For these reasons there was no error of law in the second round of appeal.
33. In circumstances where the Respondent had challenged the First Appellant’s credibility, specifically in relation to his claimed attendance at the march and beating during it (although not whether the march took place at all) and where he was cross examined on the detail of his participation and events that day, fairness did not require the Judge to have specifically put to him the parts of this CPIN which the First Appellant had himself put into evidence as inconsistent with his other claims. The Judge was lawfully and rationally entitled to consider all of the evidence about the march in the round and draw the conclusions that they did as to the First Appellant’s credibility. The requirements of fairness are fact specific and on the facts of these particular appeals, there was no breach of fairness, nor any need to directly address the point relied upon in paragraph 28 quoted above. For these reasons there was no error of law in the third ground of appeal.
34. The fourth ground of appeal concerns the credibility of the First Appellant’s claim in relation to the attack on his farm and in particular whether his account of this incident was consistent. The First Appellant’s asylum interview included questions about the attack on his farm in July 2021. At question 75 he was asked how further threats were communicated to him, to which he answered, “I was in my farm, there was a field, when I came out they were there, I met them and they started to insult me and beat me up, and they were asking me if I wanted to live in the city or no, I thought it may be because of my brother they were trying to scare me.” There were two further follow-up questions from the Immigration Officer about how the First Appellant knew that the incident was related to the demonstration and what he had said to them, to which he answered, “When they saw me the first thing they said to me was oh, you gay person, are you gay, they were asking me that.”, and, “what could I reply, I was scared, I was asking them to leave me alone, asked what they wanted, they said they would make my life hell, they will kill me, beat me up.”. The First Appellant said that there were two people at this incident but he could not describe them as they had covers on their faces and it was dark. Later at question 92, the First Appellant was asked if he ever received threats because of his brother (although not specifically tied to the incident on the farm in the question), to which he responded, “those people are not asking me why I was participated in demonstration, they just insulted me, I didn’t give them chance to threat me in the future, maybe they try to use me, to scare him, to tell him about me. I did not give them a chance to use me.”, and in answer to the next question he said that given time he could prove that this was all linked to his brother.
35. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision in relation to this ground, which includes reference to other parts of the First Appellant’s evidence is at paragraphs 35 to 38 as follows:
“35. When the Appellant submits his appeal reasons he states in relation to the threats on 12 July 2021 “I am sure that the people who threated me was from authority because of my brother, as I mentioned he is an active member of opposite parties. In my opinion by using me they wanted to make my brother leave the party another fact is my family, after I left the country they began to threaten my wife using the same message, they insisted ask my brother to leave the party.”
36. In his appeal witness statement at §8 states the Appellant in relation to 12 July 2021 “On this date I was stopped and I was insulted and I was again beaten on this day. I asked why they were beating me and they said that because what I have been doing in the city for the people and because of my party involvement. They said that they knew that I had attended the LGBT pride event and because of my work and support I am going to be killed for this. I told them I was not gay as I was being accused of being one and I was crying asking them to stop beating me.” I find that the Appellant’s witness statement is inconsistent with his substantive interview in that he stated when interviewed as his attendance at the demonstration was not mentioned.
37. In cross-examination it was put to the first Appellant that he could not be certain about the reason behind the attack. He responded that those who attacked him did not tell him why they were beating him. They were swearing at him and saying “how dare you, who are you, who are you and your brother to do what you did”. When it was put to him that this was inconsistent with §8 of his witness statement which contains no mention of his brother the Appellant stated that he definitely mentioned about his brother whilst he was explaining the attack. It was also suggested to the Appellant that this was inconsistent with his response at Q.75 of his interview (although I accept he mentioned his brother in this response). The first Appellant responded that the man who attacked him was speaking in a plural way and that they did not mention it was because of his brother or because of the demonstration he attended. The event was over quickly.
38. I find that the first Appellant’s evidence in relation to the attack which is said to have taken place on 12 July 2021 has been inconsistent. The Appellant has given inconsistent evidence as to whether or not his participation in the demonstration was mentioned, what was said to him and whether or not his brother was mentioned. I find that this establishes credibility.”
36. From the evidence set out above, including that specifically quoted or referred to by the First-tier Tribunal, it is evident that on different occasions, the First Appellant gave a different account of what happened on his farm on 12 July 2021 and whether the threats were because of his brother, because of his participation in the LGBT March or because he himself was gay. Although the totality of the First Appellant’s evidence seem to link this incident both to his brother’s political activity and to his own support for the LGBT community, his answers did not consistently identify this in the same way on each occasion and he gave a different account of what was, or was not said to him at different times. Whilst it could be said that there was overlap between the First Appellant’s different answers and statements, there were clear differences between the answers that he gave on different occasions and I do not find that the First-tier Tribunal made any mistake of fact, nor any mistake in finding that there were such inconsistencies. The finding that there were such inconsistencies, was one which was lawfully rationally open to the First-tier Tribunal when considering all the evidence before it in the round in relation to this particular claim from the First Appellant. There is no error of law on the fourth ground of appeal.
37. The final ground of appeal concerns the consistency of the Second Appellant’s evidence in relation to her employment whilst being a political opponent against the view of the country expert that such employment would not be available or would be terminated for reasons of political opinion.
38. In her written statement before the First-tier Tribunal, the Second Appellant stated that after the First Appellant left Georgia, there were two specific incidents during which she and her children were directly threatened and during which she was told to give up her brother-in-law and stop being a supporter of the Gakharia for Georgia party. The Second Appellant had joined the party at the same time her brother-in-law did in 2021.
39. The country expert report by Alexander Kupatadze includes an assessment of risk to those holding political views contrary to the governing authorities of being dismissed from public office or excluded from initial hiring process. The risk extends not just to political activists but also their associates and relatives who are often deemed suspicious and who are routinely barred from public service employment. If such connections are discovered during employment, the employee is swiftly dismissed. He concluded in the section that the Second Appellant and her family would not be able to secure legal employment in Georgia.
40. The First-tier Tribunal’s findings on this were as follows:
“49. In submissions Ms Larkai noted that the report concluded that no legal job would be available to the Appellants but that this was inconsistent with the second Appellant having maintained her job. At s21 of the report Mr Kupatadze states that relatives of politically active individuals are often deemed suspicious and routinely barred from public service employment. He states “If such connections are discovered during employment, the employee is swiftly dismissed.” He concludes at s22 that “It can be stated with the utmost certainty that [the Second Appellant] or his family would not be able to secure legal employment.”
50. I give weight to the submission made on behalf of the Respondent. The second Appellant maintained public service employment as a teacher until she left for the UK. The letter she relies upon from a colleague makes it clear that they were aware of her political affiliation. I find her account is inconsistent with the expert evidence and undermines her credibility. I accept that the report makes it clear that political harassment occurs in Georgia and I will consider this as part of my overall evaluation.”
41. I find the First-tier Tribunal’s findings in the paragraphs quoted immediately above were lawfully and rationally open to it on the evidence available. Whether or not the letter from a colleague was from someone in a position of authority with the power to dismiss the Second Appellant, considering the evidence as a whole the Second Appellant’s claim rests on others knowing of her brother-in-law’s political activity (if not her own political activity as well) and this of itself within the expert view be sufficient for her dismissal as her political views were known. The Second Appellant however continued in her public employment as a teacher for a not insignificant amount of time before leaving for the United Kingdom and contrary to the expert’s view, was not dismissed for political reasons. It was in the circumstances entirely rational to conclude that her claim was inconsistent with the expert evidence. For these reasons there is no error of law the final ground of appeal either and in any event, it would be incredibly difficult to see that this relatively small adverse credibility finding could be material against the others made..
42. In circumstances where I have not found any errors of law on any of the grounds of appeal identified by the Appellants, there is no requirement to deal in any detail with the Appellants’ submissions in relation to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, I would note that there was both no express appeal on Article 8 grounds before the First-tier Tribunal at all, nor was there an express ground of appeal to the Upper Tribunal, even in reliance on success in any of the grounds of appeal dealing with the protection claims, on Article 8 grounds either. The passing reference in the introductory paragraphs to the grounds of appeal was far from sufficient to raise this as a ground to be determined, even as a consequence of an otherwise successful appeal and I would not in any event have entertained it as such. To do so, when it had not been pursued as an issue in the First-tier Tribunal would be directly contrary to the principles set out in Lata.

Notice of Decision

The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is not necessary to set aside the decision.

The decision to dismiss the appeals is therefore confirmed.


G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29th October 2026