Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002187
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/60571/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILSON

Between

F A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Rashmi (Counsel)
For the Respondent: Ms Lecointe (Senior Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 6 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge dated 9 February 2026 dismissing her appeal against the Respondent’s decision dated 9 August 2024 to refuse her human rights claim made on 19 January 2024.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Syria aged 61. The appellant seeks to enter the United Kingdom ("UK") on the basis of her family life with her son (the “sponsor”), who is resident in the UK with settled status as a refugee.
3. The appellant made a previous entry clearance application on 7 November 2021, with the same sponsor. This was refused on 8 February 2022. That refusal was appealed, and her appeal was dismissed by a First Tier Tribunal judge in a decision on the papers promulgated on 2 August 2023 (the “previous decision”).
The Hearing & Documents
4. At the hearing I noted that, despite the directions and a reminder letter dated 24 July 2026, the appellant’s representatives had not produced a composite electronic bundle. Ms Rashmi indicated that she had been provided with papers but could not confirm whether a bundle had been filed and served. The respondent’s representative indicated that she had not been provided with a bundle but believed that she had all relevant papers.
5. I informed the representatives that I had a copy of the decision under appeal, the grounds of appeal, the Rule 24 response, the First-tier Tribunal grant of permission to appeal, and the skeleton argument that had been before the First-tier Tribunal. I also indicated that I had access to the original papers via MyHMCTS. The representatives confirmed that they were content that the Tribunal had all relevant documents before it.
6. The representatives indicated that there were some documents held by the other party which they had not seen. For example, the appellant’s representative had not seen the Rule 24 response. Arrangements were made for the parties’ representatives to exchange the missing documents, and they were afforded time to review them. Following this process, both representatives confirmed that they had received all relevant documentation and were content to proceed.
7. For completeness, the Tribunal noted that the previous decision was not held on the Upper Tribunal file. Both representatives confirmed that they did not require a copy of the previous determination, nor did the Tribunal require the same. The representatives confirmed that they were content to proceed without a copy of the previous determination as it was not material to the error of law issues to be determined by the Tribunal.
8. At the hearing, Ms Rashmi confirmed that the appeal was limited to consideration of Grounds 2 and 3.
9. I heard oral submissions from both representatives which are fully recorded in the record of proceedings. So far as is relevant to this decision and reasons the submissions are summarised below.
Grounds of Appeal
10. As stated above the appeal is advanced solely on Grounds 2 and 3 which can be summarised as follows:
a. Ground 2 - the sponsor’s evidence was that the appellant was living in Quneitra in Syria which was a war zone and unsafe. However, the judge makes no reference to the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) referred to in submissions that addressed the humanitarian situation and risk for lone women in Quneitra. This evidence was material in considering proportionality [IA and Others v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516.] In addition, in reaching his findings at [36] the judge makes no reference to the sponsor’s evidence explaining why the appellant was deported from Saudi Arabia to Syria and why the appellant was unable to provide evidence of such deportation. As a consequence, the judge failed to take into account material evidence and made irrational findings.
b. Ground 3 – the judge failed to give adequate reasons why the sponsor’s evidence that the appellant had been deported from Saudi Arabia to Syria and continued to reside in Syria was rejected. The sponsor’s credibility or reliability as a witness of truth was not questioned. Accordingly, it was irrational to find against the sponsor’s account without providing adequate reasons why he was not believed. [Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC)].
Permission to Appeal
11. Permission to appeal was granted on grounds 2 and 3 only by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision dated 23 April 2026. The grant characterised the error of law as a failure to engage with evidence rather than, as set out in the grounds, a failure to refer to evidence. So far as is relevant to this decision the grant provides:
Grounds 2 and 3 are arguable. The decision does not expressly engage with the sponsor's oral evidence that the appellant is in Quneitra and that conditions there include violence and Israeli military action, nor with the country material said to have been advanced in submissions addressing the security situation in Quneitra, the humanitarian situation in Syria, and the position of lone women. It is arguable that the reasons given for not accepting the sponsor's evidence as to the appellant's location, in circumstances where his general credibility was not in issue, are insufficient.
Rule 24 Response
12. The Respondent opposed the Appellant’s appeal in a Rule 24 response dated 14 May 2026. I do not rehearse the submissions contained in the Rule 24 response but refer to them where relevant to my reasoning.
Appellant’s Submissions
13. Ms Rashmi confirmed that the appellant had not produced a skeleton argument for the Upper Tribunal proceedings nor had the appellant replied to the rule 24 response. Ms Rashmi relied upon the grounds of appeal. Where appropriate she developed or highlighted relevant themes. So far as is relevant to my reasoning Ms Rashmi’s oral submissions are summarised below.
14. Ms Rashmi submitted that the central issue was not whether the judge had referred to the sponsor's evidence, but whether he had properly engaged with it. She submitted that this was the concern identified in the grant of permission. Although paragraph [32] recorded the sponsor's explanation that corroboration could not be obtained from the relevant authorities, the decision did not explain why that explanation was rejected and instead moved to matters such as the absence of photographic evidence, objective evidence concerning deportations and the position in Syria.
15. Ms Rashmi submitted that the focus on the absence of evidence that Saudi Arabia deports Syrian refugees missed the point. The judge was not determining a challenge to the country evidence; he was determining whether this appellant had in fact been deported. The primary evidence on that issue was the sponsor's oral evidence. The sponsor had previously been accepted as credible and, whilst the judge was entitled to reject his account, adequate reasons for doing so had not been given.
16. Ms Rashmi relied upon MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT. She submitted that, although the judge recorded the evidence, the decision did not explain why the sponsor's evidence concerning deportation, including his explanation for the absence of deportation documents, had been rejected. She submitted that there was no adverse credibility finding against the sponsor.
17. In reply, Ms Rashmi accepted the principles in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 concerning appellate court restraint in relation to findings of fact. Her challenge, however, was directed to the reasoning process rather than disagreement with factual conclusions. She maintained that the judge had failed to engage with material evidence, including the sponsor's oral evidence, the explanation for the absence of deportation documents, the tribe letter, and the documentary evidence relating to Syria. She submitted that the evidence had not been considered holistically.
Respondent’s Submissions
18. Ms Lecointe submitted that the judge had engaged with the sponsor's evidence [32]-[37]. The sponsor's account had been summarised in the decision and the grounds were wrong to suggest that the evidence had been overlooked.
19. Ms Lecointe submitted that the Judge’s findings were rational. The judge concluded that, on the evidence available, he could not accept the account in its entirety.
20. In relation to paragraph [35], Ms Lecointe submitted that the judge acknowledged that the sponsor was a recognised refugee. However, the Judge was entitled to take account of his close family relationship with the appellant when assessing the evidence. The paragraph did not amount to a finding that the sponsor was dishonest but formed part of the overall assessment of reliability.
21. Ms Lecointe submitted that the absence of any challenge to the sponsor's evidence did not oblige a judge to accept everything said by the sponsor. The judge was entitled to assess reliability against the documentary and other evidence.
22. Ms Lecointe relied upon Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464. She submitted that the judge was not required to address every submission or item of evidence expressly. It should be assumed that all of the evidence had been considered unless the contrary is established. The judge had recorded the oral submissions and documentary evidence and was entitled to focus upon those matters considered material to his assessment. Ms Lecointe submitted that the assessment had been conducted on the balance of probabilities and that the weight to be attached to the evidence was a matter for the judge unless the resulting finding was one which no reasonable judge could have reached.
23. Ms Lecointe submitted that the grounds failed to identify any passage of country evidence which compelled acceptance of the appellant's claim to have been deported to Syria or demonstrated that the judge's assessment was unsustainable.
24. In relation to the medical and Article 8 elements of the appellant’s claim, Ms Lecointe submitted that the judge had considered conditions in both Syria and Saudi Arabia, had approached the matter with appropriate care and had considered the availability of healthcare.
25. Ms Lecointe submitted that the judge properly applied the Devaseelan principles and that the evidence before the Tribunal did not justify departure from the earlier findings. However, the decision did not rest solely upon Devaseelan and the judge conducted a full assessment, including consideration of healthcare evidence, proportionality and public interest factors. The sponsor's evidence was not decisive. The Judge’s approach to the Article 8 assessment was consistent with the approach adopted in IA and Others [42-44].
26. Ms Lecointe submitted that the findings reached were properly open to the judge on the evidence and that the judge was entitled to attach the weight he did to the evidence. The decision represented a balanced and reasoned assessment which disclosed no material error of law.
Discussion and Conclusions
27. There are essentially three issues for the Tribunal to consider. Firstly, whether the judge properly engaged with the sponsor’s evidence (Ground 2). Secondly, whether the judge gave adequate reasons for rejecting the sponsor’s evidence (Ground 3). Thirdly, whether the judge properly engaged with the CPINs advanced by counsel in oral submissions (Ground 2). The first and second issues (engagement with and reasons for rejecting the sponsor’s evidence) are so closely interlinked that it is appropriate to consider them together.
Engagement With and Reasons for Rejecting the Sponsor’s Evidence.
28. The judge’s approach to the sponsor’s evidence is set out in the paragraphs below.
29. At [13 & 14], the judge confirms that he considered the oral evidence, oral submissions and documentary evidence to include the witness statement of the sponsor.
30. At [15] the judge summarises the key evidence before him. That includes [15(f)] where the judge states (with emphasis added):
‘The appellant was deported back to Syria in or shortly after December 2024 and she returned to south-western Syria. She has had to move frequently from place to place because of the danger from continued unrest in the area and because, as a consequence of the sponsor’s past work with rescue organisations, his family members are considered to be collaborators with Israel and the US. She is currently in Quneitra, which is in the UN-patrolled buffer zone near to the Israeli border.
31. The Judge considers the Appellant’s claimed deportation to Syria by the Saudi Arabian authorities at [32-37]. At [32], the Judge states:
Very limited evidence other than the sponsor’s oral and written evidence has been provided of this occurring, or of the appellant’s recent presence in Syria. When this was put to the sponsor his response was to ask what evidence could he provide, his claim being that the family cannot get co-operation from the authorities because of his believed collaboration with Israel and the US.
32. At [35] the judge states:
I take into account, in considering his evidence, that the sponsor has been accepted by the respondent as a refugee.
33. Again, at [35], the judge goes on to state:
… The sponsor’s desire to bring the appellant, now a widow and separated from her remaining family, to join him and his family in the UK is natural and entirely understandable. In the circumstances the appellant and the sponsor are in, it would be naïve of me not to consider the possibility that the sponsor might be prepared to exaggerate the difficulty of the appellant’s present circumstances so as to try to help the appellant to move to the UK.
34. At [37] the judge states:
The fact that certain aspects of the account and/or evidence are not accepted as true or established does not mean that none of it is.
35. I accept, as submitted by Ms Lecointe and as set out in the extracts above, that the judge recorded and referred to the sponsor’s evidence and acknowledged that the sponsor’s credibility had previously been accepted in his asylum claim. I accept, as submitted by Ms Lecointe and as set out in the extracts above, that the judge was open to the possibility that the appellant may be exaggerating and noted that certain elements of an account may be accepted whilst others rejected [36 & 37]. However, as submitted by Ms Rashmi, the Appellant’s claim that she had been deported to Syria in the manner claimed was a key component of the Appellant’s appeal. The primary evidence before the judge on the issue of deportation was the sponsor’s oral evidence. Accordingly, it was necessary for the judge to undertake a meaningful assessment of the sponsor’s evidence and the weight that should be afforded to it. The paragraphs detailed above merely recite the sponsor’s evidence and indicate that the judge is aware of the possibility that the sponsor may be exaggerating and could be truthful in one element of his account and untruthful in another. In my judgement this falls short of a meaningful assessment or engagement with the sponsor’s evidence. The judge’s failure to properly engage with and assess this material evidence is an error of law.
36. I now turn to the question of whether the judge gave adequate reasons for rejecting the sponsor’s evidence. The sponsor’s evidence was that the appellant had been deported to Syria. The judge found that the appellant had not established, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant had been deported to Syria [32]. The Judge therefore rejected the sponsor’s evidence.
37. The Appellant relies on MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) and Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC)
38. The headnote of MK, so far is relevant to this appeal, provides (with emphasis added):
(2) If a tribunal finds oral evidence to be implausible, incredible or unreliable or a document to be worth no weight whatsoever, it is necessary to say so in the determination and for such findings to be supported by reasons. A bare statement that a witness was not believed or that a document was afforded no weight is unlikely to satisfy the requirement to give reasons.
39. In Mk [12] the court indicated that in cases where a witness is disbelieved in full or in part, such issues “must be squarely addressed” and neither party “can be left or expected to guess”.
40. Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] [12] provides that parties should be in no doubt why they have won or lost and cites Henry LJ
“The judge must explain why he has reached his decision. The question is always what is required of the judge to do so; and that will differ from case to case. Transparency should be the watch word”.
41. Contrary to the principles set out in MK, the judge dismissed the appeal but did not make an express finding that the sponsor’s oral evidence was implausible, incredible or unreliable. Neither did the judge give express reasons why the credibility of the sponsor’s account was rejected. As set out above, I am not satisfied that the judge properly engaged with or assessed the sponsor’s evidence. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the reasons for the judge’s rejection of the sponsor’s evidence can be properly inferred. Accordingly, in my judgment, the judge failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the sponsor’s evidence which was material to the appellant’s claim. This is an error of law.
42. I am not satisfied that the Judge would have inevitably come to the same conclusion had he not made the errors of law identified above. Accordingly, the errors are material.
Engagement with Country Policy Information Notes
43. It was undisputed that at the First tier Tribunal hearing counsel had relied upon country policy information notes that addressed the humanitarian situation and the risk for lone women within Quneitra.
44. The judge does not refer to the CPIN within his decision and reasons. I accept, as set out in [2(iii)] of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, that the mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it. However, the appellant’s claimed deportation to Syria and her claimed circumstances within Quneitra were at the core of her appeal. In my judgment, the CPIN evidence is relevant in two respects. Firstly, it is a relevant consideration when assessing the credibility of the sponsor’s evidence. The consistency or otherwise of the sponsor’s account of the country conditions within the specific area in which the appellant claimed to reside was a relevant consideration when assessing the credibility of the sponsor’s evidence. Secondly, it was relevant to the circumstances in which the appellant claimed to find herself in Quneitra. This is a relevant and material consideration in the proportionality assessment [IA and Others v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516.]. Accordingly, I find that the judge’s failure to engage with this material evidence is an error of law. The respondent contends that this error cannot be material as the judge found that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that she had returned to Syria. However, as I have set out above, there is a material error of law in the judge’s approach to the sponsor’s evidence which infects the judge’s conclusion that the appellant had not returned to Syria. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the Judge would have inevitably come to the same conclusion had he not made this error of law.
45. I have considered Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC) and the relevant Practice Direction and Practice Statement. Given the nature of the errors of law, a credibility assessment and full fact finding exercise is required and no findings of fact are preserved. Accordingly, it is appropriate to remit this appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo by a different judge.
Anonymity
46. I have decided to make an anonymity order as this decision and reasons considers issues of adverse state interest that relate to the sponsor. There is potential for the sponsor to be identified through association with the Appellant. In these circumstances, maintaining the integrity of the UK’s asylum system justifies derogation from the principle of open justice.

Notice of Decision
47. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained material errors of law and is set aside. No findings of fact are preserved.
48. The appeal shall be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo by a different judge.

G Wilson
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 September 2026