Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002097
FtT No: PA/60683/2024
LP/01173/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 8th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O'CALLAGHAN

Between

YC
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms K Vass, Counsel, instructed by Nag Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No‑one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The appellant appeals with permission a decision of the First‑tier Tribunal dismissing his protection and human rights (articles 3 and 8 ECHR) appeal sent to the parties on 19 March 2026.

Anonymity Direction

2. The First‑tier Tribunal made an anonymity direction. Neither representative requested that it be set aside. I am mindful of the fact that I am required to balance the appellant’s protected article 8 rights with the right of the public to know the parties to these proceedings, which is protected by article 10 ECHR. I observe that the appellant seeks international protection and presently I consider his private life rights outweigh the public right to know that he is the appellant in this appeal. Consequently, I make an anonymity direction that is detailed above.

Relevant Facts

3. The appellant is a national of Honduras and presently aged 29. Having arrived in the United Kingdom on 10 March 2022, he claimed asylum almost twenty-one months later on 4 November 2023. A screening interview was conducted, and the appellant attended a substantive asylum interview. The respondent refused the application for international protection by a decision dated 5 April 2024.

4. The core of his claim is his contention that consequent to having friends who are police officers, an organised criminal gang, the Mara Salvatrucha (‘MS‑13’) assumed that he was a police informant. He experienced ever increasing persecution from MS-13, an organisation engaged in drug trafficking, extortion and localised violence in Honduras.

5. In the early evening of 24 January 2022, he left the house of a friend, ‘B’, with others, including B who is a police officer. Shots were fired when they were in a car. A friend, ‘L’, was killed. The appellant reported the incident to the police and subsequently the MS‑13 were unofficially informed of his report.

6. The appellant states that members of MS‑13 visited his home five days later, kidnapped him and detained him for five hours. He was beaten and six of his teeth were extracted. His shoulder was injured. At the time of his release, his captors informed him that he had ten days to provide further information to ‘give up’ B. Following his release, he went into hiding at his aunt’s home. Later, when he was absent from the properly, his aunt’s home was burnt down. The appellant believes that this was an act of criminality undertaken by MS‑13.

7. In February 2022, another police officer friend, ‘E’, was killed. The appellant left hiding and attended the wake at E’s family home. He was inside the property when he heard two shots fired outside. He ran away from the property and, as he did so, he heard threats being made against him. Following this incident, he went back into hiding.

8. He left Honduras on 10 March 2022, transited through Spain and arrived in the United Kingdom on the same day. Upon his arrival, he was issued with six months’ leave to enter, expiring on 10 September 2022. He overstayed and did not seek asylum for a further fourteen months. At the time of his arrival, the United Kingdom did not require nationals from Honduras to obtain a visa to enter or transit through the country.

9. Though accepting the appellant’s nationality, by her decision of 5 April 2024 the respondent did not accept any other element of his stated personal history. She noted inconsistency in his evidence, considered it lacked detail, and determined that elements were not consistent with external information. Inconsistencies in the appellant’s timeline were also noted.

Decision of the First‑tier Tribunal

10. The appeal was listed before a judge at Hatton Cross on 18 March 2026. The appellant attended the hearing and gave evidence.

11. The First-tier Tribunal did not expressly identify the principal controversial issues in his decision: Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC), [2023] Imm AR 1416, approved by the Court of Appeal in AL v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 370, at [89]-[91]. However, it is possible to identify the principal controversial issues arising from the appellant’s ASA and the respondent’s review. The respondent’s position at the hearing was that the claim did not engage a Convention reason, the appellant did not have a well‑founded fear of persecution and he was not credible as to his personal history.

12. The protection and human rights appeal was dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal found the appellant to be vague and inconsistent. Consequently, he was not a witness of truth. Relevant to this decision, I cite [18] of the First-tier Tribunal decision:

’18. The appellant has been unclear, vague and inconsistent regarding the main events of his claim. He did not make clear in earlier sources of evidence that there were two of his friends who had been killed. At screening his mentioned one friend being shot dead, who was unarmed. Whilst referring to two policemen friends in the AIR he did not name them and did not make it clear that two had been shot. Only in his witness statement does he say that [L] )(his friend’s brother in law) was shot in the Appellant’s presence and separately a friend [E] had been killed on 12 February 2022. The SAG referred briefly to two people who were unnamed. I find that the Appellant has sought to clarify all this very later at the time of his witness statement to seek to explain the inconsistencies highlighted in the timeline by the respondent. If there had been two murders of friends the Appellant would have mentioned this earlier.’

Grounds of Appeal

13. One ground of appeal is advanced, namely that the First‑tier Tribunal made factual errors. Though not expressly referenced in the grounds, the challenge is founded upon the well-established principle that an error of fact can constitute a material error of law: R (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982, [2005] Imm AR 535.

14. The following complaints are made:

(i) At [17] of its decision, the First-tier Tribunal found it incredible and speculative that if the organised criminal gang were aware of B’s whereabouts, they would have targeted him after the first encounter. The Tribunal is said to have failed to consider the appellant’s evidence that after this incident B went into hiding.

(ii) At [18], an adverse finding was made in respect of the appellant failing to make clear that two friends had been killed. The First-tier Tribunal observed that the appellant was not clear on this central element of his case until he filed his witness statement for the hearing. The appellant contends that he filed a statement of additional grounds, signed on 25 January 2024, postdating his screening interview held on 11 December 2023, that refers to a friend who died instantaneously and another friend also being killed. Furthermore, the appellant notes his reference at question 43 of his substantive interview to the fact that his best friend, a policeman, was killed and at the subsequent service, or wake, the appellant was targeted as the ten days he had been given to produce B had passed. The appellant’s position is that he has been consistent as to two friends being killed and the First-tier Tribunal erred in suggesting he had not mentioned such matters earlier.

(iii) At [20], the First-tier Tribunal relied upon inconsistency as to whether the victim was dead when removed from the scene by ambulance. The appellant contends that his witness statement is clear at paragraph 6 that the friend was murdered and his body was removed by an ambulance.

(iv) The appellant challenges the First-tier Tribunal's conclusion that there was no evidence he possessed official documents now relied upon when he entered the United Kingdom. He relies on question 6.2 of his screening interview where he references having documents that he wished to rely upon. The grounds of appeal further detail, at paragraph 9, ‘there was evidence before the Tribunal that the documents were in existence as early as the screening interview.’

(v) At [23], the First-tier Tribunal made adverse observations that a document relied upon to establish that the appellant did not have a criminal record was undated and so no weight was to be placed upon it. The appellant observes the face of the document confirming that it was issued on 1 October 2020.

15. First‑tier Tribunal Judge Rodger granted the appellant permission to appeal to this Tribunal on 24 April 2026, reasoning:

“The grounds assert a number of errors of fact and materiality to the key issue of credibility are arguable errors of law. If the errors of fact are made out, then it is arguable that they are material to the adverse credibility findings made by the judge. Permission is therefore granted on all grounds.”

Analysis

16. There is no challenge advanced that the First‑tier Tribunal failed to undertake a holistic assessment.

17. I turn first to the challenges directed to the consideration of documents relied upon by the appellant at (iv) and (v) of his grounds of appeal, including, but not limited to, documents said to originate from the Honduras CAS Security Secretary Police Investigations Directorate, and a police complaint in respect of events that took place on 24 January 2022. It was the appellant’s case at the hearing that he brought the originals of these documents with him from Honduras, but they were stolen along with his rucksack approximately eighteen months after his arrival in this country and some two months before he claimed asylum.

18. The First‑tier Tribunal addressed the provenance of the documents relied upon, at [21]:

’21. … He explained in his oral evidence that he had brought the original documents to the UK at the time that he left Honduras. He has failed to provide the originals. He claimed in his oral evidence, for the first time, that these were stolen in a robbery when his rucksack, which they were within, was stolen around two months prior to him claiming asylum. He states that the copy documents now within the bundle are produced because copies of the originals have been provided to his former solicitor. There is no evidence of this, and this account does not fit the timeline, and his inability to provide documents at the time of his interviews which he had available, he says, in copy form. It is also unlikely that the solicitor would not keep the originals. The appellant was asked whether he had reported the robbery to the police. He said that he reported the passport but had not reported the robbery, the theft of the rucksack or the theft of these important documents. He explained that he did not do so because he was fearful having to identify the culprits and he did not know who they were. This is incredible and makes no sense If he reported the theft by robbery of the passport, then there are no reasons why he would not have reported the other elements of his claimed robbery. I reject his whole account of having had the originals on entry to the UK and thereafter these being robbed.’

19. The appellant relies upon his answer at question 6.2 of his screening interview. To the question, ‘Do you have any documents or other evidence relevant to your claim, family life, or other personal circumstances that you wish to submit to support your asylum claim. If yes, do you have them with you today or when will they be available?’ The appellant is simply recorded as answering, “documents.”

20. I accept Ms Vass’s observation that there is no requirement for the respondent to note in detail the answers provided by an applicant at a screening interview. It is therefore sufficient to observe that at the time of this interview the appellant stated that he had documents he wished to rely upon. It can properly be observed that it is not his case that he brought them to the screening interview. However, this answer at the screening interview does not ultimately aid the appellant. As accepted within the grounds of appeal, the answer is simply evidence only as to the appellant having documents in his possession at the time of the screening interview some twenty-one months after he arrived in this country. At its highest it comes nowhere close to materially undermining the cogently reasoned conclusion of the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant was not credible as to having the originals stolen, or indeed having had possession of them when he entered this country. As Ms Vass properly accepted, there is no challenge to the judge’s reasoning for rejecting the appellant’s evidence as to his being robbed.

21. Further, there is no challenge to the adverse credibility founded upon there being no evidence from the appellant’s former solicitor that they had for a time held the originals or had taken copies of them. Observing the Court of Appeal guidance in TK (Burundi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 40, [2009] Imm AR 488, it was entirely lawful for the First-tier Tribunal to place adverse weight on the failure of the appellant to provide evidence readily obtainable from his previous solicitors that they had for a time possessed the original documents and then returned them to him. Though not a matter that I place weight on in my assessment, the appellant was unable to name this firm of solicitors at the hearing before me.

22. At the hearing, Ms Vass’s focus was upon the sentence in [21], ‘There is no evidence of this and this account does not fit the timeline and his inability to provide documents at the time of his interviews which he had available, he says, in copy form.’ She contends that the ‘no evidence’ finding relates to there being no evidence at all that the appellant had raised the issue of his possessing relevant documents prior to his witness statement.

23. I do not agree with this submission as it is inconsistent with a fair and proper reading of the sentence in the context of the paragraph as a whole. The First-tier Tribunal was specifically considering the appellant’s evidence that he had brought the documents to the United Kingdom when he left Honduras, and his explanation as to why he was unable to provide the originals. His sole explanation was that they were in his rucksack when it was taken from him in a robbery. This was two months prior to him claiming asylum. It is this explanation which is being considered by the First‑tier Tribunal and the reference to ‘no evidence’ is specifically directed to the prior sentence which is concerned with the appellant having, on his evidence, provided the originals to his former solicitor. This is also the subject of the following sentence.

24. Clear and unchallenged reasons were given as to why neither the robbery not the handing over of the documents to the unidentified former solicitors were accepted. The First-tier Tribunal was perfectly entitled to proceed on the basis that the appellant was not being truthful as to the circumstances in which these documents found their way into the appeal bundle, and that these documents had been acquired post‑entry. The ground as advanced is an inappropriate effort to island hop: Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [65]

25. The challenge to the judge’s reasoning at [23] is parasitic upon the unsuccessful challenge to the reasoning at [21] and therefore falls away. In any event, though I accept the appellant’s contention that contrary to the conclusion reached the document does have an issue date, namely 13 January 2020, there are no challenges advanced to the judicial findings that the English language translation is not certified by an approved professional, nor as to the translated document not making grammatical sense on occasion. The document as translated is unreliable.

26. Additionally, I observe that there is no challenge to the conclusion that this document, and the others relied upon, does not contain the hallmarks and characteristics of a genuine official document.

27. For completeness, I observe the unchallenged finding at [24]:

“24. The contents of the police complaint is highly inconsistent with the appellant’s current position. The appellant said in his oral evidence that no words were spoken at the time of the shooting and no demands were made. In stark contrast, the police report refers to demands being made. Additionally, the report itself is inconsistent as it refers to the incident starting when the victims were walking, but also with a motor vehicle. The appellant says that things started when they were in their vehicle. None of this can be reconciled.”

28. The challenge to the judicial reasoning in respect of the appellant’s documents is properly to be dismissed. It was reasonably open to the judge to find that the documents were not genuine and that they undermined the appellant’s credibility in the round.

29. Turning next to the challenge advanced by ground (ii) to the factual findings and their assessment in respect of credibility, I have read the appellant’s interviews and statement of additional grounds with care. I conclude that they do not have the clarity the appellant now seeks to place upon them. As reasonably expected of a screening interview, the appellant gave a brief answer as requested to why he could not return home, stating, inter alia, “I cannot return to Honduras because a gang tried to take my life and my friend has died from a gunshot to his head.” There is reference to only one death in the interview, which is said to have taken place on 10 February 2022, and on the appellant’s current account of events is a reference to the murder of E. However, the First-tier Tribunal can properly be expected to place into its assessment that a screening interview commences with an applicant for international protection being informed that they only need to give brief answers.

30. As acknowledged by Ms Vass, the difficulty for the appellant in this matter is the content of the statement of additional grounds which he now relies upon as establishing that that he had referred to the murders of two friends before preparing and signing his witness statement, dated 24 April 2024. The statement of additional grounds is dated 25 January 2024 and details, inter alia:

'5) The applicant narrowly escaped death when the car in which he travelled was shot at. One of his friends died instantaneously.

6) The applicant’s another friend, too, was killed.

7) The applicant was visited by the gang members at his home and was warned.

8) The appellant moved away to live with his aunt. He was traced to this place of hiding too.

9) The appellant fled Honduras when he faced imminent death.'

31. Though not strictly evidence, the statement of additional grounds details the appellant’s case on instruction and was not subject to revision at the outset of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal. Though it references two deaths, it is a document that does not aid the appellant. It does not provide any dates as to events, and on a fair reading, it identifies two friends being killed before the applicant was visited by gang members and warned, and before he moved away to live with his aunt. It also suggests that two friends were killed when the appellant was shot at in a car. These circumstances are not consistent with the personal history advanced at the hearing. On his oral case before the First‑tier Tribunal, after a friend was killed, he was then visited by gang members at his home, seriously ill treated and warned, then moved away to live with his aunt whose home was subsequently destroyed, remained in hiding whilst a second friend was killed, then attended a wake where shots were fired and threats were made, then returned to hiding before leaving Honduras.

32. Whilst the appellant is correct that the statement of additional grounds references two deaths, the error of fact is not material because the document is significantly inconsistent with the appellant’s evidence at the hearing. On a clear and fair reading, the statement of additional grounds does not expressly reference the two killings as having occurred several days apart. Rather, the chronology can be fairly read as saying that they occurred before he went into hiding. It was for the appellant to establish his case to the requisite standard of proof. The First-tier Tribunal was reasonably and lawfully permitted to rely upon the appellant having been unclear and vague as to the deaths of two friends in separate incidents up until he filed his witness statement. On its face, having carefully read the decision, there was no material error of fact in the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment.

33. I accept in respect of ground (i) that the First-tier Tribunal failed to take into consideration, at [17], the appellant’s evidence that his friend B had gone into hiding. I further accept that [20] is a very confused paragraph as contended by ground (iii). The notion that the appellant’s deceased friend was taken to a police station to make a complaint after having been killed is simply nonsensical. However, these errors do not come close to being material errors in circumstances where several other cogent reasons were given by the First-tier Tribunal for not finding the appellant to be a credible witness as to his personal history. These two errors do not adversely infect the decision when the findings at [18], [19], [21], [22], [24], [26], [27], and [28] are considered.

34. Consequently, the appeal is properly to be dismissed.

Notice of Decision

35. The making of the decision of the First‑tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on any point of law.

36. The decision of the First‑tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 19 March 2026 is upheld.

37. An anonymity direction is made.

D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
28 August 2026