Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002114
& UI-2026-002117
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67311/2024
PA/58066/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

21st September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

(1) K A
(2) K B
(ANONYMITY ORDERS MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Pullinger, Counsel instructed by Justice and Rights Law Firm.
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 11 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellants appeal the decision of First-tier Tribunal Sweet (‘the FtT / the Judge’) dated 8th February 2026, in which the Judge dismissed the Appellants’ protection and human rights appeals. The Appellants are mother and (adult) daughter. They arrived in the UK together and applied for asylum at the same time. The second Appellant’s daughter (a child) is also in the UK and she is dependent on the second Appellant’s appeal. Because each claim and appeal arises from the same factual matrix, their appeals were linked to be heard and determined together in the FtT and the same continues in this Tribunal.
2. I have maintained the Anonymity Orders in favour of the Appellants, which was made on an interim basis by a different judge of the Upper Tribunal. This order was made because the Judge considered that on the specific facts of the appeals, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the potential risk of serious harm if the Appellants are identified was such that an anonymity order on a precautionary interim basis was a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
3. I was not asked to set that order aside and I consider that it is necessary for it to stand. This is because the Appellants’ protection appeals remain outstanding for determination and their claims involve a fear from the authorities in a particular area of Russia, as well as more widely in Russia. There is a real risk of harm to the Appellants and/or their families if the Appellants’ names are published causing them and/or their family to come to the attention of those authorities.
Factual background and procedural history
4. The Appellants are Russian citizens, who originate from and who resided in Dagestan. Their protection claims are grounded in their actual/imputed political belief(s), which involved inter alia attending demonstrations and meetings of a political nature in Dagestan, and their religious beliefs, which they say, as Muslims, would prohibit any internal relocation to a different part of Russia.
5. The Appellants’ protection and human rights claims were refused by the Respondent on 19th June 2024 and the appeals were heard in the FtT on 2nd February 2026.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
6. After providing a summary of the Appellants’ claims, the Judge found at [16] that the Appellant had given “some false evidence”. The reasons for this finding are set out at [16] and appear to be as follows:
(a) There were inconsistencies as to their ability to work and live in Russia;
(b) Their disguising the true purpose of their visit to the UK – both Appellants having confirmed that on arrival to the UK (utilising their entry clearance as visitors) they had no intention of returning to Russia;
(c) The Judge found their demeanour when giving evidence to be evasive and not straightforward;
(d) The Judge did not accept the Appellants’ account of fear of police/state persecution;
(e) The first Appellant’s “chats with her sister (name omitted) regarding 2018 do not add anything to the claim”.
7. The Judge then noted at [17] that the Appellant had failed to mention her son in her asylum interview, neither Appellant had referred to him in their respective witness statements, which was in contrast to the son being identified in the entry clearance visa application. The Judge confirmed not accepting the reason given for this, which was that one of the Appellants wished to protect him - it is not clear in the decision which Appellant the Judge is referring to.
8. At [18], the Judge found that the Appellants are able to pray at home and that the CPIN on Muslims in Russia, which had been relied upon was not considered by the Judge to lend any support to their claim. The Judge added at [19] the following:
“The COI schedule merely describes the situation on Dagestan and the North Caucasus, without enhancing the appellants’ claims which I have found lacking credibility. I do not accept that the appellants would be at an enhanced risk on return due to their race or religion.”
9. At [20], the Judge also found as follows:
“There were inconsistencies as to whether the first appellant had reported the threats to the police and whether she attended the police station or not. I place little weight on the documents provided by the appellant in respect of the alleged attendance on protests and subsequent attendance at the police station. I do not accept that the appellants will be identified as failed asylum seekers on return, as the UK authorities will not have reported them as such.”
10. Lastly, at [21] the Judge briefly considered the Appellants’ claims against the threshold of whether or not there are “obstacles to returning to Russia” and at [22], the Judge confirmed taking into account previous visits undertaken to the UK and the lack of difficulties experienced on return to Russia. The Judge also noted that the marital status of one of the Appellants (again it is not clear which one of the two) is recorded as divorced in 2018 and married in 2019 and 2022. Where such marital status is said to have been recorded is unclear but it would appear that this is from the visa application forms, since these were submitted in those years also.
11. At [23], the Judge confirmed that “for all these reasons”, the appeals would be dismissed.
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal
12. The Appellants applied for permission to appeal and raised a number of grounds, which effectively argue that the Judge had misunderstood and/or conflated the two distinct aspects of the Appellants’ protection claims, namely between their actual/imputed political beliefs and their religion. The grounds also argue that the Judge took irrelevant matters into consideration, such as the lack of reference to the first Appellant’s son and marital status and gave inadequate or insufficient reasons for the findings reached.
13. The Appellants were granted permission to appeal by a different judge of the Upper Tribunal, who stated as follows:
“The grounds present multiple occasions on which Judge Sweet is said to have misunderstood the nature of the appellants’ protection claims and the evidence in their support, which taken together disclose an arguable prospect of success in establishing an error of law.”
14. In response, the Respondent did not file and serve a reply under Rule 24 of the Procedure Rules.
15. At the hearing, Ms Clewley, on behalf of the Respondent, indicated that she was not seeking to contest the appeal. Ms Clewley accepted that the Judge’s determination contained material errors of law. Having reviewed the documentation that was before the FtT Judge, and in particular the Appellants’ asylum interview records, Ms Clewley agreed that the Judge had mischaracterised the Appellants’ evidence.
16. In particular, when stating at [16] that there were inconsistencies as to the Appellants’ ability to work and live in Russia, the Judge had failed to reflect the first Appellant’s evidence that she had been able to work and rent accommodation in her home area, and that the difficulties she described related to other parts of Russia rather than her home area. Helpfully, Ms Clewley took me to the relevant parts of the first Appellant’s answers in the asylum interview. These included Question 8 of the first interview record (TB [227]) and Questions 33 and 42 of the second interview record (TB [241] and [243]). Ms Clewley very fairly submitted that those passages made the position very clear: the first Appellant had explained that she had worked previously in Dagestan but would not be able to find work in other areas of Russia, including for example Moscow as a result of discrimination and other treatment against Muslims.
17. Ms Clewley also outlined the Respondent’s view that the Judge had incorrectly stated in the determination that the Appellants’ claims were that they would face discrimination throughout the entirety of Russia. In fact, the Appellant’s evidence had been directed to the risk of discrimination and other difficulties arising in the context of relocation and residence outside their home area.
18. Ms Clewley also accepted the second ground of appeal pursued by the Appellants. She agreed that the Judge had taken into account irrelevant considerations when assessing the Appellants’ credibility, including the matters relating to the first Appellant’s son addressed by the Judge at [17].
19. In the circumstances helpfully and comprehensively outlined by Ms Clewley, it was accepted on behalf of the Respondent that the Judge’s decision was unsafe as a whole and that the appropriate course would be for the appeal to be remitted for a fresh hearing, before a different judge of the FtT. Ms Clewley was therefore content to concede the errors of law, on the basis of her submissions which I have summarised above, and it is not necessary for me to resolve the remainder of the Appellants’ grounds of appeal.
20. For completeness, I also record that the Appellants had made prior to the hearing, via their legal representatives, an application to amend their grounds of appeal in order to add an additional ground. In light of the Respondent’s position in response to the appeal, which was clarified before me at the hearing, it was not necessary for the Appellants to pursue this application nor for me to determine whether they should be permitted to do so.
21. In these circumstances, it was not necessary for me to hear from Mr Pullinger, on behalf of the Appellants. I also indicated at the hearing that I was satisfied that Ms Clewley’s concessions were fair and appropriate. In particular, there was no real sense from the Judge’s decision of the two distinct aspects of the Appellants’ claims and the issue of religion relating to the issue of internal relocation. In addition, there was a distinct lack of reasons for many of the findings reached at [16]-[20]. I also agreed with Ms Clewley that it was appropriate, in line with the relevant guidance and Practice Direction, to remit the matter to the FtT to be heard afresh before a different judge – all of the relevant fact-finding needing to be done properly and afresh.
22. In light of the above, I am satisfied that the Judge made material error(s) of law and the FtT’s decision to dismiss the Appellants’ appeals promulgated on 8th February 2026 shall be set aside in its entirety.
Notice of Decision
23. The decision of the FtT dated 8th February 2026 contained material error(s) of law and is set aside. None of the FtT’s findings of fact are preserved.
24. This matter is remitted to the FtT for re-making, to be heard afresh before a different judge.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14.09.2026