Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2026-002229
PA/04595/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 15 July 2026
14th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS

Between

DH
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Swain, Counsel, instructed by Halliday Reeves
For the Respondent: Ms Isherwood, Senior Presenting Officer

DECISIONS AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals with permission against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent on 11 February 2024 dismissing his appeal against a decision dated 12 November 2024 to refuse his human rights and protection claim.
Background and Immigration history
2. The appellant is a national of Vietnam born in 1989. He entered the UK on 30 July 2014 and claimed asylum on the same date. His application was refused and the appeal was dismissed in 2014. Later in 2017, he was the subject of a deportation order. On 9 April 2024 he received a positive conclusive grounds decision that he is the victim of trafficking. He lodged further submissions on 4 July 2024 which were refused in the decision under appeal.
The positions of the parties
3. The appellant claims to be a victim of human trafficking and modern slavery. It is accepted by the respondent that the appellant was persecuted by illegal money lenders on account of an unpaid debt and that those same money lenders had trafficked the appellant from Vietnam to the UK, via Russia and Poland, during which time the appellant was subject to forced labour and physical violence. It is accepted by the respondent that the loan is unpaid. (The debt is 2 billion dong). The appellant says he fears loan sharks and he fears being re-trafficked. He has anxiety and depression. The respondent also accepted that the appellant was subject to modern slavery in Newport in 2015 and in Bradford and Coventry between January 2017 to October 2017. He also has private life with a very close friend in the UK.
4. Despite accepting the appellant’s account of being trafficked, the Secretary of State decided that sufficiency of protection and internal relocation options were open to the appellant in Ho Chi Minh City for example. There would also be no very significant obstacles to reintegration on return to Vietnam.
The decision of the First -tier Tribunal
5. The judge heard evidence from the appellant as well as oral submissions. The judge found that the appellant was trafficked to the UK by loan sharks. The judge found that after a period of 12 years the appellant had not shown that there was a real risk that he would be found or pursued by those from whom he borrowed money. The judge found it “mystifying” why the appellant had not kept in touch with his family and “astonishing” that he has not made an effort to establish if there is any ongoing interest in him. The judge found that the appellant would not face a risk of serious harm on return and that there would be no disproportionate interference with his private life to remove him from the UK.
Grounds
6. The judge’s reasoning is flawed in the following respects:
Ground 1 – Failure to take into account objective evidence when evaluating risk.
The judge did not address the detailed expert report of Dr Tran Thi Lan Anh dated 7 May 2024 which confirmed that the appellant would be at continued risk of persecution and re-trafficking. The judge also failed to take into account the current Home Office Guidance “Vietnam; Trafficking- February 2025” or the submissions about the appellant’s profile including his mental health problems and his lack of family support in Vietnam.
Ground 2 – The judge failed to adequately or correctly take into account the appellant’s evidence of remaining family ties when determining risk.
In his witness statement the appellant explained that he has no memory of his parents; he was brought up by his grandmother who died before he left Vietnam and he may have a sister who he has never met. The judge’s finding that the appellant’s failure to contact his family in Vietnam was prejudicial to his claim is a material error.
Ground 3 – Inadequate assessment of whether there would be very significant obstacles on return under PL 5.1(B). It was argued on behalf of the appellant that there would be very significant obstacles to his return because of his close relationship with Ms Lien a British citizen. This was not taken into account, nor was his poor mental health and the social stigma in Vietnam towards mentally ill people.
Grant of permission
7. Permission was granted by a judge of the First-tier Tribunal on all grounds on 27 April 2026.
Rule 24 response
8. There was no rule 24 response. Ms Isherwood indicated that she intended to defend the decision.
Discussion
9. The issues before the judge were whether in light of the concession by the Secretary of State that the appellant was a previous victim of trafficking, the appellant would be at risk either from loan sharks or generally at risk of being re-trafficked.
10. I am satisfied that the judge has erred in his approach to risk on return by failing to consider the expert evidence and the CPIN. This was material before the judge and relevant to the issues to be decided by the judge.
11. The judge deals with risk at [32], [33] and [34]. He says:
“In assessing that question, it is important to bear in mind that the appellant entered this country in 2014, which is nearly twelve years ago. By his own admission, the money he borrowed was from loan sharks rather than an institution. It is not entirely clear what loan sharks are supposed to be if they do not operate formally as a business. I presume they comprise people who have come together with a common interest to generate profits by lending money to people on high interest rates.
What is also unclear is how it is that the loan sharks, whether it was an individual who lent the money to the appellant or part of a group, maintain record of their lending. It is also unclear whether these loan sharks have an office from which they operate, employing staff, similar to bailiffs in this country who are able to chase their debt.
Against all of the uncertainties, I find that I am not satisfied that the appellant has shown that there is a real risk, if he now returns to Vietnam, he will either be found or pursued by those from whom he borrowed money”.
12. Apart from the speculative quality of this reasoning there is no attempt by the judge to deal with the expert evidence.
13. The evidence of the expert which is summarised in the skeleton argument is that the appellant will be at risk from the criminal loan sharks, that he is at risk of being trafficked again, the state will not protect him and internal relocation is not viable. It is asserted that the expert was highly qualified to assess risk in the light of her experience and qualifications. In particular, at page 21 the expert’s opinion is that the appellant will continue to be targeted by loan sharks because the debt is unpaid. This reflects common practice in Vietnam. Limited support is available to the appellant as a recognised victim of trafficking (page 27,28,32, 34). His evidence that he remains a target is consistent with country information and plausible. The expert’s view is that even if the appellant is not targeted by the original loan sharks he remains vulnerable to re-trafficking and the police cannot provide realistic protection against the risk due to gaps in state infrastructure and weak implementation of the law. The expert also addressed the ability of the creditors to locate him.
14. The judge did not engage with this evidence.
15. Further the judge did not engage with the current Home Office Guidance which at 3.1.4 confirms the risk of trafficking to those who still owe a debt, who are mentally unwell or who without a network of support. This was referred to in the skeleton argument and closing submissions.
16. Ms Isherwood conceded that the judge did not deal with the expert evidence but in essence argued that this was immaterial because the report did not address how the traffickers would be able to find him if he returned. I reject this submission because the report also addresses the risk in general of the appellant being re-trafficked and other issues such as sufficiency of protection.
17. This evidence was material to the decision on risk and the judge failed to engage with it and if he meant to reject it, he failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting it. This error is material to the outcome of the appeal.
18. I also agree with Mr Swain that the judge’s finding that the appellant has family in Vietnam has not been adequately reasoned. The appellant’s evidence has always been that his parents went to work abroad abandoning him with his grandmother when he was 2 years old; that his grandmother died prior to him leaving Vietnam; and although he may have a sibling, he has never met the sibling. The appellant’s evidence was that he had negligible family support in Vietnam.
19. The judge appears to have overlooked this evidence completely. The judge says at [34]
“Be as that may I note that there is absolutely no indication that those from whom he borrowed money and whom he claims trafficked him to the this country maintain an interest in him. It seems to me totally mystifying why this appellant would not have kept in touch with his family not least to establish whether the moneylender have come looking to them to realise their debt.”
20. I am satisfied that the judge failed to take into account material evidence, or alternatively failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting this evidence. This indicates a lack of urgent scrutiny on the part of the judge.
21. The judge has found that the appellant is not at risk, inter alia, because he has not produced corroborative evidence from his family that is not reasonably available to him. This is a material error of law. This error has also infected the judge’s assessment of the risk of re-trafficking because both the CPIN and the expert report highlight the lack of family support as a factor which may lead to the risk of re-trafficking. The assessment on whether the appellant would be at risk of re-trafficking is fact sensitive and needs to undertaken against the individual circumstances of the appellant.
22. Grounds 1 and 2 are made out.
23. Ground 3 is also made out because the made no findings at all on very significant obstacles to integration.
24. I am satisfied that these errors are material to the outcome of the decision and that the decision should be set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved.
Disposal
25. Both representatives agreed that because of the large number of factual findings that needed to be made, the decision should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo. I am agreement with this course of action. I am satisfied that in this appeal, because of the extent of the factual findings to be made, it is appropriate to deviate from the normal course of retaining the appeal in the Upper Tribunal and to remit to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
1. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law.
2. The decision is set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved.
3. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo before a Judge other than Judge MB Hussain.

Signed R J Owens Date 4 August 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Owens