Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No’s: UI-2026-002144
UI-2026-002149
First-tier Tribunal No’s: HU/01882/2024
HU/01883/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

7th September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

DE and OE
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Azmi, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellants
For the Respondent: Mr Parvar, Senior Presenting Officer on behalf of the respondent

Heard at (IAC) on 26 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellants appeal with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (hereinafter referred to as the “FtTJ”) who dismissed the appellants human rights appeal in a decision promulgated on the 11 January 2026 .

2. Permission to appeal that decision was sought and a grant of permission was issued by Upper Tribunal Judge Khan on 2 June 2026.

3. The FtTJ made an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged.

4. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Background:

5. The appellants are siblings and are nationals of Nigeria who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) against a decision to refuse their respective applications made for leave to enter the UK as children of the sponsor made under Appendix FM and in the context of a human rights claim.

6. They made applications for entry clearance on 5 July 2024 as the children of their father (“the sponsor”) who was lawfully resident in the UK as the partner of a British national. Their applications were refused in decisions by the Entry Clearance Officer dated 5 September 2024. The ECO was not satisfied that the sponsor held sole responsibility for the appellants, and that it was noted in the sponsor’s recent visa application he denied having any dependent children, and also there were no exceptional circumstances which would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences in the refusal of entry clearance. It was however accepted that the eligibility financial requirements of paragraphs E-ECC 2.1-2.4 were met.

7. They appealed the decisions which came before the FtT. The FtTJ summarised their factual claim between paragraphs 12 – 19. In summary, following the separation from the appellant’s mother in 2015, the sponsor arrived in the UK in June 2023 having married a British national. The appellant’s mother began to suffer from severe mental illness in August 2023 and in November 2023 she was admitted to Psychiatric hospital where she remains and is incapable of caring for the appellants. In the circumstances the sponsor had sole responsibility. The appellants are being cared for by “the church” (as named in the decision) and were under the supervision of the (named) Bishop. There were concerns about the suitability of the accommodation; they do not have their own bedroom, lack of privacy and sanitary arrangements. There is a social welfare report referring to their circumstances and other welfare concerns for the appellants and their safety including an incident in August 2024 when the first appellant went missing. The sponsor has visited Nigeria and has provided money transfers to the appellants from January 2024 onwards.

8. In a decision promulgated on 11 January 2026 , the FtTJ dismissed their appeals, rejecting the evidence as unreliable and finding that the sponsor did not have sole responsibility for their upbringing nor that there were serious and compelling family or other considerations which made the exclusion of the children undesirable. The FtTJ concluded that it was likely that the appellants to live with their mother or at least was still cared for by her.

9. As regards Article 8 he FtTJ stated that he was satisfied that there was “some family life” between the sponsor and the appellants although this had been largely remote since around 2015, they had their mother and at least one other involved relative in Nigeria and that the relationship including the financial support from the sponsor could continue. In the circumstances he was not satisfied that the refusal of the application was of such gravity to invoke the provisions of Article 8 but that in any event having regard to the circumstances he was satisfied the decision to refuse entry clearance was proportionate.

10. The appellants sought permission to appeal the decision of the FtTJ and permission was granted on all grounds by UTJ Khan for the reasons given in his decision on 2 June 2026.

11. At the hearing, Mr Azmi of Counsel appeared on behalf of the appellants and Mr Parvar, Senior Presenting Officer appeared on behalf of the respondent. The sponsor was also in attendance so that he could follow the proceedings. Mr Azmi, who represented the appellants before the FtT relied upon his written grounds of challenge alongside oral submissions that he advanced. Mr Parvar, Senior Presenting Officer confirmed that there was no rule 24 response filed but the grounds were opposed. Both advocates provided their submissions and it is not necessary to set them out and they will be referred to in the analysis of the grounds. I am grateful for the help and assistance given by both advocates during the hearing.

Decision on error of law:

12. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, I take into account the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.

13. I remind myself that restraint should be exercised when examining the reasons given by the judge for his decision. In HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, at [72] Lord Hamblen said:

It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
   i.       They alone are the Judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirection’s simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently - see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
ii.       Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account - see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson
   iii.       When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out - see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope.

14. The issue in these appeals relates to whether the appellant’s father (the sponsor) has sole responsibility for the two appellants and whether there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make their exclusion from the UK undesirable. The appellants had provided a number of documents in support of their circumstances in Nigeria and those in respect of their parents which the FtTJ assessed in his decision between paragraphs 37 – 46. The FtTJ made the overarching finding at paragraph 37 that he had significant concerns about the appellants evidence and in particular his assessment highlighted the documents which included the medical report relating to their mother (see paragraph 39), evidence as to their circumstances (paragraphs 40, 41) evidence from family members (paragraph 42) and the FtTJ reached the conclusion that he did not find the evidence sufficiently reliable. This led to the significant finding made that he did not accept that the appellant’s mother was incapable of caring for them and that it was likely that they still lived with their mother or at least were cared by her (see paragraph 45). Thus, he was also not satisfied that taking them from their mother would be in their best interests (paragraph 46).

15. There are 9 grounds of challenge to the decision. Grounds 1-6 centre on the asserted errors related to the FtTJ’s reasoning and assessment of the evidence and in particular the documentary evidence provided. Grounds 7-8 draw together those grounds and grounds 9 challenges the Article 8 assessment. When assessing the grounds I take into account that the weight given to documents was a matter for the FtTJ to assess “in the round” and that FtTJ was required to assess their reliability.

16. Having heard the submissions made by each of the advocates and having considered the grounds in the context of the evidence and the decision of the FtTJ I am satisfied that there have been a material errors of law in the assessment of the documentary evidence for the reasons set out below.

17. Dealing with ground 1, the claim made was that the appellant’s mother was unfit to care for the children by reason of her mental illness and that the appellant’s father has sole responsibility for them. The FtTJ addressed this at paragraph 39 and in his conclusions at paragraph 45. At paragraph 39 the FtTJ found that it was unclear how and in what circumstances the medical report was obtained and that there was no other direct supporting medical evidence of her condition. He set out that he would have expected “further and better evidence “on the point.

18. The evidence is set out in a report dated 2 October 2024 (p 165CB). The report provided a chronological account of the appellant’s mother’s medical history, that she was a known patient at the psychiatric facility named in the letter, it detailed the diagnosis of schizophrenia, along with her psychological presentation in August 2023, hospital admission in November 2023 along with the history of her relapse and continuing incapacity and the treatment that was provided. It also provided evidence that her medical condition was such to prevent her care of the children. As set out above this was addressed by the FtTJ at paragraph 37. Whilst Mr Parvar submitted that the finding made by the FtTJ was open to him to make because the letter came from a complete unknown and it was not clear if the author of the report had specific interaction with the appellant’s mother, this does not take account of the contents of the report. None of the reasoning given by the FtTJ related to what was set out in the contents of the letter. Nor did it take into account the stated history of the appellant’s mother. The content of the letter provided a chronology of her health condition from a treating physician from the facility. It also provided a detailed clinical history and diagnosis neither of which was lacking in detail as Mr Azmi submitted. The reference made to expecting “further and better evidence” is not explained by the FtTJ in the context of the material. The FtTJ rejected the reliability of the report without considering the contents of the report but rather rejected it as to what other evidence might exist. Alongside that the FtTJ did not identify any internal inconsistencies within the report or by reference to any other material. It is also the position that this was a report which evidenced the circumstances both before and at the date of the application made in July 2024 and provided some basis for the other evidence from the church and social services. Thus, the FtTJ did not explain why a detailed report on the treating physician should be rejected as unreliable and as such demonstrates a lack of reasoning as submitted in the grounds.

19. The materiality of the error is that it led (at least in part) to the finding made at paragraph 45 that the appellants were likely to be living with their mother or at least still cared for by her. Whilst I would accept that this was a finding made on the basis that the FtTJ’s assessment that the documents were unreliable, this does not explain how he reached this finding in the light of what appears to be an unchallenged medical report.

20. Dealing with ground 2, this relates the assessment made of the evidence from the church (and Bishop). The FtTJ assessed the evidence at paragraph 40 on the basis that it was unclear what influence had affected the contents of that evidence thus he approached it with caution.

21. Mr Parvar submitted that the assessment made was open to the FtTJ on the evidence as the FtTJ was referring to the impartiality of the bishop’s evidence on the basis of the references made in the first letter about “violations of article 8 rights” and other legal language utilised. Whilst Mr Parvar accepted that the FtTJ only considered the contents of the first letter from 2024, he submitted that the reasons given were sufficient to undermine the contents of the second letter.

22. Having heard the submissions made by each of the advocates in the context of the decision, I am satisfied that the ground is made out. Whilst the FtTJ referred to the first report (dated 29 September 2024 at p 169CB) he did not refer to the supplementary report dated 13 August 2025 (p92CB). The observation made by the FtTJ that the evidence in the letter was “curious” due to its specific reference to immigration principles for example, violation of article 8 rights and sole responsibility, is an understandable one. Indeed, that was conceded by Mr Azmi. However, Mr Azmi properly makes a point that this is not sufficient to reject the evidence or treat it with caution without having addressed the contents of the report and also by taking account of the second report which did not contain similar references.

23. The second letter provided a factual account of the appellants’ circumstances including references to their mother’s mental health, their emergency and temporary accommodation. The letter referred to incidents of safeguarding (an event which had been referred to in the police report) and the sponsor’s asserted continuing presence and support in their lives. The second report also provided a detailed explanation of their circumstances including confirmation that he had met with the sponsor when he visited in 2025. The visit appeared to be accepted by the respondent and the FtTJ also accepted that there were “purported photographs” of the bishop from a recent visit by the sponsor and accepted that this gave “some credibility to the evidence.” The FtTJ did not address the second letter which did not have the “curious “references in it. Whilst it was not an unreasonable observation of the first letter, the FtTJ did not engage with the second letter which provided factual evidence relating to the issues of sole responsibility and circumstances of both appellants. The FtTJ did not identify any inconsistencies or implausibility’s by reference to the evidence and therefore I accept the submissions made that the FtTJ did not give adequate reasons for rejecting the evidence on that basis or approaching it with caution in circumstances where the assessment was made in the absence of its contents.

24. Turning to ground 4, this has relevance in the same context. The grounds challenge the assessment made of the police report and by reference to paragraph 41 of the decision. The finding made by the judge related to how it was obtained and that it appeared “tailored to the appellant’s immigration purposes to an unnatural extent.” Mr Parvar in his submissions relied upon the point made as to how it was obtained and that the FtTJ was justified in stating that this was tailored to the application. He further submitted that whilst the grounds at paragraph 4.3 referred to oral evidence given by the sponsor who had explained about how the reported been sent to him, there being no evidence in support by way of the record of proceedings or any note.

25. I am satisfied that the grounds are established. Whilst the judge reached the view that the evidence appeared to be “tailored,” the assessment made failed to take into account the evidence itself by way of the contents. The document was an extract from a crime diary (see p 192CB) which detailed an incident which occurred in October 2024, and a report made later by the bishop. He did not purport to provide any other information. It is therefore not explained how the judge reached the decision that it gave the appearance of being “tailored” for immigration purposes. I cannot determine if the sponsor did give oral evidence about how he obtained the report as there is no record of proceedings provided, and the grounds do not prove themselves.

26. However, I am also satisfied that the other reason given by the judge to characterise the evidence as unreliable, that there were discrepancies in the evidence or at least omissions referring to the bishop’s involvement with police, is not reasoned by the FtTJ. The judge made no reference to the evidence to identify what the discrepancies or omissions were in support of that finding. Mr Parvar could not identify what they were and agreed that the FtTJ did not explain at paragraph 41what they were.

27. Ground 3 relates to the assessment of the social worker evidence which was made at paragraph 43. The FtTJ found that there was no letter of instruction or chain of evidence and “appear to be tailored solely for immigration purposes rather than a more objective assessment.” There are two reports-the first is dated 14 October 2024 and the second on 15 August 2025 which are described as social welfare reports by an assistant chief social worker. Mr Parvar submits that the finding made was open to the judge to make and that the reports were from someone who stated that they were a social worker and that there was a lack of objectivity and there was an absence of the letter of instruction and in the circumstances, it was open to the judge to find the document was unreliable.

28. This was one of a number of reports which purported to be from official government departments. I accept the submission made by Mr Parvar that the FtTJ did not expressly state that the author of the reports was an expert. However, it is unexplained by the FtTJ why he considered a letter of instruction was required. There does not seem to have been any dispute that the reports were written from professionals who were involved with the appellants. It does not appear to have been advanced that the evidence was provided as “expert evidence.” The reference made at page 98CB to the social worker “monitoring their welfare” and the contents of the report appeared to suggest it was a description of the appellants circumstances and the support given by others.

29. I accept the submission made by Mr Parvar that the documents did provide what were referred to as “conclusions and recommendations” but that has to be balanced against what was said in the contents of the report and that they appeared to be given by those involved with the family and based on their knowledge. The finding that “taken at its highest the appellants are under the general care and supervision of the social worker of the stated ministry” seems to run contrary to the finding made that it was not explained how it was obtained or why a letter of instruction was not provided. I therefore conclude that it would have been open to the FtTJ to engage with the conclusions and recommendations but that was not the assessment made.

30. Whilst ground 5 seeks to challenge the assessment made of the family members’s affidavit, which was addressed by the FtTJ at paragraph 42, I am not satisfied that the assessment made by the FtTJ was not open to him or that he failed to give adequate reasons. The affidavit was no more than a statement made relating to what was said to be the decision made by the family that the appellant should reside with their father. As Mr Azmi stated the document had no legal effect. The reasons given by the FtTJ for not giving weight to the document were that the document provided a lack of detail and evidence relating to the author’s role in the appellant’s lives and those of other relatives. That was a finding that was reasonably open to him on the evidence. The issue of what other family relatives were available in Nigeria and their presence in the appellant’s lives was a relevant consideration.

31. I also do not find the ground 7 when viewed in isolation is made out by reference to paragraph 38. The factual circumstances are set out at paragraph 38 do not seem to be disputed( see decision letter) and the FtTJ heard the sponsor’s explanation for those inconsistencies but rejected it for the reasons given.

32. In summary whilst not all of the points raised in the grounds are established, there are grounds identified above which are sufficient to set aside the decision. I am satisfied that there were errors which were material in the assessment of the documentary evidence both in the assessment of their contents and that there was a failure to engage with material evidence and to give adequate reasons for rejecting the documentary evidence. In the light of the conclusion reached that he did not find the evidence to be of sufficient reliability and thus rejected the appellant’s material circumstances; the basis of that conclusion is undermined by those errors as identified. In those circumstances it is not necessary to address the other grounds of challenge.

33. In view of the fact finding that is necessary on all parts of the claim the appeal should properly be heard afresh. The request made in the grounds is that both appeals should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.

34. I have given careful consideration to the Joint Practice Statement of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal concerning the disposal of appeals in this Tribunal. I have considered the issues in the light of the practice statement recited and the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in AEB v SSHD[2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and the decision in Begum [2023] UKUT 46(IAC. ) As to the remaking of the decision, I am satisfied that in light of the errors of law identified and the fact findings which will be necessary, the appeals fall within paragraphs 7.2 (b) of the practice statement. I further consider it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process. I therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for that hearing to take place.
35. Accordingly, I am satisfied that it would in all circumstances be appropriate to set aside the decision in its entirety and for it to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh with no findings of fact preserved.
36. I note that from the litigation history, there was no respondent’s review provided following the case management hearing. It is not clear on what basis the documents were challenged by the respondent in advance of the hearing. In the circumstances the respondent should provide their review. Whilst the directions are for the FtT to consider, I invite the parties to liaise promptly with the FtT as this might enable there to be a more efficient listing and hearing at the First-tier Tribunal. Counsel’s availability should be provided and any witnesses who will be giving evidence.

Decision
37. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law; the decision is set aside and shall be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh with no findings of fact preserved.

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

3 September 2026