Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002234
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64863/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KUDHAIL

Between

JM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Timson, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This has been a remote hearing which has not been objected to by the parties. The form of remote hearing was by video, using cloud video platform. There were no technical difficulties for the hearing itself and the papers were all available electronically.
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge (”the Judge”) promulgated on 31 March 2026 in which the appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claim was dismissed. Permission to appeal was granted by UTJ Perkins on 27 May 2026 on all grounds.
Anonymity
3. The FTJ granted anonymity due to the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the refugee convention. I have not been asked to set aside the order made and consider it is necessary for it to stand.
The Hearing
4. At the outset of the hearing it was confirmed that the appeal was resisted on all grounds. Mr Timson made submissions outlining what he said were errors of law and Mr Wain responded. Mr Timson made further submissions in reply and I reserved the decision.
Findings and reasons
Ground 1
5. The appellant contends that the judge materially erred in the assessment of documentary evidence, particularly the arrest warrant, by effectively requiring independent verification, failing to assess the evidence holistically under Tanveer Ahmed, and failing to engage with the appellant's explanation that the defamation allegation was linked to broader accusations of spying. He argued that at paragraph 34 the judge accepted that the documents were not inherently implausible based on the appellants account of how they were obtained but then requires “independent verifiable chain of custody”, without explaining what exactly this means. In essence the judge required corroboration without good reason and applied a higher standard of proof.
6. Mr Wain relied on the rule 24 response and added that the appellant had conflated verification with reliability, he relied on QC China 2021 UKUT 33. He submitted that there was a distinction between authenticity and reliability and its consideration in the Mbanga sense. At paragraph 32, the Judge was entitled to attach limited weight to the documents because of the discrepancy between the alleged offence of defamation and the appellant's claim that he faced execution, notwithstanding that the documentary evidence referred to penalties such as fines and imprisonment. The issue was not document authenticity but reliability and evidential weight. The Judge properly considered the provenance of the documents, including their production via WhatsApp, and was entitled under Tanveer Ahmed to assess all the evidence holistically rather than accept documents at face value. Further, the discrepancy was put to the appellant, who was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation, stating that he was unaware of the details of the law. The Judge was therefore entitled to reject that explanation and treat the inconsistency as undermining credibility.
7. Mr Timson responded that the judge had already accepted core aspects of the appellant's account, including findings relating to being questioned by the authorities about camera equipment in his workplace, requiring him to return for questioning and searching his home (§30), yet appears to have rejected the documentary evidence because there was no independently verifiable chain of custody. This he argued was significant as it went to ongoing adverse interest. He submitted that Tanveer Ahmed had not been applied correctly.
8. At paragraph 33, the judge is unequivocal that he turns to look at provenance of the documents relied upon. In doing so he considers the appellant’s account of how he acquired the document. He finds that this account is not inherently implausible, but that there was not “ a clear or independent verifiable chain of custody. He adds “Applying the principles of Tanveer Ahmed[ 2002] UKIAT 00439, I place limited weight on those documents in absence of reliable evidence as to their origin.”
9. In QC, Justice Lane gave the following guidance:
“(3) What the case law reveals is that the judicial fact-finder has a duty to make his or her decision by reference to all the relevant evidence and needs to show in their decision that they have done so. The actual way in which the fact-finder goes about this task is a matter for them. As has been pointed out, one has to start somewhere. At the end of the day, what matters is whether the decision contains legally adequate reasons for the outcome. The greater the apparent cogency and relevance of a particular piece of evidence, the greater is the need for the judicial fact-finder to show that they have had due regard to that evidence; and, if the fact-finder’s overall conclusion is contrary to the apparent thrust of that evidence, the greater is the need to explain why that evidence has not brought about a different outcome.”
10. I am satisfied that the judge did not consider this evidence in the round and misapplied Tanveer Ahmed. The Judge did not conduct a holistic assessment of the appellant's evidence when assessing the reliability of the document, particularly as the judge accepted core aspects of his account. By requiring “clear or independent verification”, I am satisfied a higher evidential burden was placed upon the appellant. Accordingly, I am satisfied there was a material error of law.
Ground 2
11. The appellant argues that although the judge identified the structured credibility approach in KB & AH, the judge failed properly to apply it, accepted significant parts of the factual account, engaged in speculation, imposed too high a standard of proof, and gave insufficient weight to documentary evidence originating from Iraq. Mr Wain submitted that the judge did not engage in speculation as he made findings of fact on risk pertaining to outstanding charges based on the appellants own inconsistent evidence and the documents provided. Having carefully considered the decision, I am satisfied the judge made findings on core aspects of the appellant account pertaining to past state interest namely that he was apprehended by security services due to being found with camera equipment, his home was searched and the requirement to return to the authorities. The judge‘s rejection of the appellant account as acknowledged by Mr Wain was the inconsistency about charges/sentence and the provenance of the documents. Given the findings on ground 1, I am satisfied the judges approach to credibility was not structured given core aspects of the account were accepted as broadly consistent. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the judge materially erred in his approach to credibility.
12. I find that these errors fatally undermine the sustainability of the decision as a whole. Therefore, I am satisfied no findings can be preserved. I have considered whether the rehearing of the appeal should take place in the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal. I have had regard to paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement for the Immigration and Asylum Chambers, and the guidance in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or Remittal) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), and have concluded that fairness requires the appeal to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal given the extent of remaking required. I therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal pursuant to section 12(2)(b) of the 2007 Act.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is necessary to set aside the decision. I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a judge other than the original judge.

S K KUDHAIL

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
10 September 2026