UI-2026-002131 & Ors.
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002131;
UI-2026-002132; UI-2026-002133
UI-2026-002134
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00906/2024
РA/00908/2024; PA/00910/2024
PA/00912/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued
On 3rd of November 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING
Between
AJM
PAM
FCG
ALH
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Not legally represneted
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer
Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 9 September 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal ("the Judge") dismissing his appeal against the respondent's decision to refuse his claim for asylum.
Background
2. The appellant, is a national of Namibia, who fears return. His case was that, following his baptism in Nigeria and association with Prophet T.B. Joshua, he came to the adverse attention of a pastor and members of his former church in Namibia. He claimed that he and his family were subjected to threats, intimidation and other serious harm, including allegations that his wife had been sexually assaulted by the pastor, such that they could not safely return to Namibia. The issues before the First-tier Tribunal were whether those events had occurred, whether the appellant genuinely feared persecution on return, and whether protection or relocation would be available if required.
3. The appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 9 March 2026. The Judge accepted the appellant's identity, nationality and Christian faith. However, he rejected the core account as not credible. The Judge found that the appellant had not established that he was baptised in Nigeria as claimed, did not accept that he or his family had been subjected to the threats and persecution alleged, and concluded that the claims concerning the pastor's conduct, including the alleged sexual assaults upon the appellant's wife, were not truthful and had been advanced at a late stage to strengthen the claim. Having rejected the factual basis of the protection claim, the Judge found that the appellant did not face a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Namibia and dismissed the appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection, Articles 2 and 3, and Article 8 grounds.
4. The appellant sought permission to appeal. The grounds were fourfold. In granting permission, a different Judge of the First-tier Tribunal synthesised the grounds, consistent with R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982, and observed that, in essence, the grounds advanced a complaint that the Judge had failed to give adequate reasons for findings on material matters.
The hearing
5. The appellant was not legally represented at the hearing before me. I explained the procedure to him and that the purpose of the hearing was not for me to form my own view as to the merits of the appeal, but rather to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal had made mistake of fact or law that was material to the outcome. I described the documentation before me and the appellant confirmed that nothing was missing and that he was familiar with the papers.
6. I explained that I would invite Mr Diwnycz to make submissions first. Although this was the appellant's appeal, I considered that, as he was unrepresented, he might find it helpful to hear how submissions were advanced before having the opportunity to respond. I also indicated to Mr Diwnycz that I had concerns regarding the adequacy of the reasoning within the determination and would be assisted by submissions explaining why it was said that the reasons given were sufficient.
7. I heard submissions from both Mr Diwnycz and the appellant. At the conclusion of the hearing, I indicated that I was persuaded that the Judge had failed to give adequate reasons on material matters and that the decision contained a material error of law.
Analysis
8. In MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485, the Court of Appeal helpfully summarised the law relating to the adequacy of reasons. The relevant principles may be distilled as follows:
(a) reasons must be intelligible and adequate;
(b) they must enable the losing party to understand why they have lost;
(c) reasons need not be lengthy or elaborate; and
(d) appellate restraint is required. An appellate tribunal should not assume error merely because every step in the reasoning process has not been expressly set out
9. It is fair to say that the Judge attempted to give reasons for reaching his conclusions. The decision is concise and clearly structured. Concision in judicial decision-making is to be encouraged and is not, of itself, problematic. I have also been mindful of the need to exercise appellate restraint.
10. However, even allowing for those matters, I am concerned that the appellant cannot properly understand why his evidence was rejected on a number of material issues.
11. By way of illustration, at paragraph 31 of the determination the Judge stated:
"I attach significant negative factor weight to bullet points 1 to 4 and 6 under the heading 'Credibility' in the Reasons for Refusal Letter, pages 7 and 8 regarding the claimed baptism in Nigeria."
12. On a first reading, that was a finding open to the Judge. Weight is a matter for the judge hearing the evidence. The difficulty lies in the analysis. It is not apparent to the reader why those matters attracted significant negative weight. The reasoning underpinning that conclusion is not explained.
13. Similar difficulties arise at paragraphs 32, 37, 38, 39 and 40 to 46 of the determination. The Judge repeatedly identifies matters to which he attaches negative weight, or aspects of the respondent's case that he accepts, but without adequately explaining why he has reached those conclusions.
14. Equally, at paragraph 48 of the determination the Judge accepts the respondent's submissions. Again, it was plainly open to him to do so. The difficulty is that the determination does not sufficiently explain why those submissions were preferred.
15. I have read the determination as a whole with a benevolent eye but doing so has not allayed my concerns regarding the adequacy of the reasoning. The cumulative effect is that the appellant cannot properly understand why significant aspects of his evidence were rejected on issues central to the appeal.
16. For that reason I find that the determination does contain material errors of law.
Disposal
17. In relation to disposal, I acknowledge that the ordinary course may be for the Upper Tribunal to retain a matter for remaking. However, I accept the submission that, given the extent of the fact-finding required and the fact that the credibility findings cannot safely stand, this is a case that should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
18. The determination contains material errors of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside in its entirety.
19. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a judge other than the Judge who originally heard the appeal.
RA Pickering
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
28 October 2026