Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002089
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61832/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BIBI

Between

ZL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Huzefa Broachwalla, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Kevin Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of First-tier Tribunal dismissing his protection appeal following a hearing which took place on 29 January 2026.
Anonymity

2. We have continued the anonymity order made by the First-Tier Tribunal. We have considered the public interest in open justice but conclude that it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations to those claiming international protection because of the need for confidentiality.

Factual Background
3. The appellant is a national of China, now aged thirty-nine, who entered the United Kingdom on 6 September 2015 as a visitor. His asylum claim was made on 7 June 2023. He claims to fear loan sharks in China after borrowing RMB 200,000 in 2014 to support his bakery business. However, the business became insolvent in May 2014, leaving him unable to repay the debt. He states that he went into hiding, was traced and assaulted by the loan sharks, moved between several cities to evade them, and ultimately fled China.

4. The appellant’s protection claim was refused by way of a decision dated 23 April 2024. The respondent accepted the appellant’s identity and nationality but rejected the core account. The respondent identified inconsistencies concerning the appellant's immigration history, employment history, the alleged loan, and the failure of his business. Reliance was also placed on the appellant's failure to provide supporting documentary evidence.

5. The respondent did not accept that the appellant had borrowed money from loan sharks or would be at risk on return and concluded that sufficient state protection and internal relocation would be available. Reliance was also placed on section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, noting that the appellant had overstayed his visit visa and did not claim asylum until after he was encountered by immigration officers in May 2023.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal

6. The appeal came before the judge on 29 January 2026. The judge identified a number of material inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence concerning his employment history, the alleged loan, the failure of his bakery business, and the circumstances in which he claimed to have evaded and been traced by loan sharks. The judge also found that the appellant had failed to provide reliable documentary evidence to establish either the existence of the business or the alleged debt and rejected his core claim.

7. The judge further attached adverse weight to the appellant’s travel history and the section 8 factors. Despite claiming to fear loan sharks, he travelled to several European countries without seeking protection, returned to China, and delayed claiming asylum until after being encountered for illegal working in 2023. His explanations were found unpersuasive. The judge dismissed the appeal.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. The appellant sought permission to appeal the judge’s decision on the grounds that firstly, on the basis that the Judge placed undue weight on the absence of documentary evidence and applied an unduly high evidential standard, contrary to MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 and the principle that corroboration is not required in asylum claims.

9. Secondly, it was argued that the Judge wrongly found the appellant’s evidence to be contradictory and made an impermissible plausibility-based credibility findings, contrary to HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, in relation to how he was traced and avoided detection. Reliance was also placed on CPIN evidence.

10. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Dhanji on 23 April 2026 on ground one. As permission was not restricted, it extended to both grounds.

11. The respondent did not file a Rule 24 response.

The error of law hearing

12. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. A bundle was submitted by the appellant containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.

13. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary. It was agreed that, if a material error of law were found, the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing.

14. At the conclusion of the hearing, we reserved our decision. We now provide our reasons for that decision.

Discussion

15. The principles and cautious approach to be applied by an appeal court to first instance findings of fact are well established and set out in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2]. We remind ourselves of the role of the First-tier Tribunal as an expert Tribunal and also bear in mind that a determination should not be ‘picked over’ or subjected to narrow textual analysis: HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, 1 WLR 3784 at §72.

Ground one:

16. Mr Broachwalla submitted that the judge materially erred in placing weight on the absence of documentary evidence said to establish the appellant's ownership of a bakery business and the existence of the alleged debt. He submitted that the only document relied upon was excluded because it had not been translated and that no enquiry was made as to how that document had been obtained. Mr Broachwalla drew our attention to paragraph [11] of the decision: -

“The appellant claims to have owned and operated a bakery yet there is no business licence, no registration, no payroll or tax material, and no independent record capable of corroborating the business’ existence. I apply the approach reflected in the refusal to missing corroboration that is reasonably obtainable and attach little weight to unsupported assertions. Indeed, he purports to rely on such a document which, despite being on notice about a lack of translation, remained untranslated and was excluded for that reason.”

17. He further argued that the Judge thereby fell into error by effectively requiring corroboration of the appellant's claim. Reliance was placed upon MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216, in particular paragraphs 52 and 87 which states as follows:-

Paragraph 52 “ It is also well established that the standard required is less than a 50% chance of persecution occurring. Even a 10% chance that an applicant will face persecution for a Convention reason may satisfy the relevant test”

Paragraph 87 “that there is no legal duty on the Appellant to corroborate his claim, that was in substance the basis on which it proceeded. Each of the three perceived deficiencies in the evidence adduced on his behalf was to the effect that he could have but had not obtained corroborative evidence to support his claim. In the circumstances of this case, bearing in mind both the relatively low standard of proof and the fact that the Appellant had adduced positive evidence which supported his claim (as the UT recognised), evidence both of what he had himself witnessed and evidence of experts which was consistent with his claim, I have reached the conclusion that the UT required more of him than was necessary. It then fell into error by concluding that the failure to adduce corroborative evidence undermined his credibility with the result that his evidence was found not to be “truthful”

18. He submitted that the Court of Appeal reaffirmed both the lower standard of proof applicable in protection claims and the principle that there is no legal requirement for an asylum claimant to corroborate his account. It was submitted that the judge's adverse credibility findings were materially influenced by the absence of documentary evidence and therefore disclosed an error of law.

19. In response, Mr Ojo submitted that the judge was fully entitled to make the findings reached. He referred to paragraph [3] of the decision, in which the judge refused the application to admit the untranslated document and attached no weight to it. He submitted that, notwithstanding that the appellant had been on notice of the deficiency, no translation was ever provided. In those circumstances, the document could not have assisted the Tribunal.

20. Mr Ojo further submitted that, during his asylum interview, the appellant was specifically asked whether he possessed any evidence to support his claim that he operated a bakery business and whether he could provide a translated copy of the purported business licence. Despite those requests, no translated document was produced. Mr Ojo also noted that, although the appellant stated at question 72 of his interview that he lost contact with his family, he had nevertheless been able to obtain both the untranslated document and documentation relating to his visa application

21. He relied upon paragraphs 74 to 76 of MAH (Egypt), placing particular emphasis on paragraph 76, which refers to the respondent's guidance, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status in Asylum Claims Lodged Before 28 June 2022 (version 10.0), and the principle of the benefit of the doubt.

“The principle of the benefit of the doubt reflects recognition of the difficulties some claimants face gathering evidence to support their claim, and the grave and potentially irreversible consequences if international protection is wrongly refused.

You must consider whether to apply the benefit of the doubt to any material facts which remain in doubt, after you have reviewed all the evidence in the round. The concept of the benefit of the doubt in the context of the Immigration Rules is designed to provide a framework for deciding whether to accept or reject a material fact, or the facts as a whole, where the evidence in one or more areas is not sufficient to enable a clear finding to be made.

Paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules sets out that where a claimant’s account is not supported by documentary or other objective evidence, there will be no need for further confirmation when the following conditions are met:
i)the claimant has made a genuine effort to substantiate their claim.
ii)all material factors at their disposal have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant material has been given.
ii) their statements are coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to their case.
iv) they have lodged an asylum or human rights claim at the earliest opportunity, unless they can demonstrate good reason for failing to do so.
v) their general credibility has been established.

If a claimant’s account satisfies all five criteria, you must give them the benefit of the doubt – as there would be no reason not to do so. If the claimant only meets one or more criteria, you must still consider whether, on the facts of the case, it is appropriate to give them the benefit of the doubt, bearing in mind the relatively low threshold of ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ applicable. All of the credibility indicators must be considered in the round.”

22. Mr Ojo submitted that paragraph 76 makes clear that the benefit of the doubt reflects recognition of the difficulties asylum claimants may face in obtaining evidence and the potentially serious consequences of an erroneous refusal of protection. The guidance states that, where a claimant's account is unsupported by documentary or objective evidence, further corroboration may not be required where the conditions set out in paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules are satisfied.

23. He further relied upon the guidance that, even where a claimant does not satisfy all five criteria contained in paragraph 339L, a decision-maker must nevertheless consider whether it is appropriate to afford the claimant the benefit of the doubt, having regard to the facts of the particular case and bearing in mind the relatively low threshold. He emphasised the guidance's requirement that credibility indicators must be considered in the round.

24. We accept Mr Ojo's submission that the judge did not require corroboration as a matter of law but was entitled to consider the absence of evidence that might reasonably have been expected. We further accept that the judge correctly directed himself as to the applicable standard of proof and referred to that standard repeatedly throughout the decision. We have had regard to paragraphs 74 to 76 of MAH (Egypt). Those paragraphs make clear that, whilst there is no legal requirement for corroboration, a judge is entitled to consider the absence of evidence that could reasonably be expected when assessing credibility and evaluating the evidence as a whole. Equally, the assessment must be conducted in the round and by reference to the relatively low standard of proof applicable in protection appeals.

25. When the decision is read holistically, it is apparent that the judge adopted that approach. The judge did not reject the appellant's account solely because of an absence of corroborative evidence. Rather, the judge considered the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's oral evidence, witness statement, documentary evidence, and the matters relied upon as undermining credibility. In those circumstances, we are not persuaded that the Judge misdirected himself as to the burden or standard of proof, imposed a requirement for corroboration, or otherwise departed from the principles identified in MAH (Egypt).

26. Accordingly, we find that there is no material error of law in the judge's approach to the evidence.

Ground Two

27. We are not persuaded that the judge erred in law in his assessment of this aspect of the appellant's evidence. At paragraph 12, the judge identified what he considered to be two competing strands of the appellant's account: on the one hand, that he could be located within a short period of checking into a hotel because hotels report guests to the police, and on the other, that he could avoid detection by refraining from using his national identity documents and relocating to remote areas.

28. Mr Broachwallah submitted that, without access to his identity card or hukou registration, the applicant would be unable to access employment, housing, travel or welfare and would be left destitute. Relocation and living in hiding would provide only temporary protection from the loan sharks. He therefore had no realistic alternative but to leave China.

29. He further argued that the judge impermissibly relied upon plausibility reasoning at paragraph 12, assessing the claim by reference to what might be considered reasonable in the UK. He referred to HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, particularly paragraphs 28 and 29, where caution was expressed against rejecting an asylum claim on plausibility grounds. He submitted that the applicant's account was not internally inconsistent and that the adverse credibility finding was therefore unsound and material to the outcome.

30. We reject this ground. The judge was entitled to assess whether the appellant's account was internally coherent and whether the explanations advanced were plausible in light of the evidence.

31. Contrary to the submissions made on the appellant's behalf, the judge did not reject the account solely on plausibility grounds or because he considered it contradictory. He considered the evidence, including the absence of any evidential basis for the claim that the alleged pursuers could trace the appellant through official systems, the absence of the threatening text messages said to have been received, and inconsistencies within the appellant's account. These were matters plainly open to the judge when assessing credibility. We accept Mr Ojo's submission that the judge gave adequate and sustainable reasons for his findings.

32. The challenge amounts, in substance, to a disagreement with findings that were properly available to the judge on the evidence. Adequate reasons were given for attaching limited weight to the appellant's assertions and for concluding that this aspect of the evidence further undermined the credibility of the core account. The findings were neither irrational nor unsupported by the evidence.

33. Accordingly, we find no material error of law in the Judge's reasoning at paragraph 12. The ground is not made out.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, and we decline to set it aside.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

T Bibi

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 September 2026