Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002160
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/51140/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 4th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

Maxhun Kastrati
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Z Raza, instructed by Mayfairs Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms K Khan Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a national of Albania, appeals a determination of FtT Judge Burnet dated 3rd February 2026 and which dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
2. The appellant had entered the UK in 1998 and claimed asylum using a false Kosovan nationality and was granted a period of exceptional leave. He applied for leave on the basis of long residence. The Secretary of State’s refusal letter dated 24th March 2021 noted ‘I am satisfied that you knowingly provided false information and representations and knowingly failed to disclose material facts in your asylum claim and further leave application’.
3. The judge relied on the absence of documentary evidence during the period 2000-2012 and during that period the appellant did not have leave to remain.
4. In his key findings the judge recorded this:
Findings
24. I first turn to consider the appellant’s claim to have resided continuously for 20 years in the UK. I appreciate the difficulty that some people face in producing documentation to support a period of residence. This is particularly the case since restrictions have been placed by the Home Office upon individuals renting property, opening bank accounts etc.
25. The respondent accepts that the appellant claimed protection in 1998. However this was in a false identity. The appellant accepts he practised this fraud and deception upon the Home Office.
26. The appellant claims he has lived in the UK since 1998. He states his wife joined him in 2016. His daughter EH also arrived in the UK around 2014. The appellant’s wife did not attend the hearing to give evidence. This is a very notable absence from providing oral evidence as to the appellant’s whereabouts.
27. There is quite a bit of documentary evidence of the appellant’s residence from around 2013. There is little evidence of residence between 2000 and 2012. There is a huge gap in the documentary evidence for this period of time.
28. When giving evidence the appellant was not consistent about where and when he lived at particular addresses in the UK. When giving oral evidence the appellant’s claims as to where he lived, did not correspond at times to addresses contained on letters within the bundle.
29. EH stated that her father was helpful in her child care arrangements and she had supported him when she met him after she arrived in the UK. This was not until 2014. She stated her husband worked full time and so the appellant assisted her so she could work. She stated she had been in contact with her father over the telephone during 1998 until 2014, when she arrived in the UK. She believed he was living in the UK during that time. EH has no direct knowledge of where the appellant was between 1998 and 2014. I give little weight to her claims of the appellant’s whereabouts during that period of time.
30. IM is the appellant’s brother in law. He is the brother of the appellant’s wife. He states he arrived in the UK at the same time as the appellant in 1998. The witness stated he too had claimed to be Kosovan but was in fact Albanian. He had obtained his British citizenship now. He explained he had corrected his details after he had obtained his passport. I was concerned as to the answer the witness gave regarding this. It demonstrated he too had committed deception previously. Despite claiming the appellant had obtained an NI (national insurance) number and had worked, no evidence for the appellant was provided as to this. He stated he had seen the appellant from time to time but had not lived with him again after IM moved out from the first address in around 2000. There was little supporting evidence to corroborate what IM stated in respect of the appellant. The appellant now lives in a property owned by IM. IM supports the appellant and his sister (the appellant’s wife). I give little weight to his evidence as to the appellant’s claimed whereabouts during 2000 and 2012.
31. There were a number of discrepancies and inconsistencies which arose from answers the appellant gave during evidence and the other witnesses. I found them to be unsatisfactory witnesses and they would change their evidence, when discrepancies were put.
32. I should also note that the appellant had provided little documentary evidence of the addresses he had lived in from 2000 until 2012. I find that the documentary evidence was lacking to demonstrate his residence between 2000 and 2012.
33. I give little weight to the statements of the people who did not attend the hearing to give oral evidence and be crossed examined about their claims as to the appellant’s period of residence.
Grounds of appeal
5. The grounds of challenge set out that:
(i) the judge provided inadequate reasons for findings against the appellant in respect of his continuity of residence. A central feature of the Article 8 claim was whether the appellant had established in excess of 20 years continuous residence in the UK and the judge found at [36] that he was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the appellant was so resident in the UK between 2000 and 2012. The judge failed to take account of Khan R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 416 [61] which identified that the ’14 year rule’ (as then) was ‘in effect an amnesty clause’ and that it was likely that those in the United Kingdom without leave, ‘will have no official documentation, particularly in the early period of their residence’. Further documents such a tenancy agreement and letter from a landlord were difficult to classify as ‘official’.
As to [31] of the determination, the judge failed to explain what these inconsistencies or discrepancies were nor give examples of how the evidence changed. The evidence of IM was consistent with that of the appellant in respect of their entry to the UK together in 1998 and the regularity of their meetings in the UK. The judge had not complied with MK (Duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC). Further, the reasons must be intelligible and adequate.
(ii) the judge failed to weigh into the Article 8 assessment the considerable delay in the Secretary of State arriving at her decision. The application was made on 31st October 2013 and decided on 24th March 2021. This would militate against the public interest on removal. Kaur (children's best interests / public interest interface) [2017] UKUT 00014 (IAC) confirmed that in every balancing exercise the scales must be properly prepared by the judge followed by all necessary findings and conclusions.
Grant of permission
6. Permission to appeal was granted by UTJ Hirst on the basis that it was arguable that the judge erred by failing to identify the discrepancies and inconsistencies in the witnesses’ evidence. further it was arguable that the judge did not factor delay into the proportionality assessment.
Rule 24 notice
7. This observed that judge found the appellant’s evidence was inconsistent and provided reasons for attaching little weight to the witness evidence at [29] and [30] and provided adequate reasons. The Respondent relied on MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485 and submitted that the determination should be read as a whole and caution should be displayed when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account, MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 All ER 65, para 45 per Sir John Dyson JSC.
8. In terms of ground (ii) the judge acknowledged the delay but following UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, the appellate court should not assume too readily that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out in it. The issue of delay would and could not materially affect the outcome of the decision when considering the reasons set out at [39] to [50]
Submissions
9. Mr Raza relied on his written grounds but emphasised that [31] of the decision was the focus of the challenge. The judge gave no reasoning for the adverse credibility finding. The judge recognised the difficulties in obtaining documents but did not apply this to the earlier period as identified in Khan. This was the area of dispute. The judge failed to factor in the delay in relation to proportionality notwithstanding [3]. The appellant accepted he had returned to Albania in 2012. Mr Raza emphasised that it was common for findings to be made on oral evidence and the assessment of the oral evidence in this instance was flawed. There were no examples given of the difficulties in the evidence of IM.
10. Ms Khan, for the Home Office, relied on the Rule 24 response. The judge had made relevant findings. She referred to MN Vietnam and that the decision should be read holistically. Paragraph 31 followed clear reasons that the appellant did not meet the 20 years residence requirement. The judge identified the absence of the wife in giving oral testimony, a lack of documentation, inconsistent oral evidence at [28] and the daughter (EH) had no direct knowledge of the appellant’s whereabouts at the relevant time as she came here in 2014. In relation to IM (the friend) both had committed deception on entry, and it was noted there was no corroborative evidence to support the claim that the appellant lived at certain addresses from around 2000.
11. The judge did not need to go into significant detail, and adequate reasoning was given in the paragraph preceding [31]. The weight given to the evidence was a matter for the judge. The judge had given a variety of reasons and even if this in isolation was not expansive this would not be material. The appellant could not meet the immigration rules owing to suitability.
12. Ground (ii) was parasitic on ground (i) which had not been made out. The Upper Tribunal should not readily find a misdirection. Even at its highest, delay would not be a determinative factor when looking at the findings of the judge. At [46] the judge found that the deception by the appellant weighed heavily against him.
Conclusions
13. Khan related to whether only official documents were acceptable evidence of long residence and in the event in that case the Secretary of State accepted that that stance could not be defended. That does not mean that the judge concluded here only official documents would suffice or that he must place weight on the evidence before him; clearly the context is relevant. All decisions are fact sensitive.
14. The appellant entered the United Kingdom seeking asylum but practised deception through the representation that he was a Kosovan national. Indeed, he received exceptional leave on that basis until 6th September 2000. From 1998 the appellant maintained he was a Kosovan national. In his application of October 2013, the appellant still maintained he was a Kosovan national and continued to do so in 2018 after his arrest. The Secretary of State undertook verification checks with the General Directorate of Civil Registry at the Ministry of Interior of Albania on 9th October 2018, and which confirmed the appellant to be Albanian.
15. Additionally, this appellant, bearing in mind he claimed to have continuous residence for 20 years, left the United Kingdom on his own admission in 2012 and then returned again illegally, he says a matter of weeks later. As the FtT judge observed it was only after 2013 that the appellant’s evidence became more ‘reliable’. The wife has no permission to remain in the UK and did not give evidence, and the daughter only came to the UK in 2016.
16. Having set out the background to this appeal the judge identified that the appellant accepted he could not meet the immigration rules. At [24] the judge clearly recorded that he appreciated the difficulty that some people face in producing documentation to support a period of illegal residence and particularly since the restrictions used by the Home Office in relation to renting property and opening bank accounts. The judge plainly applied this understanding to the whole period in question and not as Mr Raza submitted merely to the later period from 2013. The judge noted the appellant had practiced ‘fraud and deception’ upon the Home Office on entry. [25]. The judge also contrasted that the appellant claimed he lived in the UK since 1998 but his wife only came to the UK in 2016 and he stated his daughter arrived in 2014. This is after the period which the judge clearly had in mind. The judge also remarked on the wife’s ‘very notable absence from providing oral evidence as to the appellant’s whereabouts’ [26]. The judge identified a ‘huge gap in the documentary evidence’ for the period from 2000-2012 [27].
17. Against this background the inconsistencies identified in the appellant’s evidence was as follows:
28. When giving evidence the appellant was not consistent about where and when he lived at particular addresses in the UK. When giving oral evidence the appellant’s claims as to where he lived, did not correspond at times to addresses contained on letters within the bundle.
18. The judge proceeded to address the evidence of the daughter. Bearing in mind she was born in March 1995 and would have been approximately 3 years old when he came to the UK, and the judge at [29] identified that she did not come to the UK until 2014 and only claimed to have contact with him by telephone from 1998 to 2014 (which is surprising if he returned to Albania in 2012 on his own admission) the judge simply found ‘she believed’ he was living in the UK during the period of 1998 and 2014 and thus was entitled to give little weight to her claims of the appellant’s whereabouts during that period of time. The judge had clearly dealt with this evidence, and his treatment cannot be criticised.
19. In terms of the evidence of the appellant’s friend, IM, the brother of the appellant’s wife, the judge observed that he came to the UK at the same time as the appellant and also falsely claimed he was Kosovan but in fact was Albanian and only corrected his details after he had obtained his British Citizen passport [30]. The judge was entitled to find that this witness had also committed deception previously and to find that this undermined his evidence as to the whereabouts of the appellant during the relevant period. An inconsistency was clearly identified between the evidence of this witness and the appellant in the light of the NI (national insurance number). The witness claimed the appellant had an NI number, but no evidence was produced. Also, this witness stated that ‘he had seen the appellant from time to time but had not lived with him again after IM moved out from the first address in around 2000’. Once again, this evidence simply does not found or support the appellant’s claim that he lived continuously in the UK from 1998.
20. Thus, by the time the judge reached his conclusions at [31] he had identified discrepancies in the evidence and these I have highlighted above. The judge also added at [32] that there was ‘little documentary evidence of the addresses he [the appellant] had lived in from 2000 to 2012’. This is not official documentation but simply correspondence to addresses which was plainly absent particularly in the context of claiming to have lived in the UK continuously since 2000 [35]. That was a reasoned and cogent finding unarguably open to the judge.
21. The Court of Appel in Lowe v SSHD [2021] EWCA 62 referred to and repeated the judgment of Lewison LJ in Fage UK Ltd. v Chobani UK Ltd. [2014] EWCA Civ 5 at paragraph 114 as follows:
“Appellate courts have been repeatedly warned, by recent cases at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them. The best known of these cases are: Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1977] RPC1; Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360; Datec Electronics Holdings Ltd v United Parcels Service Ltd [2007] UKHL 23 [2007] 1 WLR 1325; Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33 [2013] 1 WLR 1911 and most recently and comprehensively McGraddie v McGraddie [2013] UKSC 58 [2013] 1 WLR 2477. These are all decisions either of the House of Lords or of the Supreme Court. The reasons for this approach are many. They include.
i) The expertise of a trial judge is in determining what facts are relevant to the legal issues to be decided, and what those facts are if they are disputed.
ii) The trial is not a dress rehearsal. It is the first and last night of the show.
iii) Duplication of the trial judge's role on appeal is a disproportionate use of the limited resources of an appellate court and will seldom lead to a different outcome in an individual case.
iv) In making his decisions the trial judge will have regard to the whole of the sea of evidence presented to him, whereas an appellate court will only be island hopping.
v) The atmosphere of the courtroom cannot, in any event, be recreated by reference to documents (including transcripts of evidence).
vi) Thus even if it were possible to duplicate the role of the trial judge, it cannot in practice be done”.
22. The judge had the benefit of hearing live evidence from the appellant and his witnesses and was able to clarify issues as they arose. He heard all the submissions on the evidence and weighed the evidence.
23. In the overall context I find no error of law in relation to this ground.
24. Turning to ground (ii) I find no merit in this ground at all. The application was filed by the appellant in 2013. At that time, he maintained fraudulently that he was Kosovan. After his arrest in 2018, the appellant continued to maintain that he was Kosovan and in October 2018 his then solicitors submitted a Statement of Additional Grounds which continued to maintain his Kosovan nationality. The Secretary of State was put to the task of undertaking verification checks with the Ministry of Interior of Albania which then confirmed the family details, certificates and photographs. These checks also revealed, undisclosed at that point by the appellant, his travels to Albania, and the Secretary of State’s refusal decision stated that ‘you have returned to Albania on at least one occasion since your arrival in the UK using a lawfully issued Albanian passport’. Clearly checks would take time to conduct. Delay was considered in the refusal letter and noted that the appellant’ time in the UK had been due to issues ‘entirely within [his] control’ and the appellant had ‘pursued various immigration applications under a false identify and obtained a period of leave’ to which the appellant was ‘not entitled’. The refusal letter was made on 24th March 2021.
25. Against this background I note the skeleton argument before the FtT did not raise the issue of ‘delay’ on the part of the Home Office and as there was no effective ‘delay’ the judge cannot be criticised for his approach.
26. The judge was clear that the application was based on private life. The appellant’s wife had no leave to remain in the UK. Butt v Secretary of State [2025] EWCA Civ 189 considers the statutory provision of S117B (4) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and underlines the limited flexibility inherent in that statutory provision and see [82]. The judge’s decision was in accordance with S117B of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
27. The grounds are not made out, and I find no material error of law in the decision.

Notice of Decision
The determination of the judge contained no material error of law and will stand. The appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

H Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28th August 2026