Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002175
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53730/2024
LP/13718/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

28th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McWILLIAM

Between

RA
(Anonymity Direction Made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms F Iqbal, Counsel instructed by Barnes Harrild & Dyer Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms K Khan, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity. His date of birth is 1 January 1985. He has been granted permission to appeal against the decision of the F-tT to dismiss his appeal against the decision of the respondent on 1 December 2023 to refuse his claim for asylum.
2. The appellant’s case in a nutshell is that before coming to the UK he worked as a shopkeeper. He was asked to deliver food and drink for the PJAK. In addition, he was told by Asayish, the Security Agency of KRI, to spy on the PJAK. He refused and was threatened by Asayish. The appellant stopped supplying the PJAK. The appellant is a member of the Gorran party. The appellant also relies on his political sur place activities in the UK which include attending demonstrations and activity on Facebook. He has been politically active against the Iraqi government since he came to the UK.
The Grounds of Appeal
3. There are two grounds of appeal as follows:
i. The judge failed to make findings on (1) risk threshold for sur place activity (2) the appellant's Facebook profile and content and (3) the failed asylum seeker “pinch point” and the return process.
ii. The judge gave a misdirection as to the legal test on sur place activity and did not ask himself what the appellant would do on return
The decision of the FtT
4. The F-tT did not find the appellant to be credible. His evidence was found to be vague and evasive. The appellant claimed to have a past involvement with the Gorran movement. However, the judge said that he did not disclose this at the time of his screening interview and he had failed to provide a credible explanation regarding it. The judge said that the appellant in his interview had been asked an open question about political affiliations and he did not disclose this aspect of his claim.
5. The appellant at the hearing produced documentation saying that he was a member of the Gorran movement in Iraq; however, the judge found that the evidence was skeletal in detail and it contained grammatical errors. The judge attached little weight to it. Furthermore, the judge said that the letter from the Gorran movement said that the appellant's difficulties with the KDP and the PUK were due to Gorran and not to do with the PJAK. The judge found that this undermined the appellant's credibility.
6. The judge said that the appellant’s evidence lacked sufficient detail and plausibility. He found internal inconsistency between the appellant's first witness statement and the substantive asylum interview regarding his claim of being approached by Asayish to spy on PJAK members. The judge said that the appellant claims to have been aware of the Asyaish monitoring activities and this was disclosed to him by a friend. Despite this he continued to take the risk and deliver goods to PJAK.
7. The judge said that the appellant was “nothing other than a small-scale shopkeeper”. The judge found that the PJAK members with whom he says he became involved with were on his own account ordinary civilian members of the public dressed in normal clothing who would come in and buy goods. The judge found it to be “incredible” that the appellant would have been trusted to assist the PJAK in the way which he described.
8. The judge said that the PJAK is “a highly orchestrated party which would have its own supply channels”. The judge found that it was incredible that the appellant, a small operator, would be supplying the PJAK in this manner claimed. The judge said that the appellant's evidence that he would drop the goods at a small house in the village and not to any official location or camp or PJAK centre was incredible.
9. The judge found that given the short time that the appellant was involved even if this was the case it is highly unlikely that a Asaysish would entrust him to spy on the PJAK
10. The judge found that the appellant had been materially inconsistent. He noted that in the appellant's 2023 witness statement, at paragraph 16, the appellant stated that after Asayish initially detained and released him he stopped supplying food. However, his oral evidence was that he continued to supply food.
11. The judge considered the evidence of a witness in Germany who claimed to have “tipped [the appellant] off” about a Asayish interest in him. However, the judge said that his evidence had not been tested, and he found it to be self-serving.
12. The judge noted that the appellant did not leave Iraq until some seven months after his first encounter with Asayish and during that time he came to no harm despite claimed threats.
13. The appellant accepted that he used his own passport to leave Iraq through the airport and through normal channels. The judge said that the appellant had given a “superficial explanation about the engagement with an unknown agent arranged by his brother”. The judge recorded that when the appellant was asked about the arrangement under cross examination and why he was able to travel if he was under suspicion the appellant disclosed that he believed the agent had substantial power. The judge found this to be “clearly speculative.”
14. The judge did not accept that the appellant does not have ongoing contact with his family in Iraq. The judge found his evidence about this to be superficial. He said there are no reasons why the appellant would not maintain contact with his family even if his claims are true.
15. The judge found that the appellant's credibility was undermined by s.8 of the 2004 Act. The appellant had travelled through safe European countries including Poland and France where he did not claim asylum. The judge rejected his explanation about this.
16. The judge considered sur place activities directing himself in relation to XX (PJAK- sur place activities-Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23. The judge found that the appellant’s political activities in the UK have been undertaken opportunistically and that they are not a reflection of his genuine political views. The judge found that the appellant has no political views on Iraqi politics.
17. The judge took into account what he described as numerous social media “threats” produced by the appellant. The judge said that there was no evidence as to the author of the posts. He found that the appellant’s evidence about the sender of the messages was inconsistent.
18. The judge said that the appellant claimed in his oral evidence to be a member of an organisation in the UK called “17 February”. The judge said that he failed to provide credible evidence of this. The judge recorded that the appellant does not claim in any event to be an organiser or anyone with any degree of power within the organisation. The judge said at para 38 that “the appellant's behaviours are commonplace. I find they are fuelled by an attempt to bolster an attempt to remain in the UK. He is not someone who has the profile of interest to the authorities in the KRI”
19. The judge said that the appellant had not provided a full download of his Facebook activities. The judge found that the appellant’s social media activity was not genuine and therefore he could delete his account before he returns to Iraq to extinguish any risks. The judge said that there is no evidence that the authorities in Iraq will be aware of his activities. The judge said that his attendance at demonstrations is not evidence in the public domain. The judge said that the appellant would not have to disclose any opportunistic disingenuous activity on return to Iraq during any questions being asked of him. The judge said that he had approached this element of the claim as approved in S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482.
20. The judge rejected the appellant's claim that he did not have ID documents or that he is unable to access them. The judge found that the appellant maintains contact with his family and there are no reasons why they cannot assist him on return. The judge found that they can provide details of the appellant's family book and or bring his ID documents to the airport to facilitate his travel to a civil status affairs office. The judge found that as they sent him to the UK for a better life his ID documents will be readily available to them and in their possession and they can securely transit them to him in the UK.
21. The judge found that the appellant could be removed to either Erbil or Sulaymaniyah and he will not be required to fly and travel through Baghdad.
Conclusions
22. The respondent opposed the appeal relying on a Rule 24 response. I heard submissions from both representatives.
23. It is the respondent's position that the appellant has provided no evidence that his Facebook account can be accessed by the Iraqi authorities. In any event, the appellant can be expected to delete his Facebook account. The appellant is relied on country guidance relating to Iran and about a pinch point that does not apply in this case.
24. At the hearing Ms Iqbal narrowed the grounds considerably. She accepted that the judge was entitled to reject the appellant's account of events in Iraq. Her sole challenge to the decision was that the judge erred in the context of HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 31 because he made a presumption that the appellant would delete his Facebook account. The judge did not make an inquiry as to what the appellant will do and why. She referred me to [33] of the judge’s decision. She said that the judge did not correctly direct himself in relation to the sur place activities which she accepted was predominantly Facebook activity. She relied on an unreported case of IM v SSHD UI-2024-004062 and submitted that the appellant would not delete his Facebook account and yet he would be security screened when obtaining a travel document.
25. Miss Khan relied on the rule 24 response and MN (Vietnam) v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 485 with reference to [36] and [46] of the judgement. She said that the judge found the appellant to be opportunist and that he does not have a genuine political opinion and therefore he will delete his Facebook account. She said that IM is not a reported/country guidance case and has no relevance and, in any event, was not before the F-tT. Moreover, it would have no impact on the outcome of this appeal. The appellant has no profile of interest.
26. I observe that IM is an unreported case which concerns a Kurdish citizen of Iran. In any event, it does not assist the appellant. The panel in IM found that it was not reasonably likely that the appellant's sur place activities [on Facebook] represent a genuine belief. The panel found that the appellant had created the Facebook account and attended demonstrations for the sole purpose of bolstering his asylum claim. The appellant was found to have made significant efforts to make himself visible at pro-Kurdish and anti-regime demonstrations outside the Iranian embassy and the panel found that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Iranian authorities have identified him as an individual to be subjected to targeted surveillance and has downloaded material from his Facebook account. The panel said that the appeal should be allowed even if there is not a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant has already come to the attention of the authorities. The panel concluded that the appellant would not delete his Facebook account when making an application for an ETD.
27. In XX the panel considered whether the appellant would delete his Facebook account prior to the application for an ETD thereby avoiding the risk of the account being discovered when the Iranian authorities might undertake an internet search at the time of the application for the EDT the panel found that the appellant would not delete the account and therefore the risk would not be mitigated. They found this because the appellant would still be in the UK when the ETD is applied for and would have no incentive to delete the Facebook account.
28. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq (not Iran) of Kurdish nationality. He is not being returned to Iran. There was no evidence to support that the authorities in Iraq would have any interest in him and that he would be subjected to targeted surveillance and/or his Facebook account had been downloaded or would be should the appellant decide not to delete his Facebook account. In any event, the judge was entitled to conclude that he would delete his account. The evidence does not support that there is a level of surveillance by the authorities in Iraq anything like that undertaken by the authorities in Iran.
29. Ms Iqbal relied on [39] of the decision where the judge said, “as I find the appellant social media activity is not genuine then he can delete his account before he returns to Iraq to extinguish any risks. She drew my attention to the word “can” whereas she submitted the question should be what he will do. This Is not an error of law. The judge having found that the appellant left Iraq with no cause for any political parties to pursue him and that he had not provided a full download of his Facebook book activity which was not genuine and in the absence of any reason why he would not do so, it is obvious that the judge was of the view that the appellant will delete his Facebook account. Whether he would do is a fact sensitive assessment. The conclusion is rational. The judge referred to S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482 which supports the judge’s approach.
30. There is no error of law properly identified.
31. There is no error of law. The decision of the judge to dismiss the appellant's appeal is maintained.

Joanna McWilliam

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
17 August 2026