Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002142
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01417/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

6th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

ZAO
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Brakaj, Iris Law
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Bradford, Phoenix House, on 13 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’) because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iraq. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.

2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 2 February 2026, of a judge of the FtT (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.

3. The appeal arose in the context of the appellant’s claim to have been targeted by the IKR governing parties before he departed the country due to his journalistic output criticising their governance of the region.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

4. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on two grounds. Only the first attracted permission: that the judge did not consider important evidence from an Iraq-based human rights organisation, RESA, which ostensibly supported the appellant’s claims about what had happened to him before he left the country.

5. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. Mr Diwnycz conceded that the challenge to the lawfulness of the decision had substance because the RESA documents were plainly important and were not the subject of any judicial assessment. At the conclusion of the hearing, I indicated that I was minded to allow the appeal and would be remitting the matter to the FtT to be decided de novo.

Discussion

6. In MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485, the Court of Appeal set out the principles which should guide the analysis of whether judicial reasons are lawfully adequate. Between [34] and [36], Dove LJ drew together the leading authorities:

[34] […] The question which then arises is by what standard those reasons are to be judged in order to determine whether or not they are legally adequate. Whilst given in a different public law context, the observations of Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood in South Bucks County Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at paragraph 36 provide an important statement of principle applicable in the current context:

“36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”

[35] Accompanying these principles, it is also necessary to observe that the decision, in this case the FtTIAC determination, must be read as a whole and in context. Part of that context is that examining the determination’s reasons should be approached and undertaken purposefully, with the object of obtaining an understanding of the decision and its basis. It should not be read or construed in a manner more appropriate to a contract or statute. It requires what Lord Bingham MR described as a “straightforward down to earth reading” of the determination which seeks to identify whether there is “room for genuine as opposed to forensic doubt” as to what has been decided and why (see Clarke Homes Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and East Staffordshire District Council [1993] 66 P&CR 263).

[36] This approach to the standard of reasons required as a matter of law can be set in the general understanding of approaches to appeals in respect of tribunals within the Immigration and Asylum Chamber provided by Lord Hamblen at paragraph 72 of HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] 1 WLR 3784; [2022] UKSC 22:

“72. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 All ER 65, para 45 per Sir John Dyson JSC.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] 2 AC 48, para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead DPSC.”

7. In addition to the above statements of principle, the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide whether an FTT decision involved a material error of law was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055. At [26], Green LJ summarised the applicable principles (I have not reproduced those principles which are reflected above in MN (Vietnam) to similar effect):  

[26] Sections 11 and 12 of the TCEA 2007 restrict the UT's jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:  
 
[…]
 
(iv)  The issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at [27];  

(v)  Judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] 4 WLR 145 at para 34;  

(vi)  It is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see R (MM (Lebanon)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 771 at para 107.  

8. I am satisfied that the decision involved a material error of law because it appears that the judge has overlooked potentially important documentary evidence which conferred support for the appellant’s claims about what had befallen him before he left Iraq. If the judge did consider this evidence, it is impossible to know what was made of it because there is simply no commentary as to whether the supporting documentary evidence is reliable and, if so, what it means for the overall credibility of the appellant’s case that he was targeted by the IKR authorities for his journalistic work.

9. The original documents purporting to be from the RESA organisation include what appear to be wet stamps, are on headed paper and include a head and shoulders photograph. The documents have been translated and indicate that the appellant sought help from the organisation before he left Iraq. If reliable, this would lend considerable support to the appellant’s claim because it would amount to an assertion from a third-party organisation that a contemporaneous and broadly consistent complaint was made about the very same facts now relied upon in support of the appellant’s claim for international protection.

10. I acknowledge that the judge stated, at [5] of their decision, that all of the evidence had been considered even if not expressly referred to. However, given the nature of this part of the evidence, the judge needed to do more than simply recite that all of the evidence had been considered. It was essential to reach findings on whether this potentially important evidence was reliable and, if so, the impact it had on the overall credibility of the claim. There is simply nothing on the face of the decision to reveal what the judge made of this evidence if it was considered in substance. It would stretch rational inferential reasoning to breaking point to infer that the judge must have rejected this evidence.

11. While the judge reached a range of other cogent findings of fact, a finding in the appellant’s favour on the RESA documents might well have made a difference to how the other aspects of the evidence were assessed. I am therefore not minded to preserve any findings of fact.

Disposal

12. The starting point is paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal which provides: 
 
7.2. The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to remake the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:  

(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or  
 
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal. 
 
13. I have also considered the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). The parties were agreed that because of the centrality of the error to the overall fact-finding process, it was appropriate to remit the matter to the FtT to be decided de novo. I agree.

Notice of Decision

The decision involved a material error of law and is set aside. No findings of fact are preserved. The appeal is remitted to the FtT to be decided de novo by a different judge.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 July 2026