The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002186
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01585/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

4th November 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

PH
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Georget, Counsel instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 28 October 2026


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Clarke) promulgated on 20 February 2026. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 11 March 2023 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ made an anonymity order as the Appellant had made a protection claim. At the hearing this was the subject of discussion with the advocates, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be maintained when the asylum claim had been dismissed and this was not the subject of any challenge. I have reviewed the grounds of anonymity with reference to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. I take as my starting point the principle that open justice requires the identification of the parties to litigation and whilst in some cases, the need to prevent harm to a party may outweigh the need to ensure openness and transparency, it has not been demonstrated that the principle of open justice is outweighed by the particular circumstances of this appeal. The anonymity order is therefore discharged.
3. Background:
4. The Appellant is a Namibian national who entered the United Kingdom on 9 January 2022 as a visitor and made a claim for asylum on 8 December 2022. He completed a screening interview, and he was interviewed in respect of that claim on 20 December 2023. The basis of his claim was that he was being forced into marriage with a woman by his father and the community in Namibia.
5. The Respondent considered his application and, in her decision, letter dated 11 March 2023 refused the claim. Beyond accepting his nationality and identity the Respondent rejected the factual account given by him concerning the events in Namibia and any claimed risk on return.
6. The Respondent in the decision letter set out the issues raised as to the credibility and consistency of his claim and also considered that behaviour under Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 was present on the facts of the case. The decision letter also addressed humanitarian protection and Article 8 of the ECHR on the facts as they were advanced at that time.
7. The appeal came before the FtTJ. In a decision promulgated on 20 February 2026, the FtTJ set out the findings of fact and analysis of the evidence between paragraphs 11-38.
8. Dealing with the asylum claim, the FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk in Namibia on the factual basis as he had claimed.
9. The FtTJ set out that the Appellant’s fear was based upon the reaction of his father and community to him marrying a woman who was not the one chosen by the father. However, the FtTJ found that his fear was not based on harm as such, and the Appellant admitted that his father had not harmed him as an adult and nor had the community. The FtTJ recorded that the Appellant admitted that he had never been threatened by his father or the community. The FtTJ stated that the Appellant is no longer in contact with the father.
10. The FtTJ addressed the Appellant’s reliance upon a newspaper article about a man who committed suicide but found that there was no evidence that the man was facing a forced marriage, and the FtTJ concluded that this had been assumed by the Appellant without a knowledge of the man. The FtTJ placed little weight upon it.
11. The FtTJ made a finding that the Appellant delayed claiming asylum and did not claim on entry but waited until December 2022. The FtTJ drew a negative inference from this but in any event found that the Appellant has not shown any basis for the asylum or humanitarian protection claim.
12. In summary the FtTJ found that the Appellant could return without the fear of risk of harm from the father or his community, that there was sufficiency of protection, and that the Appellant is able to work and maintain himself wherever he chose in his country in any event. The FtTJ dismissed the appeal on protection and humanitarian protection grounds.
13. In relation to Article 8 the FtTJ found that the Appellant had begun a relationship with his wife at a time when she was still in a relationship and living with the father of her daughter (in a different area). The parties later began to live together from 21 March 2025, and this is the first time he met the children. The relationship with the father of the youngest child ended on 1 March 2025. Whilst the claim made was that the Appellant held and maintained a parental role in respect of the two children, the FtTJ found that the evidence given by the parties was inconsistent relating to care for the children and in what circumstances and that whilst there was some documentary evidence, the FtTJ identified that there were gaps in the evidence of from any independent sources, identifying that from the school, GP, hospital, which had not been provided to demonstrate the factual claim made by the parties. The overall conclusion reached by the FtTJ applying the balance of probabilities was that the Appellant had not established that had taken the parental role as claimed.
14. The Appellant sought permission to appeal only against the decision made on Article 8 of the ECHR .
15. Permission to appeal was refused by FtTJ Watson on 15 April 2026 but on renewal was granted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Jarvis on 2 June 2026 as follows:
“I find that there is some arguable merit in the grounds predominantly in respect of the Judge’s rejection of the children’s letters: §30 and the implied rejection of the partner’s evidence about the Appellant’s role within the family.”
16. The hearing took place on 28 October 2026 at the Tribunal. The Appellant was not present at the hearing but was represented by Mr Georget of Counsel. The respondent was represented by Mr Wain, Senior Presenting Officer.
17. Mr Georget submitted that he relied upon the grounds of challenge. A skeleton argument had been provided prior to the hearing dated 22 October 2026 (although not drafted by Mr Georget). He provided his additional oral submissions on the grounds as advanced on behalf of the Appellant.
18. Mr Wain, on behalf of the respondent indicated that there was no Rule 24 response but that the appeal was opposed on all grounds and provided his submissions in response.
19. It is not necessary to set out the submissions, and they will be considered in the context of the grounds advanced on behalf of the Appellant.
20. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion:
21. I am grateful for the helpful submissions given by both of the advocates during the appeal and have considered them in the context of the factual appeal and the assessment of the evidence by the FtTJ.
22. There is no appeal against the decision of the FtTJ whereby the FtTJ dismissed his protection claim.
23. The application is directed to the FtTJ’s consideration of the Appellant’s human rights claim by reference to Article 8 ECHR, and in particular to the FtTJ’s findings concerning his claimed parental relationship with his partner’s two children in respect of whom the Appellant claimed to have assumed the role as a step parent. It was common ground that one of those children, N, is a British citizen and therefore a “qualifying child” for the purposes of s.117D of the 2002 Act.
24. There are three grounds of challenge. They are as follows:
Ground 1:
25. It is submitted that the FtTJ failed to make clear, reasoned findings as to why the evidence of the children’s mother regarding the Appellant’s role in their lives was to be rejected.
26. Both the grounds and the oral submissions refer to oral evidence given, “he does everything. He is the one looking after the kids when I am at work. He takes the kids to activities, appointments. I work away from home”, and “he is a father figure to them. They have a very strong bond”.
27. The grounds also refer to the Appellant’s wife’s written evidence, she stated that, “the Appellant is the one for me as he is so caring and loving to me and my children” (para 14 of her witness statement). It is submitted that as she was the children’s mother she was best placed to give evidence of which she has direct knowledge. The FtTJ’s found that the Appellant and his partner were in a committed marriage and he had been living with her and the children since March 2025. There was nothing on the face of the evidence to suggest that it was implausible or in any other way incredible. In those circumstances, it is submitted that the FtTJ was required to make clear and reasoned findings on that evidence and, if relevant, the witness’s credibility.
28. It is submitted that this omission amounts to a failure to make reasoned findings on material evidence and/or a failure to give adequate reasons why that evidence was, as it must implicitly have been, rejected.
Ground 2:
29. It is submitted that the evidence of his partner was not the only evidence on the subject. Their evidence on the subject of his role in the children’s lives was corroborated by numerous photographs of the Appellant and the children on various different occasions (see pp101-128 of the Appellant’s supplementary bundle), on which the Appellant also relied. However, the FtTJ did not refer to these photographs at all in her determination, nor it follows, did she make any reasoned findings on this evidence.
30. Given the number of photographs, their nature and the different occasions on which they were taken, it is submitted that the FtTJ was required to take these into account if she was to reject the Appellant’s claimed role in the children’s lives. The Judge failed to refer to this evidence at all, and so it is arguable that she failed to take them into account as part of the evidential picture.
31. Even if the FtTJ did take the photos into account, the only alternative explanation for the photographs, if they were not accepted as corroborative of the Appellant’s and Mrs Ndjiharine’s evidence, was that these pictures had been cynically staged in an attempt to deceive the Tribunal as to his role in the children’s lives when in fact the Appellant did not play such a role.
32. That is submitted to be a finding which could not properly be made by way of inference. If that was the FtTJ’s conclusion, then it required at the very least required a clear finding and reasoning.
Ground 3:
33. It is submitted that the FtTJ at [30] on a supposed discrepancy between his partner’s evidence that the children call the Appellant “papa” whereas the letters/cards read “Dad”. However, it is submitted that that is not accurate. For instance, the letter reproduced at p62 of the Appellant’s bundle states, “I love Papa from N”. As such, it is submitted that the FtTJ must have overlooked that evidence and failed to take it into account when relying on this supposed discrepancy.
34. It is submitted that the grounds do disclose errors that was material to the outcome, which cannot be said to be “inevitable” and that the decision should be set aside and remitted to the FtT.
Analysis and discussion:
35. Before addressing the grounds of challenge, there are two important overarching considerations when approaching my assessment of whether the FtTJ materially erred in law. The first is the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. Over the course of many years, the higher courts have emphasised the importance of the application of such restraint before interfering with a first-instance decision. Examples include: Biogen Inc. v Medeva plc [1996] UKHL 18, at [54]; SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL; [2008] 3 WLR 832, at [30]; Fage UK Ltd. v Chobani UK Ltd. [2014] EWCA Civ 5, at [114] and [115]; UT (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [19]; MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC, at [45]; Lowe v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 62, at [29]; Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2]; HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, at [72]; Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51]; and most recently Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47].
36.  For present purposes, the essential principles derived from these authorities can be summarised as follows:
(a)   Although "error of law" is widely defined, the Upper Tribunal is not entitled to set aside the decision of the FTT simply because it does not agree with it, or because it thinks it can produce a better one ;
(b)   An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that the judge was "plainly wrong";
(c)    What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached;
(d)   The judge must consider all the relevant evidence relied on by the parties, although it need not all be specifically addressed in the judgment;
(e)    The weight attributed to relevant evidence is pre-eminently a matter for the judge;
(f)     An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable;
(g)   The reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract;
(h)   Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account;
(i)     When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out.
37.  I confirm that I have had regard to these propositions, amongst others, when considering the challenges brought to the decision of the FtTJ.
38. Dealing with ground 1, the issue to be determined is that set out at paragraph 6 relating to section 1176 (B).
39. Section 117B(6) provides:
"In the case of a person who is not liable to deportation, the public interest does not require the person's removal where -
(a)     the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and
(b)    it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the United Kingdom."
40. As Mr Georget submitted sub-paragraph (b) requires a more nuanced approach but the issue raised and to be determined by the FtTJ was that set out at (a) and whether there was not just a genuine relationship between the children and the Appellant but a genuine and subsisting parental relationship, which is not the same.
41. Looking at the background factors, there is no dispute that the Appellant was not the biological parent of either child and that each of the children had established relationships with their respective fathers who maintained contact with them. The issue here is whether the role played by the Appellant was one where he had “stepped into the shoes” as a parent. Such an assessment is fact sensitive ( see SSHD v AB (Jamaica) [2019] EWCA Civ 661 at [98]).
42. Having carefully considered the grounds and in the context of the decision of the FtTJ and the evidence adduced, I am satisfied that the FtTJ did not err in law in the way it is claimed. I am further satisfied that the FtTJ undertook an assessment of the evidence that was before the tribunal on this issue and reached a conclusion having given adequate, sustainable evidenced based reasons. I set out my reasons below.
43. Whilst Mr Georget refers to the failure to make clear findings on the Appellant’s wife’s evidence and to expressly state that her evidence was disbelieved, this submission fails to take into account the assessment of the evidence and the decision reached as a whole.
44. The FtTJ was entitled to view this issue against the background upon which the claim arose. It is not in dispute that the Appellant arrived in the UK as the visitor in 2022 and later claimed asylum. That claim was rejected by the FtTJ with the reasons given and is not challenged in these proceedings. At the time of the decision letter in March 2023, the Appellant had not asserted any family life in the UK, and it was not until a later stage of the appeal that the Appellant’s claim centred upon his relationship with his partner and her children. As such this was a “new matter” as the FtTJ recorded (see paragraphs 5 and 15) and as such had not been a factual issue considered by the Secretary of State. It therefore fell to the FtTJ to assess that claim for the first time.
45. Looking at the evidence, the ASA filed on behalf of the Appellant referred to the Article 8 claim and that the Appellant had formed a “close bond” with the Appellant’s children (see paragraph 21 and 24). Nothing further was stated in that document (dated 29/7/25). The evidence before the FtTJ was that he had met the children for the first time on 21 March 2025 and that the Appellant’s partner had continued in a relationship with one of the children’s fathers until 1 March 2025 (see paragraph 20). As stated, both children had established relationships with their respective fathers (see witness statement paragraph 13; p125). The FtTJ was required to consider the claim made that the Appellant was not only in a genuine relationship with the children that was subsisting but that he had a genuine and subsisting parental role.
46. On this issue the FtTJ had witness statements from each of the parties. The Appellant’s witness statement (page 125CB) referred first meeting with the children on 21 March 2025 (the date that the FtTJ had found the parties began living together) and that “I treat the kids like my own. My partner explained to both children that I am the new stepfather”. Nothing more was said in the witness statement giving substance to any parental role.
47. Similarly the Appellant’s partner’s witness statement (p126CB) set out at paragraph 14, “the Appellant is the one for me and he is so caring and loving to me and the children.” It is this paragraph that the grounds identifies as the relevant evidence given by the Appellant’s wife. There was nothing further in the witness statement confirming what type of parental role held or otherwise.
48. Whilst the grounds seek to rely on the oral evidence given, there is no note or record of proceedings provided setting out what was said. Nonetheless, Mr Georget was Counsel in the case and I have taken into account what was said in the oral submissions made where Mr Georget referred to the evidence given by the Appellant’s wife as follows “he does everything; he is the one looking after the children when I am at work. He takes the kids to activities and their appointments… He is like a father figure..”
49. When the decision is read as a whole, it is plain in my judgment that the FtTJ addressed that evidence and gave clear, reasoned findings why the conclusion was ultimately reached that the FtTJ did not find that it had been established on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant had a parental role.
50. First, the evidence of the Appellant and his wife was that he looked after the children when she was at work, and the FtTJ addressed this in the findings of fact between paragraphs 21 – 26 and also paragraph 32. In the assessment of that evidence the FtTJ was entitled to rely on the inconsistent evidence given by each of the parties as identified in those paragraphs. The FtTJ identified that there was inconsistent evidence as to who lived at the address and by taking into account the data collection sheet for N which recorded details of all persons who have parental responsibility or anyone else to be contacted an emergency (p237). The form was completed and signed on 22 September 2025 and it is headed “please check the information below is correct”. It is not in dispute that the form identified as a resident the Appellant’s sister (see paragraph 21). The FtTJ then set out the inconsistent evidence given by the Appellant and his wife at paragraph 22. At that paragraph the FtTJ recorded the Appellant’s evidence and at paragraph 23 found that he had given clear answers about the sister leaving and him starting as an agency worker on 1 November yet the data collection sheet dated 21 September 2025 and the name and address of the family home is given for her. At paragraph 24 the FtTJ recorded the Appellant’s wife’s evidence as in “complete contrast” where she stated that her sister moved out at the end of March 2025 and started her work last year. Whilst the FtTJ recorded the explanation given by the Appellant’s wife concerning the form at paragraph 25, the FtTJ was entitled to take into account that there was no evidence from the Appellant’s sister as to her work and employment. The FtTJ took into account the employment contract relevant to the Appellant’s wife (paragraph 29), and at paragraph 32 the FtTJ took into account the limited wage slips which the FtTJ found did not show the change of work as claimed by the Appellant and no rota of either the wife or her sister been provided. The FtTJ identified that this evidence was relevant because if they worked and were working one month on and off, they would have a plan to show cover. In other words the evidence did not demonstrate the claim made that the Appellant was caring for the children when the Appellant’s wife was not available. It is also right to note at paragraph 32 the FtTJ identified a further inconsistency in the evidence where the Appellant’s wife referred to the use of a nanny when no one else was available but the Appellant had made no reference to this.
51. The FtTJ’s conclusions on the issue of care of the children were set out between paragraphs 33 – 34. The FtTJ identified that there were inconsistencies in the evidence as to who lived in the house and who was looking after the children when the Appellant’s wife was working away from home. The FtTJ therefore made finding, “I find it more likely than not that the sister continues to do this as she was doing before the Appellant moved in.” In my judgment that expressly addressed the Appellant’s wife’s evidence that he looked after the children while she worked.
52. The evidence identified by Mr Georget given by the Appellant’s wife was that the Appellant “does everything” and that he takes the children to their appointments.
53. The FtTJ also assessed that evidence as given and was entitled to consider the evidence provided in support as set out in the bundle. The FtTJ took into account the parent pay showing the names of both the Appellant and his wife regarding the child N and also evidence of NHS appointments. The FtTJ also referred to the appointment made by the health visitor to visit the property (p155). However, the FtTJ rightly identified that there was no evidence as to who the health visitor saw or any report or letter from the health visitor, “who would be independent and more cogent than the Appellant and his wife” (see paragraph 27).
54. At paragraph 31 the FtTJ considered the GP letter provided (P151) and whilst it demonstrated that the child was registered at the practice beyond that it provided no support for the Appellant providing a parental role. As the FtTJ found, “what is missing is independent evidence from the school, GP, hospital health visitor that the Appellant is the person who does everything he says he did.” The same applied in relation to their activities. The FtTJ identified the evidence at paragraph 21 which consisted of a consent form filled in by both parties dated December 2025, but there was no evidence that the child was actually enrolled there and there was no evidence from the school in support of the claimed parental role therefore it was open to the FtTJ to find that this was merely “self-serving”.
55. The grounds do not challenge the findings of fact made or that the FtTJ wrongly recorded the evidence or otherwise was in error when reading the decision as a whole, it is plain that the FtTJ having heard and assessed the evidence was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant had a genuine and subsisting parental role which differs from having a genuine relationship with the children.
56. The submission made by Mr Georget is that the FtTJ failed to make a clear finding that the appellant’s wife was not believed and/ or as regards her credibility. I do not accept the submission that the FtTJ was expressly required to state that the evidence of the appellant’s wife was either incredible or to be otherwise disbelieved. A Tribunal is required to resolve material issues in dispute and give adequate and clear reasons, and those reasons may be expressed either directly or by implication. In my judgment the FtTJ identified the evidence relied upon by the parties and which related to the role of the appellant and his care for the children (i.e. a parental role). However, the FtTJ found their evidence to be inconsistent and important aspects of the factual claim were unsupported by adequate evidence. Therefore, applying the balance of probabilities, the FtTJ was entitled to find that the appellant’s sister took the care of the children. The findings when read together are irreconcilable with the acceptance of the wife’s evidence that the appellant “ does everything “ and that he had a parental role. It is tolerably clear from those findings of fact and assessment of the evidence taken with the finding that there was no evidence from sources “ who would be independent and more cogent that the Appellant and his wife” was an assessment that the FtTJ did not find their evidence to be reliable and to discharge the burden that the Appellant had demonstrated he had a parental role with the children. Ground 1 does not establish that the FtTJ erred in law.
57. Ground 2 relates to evidence provided in support of the Appellant’s claim that he had a genuine and subsisting parental relationship in the form of photographs.
58. Paragraph 12 the grounds refers to the Appellant’s evidence as to his role in his children’s life and that this was corroborated by “numerous photographs” and that the FtTJ did not refer to them in the decision and they should have been taken into account if rejecting his role in their lives. In his oral submissions Mr Georget referred to the photographs showing the Appellant on four different occasions with the children and that the evidence supported that given by the Appellant and his wife.
59. With respect to the grounds the photographs could not be described as “numerous” but in fairness that was accepted by Mr Georget in his oral submissions. There is one photograph in the original bundle (page 168) showing both children with the Appellant and is undated and in the supplementary bundle there are eight photographs, all undated and taken on what looks like four occasions. None of the photographs are described in the written evidence.
60. When addressing ground 2 the findings of fact summarised above are relevant. The FtTJ addressed the evidence provided in support of the claim by considering it “in the round” and taking into account the evidence which purported to come from independent sources and that evidence which did not (see paragraphs 28 and 30). In the assessment of the documentary evidence the FtTJ identified that there were gaps in that evidence from independent sources in support of the claim that he had a parental role with the children, that he took them to their appointments and did everything for them. The FtTJ noted there was a GP registration form no independent evidence of the GP, the school or the health visitor to provide such confirmation that it was the Appellant who “does everything he says he did”.
61. It is not necessary for a FtTJ to address each and every piece of evidence in the bundle. The FtTJ identified evidence that was not independent of the parties, such as forms filled in by the Appellant and his wife upon which the FtTJ placed less weight (see paragraph 31) and the failure to provide evidence from other sources (GP, health visitor, school) “who would be independent and more cogent than the Appellant and his wife” (see paragraph 27). It is in this context that the evidence of the photographs could readily be placed as “non-independent evidence”.
62. I accept the submission made by Mr Wain and that even if the FtTJ did not expressly refer to the photographs, it has not been shown that the FtTJ would have reached any other conclusion. First, the FtTJ did identify that there were gaps in the evidence from independent sources which would have been readily available but had not been produced. The factual findings in this regard are set out in relation to ground 1. It is clear from those findings made why little weight was given to the evidence that was considered to emanate from a non-independent source i.e. from the parties (see paragraph 28). The photographs would fall into such a category. The provision of 8 photographs showing the Appellant with both or either of the children may show a genuine relationship which was not an issue at the hearing but does not show that there was a genuine and subsisting parental relationship which was in issue. Consequently, the photographs cannot in my judgment undermine the findings of fact made on the assessment of the core issue that the Appellant had not demonstrated on the balance of probabilities that he had a genuine and subsisting parental role for the children. Ground 2 is therefore not made out.
63. Turning to ground 3, the ground challenges paragraph 30 on the basis that the FtTJ relied on a supposed discrepancy between the Appellant’s wife evidence that the children called the Appellant “papa” whereas the letters/cards read “dad”. It is submitted that this was not accurate and Mr Georget referred to a letter in the bundle which states “I love Papa from N”. It is therefore submitted that the FtTJ must have overlooked that evidence and failed to take into account when relying upon this supposed discrepancy.
64. Paragraph 30 reads as follows: “there are letters/Father’s Day card reading “dad” although the whites that they call him “Papa” and confirming the Appellant buys a gift for the children.”
65. In my judgment paragraph 30 is not a finding on any inconsistency but when read as it stands was simply the FtTJ recording the evidence. As the FtTJ stated there are letters/Father’s Day cards reading “dad” and the FtTJ also recorded the evidence given by the Appellant’s wife that they called him “Papa” and confirming the Appellant buys a gift for the children ( my emphasis). The FtTJ does not refer to that as inconsistency in that paragraph.
66. When the sentence is read in its totality it does not demonstrate that the FtTJ relied upon this an inconsistency. Those were properly identified in the earlier paragraphs with clear reasons and when drawn together in the conclusions reached between paragraphs 33-34.
67. I remind myself of the guidance given when considering the assessment of a FtTJ and the findings of fact an assessment of the evidence undertaken. It is important to have in mind the role of a judgment given after trial. The primary function of a first instance judge is to find facts and identify the crucial legal points and to advance reasons for deciding them in a particular way. He should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need not be elaborate. There is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case. His function is to reach conclusions and give reasons to support his view. When applied to this appeal I am satisfied that the FtTJ did give clear and reasoned findings on the evidence which were open to make.
68. For those reasons and having considered the decision of the FtTJ in light of the evidence and factual findings made I am satisfied that there is no error of law in the decision based on the grounds as advanced. Consequently, the Appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law which was material to the outcome, therefore the decision shall stand.}
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error on point of law material to the outcome and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.


29 October 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds