Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002071
First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/02126/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 23rd of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM

Between

ABDUL RAHMAN KABBA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mohzam, counsel, instructed by Burton & Burton Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 October 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of judge of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) Hickey (the judge) who, in a decision dated 20 March 2026, dismissed his appeal against the SSHD’s decision dated 12 November 2024 to refuse his human rights claim.

Background
2. The appellant, a national of the Netherlands, first arrived in the UK in 2013 with his family when he was 14 years old. He was granted Indefinite Leave to Remain under the EUSS scheme on 4 May 2019. On 15 March 2024 he was sentenced to 32 months imprisonment in respect of offences relating to the possession of class A drugs with the intent to supply. Following a decision to deport him, made on 15 May 2024, the appellant made a human rights claim based primarily on his relationship with his young daughter, (“Z”), who was 5 years old at the date of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”). Z resides with her maternal grandmother under a Special Guardian Order having been removed from her biological mother when she was less than a year old. The refusal of the appellant’s human rights claim was appealed to the FtT.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) and the judge’s decision
3. The judge heard evidence from the appellant and Z’s maternal grandmother. The judge considered a large bundle of documents that included a statement from the appellant and a report by Mr Laurence Chester, an Independent Social Worker (“ISW”).
4. Whilst the judge found that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated, and while the respondent accepted he had resided in the UK for most of his life, the judge was not satisfied that the appellant would face ‘very significant obstacles’ (part of the test established by Parliament in s.117C(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”)) to his integration if he were deported to the Netherlands. The appellant contends that the judge erred in law in reaching this conclusion.
5. Although the judge was satisfied the appellant had a genuine and subsisting relationship with Z, he was not satisfied that the effect on Z if the appellant were deported would be ‘unduly harsh’ (the threshold established by Parliament in s.117C(5) of the 2002 Act). The appellant contends that the judge erred in law in reaching this conclusion.
6. Having found that the appellant did not fulfil the requirements for either s.117C(4) or (5) of the 2002 Act, the judge considered, but rejected, the submission that the appellant met the requirements of s.117C(6) of the 2002 Act (that there were ‘very compelling circumstances’ over and above the exceptions in s.117C(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act that outweighed the public interest in the appellant’s deportation).
Consideration of the grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. I have considered the written grounds of appeal, together with the submissions made by the representatives at the ‘error of law’ hearing.
Ground 1
8. The 1st ground of appeal contends that the judge made a legal mistake in concluding that the impact of the respondent’s decision on Z was not unduly harsh. This ground argues that the judge failed to consider the evidence before him with anxious scrutiny and that he failed to consider evidence that Z is likely to suffer from ADHD and that she got easily distracted and experienced significant difficulties when trying to communicate with the appellant via technology when he was imprisoned. The appellant further contends that the judge failed to properly consider the ISW’s conclusion that Z would suffer “significant emotional harm” if the appellant were deported and erred by characterising the impact on Z as amounting to a ‘change in routine’ which was said to be incompatible with the ISW’s conclusions and the ‘unduly harsh’ test.
9. For the following reasons I am not satisfied that the 1st ground is made out. I note first Z has not been diagnosed with ADHD. There is an Expert SEND Advice document in the bundle which indicated that Z displayed some “unexpected behaviours for her age which are likely early signs of neurological differences such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. It is also possible that there are underlying specific learning difficulties such as Dyslexia.” Although the judge did not expressly refer to the Expert SEND Advice document this was contained in the bundle of documents provided by the appellant’s legal representatives and was placed just before the ISW report. The judge considered the ISW report in detail (paragraph 26). Moreover, the ISW referred to the “pending diagnosis of ADHD”. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] Lewison LJ explained that reasons for judgments will always be capable of having been better expressed and that an appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Volpi v Volpi also make it clear that there is no duty on a judge to refer to every argument of counsel, and the mere fact that a judge does not mention a piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it. Noting that the judge carefully considered the ISW report, I am satisfied that the judge was aware that Z may have ADHD.
10. The judge specifically referred to the ISW’s finding that Z would suffer ‘significant emotional harm’ if the appellant were deported when assessing what was in Z’s best interests. The judge therefore demonstrably considered the ISW’s assessment and the judge agreed with that assessment (see the last sentence in paragraph 26). Then at [30], when considering the issue of undue harshness, the judge stated that he was bringing forward his findings that it was in Z’s best interests for the appellant to remain in the UK. I am not therefore persuaded that the judge failed to consider the evidence that Z would suffer significant emotional harm when he determined that the overall impact on Z would not be unduly harsh. The judge was mindful of the high threshold for showing undue harshness and referred to appropriate authority in support (see paragraph 28).
11. I additionally note that the ISW report referred generally, in the context of Z experiencing significant emotional harm, to the negative impact of the deportation on her overall development, but there was only limited particularisation of the actual nature of the significant emotional harm to Z (the ISW referred to bed wetting and Z running back to the appellant when she visited him in prison, and talking about wanting to be with him). The ISW report referred at length to general studies on the negative impact of separation between parent and child that could give rise to risks of a child internalising symptoms such as depression and anxiety, displaying externalised behaviours such as withdrawal, aggression, and social and cognitive difficulties, but there was no actual or specific finding in respect of Z herself. It is apparent that support is available for Z (the maternal grandmother indicated that she is paying for a specialist teaching assistant and the fact that the SEND Advice report was obtained in the first place is indicative of this support).
12. Neither the Expert SEND Advice document, nor the ISW report suggest that Z will be unable to communicate with the appellant via telephone or video links. The ISW states that “It is disingenuous to assert that phone/video communication could replace the benefits that Mr Kabba’s close proximity to his family provides”, but there was no issue raised in the ISW report that Z was unable to focus when communicating with the appellant through remote means, or that she got distracted easily during such remote communication with the appellant. There was evidence before the judge that Z and the appellant have communicated remotely, for example, the ISW report Z’s maternal grandmother said that the appellant would call 3 or 4 times a week when he was not in prison. At paragraph 25 the judge recorded evidence from Z’s maternal grandmother that Z had rang or messaged the appellant on occasions when she (the grandmother) had told Z off. The judge, in any event, considered that the relationship could continue not just through remote forms of communication but also through visits. Given the ease of traveling from the UK to the Netherlands, the judge was unarguably entitled to conclude that visits could be arranged, a point not challenged in the grounds.
13. The judge noted that Z’s maternal grandmother is, and remains, her primary carer. The judge noted that appellant cares for Z every other weekend and that she spends half the school holidays with him. But it was the maternal grandmother who ultimately made the important decisions in Z’s life, although she does consultant the appellant when she does so. The judge was also aware that if the appellant were deported Z would have no close physical contact with either of her parents, and the judge was mindful of the issues that arose from Z’s mixed heritage (paragraph 31). The judge took all of these factors into account, including, by irresistible implication, the ISW’s findings on significant emotional harm, and determined that the elevated threshold of unduly harsh was not met. This was a conclusion reasonably open to the judge for the reasons he gave. The reference to a change in routine at [32] was not an equation to the unduly harsh test but a consequence for Z of the appellant’s deportation.
Ground 2
14. The 2nd ground of appeal contends that, in concluding there were no ‘very significant obstacles’ to the appellant’s integration in the Netherlands, the judge failed to take into account relevant considerations and failed to exercise the requisite anxious scrutiny. It was argued there was no reference in the decision to the appellant’s evidence that the stress of being separated from Z caused him to ‘lose hair’ or the submission that his integration into society in the Netherlands would be hindered by his emotional and physical pain of being separated from Z in circumstances where Z was not being raised by either of her parents. Nor, it was argued, was adequate consideration given to the appellant’s oral evidence that he had no friends in the Netherlands or network of support, or that his family, when they lived in the Netherlands, were unaware of Dutch culture and did not communicate in Dutch.
15. For the following reasons I am not persuaded this ground is made out. The judge properly directed himself in accordance with the correct legal framework and the correct legal test under s.117C(4) of the 2002 Act. Although the judge did not refer to the authority of Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, I am not persuaded that he failed to properly apply the test established in that authority when assessing the existence of very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in the Netherlands. There was no need for the judge to refer to every element of the appellant’s evidence (Volpi v Volpi) and there was no independent cogent medical evidence that the appellant suffered from such stress or physical or emotional pain that it was capable of affecting his ability to integrate in the Netherlands. Nor was any cogent evidence produced that the appellant would, as a national of the Netherlands, be unable to access medical or social care in that country.
16. I am not persuaded that the judge left out of account, or failed to consider, any material evidence. The judge was demonstrably aware that the appellant was not born in the Netherlands and that he lived there for 7 to 8 years from the age of 7 (paragraph 22). The judge accepted the appellant’s deportation to the Netherlands would be ‘challenging’ but rejected the appellant’s assertion that he no longer had any knowledge of the language given his length of residence from the age of 7 (paragraph 23). The judge relied on relevant factors such as the undisputed fact that 90% of the population in the Netherlands speals English, and that the appellant had the building blocks from which he could increase his proficiency in the language. The judge took account also of the appellant’s employment experience as a labourer, which would assist him in obtaining employment, and that the appellant would be able to maintain contact with Z through social media and electronic forms of communication and visits. This ground is not made out.
Ground 3
17. The third ground of appeal contends that the judge failed to take account of the impact of the appellant’s deportation on his other family members including his parents and his younger siblings, two of which are minors. The grounds specifically refer to the appellant’s father being disabled and the help that the appellant provides at home and in transporting family members, the fact that the younger siblings were undertaking exams and the ISW report that the younger siblings would also experience significant emotional harm.
18. I am not persuaded that this ground is made out. I refer again to the authority of Volpi v Volpi. There is no requirement for the judge to refer to all of the evidence or arguments made on the appellant’s behalf. It is apparent from the judge’s decision that he considered the ISW report in detail. This report made reference to the appellant’s father’s disability and the impact on the appellant’s minor siblings of his deportation. There was nothing in the evidence before the judge to indicate that the appellant’s father would not receive all appropriate support from his family in the UK (I note that his wife is an A&E nurse) or the social services, NHS or local authority in respect of his disabilities, or that the minor siblings would not receive all necessary support from their parents or the relevant authorities. The ISW report gave a limited account of how the significant emotional harm that would result from the appellant’s deportation would actually manifest and affect the particular siblings. The judge weighed up factors going both to the public interest in the appellant’s deportation and in support of the adverse impact such deportation would have on those affected by his deportation. The decision, read as a whole, does not support the appellant’s assertion that the judge failed to take account of all relevant circumstances when undertaking the test in s.117C(6) of the 2002 Act. This ground is not made out.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed

D. Blum

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 October 2026