Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002164
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/70325/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28 July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREER

Between

MK
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Timson, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard on 17th July 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a 24-year-old national of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity. He appeals with permission the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his Protection and Human Rights Appeal promulgated on 20th February 2026.

2. It is the Appellant’s case that he was involved with Kurdish nationalist causes and opposition to the Iranian State prior to his departure from Iran. It is his case that he attended 2 public demonstrations against the government and that he operated a Facebook page on which he shared opinions critical of the Iranian Government.

3. The Respondent rejected the Appellant’s claims in respect of the events leading to the Appellant leaving Iran. The First-tier Tribunal rejected the Respondent’s criticisms of the Appellant’s evidence and found that the Appellant’s account of the events leading to his departure was reasonably likely to true. However, the First-tier Tribunal found that any risk that the Appellant might face upon return to Iran could be mitigated by the Appellant deleting a second Facebook account that the Appellant opened after his arrival in the United Kingdom.

4. The Appellant sought, and was granted, permission to appeal. The Secretary of State did not provide a Rule 24 reply. However, at the beginning of the hearing before me, Mr McVeety indicated that he did not oppose the Appeal. He conceded that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision contained material legal error and, on any view of the unchallenged findings of fact, the Appellant’s asylum appeal must succeed.

Decision and Reasons

Error of Law

5. In light of Mr McVeety’s concession, it is unnecessary for me to say much more.

6. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision is, in parts, difficult to read and its reasoning difficult to follow. Nevertheless, it is tolerably clear that the First-tier Tribunal found the Appellant to be a truthful witness concerning the events that led to his departure from Iran.

7. The Appellant operated a Facebook account under the pseudonym, “Peshmerga” in conjunction with a friend who worked as a Kolbar. That friend was arrested by the Iranian authorities, who seized his telephone. This led to the discovery of the Facebook account operated under the name, “Peshmerga”. The authorities subsequently identified the account as belonging to the Appellant and raided his home in search of him.

8. Having found that the Appellant’s online criticism of the Iranian state, undertaken before his departure from Iran, was already known to the Iranian authorities, it is difficult to understand how the First-tier Tribunal concluded that the Appellant could safely return.

9. Mr McVeety submitted that [52] was particularly problematic. In that paragraph, the First-tier Tribunal stated:

I am satisfied that if he were to be returned, it would not be unreasonable for him to delete his Facebook account as per headnote 6 of XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran (CG) [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC) … because I am not satisfied that his political profile here in the UK would mean that the authorities would be aware of it otherwise. His profile in Iran prior to his departure was also not such that he can be said to be a person of significant interest such that his Facebook account would be monitored prior to any application for an emergency travel document and his participation at the demonstrations has not been highlighted in the media.

10. That conclusion is irreconcilable with the finding at [51] of the same decision:

He was not arrested for participating in the 2 demonstrations in Iran in January 2023 and the only reason his Facebook account was found by the authorities in June 2023 was because the friend, who managed that account for him, was arrested in the course of his work as a Kolbar and the Facebook account was found on his telephone. I am satisfied that if the friend had not been caught, it is very unlikely that the Appellant’s Facebook account would have been discovered when it was or that the Appellant would have been linked to an account in the name of Peshmerga.

11. It is implicit in that finding that the First-tier Tribunal accepted that the Iranian authorities knew that the Facebook account operated under the pseudonym “Peshmerga” belonged to the Appellant and that they attended his home intending to arrest him. Contrary to the conclusion reached in the following paragraph, the Appellant was therefore a person of significant interest to the Iranian authorities. Had he not been of significant interest, the authorities would not have raided his home in search of him.

12. Those findings raise real doubt as to whether the First-tier Tribunal properly applied the relevant country guidance when determining the appeal. As the Upper Tribunal held at paragraph 112 of XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran (CG) [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC), once the Iranian authorities have become aware of an individual’s Facebook account, the subsequent deletion of that account does not mitigate the risk arising from that prior discovery.

13. It is therefore difficult to understand how the First-tier Tribunal concluded that the deletion of a second Facebook account, of which the Iranian authorities were not aware (at [48]), could mitigate the risk arising from a separate account that they had already discovered and linked to the Appellant.

14. The error is compounded by the reasoning at [53]:

I have also considered whether, if returned to Iran, he will invariably questioned upon return as a Kurd without documentation and asked why he claimed asylum and following HJ ([2010] UKSC 31) he cannot be expected to lie but neither would he be expected to volunteer information about his activities in the UK.

15. Even on the broadest and most sympathetic reading of the decision, it is difficult to understand precisely what the Judge intended by this passage. Although the Judge stated that she had considered whether the Appellant would be questioned upon return, the decision does not record the outcome of that consideration. It does not state whether the Judge found that the Appellant would, or would not, be questioned, still less does it assess what questions he would be likely to face or what he could be expected to say in response.

16. This omission is significant. It is well established in the country guidance cases concerning Iran that a person returned to Iran having failed in an application for asylum abroad will be subjected to questioning by agents of the state. In SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran (CG) [2016] UKUT 308 (IAC), at [23], the Upper Tribunal considered the questioning of returnees. The country guidance further establishes that, where concerns arise from a returnee’s previous activities in Iran, the United Kingdom, or the country from which the person is returned, there may be a risk of further questioning, detention and ill-treatment.

17. If the Appellant answers those questions truthfully, his responses will disclose the reasons for his departure from Iran. The question is not, as the Judge directed herself, whether the Appellant would volunteer information or disclose his activities to the Iranian authorities without being asked. That approach fails to confront the real issue. The Tribunal was required to consider what questions the Appellant was likely to be asked and what, if he answered those questions truthfully, his responses would reveal.

18. It is therefore apparent that, notwithstanding the references to the applicable country guidance authorities on the face of the decision, the First-tier Tribunal did not conscientiously apply that guidance in substance. The decision contains a material error of law and is set aside.

Remaking

19. Mr McVeety confirmed that the Respondent did not seek to challenge the First-tier Tribunal’s findings of fact concerning the events that caused the Appellant to leave Iran. He further confirmed that the Respondent’s position was that, on any rational application of those facts to the applicable country guidance, the Appellant was entitled to succeed in his asylum appeal. I agree.

20. The First-tier Tribunal made the following findings of fact:

i. Prior to his departure from Iran, the Appellant operated a Facebook account under the pseudonym “Peshmerga”, through which he expressed views critical of the Iranian state;

ii. The Appellant attended two public demonstrations following the death of Mahsa Amini;

iii. The Iranian authorities discovered the Appellant’s Facebook account after arresting the Appellant’s friend and seizing his telephone;

iv. The Iranian authorities linked the Facebook account operated under the name “Peshmerga” to the Appellant; and

v. The Iranian authorities attended the Appellant’s home in search of him.

21. Applying the Country Guidance in HB (Kurds) Iran (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC), it is reasonably likely that the Appellant will be persecuted upon return to Iran. This is because the Appellant is known to the Iranian authorities as having operated a Facebook account on which he engaged in political speech in favour of Kurdish Nationalism and critical of the Iranian State. The Appellant is therefore a Refugee and his appeal succeeds.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.

2. The decision in this appeal is re-made and the appeal is ALLOWED.

J. Greer

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Greer

17th July 2026