Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002055
First‑tier Tribunal No: PA/66967/2024
LP/03498/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 29th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

GR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms F Dickens, Counsel instructed by Parker Rhodes Hickmotts Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No‑one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission of the Upper Tribunal against the decision of the First‑tier Tribunal Judge (the Judge) dated 9 March 2026 dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of her protection and human rights claim.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Honduras born on 11 February 1997. She claimed asylum on 17 July 2021.
3. The basis of the appellant’s asylum claim is that she is at risk from the MS‑13 gang. She claims that during 2019 she started being harassed by a member of the MS‑13 gang. She believes him to be the leader of the local cell of MS‑13 in her neighbourhood. The harassment became increasingly threatening and, on one occasion on 3 July 2021, the appellant was on her own and was encountered by two members of MS‑13 who led her away and ripped off her blouse.
4. The appellant claims that she made a report with the local police, who told her that no crime had been committed, refused to act and laughed at the appellant. The appellant went into hiding and subsequently fled Honduras. She arrived in the UK and claimed asylum on 17 July 2021.
5. The respondent refused the appellant’s protection and human rights claim in a decision dated 7 June 2024. The respondent accepted the appellant’s identity and nationality but rejected her account.
The Appeal to the First‑tier Tribunal
6. The appellant appealed against the refusal of her protection and human rights claim and the appeal came before the Judge on 23 February 2026. The appellant gave oral evidence.
7. In a decision dated 9 March 2026, the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The Judge found that there were elements of the appellant’s account that were inconsistent, incoherent or so implausible as to be incapable of belief.
8. The appellant relied on a country expert report in which the expert found her account to be plausible. The Judge accepted that the country expert had the relevant experience and expertise to provide an opinion on the country situation in Honduras, but not to determine whether the appellant was providing a truthful account.
9. The Judge considered medical reports from a psychologist and psychiatrist that the appellant relied on. The Judge accepted that the appellant “may have some issues recounting events owing to her memory now, which has been impacted by her mental health.” The Judge did not consider the recent medical evidence explained the appellant's inability to provide a consistent account when she first arrived in the UK.
10. The Judge concluded that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that she was at risk on return due to her membership of a particular social group.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
12. The appellant’s grounds for permission to appeal are:
Ground 1: the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account.
Ground 2: the Judge failed to consider the country expert’s evidence in the assessment of credibility.
Ground 3: the Judge did not approach the medical evidence lawfully.
13. Permission to appeal was refused by the First‑tier Tribunal on 17 April 2026 and granted by the Upper Tribunal on 22 May 2026. The Upper Tribunal stated:
“1. Although the judge considered the expert medical evidence relating to the appellant’s memory (paras. 32-34), it is arguable that the judge fell into error by not having regard to this evidence when assessing the credibility of the appellant’s evidence (in paras. 18-27).
2. It is also arguable that the judge failed to adequately explain why she accepted that the appellant has some memory issues but not that this could explain the inconsistent evidence.
3. It is arguable that the judge erred by characterising the expert as determining that the appellant gave a truthful account and thereby going beyond his expertise (para. 30). Arguably, all the expert did was comment on the plausibility of the appellant’s account in the light of the general situation in Honduras. Arguably, this is a finding that is within the expert’s expertise and a relevant consideration (to be considered alongside other factors) in the judge’s overall assessment of whether the appellant has given a credible account.”
14. The respondent provided a response under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 opposing the appeal.
15. I heard submissions from Ms Dickens and Ms Khan. I fully considered their submissions in addition to all the papers in this matter. At the hearing I indicated that I was satisfied that the First‑tier Tribunal had materially erred in law and that my written reasons would follow.
Discussion
16. The appellant relied on a psychiatric report by Dr Sen. Dr Sen concluded that the appellant suffered from a moderate depressive episode. Dr Sen stated:
“Her mood is depressed, her energy levels are low, she has problems with sleep and appetite, problems with concentration, feels slowed down and everything and she is suffering from low self‑esteem.”
17. In addition, Dr Sen recommended that the appellant have a full cognitive assessment. The appellant had provided a developmental history of difficulties in school with her education. In the screening assessment conducted by Dr Sen, the appellant “could not answer relatively simple questions”.
18. The appellant relied on a psychological report by Dr Ward. Dr Ward agreed with Dr Sen that the appellant was presenting with depressive symptoms. Dr Ward also considered that the appellant presented with symptoms of anxiety and trauma‑related symptoms. Dr Ward noted that the appellant is hyper‑vigilant with men. Dr Ward considered that there were deficits in the appellant’s cognitive reasoning found through cognitive testing with verbal attention and with memory recall. Dr Ward’s professional opinion was that there was “trauma fragmentation present in relation to her memory recall which impacts her recollection of events and details.”
19. The appellant relied on a country expert report by Dr Knox. Dr Knox concluded that the appellant’s account is plausible and that her statements and account of events are consistent with Dr Knox’s expert knowledge of the situation in Honduras.
20. I am satisfied that the medical evidence and country expert evidence are relevant to the assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
21. Dr Sen and Dr Ward’s evidence potentially provides an explanation as to why the appellant’s account may be inconsistent. Dr Ward’s opinion that the appellant suffers from trauma‑related symptoms corroborates the appellant’s account to have experienced trauma.
22. Dr Knox’s evidence that the appellant’s account is consistent with her expert knowledge of Honduras corroborates the appellant’s account.
23. The Judge was entitled to come to their own conclusion as to whether the appellant was giving a truthful account. However, the Judge must consider the evidence that is relevant to that assessment.
24. At [16], the Judge states that she considered the appellant’s account was “inconsistent, incoherent or so implausible as to be incapable of belief”. The Judge sets out her reasons for that conclusion at paragraphs 18 to 27. There is no reference to the country expert report or the medical evidence in those paragraphs.
25. The structure of the decision leaves the sense that the Judge had already made up her mind about the credibility of the appellant’s factual claim before turning her mind to either the country expert evidence or the medical evidence.
26. I am satisfied that the Judge erred by conclusively rejecting the appellant’s credibility before turning her mind to the expert country and medical evidence. This is a classic error such as identified in Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 36. At paragraph 24 of his judgment, Wilson J said this:
“It seems to me to be axiomatic that a fact-finder must not reach his or her conclusion before surveying all the evidence relevant thereto. Just as, if I may take a banal if alliterative example, one cannot make a cake with only one ingredient, so also frequently one cannot make a case, in the sense of establishing its truth, otherwise than by combination of a number of pieces of evidence. Mr Tam, on behalf of the Secretary of State, argues that decisions as to the credibility of an account are to be taken by the judicial fact-finder and that, in their reports, experts, whether in relation to medical matters or in relation to in-country circumstances, cannot usurp the fact-finder's function in assessing credibility. I agree. What, however, they can offer, is a factual context in which it may be necessary for the fact-finder to survey the allegations placed before him; and such context may prove a crucial aid to the decision whether or not to accept the truth of them. What the fact-finder does at his peril is to reach a conclusion by reference only to the appellant's evidence and then, if it be negative, to ask whether the conclusion should be shifted by the expert evidence.”
27. Mibanga was considered in MN and IXU v Secretary of State [2020] EWCA Civ 1746. In MN and IXU the Court was reviewing the administrative decision‑making process to determine trafficking claims. However, important observations were made by Underhill LJ about the limitations of what has been referred to as the Mibanga error. After surveying the key authorities he held at [108] that it was clear that the question is one of form rather than substance. If it is evident the Tribunal has in fact taken the expert evidence into account as part of the primary assessment, it does not matter at what particular point in the decision it is specifically referred to. It was, however, emphasised that the fundamental criticism remains good law: it would be wrong to reject credibility and then ask whether that finding should shift to make way for the expert evidence. The following guidance was given at [123]:
“The essential message of that possibly over-elaborate discussion is that decision-makers should in each case assess whether and to what extent any particular expert evidence relied on by an applicant supports their case as a matter of rational analysis. Observations in the case-law are useful in drawing attention to likely limitations on the value of particular kinds of evidence, but they should not be treated as laying down rigid rules. If there are qualifications to the value to be given to a particular piece of evidence, that is not a reason for excluding it altogether: if it has some weight it must go into the overall assessment.”
28. At [31], the Judge states the following, referring to the country expert’s opinion:
“Overall I find the appellant not credible in the core parts of her claim and I therefore find that her account is not supported by the expert’s opinion.”
29. I am satisfied that this clearly demonstrates that the Judge did not incorporate the country expert evidence into her assessment of the core parts of the appellant’s claim. I am satisfied that the expert was entitled to comment on the plausibility of her claim and that was plainly relevant to the assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
30. At [33] to [34], the Judge accepts that the appellant may have some issues with recounting events now but rejects this as explaining her inability to provide a consistent account on her arrival in the UK. The basis for that is that the appellant obtained a degree in Honduras. However, that is a material mistake of fact. The appellant did undertake studies, but she did not finish them and obtain a degree.
31. The appellant worked prior to leaving Honduras and travelled to the UK. However, the Judge does not address why these factors indicate that the appellant does not have issues with recounting events, especially what could be described as traumatic events, which is clearly detailed in the medical evidence. In circumstances where the evidence is particularly relevant, the more the Judge was required to show it was considered.
32. I note that the Judge did not challenge the qualifications and experience of the country expert or the medical professionals. I am satisfied that the Judge did not include that evidence in her assessment of credibility and that is a material error of law. This impacts on the whole decision, so no findings of fact can be preserved.
Disposal
33. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) I have considered whether to retain the matter for re-making in the Upper Tribunal in line with the general principles set out in Statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I am satisfied that it should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal because credibility is in issue and significant findings of fact will be re-made.
Notice of Decision
34. The decision of the First tier Tribunal contains material errors of law. Accordingly it is set aside in its entirety with no findings of fact preserved.
35. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing to be heard by a different Judge.

G. Loughran

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25 September 2026