Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No.: UI-2026-002148
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54204/2024
LP/13745/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 1 September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MONSON

Between

ML (PHILIPPINES)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr L Magsino, Solicitor, MBM Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Sullivan, promulgated on 14 February 2026 (“the Decision”). By the Decision, Judge Sullivan dismissed the appellant’s protection appeal in which she maintained that she had a well-founded fear of persecution on return to her country of origin at the hands of her ex-husband, who had subjected her to prolonged domestic violence and abuse up until 2015 when she re-entered the UK on a work visa and overstayed.

Relevant Background

2. The appellant is recorded as having left the Philippines in July 2015, and as having entered the UK in the same month on a work visa, having first been issued with a Tier 5 work visa on 21 November 2012 which was valid from 23 November 2012 to 7 December 2013. The appellant is recorded as claiming asylum on 11 October 2022. In the reasons for refusal letter (RFRL) dated 13 February 2024, the respondent did not accept any of the material elements of her claim, including that she was of adverse interest to her husband.

The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal

3. The appellant’s appeal came before Judge Sullivan sitting at Hatton Cross in the First-tier Tribunal on 3 February 2026. Both parties were legally represented. The Judge received oral evidence from the appellant and her claimed partner GW, and from 2 additional witnesses JS and MM.

4. In the Decision, the Judge’s findings began at para [17]. At paras [22]-[24] the Judge gave reasons for finding that the appellant was not a member of a PSG, and that therefore her claimed fear was for a non-Convention reason.

5. At para [25] the Judge found that there were discrepancies in, and features of, the appellant’s evidence, which together meant that he was not satisfied that she had told the truth about her past relationship with her husband (from whom she was now divorced as evidenced by a Decree Absolute issued on 3 September 2025 by a Family Court in the UK that was uploaded to the CCD file by her solicitors on the morning of the hearing).

6. The Judge went on to set out the asserted inconsistencies in sub-paras (a)-(c) of para [25]. At para [26] the Judge said that it was the appellant’s evidence that she had not had any contact with her former husband since she had returned to the UK in 2015. They were divorced by a final Court Order dated 3 September 2015 (sic). The appellant confirmed that the divorce papers had been sent to her husband in The Philippines. She had neither suggested, nor provided evidence, that he had tried to resist the divorce. Given this evidence and the passage of time, he was not satisfied that her former husband now had any interest in the appellant.

7. At para [27] the Judge said that, having considered all the evidence, he was not satisfied that upon return to the Philippines the appellant would be at real risk of either serious harm or treatment breaching Article 3 of the 1950 Convention. Her humanitarian and Article 3 claims failed on this basis.

8. At para [28] the Judge turned to address the appellant’s alternative claim on private life grounds under the Rules, and her family and private life claims under Article 8 ECHR outside the Rules. The Judge went on to dismiss the appeal on all grounds raised.

The Application for Permission to Appeal

9. The grounds of appeal were settled by MBM Solicitors. They raised several grounds, of which the most pertinent for present purposes is Ground 7, in which they pleaded that the Judge had failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting corroborative witness evidence.

10. JL (the appellant’s daughter) had given a signed witness statement describing in detail the violence that she personally witnessed her father had inflicted upon her mother, including the 2009 incident and the 2015 assault. She also gave evidence about the cultural and community pressures which her mother would face upon return, and the increased danger arising from her mother’s relationship with GW.

11. TLF (the appellant’s sister-in-law, and the abuser’s own sister) had given a signed witness statement confirming that she had personally witnessed repeated physical violence by her brother against the appellant over many years, and the appellant coming to her house injured and frightened. She also confirmed that the appellant had reported her brother to the Barangay Tanod, but was turned away.

12. Ground 7 continued: “The Judge recorded at paragraph 10 that evidence was heard from these witnesses, but the determination does not contain any adequate assessment of their evidence, any findings as to their credibility, or any explanation for why their corroborative accounts were not accepted or given weight. Where two independent witnesses, one of whom is a member of the abuser’s own family and therefore giving evidence against her own brother’s interests, provide detailed corroboration of the Appellant’s core account, a failure to engage with that evidence and explain why it is rejected or given limited weight, is a material error of law.”

The Reasons for the Grant of Permission to Appeal

13. On 23 April 2026 First-tier Tribunal Judge Jepson granted the appellant permission to appeal on limited grounds. Permission was granted on Grounds 2, 3, 4 and 7. The Judge’s reasoning with regard to Grounds 2 and 7 were as follows:

“Ground seven partially overlaps with ground 2. The judgment is attacked for failure to take account what is argued is corroborative witness evidence. Notwithstanding what is said, there is no sign of a statement from anyone with initials [TLF] in the papers. The same applies to witness JL mentioned in the grounds. That said, several witnesses are listed at paragraph 1] of the judgment. It is arguable that a lack of clear consideration of such evidence was a material error. This ground is therefore arguable.”

14. As to Grounds 3 and 4, they argued that there was a failure to consider sufficiency of protection or internal relocation. The judgment made no reference to these considerations at all, despite each being disputed within the refusal letter. Although it could be that the Judge opted not to address such matters given the rejection of the appellant’s account, that was not said in the judgment. These grounds were therefore also arguable.

The Rule 24 Response

15. In a Rule 24 response (which is undated), the respondent accepted that the First-tier Tribunal had materially erred on a point in law, such that its determination should be set aside. The First-tier Tribunal had received evidence from several individuals, that was adduced in support for the appellant in these proceedings. It was accepted that the treatment, or lack of treatment, of that evidence had a material effect on the determination.

16. However, it was submitted that the First-tier Tribunal’s findings on membership of a PSG at para [24] should be preserved, in addition to paras [20], [25](c), [31] and [32]-[36], following AB (Preserved FTT findings; Wisniewski Principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 268 (IAC).

17. It was further submitted that, given the acknowledgment of the material error with discrete effects, the appropriate venue for remaking would be to retain the matter in the Upper Tribunal, following Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC).

The Appellant’s Submissions on Disposal

18. Pursuant to directions made by the Upper Tribunal, Mr Magsino provided written submissions dated 13 May 2026 on the topic of disposal.

19. The concession in the Rule 24 response had been properly made. The supporting witness evidence comprised, principally, the witness statements and oral evidence (sic) of the appellant’s daughter JL, and her sister-in-law TLF. The evidence went to the most central issues in the appeal: namely the existence and the extent of domestic abuse; the response of local authorities to reported incidents; the continuing risk presented by the appellant’s former husband; and the cultural and practical realities that the appellant would face upon return to her home area. The First-tier Tribunal recorded at para [10]) that this evidence had been heard, but the determination contained no reasoned engagement with it.

20. Applying AB, the proper conclusion was that the findings sought to be preserved by the respondent were not severable from the conceded error. None should be preserved.

21. The appellant had effectively been deprived of a fair first-instance determination of central issues. The conceded error was not a discrete legal misdirection. It was a failure to engage with the corroborative oral (sic) and documentary evidence of two key witnesses. The evidence went to the very heart of the protection and Article 8 claim. The appellant had called these witnesses precisely so that their case could be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal. The respondent now accepted that this did not properly occur.

The Respondent’s Submissions on Disposal

22. Mr Parwar of the Specialist Appeals Team settled the respondent’s submissions on disposal in reply to the submissions made by the appellant.

23. In his submissions dated 8 June 2026, Mr Panwar submitted that the appellant had made a series of bold submissions on the proposed preserved findings, which were without merit. For example, the evidence of TLF had nothing to do with victims of domestic abuse having a distinct identity or being perceived as different in society in The Philippines. There was also no suggestion that the witnesses provided their evidence in the capacity of an expert.

24. The conceded error in the Rule 24 response had nothing to do with fairness. Putting aside the conceded error, there was no question that the Judge had embarked upon a comprehensive analysis of the appellant’s case. The appellant was free to call her witnesses at a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal.

25. The respondent would agree that the nature and extent of fact-finding would be substantial of the entirety of the Judgment was to be set aside, and the case for remittal would be stronger in such a scenario. But this would not be the case if the Upper Tribunal preserved the findings sought to be preserved by the respondent, and the live issues would be far fewer than those set out at para 12 of the appellant’s response.

Discussion and Conclusions

26. Before turning to my analysis of this case, I remind myself that I need to show appropriate restraint before interfering with the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, having regard to the numerous exhortations to this effect emanating from the Court of Appeal in recent years, including Volpi & Another -v- Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at para [2]:

“i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for the judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”

27. The concession made by the respondent in the Rule 24 response is not determinative of the question as to whether a material error of law is made out. I am troubled by the fact that both the grant of permission in respect of the Judge’s adverse credibility assessment of the core claim (Grounds 2 and 7) and the concession in the Rule 24 response appear to have been made on the mistaken understanding that (a) the witnesses referenced in paragraph [10] of the Decision gave oral evidence in support of the protection claim, and (b) that, although not referenced in para [10], JL (the appellant’s daughter) and TLF (the appellant’s sister-in-law) also gave oral evidence in support of the protection claim, when in fact they were outside the jurisdiction, and so they were not tendered for cross-examination. There is a clear error of fact in Ground 7 (Failure to give adequate reasons for rejecting corroborative witness evidence) where it is asserted that the Judge “heard” their evidence, and this error of fact is replicated in the appellant’s submissions on disposal, where it is asserted that JL and TLF gave corroborative “oral” evidence.

28. Having reviewed the evidence that was placed before the First-tier Tribunal, I am satisfied that the Judge did not err in law in his treatment of the evidence of the witnesses listed at para [10] of the Decision. The witnesses listed in para [10] only gave evidence relevant to the alternative claim under Article 8 ECHR, and the Judge went on to engage extensively with the oral evidence given by GW. Although the Judge did not make any express reference to the oral evidence of the other two witnesses in his discussion of the Article 8 claim, it is not argued, still less shown, that this was a material omission.

29. It is strongly arguable that the same consideration applies to the witness statement evidence of JL and TLF that was contained in the third appeal bundle uploaded to the CCD (aka “My HMCTS”) file at the end of January 2026. If these witnesses had given oral evidence, I readily accept that it would have been incumbent on the Judge to state whether he accepted or rejected their evidence, and to assess whether and/or to what extent they corroborated the appellant’s account of past persecution and/or future risk at the hands of her former husband. However, as these witnesses did not give oral evidence, the respondent was wrong to concede without further inquiry that the judge must have made a material error in not making findings on their evidence. The respondent’s starting point should have been that the Judge must be assumed to have taken all the evidence before him into consideration, unless there was compelling evidence to the contrary, which there was not.

30. Nonetheless, although I highlighted at the outset of the hearing that JL and TLF had not given oral evidence, and that the concession in the Rule 24 response thus appeared to have been made on a mistaken basis, Mr Parvar said that he had no instructions to withdraw the concession, and he adhered to the line that the only issue to be resolved was the forum for remaking.

31. As I indicated in the discussion which then ensued, I am satisfied that the concession made in the Rule 24 response is legally sustainable, notwithstanding that it was probably made on a mistaken basis and without adequate inquiry, I would have taken a different view if the Judge had made it clear that in broad terms he accepted the appellant’s account of past persecution, and that his adverse credibility findings were confined to the issue of whether the appellant was genuinely afraid of her former husband now, many years later. However, the Judge rejected the appellant’s protection claim in its entirety without addressing the corroborative evidence of JL and TLF as to the domestic abuse which the appellant suffered at the hands of her husband up until she last left the Philippines in 2015. Accordingly, I am persuaded that a material error of law is made out, such that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on the appellant’s protection appeal, and also her human rights appeal under Article 3 ECHR, must be set aside and remade.

32. I have carefully considered the venue of any rehearing, taking into account the submissions of the representatives. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement.

33. I consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process. In addition, as the Judge’s adverse findings on the appellant’s credibility with regard to her protection appeal require to be revisited, it is not realistic for the appeal to be retained in the Upper Tribunal due to the extent of the fact-finding that will be required. So, I remit this appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

34. However, I am not persuaded that none of the findings of fact made by Judge Sullivan should be preserved.

35. The findings on the private life claim under the Rules probably stand or fall with the outcome of the protection appeal, and so I accept they should not be preserved.

36. However, the witness statement evidence of the appellant’s daughter and the appellant’s sister-in-law has no bearing whatsoever on the issue of whether the appellant is to be treated as a member of a PSG. The appellant was not granted permission to appeal on the ground that the Judge erred in law in finding that the appellant was not a member of a PSG for the reasons which he gave in paras [22] to [24], and there is no justification for the appellant being allowed to relitigate this issue.

37. Similarly, the appellant was not granted permission to appeal against the Judge’s finding at para [31] that her relationship with GW did not to family life, and the appellant was also not granted permission to appeal against the Judge’s findings on proportionality at paras [32] to [37].

38. I accept that there is a slight overlap between the findings made in para [31] with respect to the family life claim with the Judge’s earlier adverse credibility findings with regard to the protection claim, in that the Judge’s conclusion as to why the relationship with GW did not amount to family life was expressly stated to be based on a combination of circumstances, including “(a) The damage to the Appellant’s credibility referred to above”. But the other circumstances cited in sub-paras (b) to (f) are free-standing and, on analysis, what is said by the Judge in sub-para (a) does not add anything to them.

39. In conclusion, I am not persuaded that the fact that the appellant has established an entitlement to have her protection claim reassessed means that the Decision is unsafe with regard to the findings made by the Judge on family and private life, and on the issue of proportionality.

40. As I explained at the hearing, which was attended by the appellant and GW, the practical effect of preserving the findings on family and private life outside the Rules is only that they will be the starting point for the First-tier Tribunal Judge who remakes the decision. There is nothing to prevent the appellant from bringing forward new evidence in support of her family life claim, and there is also nothing to prevent the appellant from bringing forward evidence of a material change of circumstances, as it was indicated that she would wish to do.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains an error of law, and accordingly the decision is set aside in its entirety, save that the following findings are preserved but can be departed from by the First-tier Tribunal in accordance with the principles of Devaseelan: (a) the findings at paras [22]-[24] of the Decision that the appellant is not a member of a PSG, even taking her claim at its highest; and (b) the findings on the Article 8 ECHR claim outside the Rules at paras [31] to [37], but excluding the finding at para [31](a).

This appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal at Hatton Cross for a fresh hearing before any Judge apart from Judge Sullivan.

Anonymity

The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in favour of the appellant, and I consider that it is appropriate that the appellant continues to be protected by anonymity for the purposes of these proceedings in the Upper Tribunal.

Andrew Monson
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
4 August 2026

(Typographical amendment pursuant to rule 42,
UTJ Neville, 1 September 2026)