Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002161
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/69095/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

3rd August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BIBI

Between

SR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
And

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms F Morgan, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms A Dolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Kempton (‘the Judge’) promulgated on 28 October 2025, dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his claims for asylum and humanitarian protection.
Background to the appeal
2. The appellant is a national of Albania, born in July 2007. He appeals against the respondent’s decision dated 01 August 2024, by which his claims for asylum and humanitarian protection were refused.
3. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on 8 August 2022 and claimed asylum on the same day. The basis of his claim is that he fears persecution on return to Albania by reason of his membership of a particular social group, namely his father's family. His father is a police officer who, it is claimed, was targeted by the Barjraj criminal gang after refusing to accept bribes. The appellant's case is that, in an attempt to exert pressure upon his father, members of that gang threatened, intimidated and abused him.
4. In a decision dated 1 August 2024, the respondent accepted the appellant's Albanian nationality but refused his asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights claims. The respondent did not accept that the appellant had established a Refugee Convention reason.
5. The respondent considered that the appellant's account was undermined by inconsistencies. In particular, although the appellant claimed that threats prevented him from leaving his home, he also stated that he continued to attend school and the mosque. The respondent further noted that the appellant had not suffered any actual harm in Albania. As to a Prosecutor's Office Report provided by the appellant, the respondent considered that it demonstrated no more than that the appellant's father had made a complaint.
6. It was the respondent’s position that, as the appellant’s claimed fear arose from the actions of non-state actors, he failed to establish that the Albanian authorities were either unwilling or unable to provide him with effective protection. The respondent relies on evidence that action has been taken against members of the gang and that measures have been implemented to address corruption. The respondent contends that the appellant could reasonably and safely relocate within Albania, including to Tirana, Durrës, or Vlorë. The appellant appealed the respondent’s decision.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC)
7. His appeal against that decision came before the judge at a hearing on 23 October 2025. The judge found that the appellant's evidence regarding the chronology of events was inconsistent. The appellant stated that he was 14 years old when he was stopped by several men after leaving a shop. While he initially claimed that he left Albania within weeks of that incident, later agreeing it was no more than a month later, he subsequently stated that he departed four to five months after moving to live with his uncle in Dobrac. The judge considered this inconsistency in the timeline to be significant, notwithstanding the appellant's age at the material time.
8. The judge relied on evidence contained in a further statement from the appellant in which he referred to gang members having taken him after school for several hours and forced him to beg, explaining that he had not previously disclosed this to his family out of shame. The appellant stated that these events occurred before he moved to Dobrac. However, the evidence indicates that his father's confrontation with the gang occurred in Dobrac on 8 September 2014, after which the appellant was told not to go there. The judge considered it implausible that he would then have moved to Dobrac.
9. The appellant claimed that his brother had been stopped several times, most recently two months prior to the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, but no statement from the brother was provided. He was unable to confirm whether his father had been attacked again, and no evidence was produced from his father. Although the appellant stated that his father continued to receive telephone threats, the judge considered it reasonable to expect evidence from his father regarding any ongoing threats and steps taken to address them. No such evidence was provided.
10. The appellant explained that, during his initial screening interview, he stated that he had come to the United Kingdom for a better life and education and did not mention any fear of harm because he was young and unable to recall relevant events. He contends that he was subsequently able to remember significantly more and provided a later supplementary statement containing information that had not previously been disclosed. This material was not before the respondent when the refusal decision was made and therefore represented a substantially different account from that considered by the respondent.
11. The appellant travelled through Belgium and France before arriving in the United Kingdom. The respondent relied on section 8(4), submitting that he had failed to claim asylum in either country before travelling to the UK. The judge rejected the appellant's explanation that those he feared had connections in Belgium and France, finding it to be speculative given that both are countries capable of providing protection. As the appellant accepted that it was his own decision not to claim asylum there, the judge concluded that, notwithstanding his age, his actions may be regarded as having seriously damaged the appellant’s credibility.
12. The judge did not accept that the appellant had established the existence of a blood feud, and the respondent did not consider that a blood feud had been made out. The judge was not satisfied that the appellant had been persecuted, or faced a real risk of persecution, for a Convention reason. Accordingly, the judge found that the appellant did not fall within the scope of the Refugee Convention. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
13. The appellant sought permission to appeal the judge’s decision on the grounds that firstly, a supplementary bundle was submitted on 7 October 2025. The grounds contend that the judge failed to refer to this evidence at all and did not consider whether it should be admitted. If the judge did admit the supplementary bundle, there was no reference to its contents in the decision, and no reasons were given for accepting or rejecting the evidence contained within it. If it was not admitted, the judge failed to give any reasons for excluding it. Secondly, it was contended that the judge failed to apply anxious scrutiny to the newly disclosed evidence, which included an allegation of sexual assault, and failed to explain whether the allegation was accepted or rejected. Thirdly, the judge failed to determine whether the appellant was at risk as a victim of trafficking. Fourthly, the judge’s credibility assessment failed to consider all of the evidence in the round.
14. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge JK Swaney on 28 April 2026 on ground one. The grant of permission was not restricted and therefore extends to all grounds of appeal.
15. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response. In summary, the respondent accepts that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in its treatment of the appellant’s supplementary evidence, rendering the decision procedurally flawed. The respondent also consents to the Tribunal considering the new matters raised in that evidence. The respondent submitted that the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking, in accordance with Begum (Remaking or Remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC).
Submissions
16. At the outset of the hearing, Ms Dolan, on behalf of the respondent, properly conceded that the judge had made a material error of law. She confirmed that the respondent did not oppose the appeal and accepted that the position set out in the Rule 24 response was not wholly accurate.
17. Contrary to the section 24 response there is no dispute that the supplementary bundle was before the judge. However, Ms Dolan acknowledged that issues relating to trafficking and sexual exploitation had been raised by the appellant in the supplementary bundle. She accepted that there was no meaningful engagement by the judge with that evidence, nor any discussion of the significance of the late disclosure or the weight to be attached to the explanations advanced by the appellant.
18. Further, the judge failed to make findings in respect of the alleged sexual exploitation and trafficking. In the absence of such findings and given the nature of the allegations and the appellant's asserted vulnerability, it was accepted that the judge had not subjected this aspect of the claim to the requisite anxious scrutiny. These omissions materially undermined the credibility assessment and the overall conclusions reached by the judge.
19. Ms Morgan agreed with Ms Dolan and accepted the concession that the decision contains a material error of law. She submitted that the judge made no findings on the appellant's claim that he had been subjected to sexual exploitation and trafficking. It was unclear whether the judge had considered the explanation for the late disclosure of that allegation, namely that the appellant had suffered physical and sexual abuse as a child and that shame and cultural mores made him reticent to disclose this. Ms Morgan referred us to the observation of Judge Swaney that "there is no bright line between childhood and adulthood, and I accept that his age is a relevant factor." She submitted that the judge had failed to give adequate consideration to the fact that the appellant was a minor at the time of the alleged abuse and to the potential impact of his age, vulnerability, trauma and lack of confidence on his ability or willingness to disclose such matters at an earlier stage.
20. Ms Morgan further submitted that the judge's assessment of the section 8 factors was flawed. Although the appellant was in possession of a passport, the judge proceeded on the erroneous basis that he had arrived in the United Kingdom without one. The judge also treated the appellant's method of entry as damaging to his credibility without adequately considering the circumstances of his case. It was submitted that these errors infected the overall credibility assessment and were therefore material.
21. At the hearing we confirmed that we were satisfied that there was a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. Our reasons for that decision are set out below.
Decision on the Appeal
22. The principles and cautious approach to be applied by an appeal court to first instance findings of fact are well established and set out in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2]. We remind ourselves of the role of the First-tier Tribunal as an expert Tribunal and also bear in mind that a determination should not be ‘picked over’ or subjected to narrow textual analysis: HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, 1 WLR 3784 at §72.
23. The respondent, through Ms Dolan, accepted that the decision contained a material error of law. Ms Dolan’s concession was properly made. Having considered the decision independently, we are satisfied that it does for the following reasons.
24. Ground one, there is no dispute that the supplementary bundle was before the judge who had referred to “begging” at paragraph 29 of the decision.
25. Grounds two and three, the judge failed to engage with a material aspect of the appellant's claim, namely the allegations of sexual assault, trafficking and forced begging. No clear findings were made as to whether those allegations were accepted or rejected. Given the nature of this evidence, the judge was required to subject it to anxious scrutiny and make clear findings upon it. Instead, the determination at paragraph 34 found that “The appellant was asked why in his interview he told the respondent that he came to the UK for a better life, education and that the conditions in Albania were bad. He did not mention his fears. He replied that he was young at the time, and he cannot remember. However, he has been able to remember much more after that interview in a later additional statement which is completely new information to the respondent from that which the refusal decision was based.” The judge focused upon the lateness of the disclosure without considering the appellant's age at the material time, together with the cultural and social factors that may have affected his ability to disclose matters of such a sensitive nature. In those circumstances, it is impossible to discern whether the allegations were rejected, accepted, or what weight was attached to them in the overall credibility assessment. This error is material, as the late disclosure was relied upon adversely without proper engagement with the substance of the evidence or the explanation for its late disclosure.
26. The supplementary evidence raised a distinct and additional basis for the appellant's protection claim, namely that he was a victim of exploitation and trafficking and feared persecution at the hands of those responsible for that exploitation. We accept Ms Morgan’s submission that although the appellant's skeleton argument did not identify the issues with complete clarity, it did not confine the claim solely to the alleged blood feud. Rather, it expressly asserted that the appellant feared persecution from the criminals who had exploited him.
27. However, the judge's analysis did not engage with that aspect of the claim. The only substantive conclusion reached was that there was insufficient evidence to establish a blood feud and that the appellant had not been persecuted for a Convention reason. That conclusion was inadequate in circumstances where the appellant had advanced allegations of exploitation, trafficking and sexual assault, giving rise to a separate claimed risk from the Bajraj gang. The judge failed to make findings on those allegations or to assess whether, if accepted, they engaged the Refugee Convention. This omission constitutes a material error of law.
28. We agree with Ms Morgan that the judge's assessment of the section 8 factors was flawed. At paragraph 21, the judge concluded that the appellant's credibility was seriously damaged because he had travelled through other countries without claiming asylum and had arrived in the United Kingdom without a passport. However, the evidence shows that the appellant was in possession of a passport. This factual error undermines to some degree the adverse credibility finding and suggests that insufficient consideration was given to the weight properly attributable to the section 8 factors, particularly in light of the appellant's age at the relevant time.
29. Accordingly, the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision has to be set aside in its entirety and the decision re-made. Ms Dolan agreed that there are no findings which are capable of being preserved. The appropriate course, in such circumstances, is for the matter to be decided afresh and for the case to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
30. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law.
31. We set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different Judge, with no findings of fact preserved.

T Bibi

T Bibi

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 July 2026