UI-2026-002195
- Case title:
- Appellant name:
- Status of case: Unreported
- Hearing date:
- Promulgation date:
- Publication date:
- Last updated on:
- Country:
- Judges:
The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002195
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/70384/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4th of November 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER
Between
NG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. Nadeem, Legal Representative
For the Respondent: Dr S. Ibisi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 23 October 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This hearing proceeded as a remote hearing, which was not objected to by either party. Both representatives and the Appellant attended remotely. There were no technical issues.
2. The Appellant is an asylum seeker whose nationality is disputed. His case is that he is Eritrean whereas the Respondent’s case is that he has failed to establish his nationality. The Appellant explains that he left Eritrea at a young age and grew up in Ethiopia.
3. This appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Lloyd-Lawrie (‘the Judge’) remotely on 24 February 2026. In a determination promulgated on 1 March 2026 the Judge dismissed the appeal. The appeal turned on the Judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s credibility. The Judge found that the Appellant was not credible, essentially on the basis of what the Judge considered were inconsistencies in his account.
4. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the Judge’s decision. The grounds are lengthy, but the key points are (i) that the Judge is said to have erred in their understanding of the Appellant’s account of his faith, and (ii) there was a failure to take the Appellant’s evidence in the round. The Respondent’s position is that the Judge gave adequate reasons for their conclusions and that the Appellant’s case amounts to mere disagreement.
5. For the reasons given below, while I reject the majority of the grounds of appeal, I do identify a material error on two grounds and allow the appeal on that basis.
Analysis
6. Ground 1. The Appellant submits that the Judge has treated the Appellant’s inability to speak Tigrinya as “near determinative” of the appeal, with reference to §26 of the determination. The Judge there sets out their conclusion that the Appellant “clearly did not live in Eritrea longer than he said, as he does not speak either of the main languages of the country”. I do not accept that this is a determinative element of the Judge’s reasoning. Rather, it must be read by reference to the Judge’s rejection, in the preceding sentence, of the Appellant’s account to have moved from Eritrea to Ethiopia at a young age. I read the reference to his not living in Eritrea longer than claim as a follow-up point to that initial analysis; the Judge is finding that the Appellant didn’t move to Ethiopia for the reasons claimed, nor can he show that he lived in Eritrea beyond his early years, given his inability to speak the language. That is a lawful conclusion.
7. The Appellant, in his Ground 1, also raises a separate point, which contends that the Judge failed to grapple with the Appellant’s ability to correctly identify various facts about Eritrea in his asylum interview. I note the large number of apparently correct answers regarding the history, geography, and culture of Eritrea given by the Appellant at interview. The Respondent did not dispute the accuracy of these references, although I note that in the refusal letter the Respondent stated: “You lack sufficient detail regarding your knowledge of Eritrean culture when asked about this during your asylum interview. You provided answers in some areas of Eritrean culture, including traditional food (AIR Q30) external sources confirm that these items are traditional in both Eritrea and Ethiopia”. However, none of the points raised by the Appellant in §7 of the grounds of appeal (which including his knowledge of currency, geography, and public holidays) were disputed by the Respondent nor taken into account by the Judge. These points were not raised in the extremely brief and cursory appeal skeleton argument filed in the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Nadeem, who did not make any substantive submissions either in opening or in reply before me, did not suggest that these points were raised with the Judge orally. I therefore consider that, while this was a point which the Judge should arguably have taken into account as part of the application of anxious scrutiny, I do not consider that it rises to the level of an error of law to fail to do so where neither party put the issue in play. To require a judge to do so would be to require them to investigate the accuracy of the Appellant’s answers proactively, which is not appropriately part of their role. The Tribunal is not inquisitorial.
8. Ground 2. The Appellant’s Ground 2 contends that the Judge erred in concluding that he could return to Ethiopia to live with his family as he was not Eritrean. The Appellant criticises the Judge for not addressing “the practicality or legality of return to Ethiopia”. This is not an error of law. The Appellant’s own account was that he had lived in Ethiopia with his family from childhood. While, plainly, the issue of returnability is a question which will have to be addressed at some stage, this is primarily a question for the Respondent. The Judge’s conclusion at §27 was simply the logical conclusion of their previous findings.
9. Ground 3. I accept there is an error in the Judge’s findings regarding the Appellant’s religion. His account of his religion at screening interview is recorded as Orthodox Christian but his account thereafter has been that he is Pentecostal. I set out the Judge’s analysis below in full.
“The Appellant is also recorded as having said that he was an Orthodox Christian in his Screening Interview. In his asylum interview, he said he was Pentecostal Christian and that is why his father was imprisoned. The discrepancy was put to him and he said that he told his lawyer to correct it and that he did not state Orthodox but that he had said Pentecostal. No corrections were received. I find that the Appellant believed that corrections were being done as he raised his [sic] also at the start of his asylum interview. However, the Appellant in his witness statement would have had the benefit of his lawyer’s assistance to discuss matters. He provides a slightly different response here to say that when asked about the discrepancies regarding religion he said “When asked about this, I said it was a mistake. In my response, I did not understand the question correctly during the screening interview. I had just arrived in the UK and was confused. I do not remember saying I was Orthodox Christian, and I have always been a Pentecostal Christian. If there was an error, it was due to misunderstanding or confusion during the interpretation”. Being confused and unsure of response is a different answer to the asylum interview where the Appellant was adamant he had not said Orthodox Christian. The Appellant has provided a letter that has a grammatical error, from a church. I consider this with Tanveer Ahmed guidance in mind. I find that as an English speaker, if the document was false it is likely the Appellant would have noted the error. I find it is more than likely that the Appellant atte4dned [sic] the church for a short while and asked for the letter, as claimed. The Appellant did give some correct information about the Pentecostal religion in his asylum interview. However, in oral evidence, the Appellant agreed that there was 1 baptism in his religion. He only corrected this on being prompted. I find that the Appellant is more likely to be an Orthodox Christian, as stated at first interview due to his stating this and this rather fundamental error in oral evidence.”
10. I consider that there are two errors in this analysis.
a. First, the Judge places adverse weight on what is treated as an inconsistency between the Appellant’s statement in his asylum interview (i.e. that there was a mistake in the screening interview which he asked to correct) and his witness statement, which is quoted by the Judge in the passage above. I do not consider that this is properly an inconsistency. His initial statement was that there was a mistake. His witness statement states: “If there was an error, it was due to misunderstanding or confusion during the interpretation”. I appreciate the statement also refers to not understanding the question. While the evidential position is not as clear as it should be, I do not consider that it is correct to treat this as a self-contradiction. The Appellant’s position throughout has been to say that the reference to being Orthodox was mistaken. As he did not keep the record of the interview and cannot reasonably be expected to remember the specifics of the questions and answers, it is unsurprising that his evidence is somewhat vague, essentially explaining that he might have misspoken or been mistranslated. I consider that the Judge erred in treating this as an inconsistency.
b. Second, the Judge appears to accept that the Appellant attended a Pentecostal church and that the supporting letter from them is genuine, but does not proceed to reach any conclusion about the weight to be given to this potentially significant piece of evidence. I note that the letter confirms that the Appellant has been attending the church for over a year and regularly attending activities during the week and at the weekend. The writer (a Pentecostal pastor with 20 years’ experience) states: “He has shown commitment to Christian fellowship and appears to me a Pentecostal Christian”. While the Judge was not required to accept this evidence, reasons were required to explain whether this evidence attracted any weight and why.
11. The Appellant’s religion was relevant both to his claimed risk in Eritrea and to the anterior question of his credibility. It formed part of the Judge’s rejection of the veracity of his account and is a material part of the adverse credibility conclusions.
12. Ground 4. I also accept there was an error in the Judge’s treatment of s. 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004. At §25 the Judge found that s. 8 findings were warranted because “the Appellant was in France and Germany and in contact with the authorities there. He could and should have claimed asylum”. While that is a conclusion which the Judge may have been entitled to reach, I do not consider that it was consistent the obligation to take into account all relevant information to reach this conclusion without analysis of the Appellant’s explanation given in his witness statement, namely that he was under the control of agents. It is clear that this explanation was overlooked by the Judge, who only considers the explanation given in the screening interview, which refers to the language barrier. It is also unclear to me on what basis the Judge concluded that the Appellant was ‘in contact with the authorities’ in France and Germany; the only evidence of contact is his journey through immigration controls.
13. Ground 5. The Judge at §24 found that the Appellant was dishonest in his claim to have been unwell at his asylum interview when “the evidence from the NHS clearly indicated that he only became unwell in December 2023”. This finding is plainly sustainable; the asylum interview took place in August 2024 and the NHS letter states that he “first became unwell in December 2024” (there is a typographical error in the Judge’s determination). I was not taken to any other evidence which could change this conclusion.
14. Ground 6. The Appellant had adduced a supporting witness statement which was included in the bundle. The writer of the statement refers to his longstanding knowledge of the Appellant as an Eritrean national. The writer did not attend the hearing, apparently due to ill-health. There was also evidence of the Appellant being part of an Eritrean community group in the UK. The Judge addresses the witness statement and other supportive evidence at §§8 and 18. These passages are a little difficult to follow at times:
a. There is a factual error at §8 of the determination where the Judge states that “the statement was not before me”. Possibly this is an allusion to Mr Nadeem apparently asking the Judge (for reasons which have not been explained at any point) to “disregard” the statement. I do not accept that there can be any error in the Judge’s failure to refer to a statement which they were asked by the Appellant’s representative to disregard. I find it surprising that Mr Nadeem, who drafted the grounds of appeal and attended the first instance hearing, thought it appropriate to criticise the Judge for not engaging with material which he personally invited the Tribunal to disregard.
b. At §18 the Judge states: “I find that the Appellant could have been expected to ask someone from the society he joined to attend as a witness in this case where he knew his nationality was disputed but that the Appellant had thought a witness would come until the day before the hearing and therefore cannot be criticised for this. Further, I find the Appellant would have been said to have provided self-serving evidence should he have provided it, as said in regard to the church letter.”
15. As explained above, there can be no criticism of the Judge for not considering the supporting witness statement in the body of the determination. I confess that I have found the Judge’s analysis at §18 harder to follow. It is unclear whether the reference to the witness who did not attend refers back to the supporting witness statement or to some otherwise unmentioned witness from the community organisation. In any event, and notwithstanding the slight lack of clarity in this analysis, it is clear that this did not form any part of the Judge’s negative conclusions on credibility. Therefore, I do not accept there is any material error of law raised here.
16. Ground 7. The determination records at §7 that the Appellant’s Article 3 ECHR claim was withdrawn. The Grounds of Appeal complain that the Judge was required to deal with this point in circumstances where the ground was expressly advanced in the skeleton argument. That is not correct; legal representatives are entitled to abandon a ground in oral submissions, thereby relieving the court of any obligation to deal with the point (absent any issue such as Robinson obviousness, which does not arise here).
17. The Grounds of Appeal appear confused about whether the grounds was in fact withdrawn. This is highly surprising, as Mr Nadeem was the representative in the First-tier Tribunal, and prepared the Grounds of Appeal. He chose to make no oral submissions on this point. He did not obtain, nor seek to obtain, a transcript of the First-tier Tribunal hearing. I have been given no basis on which to conclude that the Article 3 ECHR claim was in fact pursued, contrary to what is recorded by the Judge. There is plainly no error of law here.
18. I therefore allow the appeal on the grounds set out above. The parties agreed that, if I found an error, the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed.
This matter shall be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing.
Miranda Butler
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
29 October 2026