Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002249
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/69859/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 4th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

IAM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Faran, instructed by Commonwealth Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Khan Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh born in 2001 and who appealed a decision of the respondent dated 20th August 2024 refusing his protection claim based on being a member of the student wing of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). He claimed he had been arrested and mistreated after attending a demonstration and an arrest warrant had been issued.
2. The FtT judge’s decision, following the hearing on 12th February 2026, as to the adjournment recorded as follows:
‘14. The appellant did not attend the appeal hearing. Mr Hamid submitted that the appellant is unwell. He relied upon a written application dated 11 February 2026 to adjourn the hearing. In the written application it states that the appellant informed his representatives that he had a high temperature, a cough and occasionally vomiting over the last few days. He also stated that he had some back pain and does not feel well enough to attend the hearing. Mr Hamid acknowledged that there is no medical evidence.
15. He reiterated at the hearing that early yesterday the appellant had back pain, a high temperature and vomiting and said that he had these symptoms over the last few days. He said the appellant told him that he is unable to move or stand up. He said he went to hospital 2 days ago but was released after a few hours and given Voltarol, a pain medication for his back. He said the appellant indicated he would make an appointment with his GP. Mrs Arif objected to the application to adjourn. She said the appellant has been aware for some time about the date of the substantive hearing, and he has failed to provide any medical evidence.
16. I took into account the written application to adjourn and the oral application made by Mr Hamid at the hearing. The history of the matter shows that the appellant requested an adjournment in respect of the hearing on the 20 November 2025 because he was ill. The hearing listed for four December 2025 was adjourned due to lack of court time as the appeal was in a float list.
17. I found that if the appellant was unwell 2 days ago and attended hospital, he would have been able to provide some form of documentary evidence of his attendance at hospital, a diagnosis and a prescription. It is unclear why he has still not been to see his GP when he has been unwell for the last few days. I bear in mind that he told Mr Hamid that the hospital gave him the pain killer Voltarol which is widely available in chemists.
18. I take into account the tribunal's overriding duty being the interests of justice. Mr Hamid was informed that reasonable adjustments would be made for the appellant including as many breaks as he wished to enable him to give evidence comfortably remotely at home. He declined to speak to the appellant further despite being offered the opportunity. He said that he would not be able to represent him in a substantive appeal and counsel instructed for the hearing had been cancelled.
19. I found that in the absence of any medical evidence and taking into account the history of this matter, the application to adjourn was refused. Mr Hamid was asked again whether he wanted to take instructions from the appellant about attending the hearing however he declined to do so. He withdrew from the hearing having declined to make submissions. The hearing preceded by way of submissions from Mrs Arif on behalf of the respondent.’
3. Permission was refused at first instance. The grounds were then drafted by counsel and submitted to the Upper Tribunal.
Grounds of appeal
4. The grounds of challenge to the Upper Tribunal set out that the FtT judge dismissed the protection appeal primarily on the basis that the appellant was not credible and his documents carried no weight. The appellant was not present at the hearing and there were no submissions on his behalf. The judge refused the adjournment despite the appellant’s ill health. The judge adopted a course which was procedurally unfair.
5. Ground 1 – misdirection/procedural unfairness. The appellant sought an adjournment on the day before the hearing and by oral application at the hearing on the basis that he had become unwell in the days before the hearing. He was suffering in particular from severe back pain, a high temperature, a cough and vomiting and by 11th February was unable to move or stand up and so informed his solicitors. He did not provide medical evidence. It was also explained to the judge that the representative would not be able to attend. The appellant was offered breaks, but the judge failed to consider if he were genuinely suffering from headache, vomiting and/or a high temperature and the appellant could not play a full part in the hearing and it was unrealistic to suppose that he could give full and clear instructions for a substantive hearing. By the 11th February 2026 the appellant was unable to move and could not be expected to go to hospital. It was only logical to place weight on a lack of evidence if the appellant was not as ill as claimed. A previous ‘floating out’ of the case was not the responsibility of the appellant and he had been genuinely ill on a previous occasion. The judge failed to consider if the lack of adjournment would fail to provide the appellant with a fair hearing.
Grant of permission
6. Permission to appeal was granted by UTJ Sheridan following refusal by the FtT as follows:
‘…On the one hand, there were good reasons to not adjourn. This includes that (i) the appellant provided no medical evidence; (ii) this was the second time he had sought an adjournment for medical reasons; and (iii) Counsel had been “cancelled” [18] and Mr Hamid refused to make submissions [19] thereby creating a situation where the appellant lacked effective representation when it does not appear that there was a need for this to be the case.
3. However, on the other hand, the test for the judge, as explained in Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 418, is whether there has been any deprivation of the affected party’s right to a fair hearing. In this case, the consequence of refusing the adjournment was that the appellant lacked any representation in the substantive appeal and did not give evidence in a case where the credibility of his account was a central issue.
4. Arguably, refusing to adjourn compromised the appellant’s right to a fair hearing even though the judge may have had good reason to question the merit of the adjournment application.
5. It is surprising that the appellant’s representatives would not be ready and prepared to proceed when the adjournment application, made prior to the hearing, had not been granted. I am concerned that this could amount to an abuse of process and it may be that this will need to be addressed at the Upper Tribunal hearing.
Directions
1. At least 7 days before the hearing, Mr Hamid must file and serve a further witness statement explaining why he cancelled Counsel and why he was not instructed to deal with the substantive hearing when the adjournment request made prior to the hearing had not been granted.
2. At least 7 days before the hearing, Counsel who had been “stood down” (as referred to in para. 4 of the grounds and para. 11 of Mr Hamid’s statement) must file and serve a witness statement explaining the circumstances of his/her being “stood down” despite an adjournment not having being granted.’
Rule 24 notice
7. This identified that there was no medical evidence before the judge, the certificate now provided did not confirm the appellant was unfit to attend the hearing particularly remotely and only referred to back pain and which in itself was undermining of the appellant’s evidence that he was unable to move to particular in his appeal but attend the Doctor’s on 13th February 2026. Fairness cut both ways and did not demand an adjournment each time an appellant required an adjournment owing to illness and when without medical evidence.
Submissions
8. Ms Faran referred to the directions of Judge Sheridan which requested a witness statement from the instructing solicitor Mr Hamid. Attached to this statement were attendances notes and a screen shot of a doctor’s appointment. It was accepted that this evidence had been provided at the last minute and not before the FtT Judge. There was no evidence from the hospital and no evidence of GP medical notes over time. Mr Faran submitted that the day before the hearing, the appellant advised as to feeling unwell and an adjournment was requested but refused. The appellant was suffering with fever and back pain and unable to move and advised, in fact, to get medical advice on 10th February 2026. Thus, the day before the hearing counsel instructed was cancelled on the instructions of the appellant.
9. The appellant was informed that the adjournment request was refused but nevertheless instructed the solicitor, who was not prepared to present the case orally, to apply again for an adjournment. The appellant instructed the solicitor not to proceed with the substantive hearing and thus Mr Hamid was not prepared. It was important to the appellant as the matter rested on credibility. The question was whether the procedure was fair? The detriment to the appellant was fatal to his case. The adjournment in November was also owing to his same pain and fevers which had not yet been diagnosed and relating to his past torture and injury suffered since 2022. The second time the matter was adjourned in February 2026 was owing to the case being in the float list. There was no medical evidence before FtT Judge Beg. The appellant then (after the hearing) attended the medical practice and there was now a screen shot of his appointment and a fit to work certificate. The appellant was not able to sit for more than five minutes. The appellant wanted to be in a better position to present his case. Ms Faran referred to Nwaigwe and Article 6 and the right to a fair hearing.
10. Ms Khan referred to the Rule 24 reply She stated that the hearing was on 12th February , the application to make the adjournment on 11th, the day before was clearly refused by a different judge. There was no medical evidence at the renewed hearing and the judge’s finding was that the claimed medical illness was not evidenced. It was important to look at the history of the proceedings. In terms of what had been produced even at the date of the Upper Tribunal hearing, it was not clear he could not actively participate in even a remote hearing. There was no evidence of counsel being stood down a day before the hearing and no evidence from counsel in accordance with Judge Sheridan’s direction. The appellant had been informed of an adjournment refusal, and it was unclear why no preparation had been made for the substantive hearing given the prospect of the refusal of an adjournment the following day. The judge offered reasonable adjournments, breaks and offered the appellant the opportunity to give evidence from home. The judge clearly tried to accommodate the appellant and offered the representative multiple attempts to take instructions. The Tribunal should be alert to the abuse of process.
11. Ms Faran then stated that the screen shot of the appointment did not mean the appellant actually attended the appointment and it was possible to obtain medication without seeing the GP and medication was prescribed. She agreed there were no medical notes and was warned about giving evidence when she had not represented at the First-tier Tribunal.
12. Ms Faran also confirmed that there had been no challenge to [46] of the decision which referenced MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812.
Conclusions
13. The overriding objective within the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 sets out as follows:

‘Overriding objective and parties’ obligation to co-operate with the Tribunal

2.—(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly.

(2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes—
(a) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties and of the Tribunal;
(b) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings;
(c) ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings;
(d) using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and
(e) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues.

(3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it—
(a) exercises any power under these Rules; or
(b) interprets any rule or practice direction.

(4) Parties must—
(a) help the Tribunal to further the overriding objective; and
(b) co-operate with the Tribunal generally.’
14. A further bundle of documentation was provided in response to the directions from Judge Sheridan together with a witness statement from Mr H Hamid dated 5th August 2026 with attendance notes from 10th February and 11th February 2026.
15. Also in the bundle was information recorded as not before the FtT namely a statement of the appellant dated 25th February 2026, a fitness for work certificate dated 13th February 2026, a photograph of Naproxen tablets dated 13th February 2026 and a photograph (undated) of Voltarol, paracetamol, co-codamol and heat 24 hour relief and a ‘statement on grounds’ from Mr H Hamid legal representative from Commonwealth Solicitors dated 25th February 2026
16. None of the medical evidence was before the judge and the information provided only complicates the issue for the appellant. Even the medical certificate which post-dates the hearing, refers to back pain and only states that the appellant is not fit for work (it appears back dated although the certificate states the appellant was assessed on 13th February the day after the hearing). It does not state the appellant could not give witness evidence at a hearing, moreover from home. Secondly, the judge was told and this has been repeated in the grounds of appeal and in Mr Hamid’s statement and by Ms Faran that the appellant had a high fever and cough. There is absolutely no mention of that in the doctor’s certificate. What the certificate does not do is confirm that the appellant is unfit to attend court or indeed a remote hearing. The judge offered the appellant reasonable adjustments for the hearing, and this was not accepted. The appellant was clearly able to attend the doctor even remotely and was also able to give instructions to the solicitor to stand down counsel the day before. Ms Faran confirmed that the appellant had given Mr Hamid instructions to stand down counsel.
17. What has never been provided are the GP medical notes from the appellant. This hearing had previously been adjourned owing to illness (apparently a similar illness according to Ms Faran) and there is no indication that any medical notes were provided at that time. The appellant had ample opportunity to provide GP notes not least owing to the last adjournment. He clearly has a doctor.
18. Further the judge was told that the appellant had been in hospital a matter of days before the hearing. No evidence of that was provided either. The appellant knew that the hearing was refused an adjournment on the day before the hearing and had ample time to secure relevant medical information. Even by the date of the hearing before the Upper Tribunal there was no medical evidence which would render the FtT judge’s approach to the hearing procedurally unfair. It was the appellant who chose not to attend his own hearing.
19. I also note that in Mr Hamid’s further grounds and reasons statement (undated) he states at [9] that the appellant went to the hospital on 12th February 2026 and ‘the Hospital did some checks’: no evidence of that was provided. Mr Hamid also states, ‘the following day, on 13/02/2026, the appellant went to see his GP’. Curiously, and in contradiction, the screenshot for the GP appointment is 12th February.
20. In his witness statement Mr Hamid dated 25th February 2026 repeats the high temperature coughing and vomiting affliction of the appellant claim and that he was unable to stand or move.
21. In a witness statement dated 5th August 2026, clearly in response to Judge Sheridan’s direction Mr Hamid confirms that the appellant was told on 10th February 2026 that medical evidence would be required. It would appear from the attendance notes appendixed to the statement that both the duty lawyer refused the application to adjourn on 11th February and also the Duty Judge. The attendance notes also confirmed that following the refusal of the adjournment by the Tribunal at 1.50pm on 11th February 2026 the appellant was called immediately and specifically gave Mr Hamid instructions ‘to pursue the adjournment ‘+to cancel counsel’s instructions for tomorrow’. The appellant was thus in contact with the representatives and able to give instructions. The appellant chose not to proceed knowing this was the third attempt to list the hearing. The representative records at 3.59 pm he had further instructions the appellant was seeking GP/hospital appointment and Mr Hamid had instructions to attend ‘for adjournment request’.
22. The information on the release of counsel was that the appellant had instructed the release counsel the day before the hearing. The only email exchange in relation to 3 Bolt Court Chambers was on 11th February 2026 from Emanul Choudhury of the representatives and which stated at 11.55 am ‘The client requested to submit an application for adjournment urgently as he is seriously ill and does not feel fit to go through hearing tomorrow. So we made an application this morning and now waiting to hear from the Tribunal’. At 14.02 on 11th February 2026, E Choudhury emailed Chambers and stated, ‘Further to our last email could you please cancel the Counsel’s attendance tomorrow as the Client made an adjournment request due to ill health’. The only email from Chambers was dated 11th February 2026 at 23.55 GMT stating, ‘Thank you for your two emails and confirmation of Arman Alam’s services tomorrow not being required for tomorrow’s Video hearing to IAC Manchester’.
23. First, it is clear that this was a CVP hearing, secondly the judge offered adjustments for the hearing and thirdly, the Home Office objected to an adjournment in the circumstances.
24. It is clear that the judge had fairness in her mind at all times and weighed the various options. The judge is obliged to comply with the overriding objective which has been set out above.
25. The appellant was well aware that the hearing may proceed and yet clearly decided, despite being legally represented, that only an adjournment application be made. The appellant was unquestionably giving instructions to his representative, and they are reflected in the attendance notes. The appellant was warned that it was unlikely that an adjournment would be granted. That is evident from the attendance notes.
26. Simply it was the appellant’s choice not to attend despite his full knowledge that the proceedings were unlikely to be adjourned (as advised by Mr Hamid) the application for an adjournment was refused by three different Tribunal personnel, the lawyer, the duty judge and the judge at the hearing. There was no medical evidence and what is produced remains inadequate bearing in mind it was submitted to me that the problems had been ‘ongoing’ since 2022. I repeat no GP noted were filed.
27. The judge is an experienced FtT judge and fully conversant with the overriding objective and the interests of justice which obviously include fairness. The underlying principle of Rule 2 is that cases should be dealt with ‘fairly and justly’ incorporates the principle of fairness under Nwaigwe. There are further principles, the judge was aware of the complexity and nature of the case having set out the detail of the account, sought to offer flexibility, was conversant with the history of the proceedings and attempted to ensure the parties were able to participate. Rule 2 includes, however, as to participation, the qualification ‘so far as practicable’. If the appellant does not wish to participate that is a matter for him. He was clearly able to give instructions and his ‘certificate’ produced belatedly and after the hearing wholly undermines he assertion that he was ‘not able to move’ or give instructions. There is a further principle in Rule 2 of avoiding delay. There is quite obviously prejudice to the Secretary of State if appeals are not heard promptly as the appellant cannot be removed and there is also prejudice to other appellants when court time is taken up with repeated adjournments.
28. Lastly, there was no effective challenge to the substantive findings made specifically those at [46] of the determination and these findings stand. Grounds to the Upper Tribunal were drafted by counsel and there was no attempt to amend the grounds at the hearing. The conclusions of the judge at [46] on the basis of MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812 at [16] were entirely open to the judge. At [46] the judge said this:
‘In MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812 , the Court of Appeal considered the significant change in the circumstances in Bangladesh following the overthrow of the Awami League government. the Court noted the CPIN dated December 2024 and accepted that the changed political landscape eliminated any real risk of serious harm to a BNP political activist. The state is now able and willing to protect against rogue or non-state actors’
29. Bearing in mind the nature of the appellant’s claim (as a BNP supporter), the FtT Judge’s finding that the appellant would not be at risk and could avail himself of sufficiency of protection, was fatal to the appeal.
30. There was no error of law either material or otherwise. The appellant essentially declined his opportunity, without good reason, to attend a hearing.

Notice of Decision
The determination of the judge contained no material error of law. The decision of the FtT stands and the appeal remains dismissed.

H Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28th August 2026