Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002236
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/62508/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILDING

Between

[J M B]
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE
HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr O Ngwuocha, Solicitor, Carl Martin Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant (and any member of his family) is granted anonymity. The First-tier Tribunal did not make an Anonymity Order, in my view it was wrong not to do so. The Appellant is a child, aged 9 years old at the date of the hearing before me. I consider it in his best interests and his private life that he is granted anonymity in these proceedings. That also extends to his father, the sponsor, so as to avoid jigsaw identification.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant [‘A’] is a citizen of Ghana. He is 9 years old. He appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Meyler [‘the Judge’] who dismissed his appeal against the Respondent’s [‘R’] decision refusing him entry clearance as the child of his sponsor [‘D’].

Background

2. A is D’s son. A lives with his mother [‘M’] and sister [‘S’] in Ghana. D and M are in a relationship with each other. S is a British Citizen. She is 6. On 2 July 2024, D applied on A’s behalf for entry clearance to join him in the UK. This was refused on 9 September 2024. The reasons for refusing the application were that:

a. R did not accept that A and D were related as claimed.
b. R also did not accept that D had sole responsibility for A either.

3. A appealed. In his evidence, prepared by his representatives, he provided statements from both D and M. Along with DNA evidence showing that D is his father. Other documentary evidence was provided by A so as to show that D has sole responsibility for A.

4. As part of the established procedure in the First-tier Tribunal, R reviewed her decision. In that review R accepted, in light of the DNA evidence, that A is D’s father and as such was related as claimed. R maintained the refusal in relation to the sole responsibility matter.

5. The appeal came before the Judge in the Virtual Region on 9 December 2025. The Judge heard the evidence of D, and submissions from both representatives. She dismissed the appeal in a decision dated 15 December 2025. In her decision she found as follows:

16. Ms Radford submitted before me that this was one of the exceptional cases where both parents are involved in the child’s upbringing, and yet the father has “sole responsibility” because he directs the care of the child and makes all the important decisions about the appellant’s welfare, including his schooling, medical treatment and accommodation. The mother was acting only at the behest and under the instructions/directions of her husband. She relied on paragraph 50 of TD (Yemen):

“the touchstone of “sole responsibility” is the continuing control and direction by the parent in the UK in respect of the “important decisions” about the child’s upbringing. The fact that day-to-day decision-making for a child - such as “getting the child to school safely and on time, or putting the child to bed, or seeing what it has for breakfast, or that it cleans its teeth, or has enough clothing, and so forth” (Ramos, per Dillon LJ at p 151) - rests with the carers abroad is not conclusive of the issue of “sole responsibility”. However, if the UK-based parent has allowed the carer abroad to make some “important decisions” in the child’s upbringing, then it may readily be said that the responsibility for the child has become “shared”.”

17. However, as I indicated to Ms Radford, I was very surprised that she was making that submission out of context. ‘Sole responsibility’ typically arises where the other parent has died, is absent, is incapable of looking after the child or has relinquished parental responsibility (para 49 TD). As Ms Taylor aptly pointed out, the mother in this case had not “relinquished” or “abdicated” responsibility for the child and is the primary carer. From all the evidence, the child is safe and well looked after by the primary carer. As is clear from the immediately preceding paragraph (49) the one Ms Radford relied on:

“Where one parent has disappeared from the child’s life and so relinquished or abdicated his (or her) responsibility for the child, the starting point must be that it is the remaining active parent who has “sole responsibility” for the child. The fact that the remaining active parent is in the UK makes no difference to this. Of course, the geographical separation of the parent from the child means that the day-to-day care of the child will necessarily be undertaken by others - relatives or friends abroad – who look after the child. Here, the issue under the immigration rules is whether the UK based parent has, in practice, allowed the parental responsibility for the child to be shared with the carer abroad. This is, of course, the question we see most frequently
in the case law.”

18. Only in that context, where the other parent is absent or not involved in the child’s care, does the question arise whether the UK-based parent retains continuing control and direction over the important decisions concerning the child’s upbringing (para 50).

19. Indeed, of all the cases considered by the Tribunal in TD (Yemen), where both parents were in the picture, the only case that actually succeeded was the case of Alagon; an exceptional and wholly unusual case where the judge accepted that the parent overseas was “doing nothing for the child beyond the bare fact of living with her on reasonably good terms.” That is the opposite of what occurs in the case before me. From the sponsor’s evidence, it is clear that Patience does everything to look after the appellant; she does all the day-to-day tasks that are expected of a parent who has primary care of the child. I find that this case is not analogous to Alagon in any
meaningful respect and that there is no sound basis for me to find that this case is exceptional in any way.

20. I accept that the sponsor has some involvement in making more strategic decisions about schooling and accommodation and sends financial support for the family, however that does not mean that he is ‘solely responsible’ for the appellant’s care. This is not a situation where the mother is out of the picture, has abdicated responsibility or does “nothing” for the child, as in the case of Alagon. This is not a case where one parent alone has responsibility. ‘Sole responsibility’ is not about which parent has main responsibility, or about who has greater responsibility; or even about which parent has “responsibility for major decisions while the other does day-to-day care”. Where there are two parents who are actively involved in a child’s life, as in this case, there will be no sole responsibility.

21. The purpose of paragraph 297 is to maintain or effect family unity; not to remove a child from the primary carer, unless the onerous requirements of paragraph 297(i)(f) are met and it was not suggested before me that they were. I find that there are no “serious and compelling family or other considerations which make exclusion of the child undesirable”.

22. Having considered all the evidence with care, I find that the sponsor has failed to establish ‘sole responsibility’ within the meaning of paragraph 297(i)(e). The father’s evidence demonstrates financial support, regular communication and periodic visits, but this does not amount to sole parental responsibility where the mother is the primary carer, providing appellant’s day-to-day upbringing and remains actively involved in his welfare, education, and development. Her statements confirm dependence on the father’s financial support but do not show that she has relinquished or abdicated parental responsibility, nor that she acts merely under his direction. On the contrary, the factual picture is one of two parents involved in the appellant’s life. This is wholly inconsistent with the narrow and exceptional circumstances considered in TD (Yemen) in which ‘sole responsibility’ may arise.

23. I accordingly find that the respondent’s decision under the Rules was well made. I have not considered maintenance because the flaw in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is fatal to the claim.

6. A was dissatisfied with the Judge’s decision and applied for permission to appeal. Permission was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Gibbs on 3 April 2026. A renewed the application, permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins in a decision dated 28 May 2026.

7. The grounds advanced by A were that:

a. The Judge materially erred in law when she said at the end of §20 “Where there are two parents who are actively involved in a child’s life, as in this case, there will be no sole responsibility.”
b. The second ground was that the Judge had shown apparent bias through her conduct in the hearing. It was said she did not allow counsel to make her submissions without being interrupted which prevented counsel from taking her to evidence in the bundle. The grounds were not particularly specific on this point, and I say more about them below.

8. Judge Perkins granted permission on both grounds but made observations only about the first:

The applicant had to show that his father in the United Kingdom exercises sole responsibility for his upbringing.

It is certainly arguable that the Judge misdirected herself at paragraph 20 of the Decision and Reasons when she said “Where there are two parents who are actively involved in a child’s life as in this case, there will be no sole responsibility” although it may well be that [the] Judge stated a working practical summary of the law. It may be much harder to say that the Judge’s actual findings confirm that she followed any misdirection but the grounds are arguable and I give permission on each ground.

The hearing

9. The appeal came before me. Mr Ngwuoucha had prepared a skeleton argument, R had provided a rule 24 response. I heard submissions from Mr Ngwoucha at length, the thrust of his submissions was that the Judge had misstated the test for sole responsibility by erroneously finding that a situation such as this one could not amount to sole responsibility.

10. The error was material because the Judge had applied her erroneous understanding that a child can never show that one parent has sole responsibility, if the child lives with their other biological parent.

11. As to the submission of bias, it was not at all clear to me that the grounds properly put what was being complained of, or properly particularised the Judge’s conduct which was complained of. In his submissions Mr Ngwoucha said that the Judge had been “hostile, intimidating, had interrupted counsel in her submissions such that she was unable to take the Judge to the relevant parts of the evidence showing sole responsibility”.

12. Mr Ngwoucha submitted that the absence of a witness statement from either counsel, or himself (having declared in his submissions that he was present), was not fatal to the ground, as there was no requirement for A to provide such a statement. It was sufficient for the allegation to be made, it was then incumbent on the Tribunal to put the allegation before the respective Judge for their comments and to obtain the record of proceedings.

13. Mr Ngwoucha relied on Alubankudi (Appearance of bias) [2015] UKUT 542 (IAC) as authority for his submission.

14. At the end of his submissions I told Ms Ahmed I did not need to hear from her, I was satisfied that the Judge did not materially err in law as claimed and that A’s appeal would be dismissed. My reasons were to follow.

Decision and reasons

15. Mr Ngwoucha’s primary submission was that the Judge had materially erred in law by misapplying the test from TD Yemen such as to consider that in a case where two parents are present, that sole responsibility can never be shown. If that is what the Judge had done he may have had some scope to argue such an error. However in my judgment the Judge plainly has not fallen into the error claimed.

16. I have set out above the totality of the Judge’s reasons; they warrant pausing over and re-reading. The Judge, on a fair and complete reading of her decision, is plainly aware that there may be unusual or exceptional circumstances in which two parents are both still present in a child’s life but where the UK based parent has sole responsibility. Her analysis of TD (Yemen) at §16 – 20 makes that clear. She expressly notes the unusual case of Alagon in §18. She was more than aware that there may be unusual or exceptional circumstances which render a UK based parent having sole responsibility for a child notwithstanding the child living with their other parent.

17. The Judge however is clear that that sort of a case is markedly different to the case that was before her. The Judge makes clear findings at §19 that M retains a significant role in A’s life. In my judgment Mr Ngwoucha takes the sentence he complains of completely out of context and attempts to use that as the basis for the claimed error. On any fair reading of the Judge’s decision, she clearly identifies that this case is not the sort of unusual case where a parent who lives with a child has no parental responsibility over them.

18. So much is clear from the way in which the Judge’s decision reads as a whole. Furthermore §22 undeniably comes to reasons and conclusions on the evidence as to why it is that the Judge finds that M retains some parental responsibility over A. No challenge was made in the grounds to these findings. Mr Ngwoucha’s submission on this matter was the Judge had not given any reasons, he did not consider it was material to his argument that he had not challenged any of the Judge’s findings. He submitted that it was enough to say that the Judge erred by not allowing counsel to make her submissions.

19. I reject entirely Mr Ngwoucha’s submission on this ground. The findings of fact which have not been and are not challenged by A clearly identify reasons why M retains parental responsibility for A, those reasons can clearly be seen at §19, 20 and 22. §22 in particular gives absolutely clear reasons for why she considered the test not met. Mr Ngwoucha was unable to explain that even if the Judge erred as advanced, how it could be said it was material given the findings.

20. I reject any suggestion in any event that the Judge erred as claimed. She was not saying a case like this can never succeed, but she was reflecting that in a case such as this where the mother has such a clear parental role, sole responsibility cannot be shown. That was a reflection on the evidence in the case, not a statement of law she was applying.

21. Turning to the allegation of bias. Despite several opportunities to reflect on his position, Mr Ngwoucha maintained that the Judge had shown bias. I consider this argument to be completely without merit and completely unarguable. No evidence had been provided from himself, or counsel, supporting the claimed hostility of the Judge. No request for a record of the proceedings to be provided had been made. No efforts had been made by Mr Ngwoucha to evidence the allegation whatsoever. The grounds themselves make no attempt to particularise the allegation, and when Mr Ngwoucha was asked to explain the complaints, he was vague as to the specific allegations.

22. The best he could advance was that the Judge had said to counsel, as reflected in §17, that she was surprised at the way the case was advanced given the test for sole responsibility. That was not an indication of predetermination or bias, but reflective that once she had heard the evidence it was absolutely clear that there was no sole responsibility. In my judgment it is not unfair, let alone an indication of bias, for a Judge to point out such things to an appellant’s advocate. Indeed, identifying such matters can assist the advocate in knowing what the Judge needs assistance with.

23. On the facts of this case the Judge was correct to point the issue out to counsel. It is clear from the evidence, and subsequent findings, that this case was one that was weak on the evidence provided. I have not been taken to any evidence which is capable of showing sole responsibility in the situation of A’s father living in the UK, and where his mother has deferred all major decisions to the father. This case, frankly, was one which was very close to being doomed to fail from the outset. Once the Judge rejects the claim that M has no role in the decision making in A’s life, the appeal becomes inevitable on the question of sole responsibility.

24. The appeal advanced by A against the Judge’s decision does not identify any error of law and the decision of Judge Meyler stands.

Notice of Decision

The Judge’s decision contained no error of law.

The Appeal is dismissed.

Judge T.S. Wilding

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Date: 4th October 2026