The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002021
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64361/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3 November 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BIBI

Between

PT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Duffy, Immigration Advisor, instructed by Firani Taylor Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 23 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dated 11 February 2026 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 27 November 2023 to refuse his protection and human rights claim made on 5 July 2018.

2. No challenge is made to the FtT's dismissal of the appeal on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds. The sole ground of appeal is that the FtT erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction to consider an Article 8 argument advanced on the basis of the appellant’s recent marriage to TG, a Nepalese citizen with refugee status.

3. Permission to appeal was granted by the FtT in a decision dated 22 April 2026. No rule 24 response was submitted by the respondent; however, Ms Ahmed did submit a skeleton argument for consideration at the hearing, as did Mr Duffy.

4. The representatives supplemented their written arguments with oral submissions. Whilst we refer below only to such matters as necessary to understand our decision, we took into account the written and oral submissions and the materials to which they referred in their entirety.

Background

5. The relevant background can be summarised thus. As recorded above, the appellant claimed asylum on 5 July 2018. He claimed that he would be at risk of harm on return to Nepal from his ex-father-in-law and the Nepalese police. He did not at the time rely on any family life established in the United Kingdom, having divorced in 2011 from the wife whom he accompanied to the country. The claim was a protection claim as defined in s82(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act).

6. The appellant’s claim was refused on 27 November 2023. The refusal noted that the appellant had not informed the respondent that he had a partner, dependent children or other dependent relatives in the United Kingdom. The respondent did consider whether the appellant satisfied the private life provisions of the Immigration Rules and concluded that he did not and, additionally, that there were no exceptional compassionate circumstances to his case. That was a refusal against which there was a right to appeal to the FtT pursuant to s82(1)(a) of the 2002 Act.

7. The appellant appealed on 8 December 2023. As is the case with reformed appeals before the FtT, the appellant was required only to indicate the statutory ground of appeals relied upon, but not the factual basis for those grounds. The appellant indicated that he was appealing on the grounds that removing him from the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom's obligations in relation to persons eligible for a grant of humanitarian protection (s84(1)(b) of the 2002 Act) and that removing him from the United Kingdom would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (s84(1)(c) of the 2002 Act). The fact that the appellant did not indicate until later that he was appealing also on the ground that removing him from the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom's obligations under the Refugee Convention (s84(1)(a) of the 2002 Act) is not a matter that need concern us, the dismissal of the appeal on protection grounds not being in issue.

8. The factual basis underlying the statutory grounds of appeal are, in reformed cases, set out in the appeal skeleton argument (ASA) (or ‘explanation of case’, where the appellant is unrepresented), directions for which are given after receipt of the respondent’s bundle (see paragraphs 7.6 and 7.10 respectively of the Senior President of Tribunals’ Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal dated 1 November 2024).

9. In the instant case, the respondent’s bundle was uploaded on 5 February 2024, and the appellant was ordered on 25 April 2024 to upload his ASA and evidence by 23 May 2024. Having failed to do so, the appellant was ordered on 24 September 2024 to upload his ASA and evidence by 1 October 2024. He uploaded the evidence upon which he intended to rely on 30 September 2024 but no ASA.

10. The evidence dealt, amongst other things, with a claimed relationship with TG. An ASA was subsequently drafted by Counsel on 8 October 2024 and uploaded on 11 October 2024 which, in addition to addressing the appellant’s protection grounds and his private life, included the following family life submissions at paragraph 31:

‘In similar vein, the A met his new partner in December 2023. [TG] is a Nepalese national and a refugee in this country, born on 31 August 1980. They planned to get married lawfully in July 2024, but this was cancelled due to lack of valid ID by the A. Nonetheless, they have been residing together since what appears to be early 2024 (see photos at [AB/61-64]). A thus developed family life in this country that he otherwise would not have developed if a prompt decision had been reached by the Respondent. While it is accepted that for the present time the relationship is non-qualifying, the Tribunal is to note that [TG] cannot relocate to Nepal because she is a recognised refugee; the effect of that would be that family life between the two would be terminated and the Tribunal ought to also consider [TG]’s Article 8 ECHR rights in this appeal.’

11. The respondent uploaded her review of the appeal on 18 February 2025. In respect of the appellant’s family life submissions and evidence, the respondent said:

‘21. It is also noted that the ASA remarks on the A having started a relationship in the UK with [TG]. [ASA, Pg 8, Para 31] It is noted that a Witness Statement from [TG] has been provided [AB, Pg 19-23] along with eleven photographs of the A and [TG]. [AB, Pg 61-64]

22. This aspect of the A’s claim is noted, however, the R submits that the A has not demonstrated this relationship to be genuine and subsisting. The R submits that the A has only provided a witness statement from his partner and some photographs, and this does not discharge the burden of proof demonstrating the relationship to be genuine. It is acknowledged that it is in the gift of the A whether [TG] is called as a witness, however, it is expected that the PO will seek to cross-examine [TG] on the relationship.’

12. The appellant uploaded an addendum skeleton argument on 21 January 2026. Its opening paragraph said:

‘1. This addendum raises a new matter within the meaning of section 85(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, namely the Appellant’s lawful marriage to a Nepalese national who has been granted refugee status in the United Kingdom.’

13. It invited the respondent to consent to the FtT considering the marriage or alternatively to agree an adjournment in order to consider the marriage for herself. The ASA argued that consent would be in accordance with the respondent’s own guidance (‘Rights of Appeal’, version 17.0, published on 30 September 2025). The addendum skeleton argument then made substantive submissions on Article 8 family life within and outside the Immigration Rules.

14. The FtT’s consideration of the consequential jurisdictional issue is set out at [31] and [77]-[81]:

‘31. The appellant’s representative sought permission for a new matter to be considered as part of the appeal, namely that the appellant was now married since 2 May 2025 to a Nepalese national who had been granted refugee status in the United Kingdom. The respondent’s representative refused to give consent to this new matter being considered as part of the appeal. I address my findings in relation to this issue below.

…

• Can the Tribunal determine the appellant’s new matter?

77. Firstly, I note that the appellant’s representative accepts that the issue in relation to the appellant’s marriage to ‘TG’ on 2 May 2025 is a ‘new matter’ and one that post-dates that respondent’s decision letter.

78. Secondly, I note that in the respondent’s review, the respondent acknowledged that the appellant now claims to have started a relationship with ‘TG’ in the United Kingdom (see [21] and [22] of the respondent’s review on page 300 of SB1).

79. Thirdly, in oral submissions, the respondent’s representative expressly confirmed that the respondent did not give consent to the new matter to be considered as part of the current appeal.

80. In the reported case of Mahmud (S. 85 NIAA 2002 – 'new matters') [2017] UKUT 00488 (IAC) it was held (emphasis added):

29. A matter is the factual substance of a claim. A ground of appeal is the legal basis on which the facts in any given matter could form the basis of a challenge to the decision under appeal. For example, medical evidence of a serious health condition could be a matter which constitutes a ground of appeal on human rights grounds based on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which if breached, would mean that removal would be contrary to section 6 of the Human Rights Act, a ground of appeal in section 84(2) of the 2002 Act. Similarly, evidence of a relationship with a partner in the United Kingdom could be a matter which constitutes a ground of appeal based on Article 8 and for the same reasons could fall within section 84(2) of the 2002 Act as if made out, removal would be contrary to section 6 of the Human Rights Act.

……

33. The second part of construction with which we have to deal is the meaning of consent in section 85(5) of the 2002 Act. A Tribunal may consider new matters if the Secretary of State has given the Tribunal consent to do so.

……

36. First, we express caution in using procedure rules as an aid to statutory construction generally and specifically for the purpose construing the meaning of 'consent' in section 85(5) of the 2002 Act. The procedure rules govern the procedure to be applied to matters that are before the Tribunal to determine in an appeal, whereas in the present situation, the effect of section 85(5) is that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider a new matter. Procedure rules governing determination of an appeal can therefore offer little if any assistance on the interpretation of statute which determines the jurisdiction of the Tribunal itself. Secondly, we do not consider that rule 24 contains any such mandatory requirement on the Respondent in relation to consent for new matters. Thirdly, in any event, it would be contrary to the clear language in section 85(5) requiring the Secretary of State to have given consent, to find that by means of procedural rules, deemed consent can be inferred by inaction. Section 85(5) of the 2002 Act requires actual consent by the Respondent which cannot be deemed or implied.

81. I am satisfied that the respondent expressly confirmed that consent has not been given to consider the ‘new matter’. As such, I find that I do not have jurisdiction to consider it as part of this appeal.’

15. Beyond the new matter, the sole Article 8 issues identified by the FtT at [27] were, ‘Are there very significant obstacles to the appellant’s return to Nepal? Will there be unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant?’, and under that subheading in its consideration, the FtT stated at [91], ‘I take into account that the appellant has friends and a private life in the United Kingdom’, and further at [93], ‘I take account that I have no jurisdiction to consider the ‘new matter’ as detailed above.’ Therefore, whilst the stated ‘new matter’ was the appellant’s recent marriage to TG, it appears that the FtT gave no consideration to their relationship at all.

The Parties’ Respective Cases

16. The appellant’s grounds of appeal challenge the FtT’s conclusion that the marriage was in fact a ‘new matter’, asserting that the appellant’s representative’s concession to that effect was wrongly made, and that the FtT was obliged to decide for itself whether it had jurisdiction to consider the matter, irrespective of the parties’ positions. That stance is reiterated in Mr Duffy’s skeleton argument. In his oral submissions, Mr Duffy accepted that the couple’s relationship had been a new matter before it had been considered in the review, but argued that it was not thereafter a new matter. Consequently, the marriage was not a new matter but merely further evidence of the already considered relationship. That was one of the paradigms considered in Mahmud at [31] (see below).

17. In the alternative, Mr Duffy submitted that the respondent had in fact consented to the relationship being considered by the FtT, by virtue of having substantively considered the matter herself in the review. He argued that the grounds of appeal, read holistically, were drafted sufficiently widely to include such an alternative argument.

18. Ms Ahmed submitted that the appellant had not applied for permission to withdraw his concession that the marriage was a new matter, and should not be permitted so to do. Consequently, the FtT made no error of law. The grounds pleaded no error in the FtT’s finding that consent had not been given; in any event, it was clear that consent had been withheld. The review did not give express consent, which Mahmud makes clear is necessary. Thus, the appeal failed even if the appellant’s alternative argument was permitted.

Consideration

19. It appears to us that the following are the issues we need to determine:

a. Given the appellant’s concession that the marriage was a new matter, was it an error of law for the FtT so to find?
b. Further or alternatively, should the appellant be permitted to withdraw that concession?
c. Was the marriage actually a new matter?
d. Was the underlying relationship a new matter?
e. Was consent given to consider either of those matters?
f. If consent was given prior to the hearing, did the presenting officer’s purported withholding of consent act to withdraw the earlier consent?
g. If we find an error of law, what is the appropriate disposal?

Given the appellant’s concession that the marriage was a new matter, was it an error of law for the FtT so to find?

20. Section 85 of the 2002 Act provides as follows:

85 Matters to be considered

(1) An appeal under section 82(1) against a decision shall be treated by the Tribunal as including an appeal against any decision in respect of which the appellant has a right of appeal under section 82(1).
(2) If an appellant under section 82(1) makes a statement under section 120, the Tribunal shall consider any matter raised in the statement which constitutes a ground of appeal of a kind listed in section 84 against the decision appealed against.
(3) Subsection (2) applies to a statement made under section 120 whether the statement was made
before or after the appeal was commenced.
(4) On an appeal under section 82(1) against a decision the Tribunal may consider any matter which it thinks relevant to the substance of the decision, including a matter arising after the date of the decision.
(5) But the Tribunal must not consider a new matter unless the Secretary of State has given the
Tribunal consent to do so.
(6) A matter is a “new matter” if—
(a) it constitutes a ground of appeal of a kind listed in section 84, and
(b) the Secretary of State has not previously considered the matter in the context of—
(i) the decision mentioned in section 82(1), or
(ii) a statement made by the appellant under section 120.

21. A vice-presidential panel of the Upper Tribunal held in Mahmud (S. 85 NIAA 2002 – ‘new matters’) [2017] UKUT 00488 (IAC) at [42] that:

‘The Respondent accepts that her view in any particular case as to whether a matter is a ‘new matter’ is not determinative of the issue, nor must it be accepted by the First-tier Tribunal. Whether something is or is not a ‘new matter’ goes to the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal in the appeal and the First-tier Tribunal must therefore determine for itself the issue.’

22. It follows that the FtT is equally unbound by the appellant’s view on the point, even if adverse to his own case. Consequently, if the marriage was not a new matter, then the FtT’s decision is no less erroneous because the appellant conceded that it was.

Further or alternatively, should the appellant be permitted to withdraw that concession?

23. Section 85(4) prohibits consideration of a matter without the respondent’s consent if the matter meets the definition in s85(6). In other words, the jurisdictional question before us is a matter of precedent fact. Therefore, our task is not to consider whether it was reasonably open to the FtT to conclude that it lacked jurisdiction but rather to decide the matter for ourselves (see the dicta of Lord Fraser in R (on the application of Khawaja) v SSHD [1984] AC 74 at 97F).

24. Consequently, we are similarly unbound by the appellant’s concession and so the question is moot. However, for the sake of completeness, we remind ourselves of what was held in MH (Appendix EU; withdrawal of concession) Albania [2025] UKUT 351 (IAC) at [55]:

‘Having considered the leading authorities in this field, we are satisfied that the following (non-exhaustive) matters are to be considered when an application is made to withdraw a concession:

I. The touchstone for considering whether a party should be permitted to withdraw a concession remains the existence of good reasons. This is inseparable from the overall interests of justice and fairness.

II. The assessment of whether there are good reasons must now be seen through the prism of the recent procedural sea change in this jurisdiction in relation to issues-based reasoning. Tribunal judges depend on, and can legitimately expect, the parties (particularly where a specialist advocate appears on their behalf) to have a firm understanding of their respective factual and legal cases. Consistent with the Senior President of Tribunal’s Practice Direction, that expectation only hardens where a concession is made at a substantive hearing where a professional advocate can be presumed to have fully digested the evidence and to have a working knowledge of the applicable legal principles. A judge may enquire as to the basis on which a concession has been made, but is under no duty to investigate the settled position of a party.

III. It will generally be more difficult for a party to establish good reason to withdraw a concession which was founded on an evaluative assessment of facts or evidence, for example, a concession that an appellant is a broadly credible witness. An exception to this general approach may be where the concession relates to an objective assessment of risk of persecution or serious harm on return to the country of origin.

IV. An application to withdraw a concession may be more readily found to encompass good reasons if the concession has resulted in a decision which is demonstrably wrong in law. An example may be where a concession has resulted in a manifestly incorrect interpretation of the relevant Immigration Rules.

V. In the assessment of whether good reasons exist, prejudice to the party who benefitted from the concession is always to be considered. Prejudice will generally harden over time and particularly if an appeal has been wholly decided on the strength of a concession. A concession which effectively disposes of an appeal is an important factor weighing against the existence of good reasons. The withdrawal of such a wholesale concession will often involve significant prejudice to the affected party and the wider interests of justice because it necessarily undermines the principle of finality and legal certainty in final decisions of the tribunal. In adversarial proceedings, the considered position of a party not to contest an appeal weighs heavily. Where there is no prejudice, justice may require a concession to be withdrawn if it should never have been made (Davoodipanah) but bad faith is likely to prove fatal to any application (NR (Jamaica)).

VI. The party seeking to withdraw a concession is under a procedural duty to clearly and expeditiously apply for the tribunal’s permission to do so and must clearly set out their claimed good reasons which will necessarily involve a clear articulation of why the concession was made (supported by evidence if not agreed between the parties), why the concession was wrong and the extent of any prejudice.

VII. If it is decided at a substantive hearing that good reasons exist to permit the withdrawal of a concession, consideration must be given to whether it remains fair to proceed to hear the appeal on the appointed date. In assessing the fairness of proceeding, regard must be had to whether the other party has had sufficient opportunity to meet the case against them as it stands upon the withdrawal of the concession.

VIII. Although not an issue arising in this case, in deciding whether a decision involves a material error of law, the Upper Tribunal will not lightly interfere with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal not to permit, or to permit, the withdrawal of a concession. The overall public interest and the implications of a concession being allowed to stand may be relevant to whether a good reason exists (CD (Jamaica)).’

25. In the instant case, it is clearly in the interests of justice that the FtT proceeded on the correct jurisdictional basis in this case and does so in future cases. Furthermore, it is the FtT’s obligation to satisfy itself of the correct jurisdictional position irrespective of the parties’ apparent agreement on the issue. The concession, that a marriage is a new matter vis a vis an existing relationship, was mistaken (see below). No prejudice is caused to the respondent in correcting any such error. The application for permission to appeal necessarily constituted an application to withdraw the concession. The respondent has been well aware of the appellant’s intention to withdraw the concession and was able adequately to address the point.

26. Consequently, and to the extent it is necessary to do so, we grant permission to the appellant to withdraw his concession that his marriage to TG was a new matter.

Was the marriage a new matter?

27. The Upper Tribunal said in Mahmud at [31] (to which specific paragraph, regrettably, the FtT did not direct itself):

‘Practically, a new matter is a factual matrix which has not previously been considered by the Secretary of State in the context of the decision in section 82(1) or a statement made by the appellant under section 120. This requires the matter to be factually distinct from that previously raised by an appellant, as opposed to further or better evidence of an existing matter. The assessment will always be fact sensitive. By way of example, evidence that a couple had married since the decision is likely to be new evidence but not a new matter where the relationship had previously been relied upon and considered by the Secretary of State. Conversely, evidence that a couple had had a child since the decision is likely to be a new matter as it adds an additional distinct new family relationship (with consequential requirements to consider the best interests of the child under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009) which itself could separately raise or establish a ground of appeal under Article 8 that removal would be contrary to section 6 of the Human Rights Act.’

28. The appellant had raised in his ASA: his relationship with TG since December 2023; their cohabiting since early 2023; their intention to marry in July 2024 cancelled because of the appellant’s lack of valid identity documentation; TG’s inability to return to Nepal; and the consequential termination of family life if the appellant were removed. The ASA accepted that the relationship was not at that time a ‘qualifying relationship’ (presumably under Appendix FM) but relied on it nevertheless for Article 8 purposes. Therefore, the couple’s relationship had been raised in the ASA as a basis on which it was said that the appellant’s removal would constitute a disproportionate interference in his right to respect for family and private life. The respondent had in her review declined to accept that the relationship was genuine and subsisting. It can properly be said therefore that the marriage was mere further evidence of an existing matter said to constitute a ground of appeal, rather than an entirely new and separate such matter. In other words, the marriage fell within the paradigm identified in Mahmud at [31] and so was a new matter if, but only if, the underlying relationship was a new matter.

Was the underlying relationship a new matter?

29. The first thing to note, albeit as an aside, is that the appellant did not concede before the FtT that the appellant’s relationship with TG was a new matter, or certainly not one for which consent had been withheld. Prior to the hearing, we ourselves had some doubt that the relationship could be anything other than a new matter and probed the point with Mr Duffy. However, ultimately, we understood that he went no further than accepting that it had been a new matter before the review.

30. Even if it could be said that he had gone further and had accepted that it continued thereafter to be a new matter, albeit one for which consent had been given for its consideration, we would now consider that to be a concession incorrectly made and not one we could accept. We reach that conclusion for the following reasons.

31. The definition of new matter was considered in Ajmal & Hooi (new matter – “considered” – Reg 9(6)(b)) [2025] UKUT 379 (IAC), albeit in the context of the corresponding (but materially identical) provisions of the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020. The Upper Tribunal held at [79] that the analysis on the point in the previously reported decision of Ayoola (previously considered matters) [2024] UKUT 143 (IAC) was ‘manifestly wrong’ and should not be followed. Instead, a matter will be a ‘new matter’ if the SSHD has not previously given deliberate thought to it in the context of the decision appealed against or a statement made under s120 (see [71] and [79]).

32. Ajmal & Hooi did not expressly consider the meaning of ‘in the context of’. In that case (unlike the one before us), there had been no substantive consideration at all of the two appellants’ Article 8 claims. However, we are clear that consideration of a matter within the respondent’s review in a reformed appeal is consideration of that matter ‘in the context of the decision under appeal’. The context of the procedural steps in an appeal is manifestly the decision under appeal.

33. We are fortified in that conclusion by what the Upper Tribunal said in Mahmud at [38] in response to a submission that a failure by the respondent to indicate in her rule 24 response to the appeal her opposition to a new matter and give grounds for that opposition gave rise to deemed consent to the FtT to consider the matter (our emphasis):

‘Further it appears that if the Respondent had made a statement pursuant to rule 24, the effect would inevitably be that the matter would not be a ‘new matter’ because it had in fact been considered by the Respondent in the context of the decision under appeal and would therefore not meet the definition in section 85(6)(b)(i) of the 2002 Act. The construction of rule 24 contended for by the Appellant would have the result of rendering section 85(5) of the 2002 Act devoid of any application in practice.’

34. In the instant case, the respondent gave careful and deliberate thought in her review to the appellant’s claimed relationship with TG. Indeed, she made substantive submissions on the point. We are satisfied, therefore, that the relationship was not by the time of the hearing before the FtT a new matter.

Was consent given to consider either of those matters?

35. Given our findings above, consent was unnecessary. However, for the sake of completeness we are of the following view. As made clear in Mahmud at [36], s85(5) of the 2002 Act requires actual consent by the Respondent which cannot be deemed or implied. However, to require the respondent to use express words such as ‘I consent to this matter being considered by the FtT’ is to demand a formality not required by the statute.

36. What matters instead is the substance of what is said rather than its form. In her review, the respondent stated, ‘It is acknowledged that it is in the gift of the A whether [TG] is called as a witness, however, it is expected that the PO will seek to cross-examine [TG] on the relationship.’ It is impossible to understand that sentence as anything other than consent for the FtT hearing evidence-in-chief and cross-examination on the claimed relationship and, therefore, consent for the FtT to consider that matter.

37. The respondent’s position in her review was also entirely consistent with her guidance, ‘Rights of appeal’ dated 30 September 2025, which says the following about ‘handling new matters before the appeal hearing:

‘If a new matter is raised before an appeal hearing, for example in the grounds of appeal, the SSHD should try to consider the matter before the appeal hearing so that consent can be given and the Tribunal can consider all matters relating to that appellant in a single appeal.

Even if the new matter is not identified until shortly before or at the hearing, if it can be considered and a decision reached quickly, that should be done. If the new matter cannot be considered before the appeal hearing, for example because the Presenting Officer (PO) needs to check whether a document is genuine and there is insufficient time to do so, the PO should inform the Tribunal that a new matter has been raised and that the SSHD does not consent to it being considered by the Tribunal.

In order to make best use of Tribunal resources, an adjournment should be sought for the SSHD to consider the new matter. Where possible, a single appeal should consider all matters that have been raised by the appellant.’

If consent was given prior to the hearing, did the presenting officer’s purported withholding of consent act to withdraw the earlier consent?

38. Again, given our finding that neither the relationship nor the marriage were new matters, it is unnecessary to consider whether the consent given in the review could be withdrawn at the hearing. However, again for the sake of completeness, we set briefly why we are of the view that it could not.

39. First and foremost, s85(5) provides that the FtT must not consider a new matter ‘unless the Secretary of State has given the Tribunal consent to do so’ (our emphasis). The provision as drafted does not require consent to be given (nor, strictly interpreted, to be maintained) at the hearing. The provision is a rare example of permitting a party (indeed only one of the parties) to determine a tribunal’s jurisdiction. It is appropriate that it be interpreted strictly against that party.

40. Holding to the contrary would in any event lead to potentially significantly unfair outcomes, for instance where an appellant withdraws their ‘old’ matters, to focus on what they consider their best point. The respondent’s withdrawal of consent would then leave the appellant with no extant appeal at all against the decision in question, and no guarantee that any decision on the new matter will give rise to a statutory right of appeal.

41. Even if withdrawal of consent were legally permissible, there is no reason why the same principles should not then apply as apply to the withdrawal of concessions. An examination of the reasons for the withdrawal would be necessary, something which was manifestly not done in this case.

What is the appropriate disposal

42. In light of our findings above, we are satisfied that the FtT’s refusal to consider the appellant’s relationship with TG and their subsequent marriage were each errors of law, which resulted in the FtT wrongly declining jurisdiction to consider the effect on that relationship of removal and so its proportionality. The only appropriate disposal is to remit that issue for consideration by the FtT.

43. No challenge is made to the FtT’s dismissal of the appeal on protection grounds and so we preserve the FtT’s findings between [52] and [76]. Neither is any challenge made to the FtT’s findings regarding very significant obstacles to reintegration and so we also preserve the findings on that issue between [82] and [95] (save to the extent that [94] includes a finding rejecting family life between the appellant and TG, such a finding being set aside).

44. Clearly, it is necessary to set aside the FtT’s findings at [77] to [81] that the marriage (and implicitly the relationship) were new matters for which consent had not been given for consideration. In addition, whilst no general challenge is made to the FtT’s Article 8 analysis and so the findings at [101] to [104] and [106] to [107] can be preserved, its findings at [105] and [108] to [109] and [113] must also be set aside so that the claimed relationship can be included in the holistic Article 8 assessment.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal on asylum grounds, humanitarian protection grounds and human rights grounds (Articles 2 and 3 ECHR) did not involve the making of an error on a point of law and is preserved.
2. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal on human rights grounds (Article 8 ECHR) involved the making of an error on a point of law and is set aside.
3. The latter decision is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by another judge with facts preserved as specified in [43] and [44] above.


Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


30 October 2026