Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002230
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66424/2023
LP/05521/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

23rd September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

CL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Unrepresented
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant appeals with a partial grant of permission by the First-tier Tribunal against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 15 February 2026 dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of her protection and human rights claim.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of the Philippines. She arrived in the United Kingdom on 22 December 2013 on a visit visa.
3. The appellan claimed asylum on 13 April 2022. The appellant claims that she cannot return to the Philippines because she fears her husband because was an alcoholic and drug addict and was physically abusive towards her in the past. The appellant claims that she is also at risk from his drug lord friends.
4. In a decision dated 10 November 2023, the respondent refused the appellant’s protection and human rights claim. The respondent accepted that the appellant was a victim of domestic violence but did not accept that there was any ongoing threat from either her husband or from any drug lord.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appellant appealed against the refusal of her protection and human rights claim.
6. The respondent provided three reviews of the appellant’s claim dated 2 April 2024, 11 April 2025 and 22 April 2025. In the review dated 22 April 2025, the respondent considered and rejected the appellant’s claim to have a son born as a result of rape in an incident in Dubai in 2013. This was an additional matter that had not previously been raised.
7. The appeal came before the Judge on 3 February 2026. The appellant was represented. Her representative appeared by video link. The appellant and her sister both gave evidence before the Judge.
8. The Judge was not satisfied that the appellant had given birth to the child whose details had been provided or that the child’s existence increased any threat to the appellant.
9. The Judge was not satisfied that the Appellant’s husband would have any ongoing interest in her given the length of time since she had left the Philippines or that she was of any interest to a drug lord or criminal enterprise.
10. The Judge considered that the sufficiency of protection would be available to the appellant and/or that she could internally relocate.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The appellant applied for permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision.
12. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on limited grounds. The grant of permission states the following:
2. It is averred by the Appellant that the judge engaged in speculation (without expert or country evidence), assumed how the sister would have reacted/in respect of the actions of drug lords and as to the concealment of pregnancy. As to ground 2 it is said that s8 was misapplied – the delay was treated as significantly damaging the claim without considering the context of barriers to disclosure where there has been domestic violence/rape trauma and fear. The factor was given too much weight rather than just being considered in the round. Under ground 3 it is averred that assessment of sufficiency of protection was flawed by failing to consider realities as to enforcement, protection orders, prosecution, deterrence. Under ground 4 it is said that as to internal relocation the reasonableness is not considered in light of vulnerability from past abuse in terms of psychological impact, finding accommodation, risk of tracing. Finally there was no consideration of re-victimisation under art 3.
3. Ground 1 is arguable – there are a number of statements that arguably go too far into speculation for example that a pregnancy is always identifiable/hard to hide. Further it is arguable in respect of internal relocation (ground 4) that the vulnerability/history of abuse was not adequately considered as part of the reasonableness of relocation.
4. I do not find any arguable errors of law in the approach to s8/the delay in claiming or (even though the treatment is relatively brief) sufficiency of protection.
5. Art 3 ECHR was not within the issues agreed between the parties. Re-trafficking is considered. Ground not arguable.
13. The respondent did not provide a response under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
14. At the hearing, the appellant was not represented but she was present in court and she was assisted by a Tagalog interpreter provided by the Tribunal. The respondent was represented by Ms Khan, who confirmed that the respondent was opposing the appeal.
15. At the outset of the hearing, I highlighted to Ms Khan that the appellant had claimed in her grounds that the Judge had failed to adequately consider the accepted history of domestic violence, rape trauma, fear of reprisal, and barriers to disclosure commonly recognised in abuse cases in their assessment of the appellant’s credibility. I noted that it was not clearly particularised, but that I was satisfied that it had been pleaded, but not considered by the Judge when granting permission.
16. Ms Khan agreed that it was pleaded and that she could address me on it as part of ground 4 and we proceeded in that manner.
17. I heard submissions from Ms Khan and the appellant responded to Ms Khan’s submissions.
18. At the end of the hearing, I indicated that I was satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal had materially erred in law, that the decision would be set aside and that my reasons would follow in writing.
Discussion
Failure to consider the appellant’s past history of domestic violence
19. As outlined above, I am satisfied (and Ms Khan agreed) that I was required to determine whether the Judge materially erred in law by failing to consider the appellant’s past history of domestic violence as part of their consideration of credibility and the assessment of internal relocation.
20. The Judge records that it is accepted by the respondent that the appellant has suffered domestic violence. It is also noted that it is the appellant’s account that she had been raped. The Judge referred to her background at [2], [22], [22(c)] and [39] of the decision.
21. The Judge records the appellant’s account of domestic violence at [22], stating:
“The respondent has accepted that the appellant has suffered domestic violence. In brief, it is the appellant’s account that she married in 1997 and suffered violence and other abuse from her husband, particularly when he was under the influence of drink or drugs. She describes he was not mentally stable. In particular, he beat her badly on 10 May 2011. She reported him to the Barangay who advised her to go to the police, which she did. After a few days, her husband returned and beat her again. As a consequence, she made no further complaints against him. She was further abused in November 2013 and that just triggered her decision to travel to the UK.”
22. Notwithstanding the Judge’s recording of the appellant’s account of domestic violence and rape there is no consideration of how her background may impact on her ability to give a detailed account of her experiences.
23. Ms Khan accepted that, but sought to persuade me that because the Judge was clearly aware of her background it could be inferred that the Judge considered it in their assessment of credibility. I am not persuaded by that submission reviewing the points that the Judge considered undermine the appellant’s credibility. For example, at paragraph 28, the Judge describes the appellant’s account as “vague”. There is no consideration of whether it is vague because she had a prolonged history of domestic violence.
24. I am also satisfied that the Judge failed to consider the appellant’s background of domestic violence in respect of whether she could access sufficiency of protection and/or whether it was reasonable for her to internally relocate.
25. I am satisfied that these errors materially affect the entire decision and that no findings of fact can be preserved. Accordingly, I do not go on to consider whether the Judge erred by entering into speculation.
Disposal
26. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) I have considered whether to retain the matter for re-making in the Upper Tribunal in line with the general principles set out in Statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I am satisfied that it should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal because credibility is in issue and significant findings of fact will be re-made.
Notice of Decision
27. The decision of the First tier Tribunal contains material errors of law. Accordingly, it is set aside in its entirety with no findings of fact preserved.
28. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing to be heard by a different Judge.

G. Loughran

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 September 2026