Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002167
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/57300/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

9th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

AA
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr N Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr C Holmes, instructed by MRG Solicitors

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 27 July 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State for the Home Department against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal allowing AA’s appeal against the decision to refuse his human rights claim/ application for entry clearance to the UK.
2. For the purposes of this decision, I shall hereinafter refer to the Secretary of State as the respondent and AA as the appellant, reflecting their positions as they were in the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal.
3. The appellant is a citizen of Iran born on 14 January 2024 and is now two years of age. On 6 March 2025 he applied for entry clearance to the UK as a dependent child of British parents. In a decision dated 24 April 2025 the respondent refused his application. As the documents submitted stated that he was adopted, his application was assessed by the respondent as an adopted child under Appendix Adoption to the immigration rules. The respondent noted that the appellant had provided, as evidence of his adoption, an Iranian guardianship document dated 27 January 2025. Since Iranian adoptions were not recognised in the UK, the respondent assessed the appellant’s application under the Adoption: Coming to the UK for adoption route.
4. The respondent was not satisfied that the appellant met the requirements of the relevant immigration rules. The respondent considered that the appellant did not meet the requirements of Appendix Adoption AD 37.2(a) as he had not paid the Immigration Health Charge. The respondent considered that the appellant did not meet the requirements of Appendix Adoption AD 41.1(a),(b) and (d) of the Immigration rules, since he had failed to address the circumstances of his stated adoption and had provided no further evidence or documents from social care or other professionals in Iran who were involved in the facilitation of his adoption, he had provided no evidence which adequately demonstrated the need for his adoption or what steps were taken regarding the suitability of his sponsors to adopt him, he had provided no details of his biological parents to show that they were not still available to provide care for him, the photographs and travel documents he had produced did not evidence that his sponsors had previously had and continued to have any parental responsibility for him, his sponsors had failed to evidence that they had met their legal obligation pertaining to adoption in the UK and there was no evidence that the relevant authorities had been contacted or that the sponsors had applied for a Certificate of Eligibility. The respondent was not satisfied that the Iranian guardianship document provided by the appellant was a credible document and was not satisfied that the application was not one of convenience to facilitate his admission into the UK. The respondent was accordingly not satisfied that the appellant’s adoption in Iran was credible, that a genuine transfer of parental responsibility had occurred, that his stated adoptive parents had acted and continued to act as a parents for him, that he had ever had a parental relationship with his stated adoptive parents, that he was not still in the care of his biological parents, that his application was not one of convenience to facilitate his entry to the UK and that his sponsor had fulfilled their legal obligations pertained to adoption in the UK.
5. The appellant appealed against that decision and his appeal was heard by a First-tier Tribunal Judge on 17 March 2026. The judge heard from the sponsor, AM, who explained that he and his wife ZV had dual British and Iranian citizenship and were habitually resident in the UK, that they had commenced the adoption process in the UK and had passed preliminary assessments and were at the ‘matching’ stage when his wife travelled to Iran in 2024 as her mother was unwell, and that his wife became aware of the appellant who had been abandoned and left next to a rubbish bin and was in the care of Iranian social care services. The sponsor explained that he and his wife went through what they said was the recognised process in Iran and were granted temporary guardianship of the appellant for 6 months on 30 June 2024 and permanent guardianship of him on 27 January 2025. The appellant was issued with a birth certificate on 11 February 2025 naming them as his parents. The sponsor explained that his wife had remained in Iran with the appellant throughout the process and remained with him to date, and that he visited them in Iran regularly prior to the start of the conflict. The sponsor explained that he had not heard from his wife for approximately three months as a result of the communication blackout in Iran and was concerned for her wellbeing and for that of the appellant.
6. The judge noted that it was agreed that the requirements of AD 37.2(a) had been met. The judge agreed that a Certificate of Eligibility was needed when a child sought entry for the purpose of adoption where the adoptive parents were habitually resident in the UK, and that the appellant did not have one, so that the requirements of AD 41.2(a) and 41.1(a) were not met. The judge considered that it might be that, if there was a Certificate of Eligibility, requirements AD 41.1(b) and AD 41.1(d) would be met, having been assessed as part of the certification process, as per TY (Overseas Adoptions – Certificates of Eligibility) [2018] UKUT 197, but that since AD 41.1(a) was not met that was academic. The judge found that there was an established family life between the appellant, ZV and AM and was satisfied that ZV and AM had commenced the adoption process in the UK when events intervened and ZV encountered the appellant whilst in Iran. The judge considered that AM and ZV had gone through the steps to complete an adoption in Iran, albeit that it was not recognised in the UK, and that they were named as the appellant’s mother and father on his birth certificate. The judge found that ZV has remained with the appellant throughout and that AM had visited when able to, that they were the only family the appellant had and that there was no suggestion that his birth parents have sought to re-establish contact with him, that the Iranian courts must have been satisfied that there was an inability of his birth parents to care for him and that there had been a genuine transfer of parental responsibility to ZV and AM. The judge considered there to be no reason to believe that ZV and AM would not have obtained a Certificate of Eligibility had they sought one. The judge was satisfied that ZV and AM were committed to the appellant and that the adoption was not one of convenience. The judge was satisfied that the refusal of entry clearance gave rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences to the appellant, ZV and AM, and that the interference with family life outweighed the public interest. The appeal was accordingly allowed.
7. The Secretary of State sought permission to appeal the judge’s decision, asserting that the judge had made a material misdirection of law. It was asserted that the appellant was unable to meet the requirements of the immigration rules as an adopted child because Iranian adoptions were not recognised in the UK and the residence requirements of a de facto adoption had not been fulfilled, that the adoptive parents had not provided any explanation why they had not taken any steps to formally adopt the appellant in the UK, and that there was no certificate of eligibility. The respondent asserted that those failures raised safeguarding issues and that it was of concern that the judge had allowed the appeal in such circumstances. The grounds asserted further that the judge had failed to make a finding that there were compelling exceptional circumstances justifying a grant of leave outside the immigration rules and that the judge had made a material mistake of fact by finding that the appellant enjoyed family life in the UK, given that he lived in Iran.
8. Permission was granted in the First-tier Tribunal, limited to the following basis:
“Ground 3 – Article 8
4. I consider that this ground is arguable for the following reasons:
(i) There was seemingly no evidential basis upon which the Judge could reasonably conclude that the appellant – who has only ever lived in Iran – enjoys a family life in the UK with the sponsor [29].
(ii) It is arguable that the Judge, in failing to expressly make a finding of exceptional circumstances which is required in the application of GEN.3.2(2), misapplied the test of unjustifiably harsh consequences [33].
(iii) The Judge was satisfied that the Immigration Rules were not met [31(i)]. In IA [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 it was held that very exceptional or compelling circumstances justifying entry clearance outside the rules was required. It is arguable that no such finding was made by the Judge. “
9. The respondent did not produce a rule 24 response.
Hearing and Submissions
10. The matter came before me for a hearing. Both parties made submissions.
11. Mr Wain relied upon the judgment in IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 in submitting that the judge had failed to make adequate findings on the issue of ‘very exceptional circumstances’. He submitted that [32] and [33] of the judge’s decision suggested that the conflict in Iran had been used to justify the finding that Article 8 was engaged and that the decision was disproportionate, whereas [172] of IA made clear that that was a factor to consider but was not one of paramount weight. Mr Wain submitted further that the judge had made a mistake of fact at [29] by finding that the appellant enjoyed family life in the UK, and that [143] of IA made it clear that it was the family life of the family in the UK whose human rights had to be considered.
12. Mr Holmes submitted that the respondent was raising for the first time an argument that the judge’s decision was to be impugned on the grounds of having factored into it the conflict in Iran, whereas that was not a point pleaded in the grounds and it was not open to the respondent to make that contention today. With regard to the asserted mistake of fact, Mr Holmes submitted that it was clear from the decision that the judge was well aware that the appellant was outside the UK and that he had never been to the UK. It was difficult to see how the judge’s assessment would have been any different had she expressed herself in different terms and there was therefore no material error in that regard. As for the challenge in relation to the question of ‘exceptional circumstances’, Mr Holmes submitted that the main complaint seemed to be that the judge had failed to use the words ‘exceptional circumstances’, as there was no criticism of the balancing exercise at [29] onwards. Mr Holmes submitted that the term’ exceptional circumstances’ was simply a euphemism for an Article 8 breach and was not a separate stage in the ‘unjustifiably harsh’ analysis. He relied upon MM (Lebanon) & Ors, R( on the applications of) v Secretary of State and another [2017] UKSC 10 at [68] and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Khera [2025] EWCA Civ 1571 at [39(iii)] in that respect and submitted that the judge had done what was required, namely to equate GEN. 3.2 with there being a disproportionate interference with Article 8.
13. In response, Mr Wain submitted that the judge had failed to show what the unjustifiably harsh consequences were and had relied upon the conflict in Iran in that regard, contrary to what was said at [172] of IA.
Analysis
14. There are essentially two issues raised in the grounds. Firstly, the apparent mistake of fact in the judge finding at [29] that the appellant enjoyed family life in the UK and secondly, the judge’s asserted failure to make a finding on ‘exceptional circumstances’.
15. With regard to the first matter, I agree with Mr Holmes that nothing material arises from this. The judge was fully aware that the appellant did not live in the UK and had never lived or spent time in the UK. That is clear from the findings and observations at [32(i)]. The addition of the words “in the United Kingdom” in [29] was clearly a mistake but it was not one that had any material impact on the decision, particularly given that the grounds do not challenge the judge’s finding that family life existed between the appellant and his adoptive parents. That was a finding the judge was entitled to make on the evidence available and for the reasons properly given.
16. The main thrust of the grounds is the judge’s asserted failure to make a finding that there were exceptional circumstances justifying a grant of leave outside the immigration rules. However again I agree with Mr Holmes that the judge did make such a finding, albeit not specifically using the words ‘exceptional circumstances’. As Mr Holmes submitted, the Court in MM (Lebanon) at [68] made clear that the ‘unjustifiably harsh consequences’ test was essentially the same as the ‘exceptional circumstances’ consideration:
“Thus, as already explained, the current instructions reflect the view that a decision in accordance with the rules will not involve a breach of article 8 save in “exceptional circumstances”; which expression is equated with circumstances where a refusal would lead to “unjustifiably harsh” consequences for the individual or their family.”
17. That was confirmed in the case of Khera at [33(iii)], as Mr Holmes properly submitted.
“The expression "exceptional circumstances" has been in relatively long use in government guidance. It was considered in MM (Lebanon) where, at paragraphs [22]-[24], the Court explained that the phrase was intended to equate to the circumstances where Article 8 would be breached. In other words it was not intended to define a sub-category of Article 8 case where clearance would be granted which was to be differentiated from other cases where Article 8 applied but where, notwithstanding, no clearance would be granted. In this sense the expression conveys the message that cases where the circumstances might reach the Article 8 threshold will, as a matter of law, be rare – "exceptional"; but nothing more than this. It neither adds nor detracts from the substantive content of Article 8.”
18. Thus, at [33], where the judge found that the refusal gave rise to ‘unjustifiably harsh consequences’, she was essentially making a finding that ‘exceptional circumstances’ had been demonstrated in the appellant’s case which justified a grant of leave outside the immigration rules. The reasons for reaching that conclusion were those set out in some detail at [32(i)] to [32(iv)]. As Mr Holmes submitted, the grounds of appeal did not seek to challenge the balancing exercise itself, but merely asserted that the judge failed to make a finding on that basis, which she clearly did not.
19. In so far as Mr Wain, with reference to IA, sought to challenge the judge’s reliance upon the conflict in Iran, I agree with Mr Holmes that he was thereby seeking to introduce a further matter not raised in the grounds or the grant of permission, and was not entitled to do so. In any event, I do not agree with Mr Wain that the conflict in Iran was used by the judge to justify the conclusion that the respondent’s decision was disproportionate. Rather, that was one of various factors which the judge took into account in conducting the proportionality balancing exercise, and in particular when considering the best interests of the child appellant. I do not see any conflict between such a finding and the observations made in IA at [173], given in particular that the judge clearly balanced that against the significant weight to be attributed to the appellant’s inability to meet the requirements of the immigration rules.
20. In the circumstances I do not consider that the grounds identify any material errors of law in the judge’s decision. The judge made her findings on the basis of a full and careful consideration of all relevant matters, within and outside the immigration rules, and was entitled to make the findings that she did. Accordingly the grounds are not made out and the judge’s decision is upheld.
Notice of Decision
21. The Secretary of State’s appeal is dismissed. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal to allow the appeal stands.
Anonymity
The anonymity order previously made in the First-tier Tribunal is maintained.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 28 July 2026