Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002068
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68451/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 1st of October 2026

Before

The Hon. MR JUSTICE LAVENDER, PRESIDENT
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CANAVAN

Between

T K
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C. Ezike, on behalf of Equity Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr D. Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity because the case involves consideration of a protection claim.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
(1) Summary
1. This is a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (“the Upper Tribunal”). The Upper Tribunal is an independent tribunal established by Parliament with powers set out in law. This decision is made as part of the Upper Tribunal’s role in deciding appeals against decisions of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (“the First-tier Tribunal”).
2. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision to refuse a protection and human rights claim. The appellant lodged an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the NIAA 2002”). The appeal could be brought on the ground that her removal would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention or would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
3. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed her appeal in a decision sent on 24 February 2026. The First-tier Tribunal judge found that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the reasons set out in the Refugee Convention. The judge found that the appellant had a genuine fear of domestic abuse by her former husband if she were to be removed to Namibia. However, the evidence showed that there was likely to be sufficient state protection from persecution and that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to another area of the country where she would not be persecuted.
4. The losing party in an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal can apply for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. If permission is granted, the Upper Tribunal will consider the legal arguments put forward by both sides in the appeal. The Upper Tribunal only has power to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal if it concludes that the arguments put forward by the appellant show that the decision involved the making of an error of law: see section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“the TCEA 2007”).
5. If the Upper Tribunal finds that a decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, the First-tier Tribunal decision will stand. If a decision of the First-tier Tribunal is found to involve the making of an error of law, the Upper Tribunal has power to set aside the decision. The Upper Tribunal will then decide whether it will remake the decision or whether the appeal might need to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal. In this decision, the Upper Tribunal is only deciding whether the First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law.
6. The Upper Tribunal finds that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision shall stand.

(2) Background
(2)(a) The First-tier Tribunal Decision
7. The judge accepted that the appellant had been a victim of domestic abuse and that her former husband had previously been a police officer. However, the judge held, at [13]-[14], that he was not satisfied that the appellant was a member of “a particular social group” (“a PSG”) so as to engage the Refugee Convention.
8. The judge also found, at [15]-[20], that there would be a sufficient level of state protection available in Namibia. Although the appellant claimed that her husband’s police connections meant that the authorities would not protect her, the judge noted that: he had ceased working as a police officer around 18 years earlier; he had not been a senior officer; and there was no evidence that the police outside his former area of work would refuse to assist the appellant. The judge also found that her claim to have obtained three protection orders was likely to be exaggerated because it had not been mentioned in her asylum interview and was unsupported by any documentary evidence.
9. The judge went on to find, at [20]-[22], that the appellant could safely and reasonably relocate elsewhere within Namibia. There was no evidence that her husband had tried to locate or contact her during the three years when she had been outside the country or that he had attempted to trace her through her family. The judge considered that the appellant could support herself on return, having worked previously in Namibia, and that she would have the support of family members who remain there. Accordingly, any risk of harm could be avoided through state protection or internal relocation.
(2)(b) Grounds of Appeal
10. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the following grounds:
(1) Convention reason: The judge failed properly to apply section 33 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“the NABA 2022”) and gave inadequate reasons for finding that women in Namibia do not constitute a PSG, despite country evidence describing Namibia as a patriarchal society with widespread gender-based violence.
(2) Procedural fairness, credibility and protection orders: The judge acted unfairly in rejecting the appellant’s evidence that she had obtained three protection orders against her former husband, treating this as an exaggeration without giving her an opportunity to explain her failure to mention these orders in her asylum interview. This ground also argues that the judge wrongly speculated that documentary evidence to support her claim to have obtained protection orders would have been readily obtainable from Namibia.
(3) Sufficiency of protection: The judge failed to assess whether protection was effective in practice, given the accepted evidence that the appellant’s former husband was a police officer and that previous complaints had not resulted in effective protection.
(4) Internal relocation: The judge applied the wrong approach to the issue of reasonableness/undue harshness of relocation, failed to take sufficient account of the appellant’s previous experience of being traced after relocating and her vulnerability as a survivor of domestic abuse and relied on speculation that her husband would be unable to find her elsewhere in Namibia.
(5) Failure to give adequate reasons: Overall, the judge failed to give adequate reasons for his key findings on: membership of a PSG; credibility; sufficiency of protection; and internal relocation.
(3) Decision
11. Before coming to a decision in this appeal, we have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation which was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal and the submissions made at the hearing. It is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions, because they are a matter of record, but we will refer to any relevant arguments in this decision.
12. Having considered the grounds of appeal as a whole, we consider that it is appropriate to deal with the grounds relating to the likelihood of risk on return before considering the ground relating to the judge’s finding concerning membership of a PSG. If the findings relating to risk on return are sustainable, then any error in relation to the issue as to membership of a PSG is likely to be immaterial. First, however, we remind ourselves of the law applicable to appeals of this nature.
(3)(a) Relevant Appellate Principles
13. We bear in mind that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of a specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings: see HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22; [2022] INLR 425. The court should not characterise as an error of law what, in truth, is no more than a disagreement with the tribunal’s assessment of the facts. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see Jones v FTT & Anor (Rev 1) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] 1 AC 678; MM (Lebanon) v SSHD [2017] UKSC 10; [2017] 1 WLR 771; and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693; [2021] Imm AR 1361.
(3)(b) Ground 2: Procedural Fairness, Credibility and Protection Orders
14. The judge accepted, as did the respondent, that the appellant had been a victim of domestic abuse in the past. The judge recorded that the appellant claimed at the hearing that she had “obtained three protection orders against her husband which he breached, the last one being issued in 2021.”
15. It was open to the judge to take into account the fact that the appellant had answered questions during the screening interview and the SEF interview. While recognising that the screening interview is limited in nature, it was open to the judge to note that the SEF interview is an opportunity for an asylum applicant to give further detail about their claim. At question 33, the appellant was asked whether she had ever reported the abuse to the authorities. She mentioned that she had reported it to the police, but said that they “took his side because he had police friends back home”. At question 41 she was asked if there were any agencies in Namibia for victims of abuse to receive help and support. The appellant confirmed that there were, but said that they were busy and that she could not get help straight away. At question 42 she was asked if she sought any legal help or support to leave her husband. She answered “yes, lots”, but she did not go on to explain what assistance she received.
16. We bear in mind that the appellant was unrepresented at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal. However, the application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was prepared by a legal representative. Beyond the bare assertion that it was unfair not to have asked the appellant about her failure to mention the protection orders in interview, the second ground fails to particularise what explanation the appellant might have offered if she had been asked about this at the hearing. Mr Ezike said that the appellant had reported her ex-husband to the traditional authorities. When asked what explanation the appellant might have offered, he said that the reason why the appellant did not mention it was “because of the circumstances surrounding the interview or that at that time it did not come to her mind.” In the absence of a witness statement from the appellant, it is not clear whether Mr Ezike’s statement was based on instructions or not. In the absence of any evidence from the appellant to explain what she might have said if she had been asked why she did not mention the protection orders in interview, the second ground fails to identify how or why any failure to clarify this with her might have made any material difference to the judge’s assessment.
17. Procedural fairness does not require each and every point to be put to a witness. The judge was in the best position to evaluate the oral evidence given by the appellant at the hearing. Even if fairness required express reference to be made to the point about the appellant’s failure to mention in interview the protection orders which she claimed to have obtained, the appellant has failed to identify any explanation which she would have given which would have been capable of affecting the outcome. For these reasons, we conclude that the second ground fails to disclose any material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal decision.

(3)(c) Ground 3: Sufficiency of Protection
18. The third and fourth grounds make generalised submissions on the evidence which disagree with the judge’s findings without particularising any errors of law in the First-tier Tribunal decision.
19. Although it was accepted that the appellant had been the victim of domestic abuse in the past, there was no detailed chronological account before the judge. The appellant had not prepared a detailed witness statement outlining the course of events. The account given in interview was generalised and lacked any surrounding detail. It seems that the appellant sought to give some further information during the course of the hearing. However, it was open to the judge to note that she had not mentioned the issuing or breach of protection orders when asked about what help she had sought from the authorities in interview. Little detail seems to have been provided to explain exactly what efforts the appellant made to report her abuse to the Namibian authorities or to non-governmental organisations which might have been able to provide her with protection or assistance.
20. It is not arguable that the judge failed to consider the specific circumstances of the case. The judge made his decision based on the limited information provided. It was open to the judge to take into account the fact that the appellant’s former husband had not been a police officer for around 18 years. It was within a range of reasonable responses to that evidence for the judge to conclude that any influence which the appellant’s former husband might have had in the local area was likely to have diminished over time. It was also reasonable for the judge to conclude that there was insufficient evidence to show that the appellant’s husband was likely to have influence throughout Namibia.
21. In the absence of any detailed account of the attempts which the appellant made to seek assistance from the authorities, we find that it was open to the judge to consider the background evidence contained in the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note on Namibia from December 2025 (“the CPIN”) to assess whether there was, in general, an effective system of protection provided by the authorities to women who are the victims of domestic abuse in Namibia.
22. We bear in mind that the Executive Summary contained in the CPIN is not evidence, but is the respondent’s policy position. However, the rest of the report contains extracts from background evidence relating to Namibia upon which that policy position is based. In the light of that evidence, the respondent’s position is that the Namibian state is willing and able to provide effective protection to the appellant from persecution.
23. The background evidence contained in the CPIN shows that the Namibian constitution provides for gender equality. The report lists various aspects of the Namibian legal framework which seek to address the issue of domestic violence, including the Domestic Violence Act of 2007, which is referred to in the CPIN at [9.3.3]. The CPIN cites the 2025 US State Department Report, which said that gender-based discrimination was prohibited. However, the law based marital property solely on the domicile of the husband and set grounds for divorce differently for men and women [9.3.4]. The UN Human Rights Committee observed in 2024 that Namibia fares relatively well in terms of frameworks which promote, enforce and monitor gender equality, while recognising that “the country still faces considerable challenges” [9.3.8].
24. The CPIN also contains a section relating to “Protection Orders” [9.4]. It states that the Combating of Domestic Violence Act 2003 makes provision for the issuance of protection orders against another person in a domestic relationship. Applications for protection orders are made to the courts and may be applied for on behalf of the complainant, including by family members, police officers or social workers.
25. The appellant’s evidence, albeit found to be exaggerated, was that she had been able to obtain at least three protection orders from the authorities. However, insufficient detail was provided to explain how they were breached or what further action the authorities might have taken in response to a breach of a protection order. We acknowledge that the evidence contained in the CPIN also shows that domestic abuse remains widespread and that gender discrimination and inequality still exists in practice in Namibia. Nevertheless, on the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal, it was open to the judge to find that the Namibian authorities provided a reasonable level of protection within the meaning outlined in Horvath v SSHD [2000] UKHL 37; [2001] 1 AC 489, notwithstanding that domestic abuse and gender inequality remain present in society. For the purpose of the Refugee Convention, a system of protection cannot and does not need to guarantee a person’s safety.
(3)(d) Ground 4: Internal Relocation
26. The fourth ground argues that the judge failed to consider the fact that the appellant’s husband had found her when she tried to relocate previously. The only evidence of this fact seems to have been the appellant’s response to question 40 in her interview, where she described her husband coming to get her when she went to stay with her mother in the village. Even if this fact is taken at its highest, there was no surrounding detail. It would still have been open to the judge to find that the appellant had worked in the past and would be in a position to support herself. She also had family members in Namibia who might be able to provide some assistance. The judge had already made a sustainable finding that there was insufficient evidence to show that the appellant’s husband was likely to have sufficient influence or the ability to find her throughout Namibia.
27. In our assessment, the judge was entitled to take into account that there was no evidence to show that the appellant’s husband had sought to contact, trace or locate her during the three years following her departure from Namibia. The judge acknowledged that the appellant was still likely to have a subjective fear of her husband, but, after considering the evidence in the round, concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show that her fear was likely to be well-founded. Those findings were open to the judge and do not disclose any errors of law which might have made any material difference to the outcome of the decision.
(3)(e) Grounds 1 & 5: Convention Reason and Failure to give Adequate Reasons
28. There is some force in the argument that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that “women” were not a PSG in Namibia for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. The judge’s self-direction at [13] was correct, but the issue required some analysis of the background evidence relating to the treatment of women in Namibia to explain why women did not have a distinct identity for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. This is a complex area of Refugee Convention law which needs to be properly reasoned. In particular, no reference was made to the key House of Lords decision in Islam v SSHD, R (ex parte Shah) v IAT [1999] UKHL 20; [1999] 2 AC 629.
29. However, any error by the judge in this respect was immaterial, given the judge’s findings as to sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.
30. As for the fifth ground of appeal, we consider that the judge’s findings relating to risk on return, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation were all adequately reasoned.
31. For the reasons given above, we conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The decision shall stand.
Notice of decision
32. The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
33. The decision shall stand.

The Hon. Mr Justice Lavender
President of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Upper Tribunal Judge Canavan
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 September 2026