Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002210
(PA/04234/2024)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

12th October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ALIS

Between

D F
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
AND

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Malik, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Pugh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House Hearing Centre on 4 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family is granted anonymity. No one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Trinidad and Tobago. He appealed against the Respondent’s decision of 23 October 2024 refusing to grant him refugee status or protection under the ECHR.
BACKGROUND AND MATTERS IN ISSUE
2. The First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on 2 March 2026.
3. The Appellant appealed this decision and permission to appeal was granted on 27 April 2026 by Judge Hickey, who stated: “The grounds assert that the Judge erred in law on four grounds. I find that it is arguable that the judge did not conduct a meaningful evaluation of the appellant’s evidence and that paragraphs 29-31 contain inadequate reasoning. I grant leave on all grounds.”
4. The Respondent did not file a rule 24 response.
5. I have maintained the anonymity order made in the FtT.
SUBMISSIONS ON ERROR IN LAW
6. Mr Malik relied on all four grounds of appeal but submitted that ground 3 was his main ground. He argued that the FtT had failed to engage meaningfully with material evidence. He referred to a Facebook post (page 20 of the bundle) relating to the Appellant’s deceased friend, KL, which, Mr Malik submitted, provided objective support for the Appellant's account that a friend had been killed at the wake. Whilst it was not suggested that the Facebook evidence proved the entirety of the claim, there was no indication that the FtT had considered what weight should be attached to it.
7. The FtT had also attached little weight to the lawyer's letter and police report on the basis that such documents were "not difficult to obtain", without explaining why they were unreliable or conducting any proper analysis of their contents. Similar criticism was made of the treatment of the video evidence said to contain the sound of gunfire. Whilst the FtT referred to the video in its decision, it had not analysed its significance in the findings.
8. In relation to ground 1, Mr Malik submitted that paragraph [30] of the decision contained speculative reasoning. There was no evidential basis for the finding that an incident of the type described by the Appellant would necessarily have attracted media coverage. He also argued that there was no evidential basis for the observation that the lawyer's letter and police report were documents that were easily obtained.
9. As to ground 2, Mr Malik submitted that this was a case to which the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA”) applied and that the FtT had unfairly criticised the Appellant for being unable to explain matters that were outside his knowledge. The Appellant's case had consistently been that he did not know why he had been targeted or the identity of those responsible for the threats.
10. In relation to ground 4, Mr Malik submitted that the FtT's conclusions concerning internal relocation were unsupported by evidence.
11. Mr Pugh opposed the appeal. In relation to ground 1, he submitted that the FtT's reasoning represented a permissible exercise of common sense and that the FtT had, if anything, approached the evidence generously. He submitted that the FtT had considered the evidence as a whole and that the absence of any independent news reporting was capable of undermining the Appellant's account. He further submitted that any suggestion of procedural unfairness in relation to the Facebook evidence had not been advanced in the grounds of appeal and so, in line with Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC), as confirmed by the Court of Appeal in AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370, could not now be relied upon.
12. As to ground 2, Mr Pugh submitted that the ground amounted to no more than disagreement with the FtT’s findings. The FtT had not required the Appellant to prove the motives of others. Rather, the FtT was entitled to consider the absence of any explanation as to why the Appellant would have been targeted. He further argued that the Appellant's claim to fear random violence undermined his challenge to the finding on internal relocation.
13. In relation to ground 3, the Respondent submitted that the FtT was plainly aware of the video evidence and the documentary material. Although the decision did not expressly mention the Facebook post, the FtT’s observations regarding the lawyer's letter and police report applied equally to that evidence. It was submitted that the FtT's findings on those documents, whilst brief, were adequate and were findings open to it on the evidence. Mr Pugh relied on the FtT’s observation that the Appellant appeared to have prepared his asylum claim before leaving Trinidad and Tobago.
14. As to ground 4, the Respondent submitted that the burden rested on the Appellant to demonstrate risk on return. It was argued that internal relocation had not been a significant issue before the FtT and should not now provide a basis for establishing an error of law.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
15. The Appellant appealed, with permission, against the decision of the FtT dismissing his appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
16. The principal criticism under ground 1 concerned paragraph [30] of the decision, where the FtT observed that a shooting at a wake, resulting in three deaths and six injuries, would be expected to attract media attention in a country the size of Trinidad and Tobago.
17. Mr Malik submitted that this finding was speculative, but I do not accept that this ground discloses a material error of law.
18. The FtT was undertaking an assessment of the evidence in the round and was entitled to consider the absence of objective material capable of corroborating an event said to have involved multiple fatalities and injuries. The observation formed only one aspect of a broader credibility assessment and was not the sole basis for the rejection of the claim. Further, the challenge overlooks the wider reasoning contained within paragraphs [26] to [34]. The FtT’s primary concern was not merely the absence of media reporting but the absence of any coherent explanation as to why the Appellant would have been singled out for threats by unknown individuals following the incident. The FtT was entitled to find that aspect of the account lacking in credibility.
19. The criticism directed at the treatment of the lawyer's letter and police report is similarly unpersuasive. The weight to be attached to evidence is a matter for the fact-finding Tribunal. The FtT was aware of those documents and expressly referred to them. It was entitled to conclude that they carried limited weight. The lawyer's letter was derived from information provided by the Appellant, whilst the police report was a handwritten document unsupported by any independent corroborative material. The fact that another FtT may have attached greater weight to those documents does not establish a material error of law.
20. Nor do I accept that the FtT was required to deal expressly with the Facebook post. The central issue was not whether the Appellant knew an individual who had died, but whether the Appellant himself became the subject of threats giving rise to a real risk on return. The Facebook material did not directly address that issue. The FtT was required to resolve the principal issues rather than provide an exhaustive analysis of every item of evidence. The omission of specific reference to the Facebook post does not render the decision legally defective. Accordingly, ground 1 does not establish an error of law.
21. Turning to ground 2, the FtT could have explained more clearly the approach to be taken in appeals governed by NABA, where a two-stage standard of proof applies. First, the Appellant must establish, on the balance of probabilities, that he is a member of a particular social group and that he subjectively fears persecution because of it. If he does so, the applicable standard of proof thereafter is a reasonable degree of likelihood. Mr Pugh pointed out that, if anything, the FtT had been overly generous in applying the lower standard throughout, without any reference to the higher standard of the balance of probabilities that applies at the first stage. Paragraph [24] refers to the lower standard, and that is the standard the FtT applied. There is nothing in the subsequent reasoning to indicate that it imposed a higher threshold.
22. The Appellant's complaint is, in reality, directed to the FtT's adverse credibility findings. The FtT did not reject the claim because the Appellant failed positively to identify the perpetrators or prove their motives. Rather, the FtT considered it significant that the Appellant was unable to provide any plausible explanation for why he, amongst approximately sixty attendees, would have been targeted. That was a matter the FtT was entitled to take into account when assessing the overall plausibility of the account. Ground 2 is therefore no more than disagreement with findings properly open to the FtT.
23. The principal ground relied upon by Mr Malik was ground 3. Contrary to Mr Malik’s oral submissions, the FtT had regard to the evidence relied upon by the Appellant. The FtT summarised the Appellant's case, referred to the lawyer's letter, the police report and the video evidence, and recorded the Appellant's oral evidence in some detail. The mere fact that particular items of evidence were not discussed at length did not demonstrate that they were overlooked. The FtT could have made more detailed findings, but that does not detract from the clear findings that were made.
24. The findings on the documentary evidence were concise, but they were sufficient to explain why the FtT attached little weight to them. The complaint advanced in this ground ultimately amounted to a disagreement with the weight attributed to the evidence rather than the identification of a legal error in the assessment itself. I am satisfied that the FtT engaged with the evidence and gave adequate reasons for the findings reached.
25. The fourth and final ground carries little independent significance in view of my earlier findings. The FtT’s primary finding was that it did not accept the factual basis of the claim. At paragraph [33] the FtT concluded that the Appellant had not established that he was the subject of threats from unknown persons and that there was therefore no objective basis for fearing harm on return. The internal relocation issue became secondary. Even if some criticism could be made of the reasoning concerning relocation, it would not be material to the outcome given the FtT’s rejection of the core account. The FtT was entitled to note that the alleged perpetrators were unidentified, were not linked to the state, and were not shown to possess any nationwide reach. The conclusions reached on relocation were therefore open to the FtT on the evidence before it. Ground 4 has no merit.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
26. I am satisfied that paragraphs [26] to [34] contain findings that were properly open to the FtT on the evidence before it.
27. The FtT directed itself appropriately as to the burden and standard of proof, identified the central issues, considered the evidence relied upon by the Appellant and provided adequate reasons for rejecting the core account.
28. None of the grounds demonstrated that the FtT acted irrationally, applied the wrong legal test, failed to address a principal issue, or otherwise fell into material legal error.
NOTICE OF DECISION
29. The appeal is dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Alis
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
8 October 2026