Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002109
linked to UI-2026-002102

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65532/2023
LP/02360/2024
PA/53285/2025
LP/02313/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN

Between

DT
KS
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr P Richardson, Counsel instructed by Sabz Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett , Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the names or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the Upper Tribunal’). The Upper Tribunal is an independent decision-making body with powers given to it by an Act of Parliament. This decision is made in the context of the Upper Tribunal’s role in considering statutory appeals from decisions made by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the First-tier Tribunal’).
2. The losing party in an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal can apply for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. If permission is granted, the Upper Tribunal will consider the legal arguments put forward by both sides in the appeal. The Upper Tribunal only has power to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal if it concludes that the arguments put forward by the party that applied to appeal show that the decision involved the making of an error of law: see section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (‘TCEA 2007’).
3. If the Upper Tribunal finds that a decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, the First-tier Tribunal decision will stand. If a decision of the First-tier Tribunal is found to involve the making of an error of law the Upper Tribunal has power to set aside the decision. The Upper Tribunal will then decide whether it will remake the decision or whether the appeal might need to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal.
4. The appellants (DT & KS) are nationals of St Vincent and the Grenadines (“SVG”) and are partners. They claim to face the risk of targeted and serious harm from a violent gang responsible for the murder of the first appellant’s younger brother in August 2021. The appellants maintain that the gang believed that the first appellant held information about the killers because he was present when his brother was found fatally injured. The first appellant submits he was pursued by the gang who orchestrated threats and intimidation, and in March 2022, he was directly confronted by a gang member when a gun was pointed at him.
5. The second appellant also claims that she has been pursued by the gang by association with the first appellant and that the threats escalated once the first appellant had left the country. Both appellants maintain that the police are ineffective and compromised and would not offer sufficient protection.
6. The first appellant arrived in the UK in May 2022 and the second appellant and her child arrived later. The first appellant’s claim for asylum made on 3 May 2022 was refused by the respondent on 07 December 2023. The second appellant’s application for asylum made on 09 October 2023 was also refused by the respondent on 16 January 2025. Both appellants appealed the respondent’s respective decisions refusing them asylum to the First-tier Tribunal.
7. By a decision made by First-tier Tribunal Judge Webber dated 11 January 2026, the appellants’ respective appeals were dismissed on protection and human rights grounds. The appellants appealed the First-tier Tribunal decision to the Upper Tribunal. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready on 23 April 2026.
8. The matter now comes before me to determine whether First-tier Tribunal Judge Webber (‘FTTJ’) erred in law, and, if so, whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
9. The appellants and the respondent were ably represented by Mr Richardson and Ms Everett, respectively. I am grateful to them for their very helpful submissions.
10. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity direction and that direction is maintained.
Grounds
11. The grounds submits that the FTTJ relied on a document titled COIR (‘Country of Origin Information Request’) which was not in evidence before the Tribunal, nor in the Respondent’s refusal decision, and that the appellants were not given the opportunity to respond to it.

12. First-Tier Tribunal Judge Mulready, in granting permission stated:
“The refusal decision did however refer to a US State Department which indicated there was government corruption, which the Tribunal was required to consider, but there is no evidence in the Decision that it has done so”.
“The Tribunal accepted there was a risk of persecution but found there would be sufficiency of protection from it and on that basis dismissed the appeals. It is therefore arguable the Tribunal erred materially in failing to allow the appellants the opportunity to respond to evidence which was relied on in the Decision to find against them on sufficiency of protection, and failing to consider evidence which they argue supported their case on sufficiency of protection”.
Rule 24
13. On 06 May 2026, the respondent filed her Rule 24 response opposing the appeal on the basis that the COIR was before the Tribunal and uploaded to the linked appeal (PA/65532/2025) and was also referred to in the directions tab on MyHMCTS for PA/53285/2023. Accordingly, the respondent submitted that the legal representatives of the appellants would have been aware that the COIR formed part of the respondent’s evidence.
Rule 25
14. In their Rule 25 response ,the appellants’ representatives accepted the position and clarification set out in the Rule 24 response and noted that the COIR was a document which the Tribunal was able to rely on. The appellants stated that they accordingly sought to rely on the remainder grounds for permission.
Submissions
15. In light of the respective Rule 24 and Rule 25 responses, Mr Richardson, accepted at the hearing that the first ground of appeal in relation to the COIR had fallen away. However, he maintained the second ground remained extant, namely, the failure of the FTTJ to have regard to the US State Department report. In short, he submitted the FTTJ had it but did not refer to it. He accepted there was a link to it in the respondent’s refusal letter (at page 447 of the compressed bundle). He further stated the only relevant passage that could have assisted the appellants was the link copied in the grounds of appeal that related to corruption.
16. Mr Richardson stated that the appellants accepted in general there was sufficiency of protection in the SVG, but that protection did not apply to the appellants’ specific needs. In this regard, the appellants relied on the headnote of AW (Sufficiency of Protection) Pakistan [2011] UKUT (IAC). This states that ‘Notwithstanding systemic sufficiency of state protection, a claimant may still have a well-founded fear of persecution if authorities know or ought to know of circumstances particular to his/her case giving rise to the fear but are unlikely to provide the additional protection the particular circumstances reasonably require”.
17. In short, the appellants’ position applying AW was that although the FTTJ did reach findings on the generality of sufficiency of protection at [59]-[69] of the decision, those findings were insufficient to address the particular circumstances facing the appellants. He noted that the objective evidence showed that gangs killed dozens of people in SVG and that the FTTJ needed to have looked at the particular elements of the appellants’ case. Mr Richardson submitted that simply addressing the generalities, did not absolve the FTTJ from dealing with the specifics.
18. Finally, Mr Richardson acknowledged that the arguments on sufficiency of protection as he had formulated them before the hearing had not been pleaded in the original appeal grounds. However, in his view the points made were ‘Robinson obvious’ in the legal sense. In this regard, sufficiency of protection had to be addressed in two stages, firstly generality and, then secondly, how it applied to the specific needs of the appellants. In this instance, the FTTJ had erred by only considering the first stage.
19. Ms Everett on behalf of the respondent submitted that the ground argued for by the appellant’s was plain and simply not pleaded by their legal representatives, and it would be a stretch of paragraph three of the grounds of appeal to interpret it in the manner suggested. Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed on this basis alone.
20. In the alterative, Ms Everett submitted that the FTTJ did wrestle with particular elements of the appellants’ case which could be seen at [63]-[65] of the decision.
21. Ms Everett also agreed with the appellants’ articulation of the headnote in AW at [2] as a general proposition but cautioned that the facts were very different in AW as the reach was across the whole of Pakistan in that case, while in this instance the gangs were local.
Findings and Reasons
22. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before it, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at this hearing, before coming to a decision in this appeal.
23. I bear in mind that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of a specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings: see HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the Tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19.
24. There are two issues that I need to address: (i) whether the FTTJ considered the relevant passage in the US State Department report relating to corruption, and (ii) whether the FTTJ was required on the basis of a Robinson obvious point to consider the specific needs of the appellants following the finding that sufficiency of protection was available to them.
25. Turning to the first issue, the appellants have accepted in their Rule 25 response that the relevant US State Department report was contained within the COIR report, and that report was before the FTTJ.
26. The relevant passage on ‘Corruption’ at section 4 of the US State Department report states ‘The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not always implement the law effectively”. The grounds of appeal at [3] submit that the FTTJ was required to consider the objective evidence in reference to the testimony of the appellants on the issue of police protection and this has not been evidenced in the decision.
27. The decision records at [45] that the first appellant stated that it was clear that the police had informed the Beehive gang of his statement because the gang knew who he was and what he said. At [51] the FTTJ referred to the COIR which stated that there was no evidence to suggest that state-embedded actors were directly involved in criminal markets or organised crime more generally.
28. Further, at [62] the FTTJ records that the COIR noted that ‘Although there are many gangs operating, very few are mafia style groups with hierarchy or territorial control. They are instead dominated by loose criminal networks. Corruption is low. The country is party to conventions and treaties pertaining to organised crime. The government generally operates with openness and transparency”.
29. While I accept there is no direct reference made by the FTTJ to section 4 of the US State Department report, the references to the COIR in the decision clearly show that the FTTJ grappled with the issue of corruption within the SVG police force as raised by the appellants and reached adequate and reasoned findings having applied the objective evidence relating to the country situation.
30. There is nothing to suggest that the FTTJ did not have regard to the relevant passage on corruption in the US State Department report as it was contained within the COIR which in turn is referenced and applied by the FTTJ. The issue of corruption was unarguably addressed by the FTTJ and there is no material error of law.
31. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in the decision of Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26(ii)] has stated, that where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the First tier-Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account. In conclusion, I find this issue amounts to nothing more than a disagreement with the decision.
32. Turning to the second issue, Mr Richardson concedes that the ground he articulates before the hearing relating to the FTTJ’s failure to properly consider the appellants’ specific needs within the context of sufficiency of protection is not set out in the grounds of appeal. I also note that no application has been made by the appellants for an extension of time to apply to amend the grounds of appeal. Rather, Mr Richardson, argues that the ground constitutes a ‘Robinson obvious’ point which should have been taken by the FTTJ.
33. The authorities are clear that, in an asylum or human rights case, a Tribunal must take a Robinson obvious point in the appellant’s favour. The term Robinson obvious derives from the judgment in R v SSHD ex parte Robinson [1997] EWCA Civ 3090.
34. That judgment makes clear that a Robinson obvious point is one that has a strong prospect of success and that mere ‘arguability’ is not sufficient. In other words, the point in question has to be obvious, in the sense of being one with a strong prospect of success were permission to be granted. In this respect the Court of Appeal at [39] stated “The appellate authorities should of course focus primarily on the arguments adduced before them, whether these are to be found in the oral argument before the special adjudicator or, as far as the Tribunal is concerned, in the written grounds of appeal …. They are not required to engage in a search for new points. If there is readily discernible an obvious point of Convention law which favours the applicant although he has not taken it, then the special adjudicator should apply it in his favour but he should feel under no obligation to prolong the hearing by asking the parties for submissions on points which have not been taken but which could be properly categorised as merely “arguable” as opposed to “obvious”.
35. I have carefully considered the respective submissions and the relevant legal test. I recall that Ms Everett submitted that not only was the ground argued for not pleaded by the appellants’ legal representatives, but it would be a stretch of paragraph three of the grounds of appeal to interpret it in the manner suggested.
36. Accordingly, Ms Everett argued that the appeal should be dismissed on this basis alone. In the alterative, she submitted that the FTTJ did wrestle with particular elements of the appellants’ case which could be seen at [63]-[65] of the decision.
37. Despite Mr Richardson’s spirited submissions, I am bound to agree with Ms Everett. The ground argued for by Mr Richardson cannot be said to be ‘readily discernible’ and therefore ‘obvious’ such that it should have been addressed by the FTTJ. In fact, from the decision, it appears no oral or written arguments were made with respect to the specific needs of the appellants in the context of sufficiency of protection and accordingly there was no basis for a Robinson obvious point to be taken.
38. However, if I am wrong in that view, it is clear from the decision at [63]–[65] that the FTTJ did try and grapple with the appellants’ specific circumstances but was limited by the paucity of evidence identifying any specific needs. Accordingly, even if the Robinson obvious point had been taken by the FTTJ it would not have had a strong prospect of success for the reason stated.
39. A careful review of the decision at [59]-[69] shows that the FTTJ took account of the objective evidence in the COIR and properly assessed the evidence in the round. At [63] the FTTJ noted there was no recent evidence about the investigation of the first appellant’s brother since the last update on 28 December 2023. There was also little evidence about the murder of the first appellant’s cousin because of the paucity of evidence about the circumstances, motivation or police involvement. At [65] the FTTJ properly attached little weight to the first appellant’s assertion that the Beehive gang was protected by the police because the objective evidence did not support the assertion. At [69] the FTTJ concluded on the evidence that despite limited resources, the SVG did operate an effective system of protection.
40. Overall, the decision shows that the Tribunal did try to grapple with the specific elements of the appellants’ case but there was little evidence before it. This scenario, coupled with the absence of any obligation on the part of the FTTJ to engage in a search for new points meant there was no Robinson obvious point for the Tribunal to take concerning the appellants’ specific needs within the context of the sufficiency of protection findings.
41. In light of the foregoing, the appellant fails on the second issue raised. There is no error of law in the First-tier Tribunal decision based on failing to take a Robinson obvious point.
42. For the reasons given above, I conclude that none of the grounds put forward on behalf of the appellant show that the First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law. The decision shall stand.

Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law
The decision shall stand

K. A. Khan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 August 2026