Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002256
(PA/51901/2025)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

9th October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ALIS

Between

A S
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
AND

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Mr Pugh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Interpreter: Mr Khan

Heard at Field House Hearing Centre on 4 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Afghanistan. He appealed against the Respondent’s decision of 17 January 2025 refusing to grant him refugee status or protection under the ECHR.
BACKGROUND AND MATTERS IN ISSUE
2. The First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on 18 February 2026.
3. The Appellant appealed this decision and permission to appeal was granted on 28 April 2026 by Judge Hollings Tennant, who stated:
“2. The grounds assert that the Judge erred in law by failing to properly consider whether there is a real risk that the Appellant may be targeted by the Taliban having accepted his family members worked for the previous government. There is some merit in this assertion such that it is at least arguable. The Judge appears to accept the Appellant has cousins who were police officers and an uncle who served in the Afghan army (see paragraphs [26] and [28]) and whilst she refers to relevant country background evidence as to risks arising there is no explicit consideration as to whether the Appellant may be targeted as a family member even if he was not a police officer nor served in the Afghan army himself.
3. Further, whilst the Judge appears to accept the Appellant has a subjective fear of persecution due to an imputed political opinion having served in the Afghan Army (at paragraph [20]) this contradicts later findings that he did not serve in the army as claimed (at paragraph [47]). However, there is no discernible challenge to the Judge’s findings on credibility, with the grounds focusing exclusively on risk arising as a family member of those associated with the previous government.
4. As such, I consider that the grounds have identified what is at least an arguable material error of law. Permission to appeal is therefore granted.”
4. The Respondent filed a rule 24 response dated 20 May 2026.
5. I have maintained the anonymity order made in the FtT.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE
6. The Appellant was no longer represented, having dispensed with his representatives’ services on 21 July 2026. Nothing had been heard from any new representatives, and at the hearing the Appellant told me that he had been unable to secure fresh representation. The Appellant was handed a court bundle and indicated that he was in a position to proceed without representation.
7. I considered whether it was appropriate to adjourn to enable the Appellant to obtain representation, having regard to rules 2 and 5 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. The overriding consideration is whether the grant or refusal of an adjournment is required in the interests of fairness. Applying the principles in Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 418 (IAC), the question was whether refusal of the application would deprive the Appellant of a fair opportunity to present his case at this error of law hearing.
8. I reminded myself that this was an error of law hearing at which I would have to consider whether the FtT had erred in its approach to risk. The grounds and a bundle had been drafted by the Appellant’s former representatives, and I also had the grant of permission. An interpreter was available at court to interpret the proceedings.
9. In the circumstances, I was satisfied that it was appropriate to proceed without allowing further time for a solicitor to be instructed.
SUBMISSIONS ON ERROR IN LAW
10. The sole ground advanced was that the FtT failed to conduct an adequate assessment of risk arising from the Appellant's family connections to the former Afghan government. The grounds accepted that the FtT had given detailed reasons for rejecting the Appellant's claim that he himself had served as a police officer or member of the Afghan army. The grounds argued that the FtT had made positive findings that the Appellant had cousins who served in the police force and an uncle who served in the Afghan army. The grounds further argued that the FtT was required to consider whether the Appellant would face persecution from the Taliban due to his familial association with persons linked to the former regime. It was submitted that the FtT failed to undertake that assessment despite country material recognising risk to former members of the police and armed forces and, in some circumstances, their family members.
11. The grounds also argued that the FtT’s conclusion, at paragraph [47], that the Appellant had "no profile" in Afghanistan was perverse or inadequately reasoned because it failed to engage with the accepted evidence regarding his cousins' and uncle's service in the police and army. If the FtT had properly considered those familial links, it would have gone on to assess matters identified in the country guidance and CPIN material, including the relatives' roles, the nature of their service, and the length of their association with the former government.
12. Mr Pugh argued that the ground of appeal amounted to a new argument which had not been raised before the FtT. Paragraph [19] of the Appellant’s witness statement described a raid on his home, during which the men asked his father only where the Appellant was. The Appellant did not mention any risk to his father in his statement, which would have been the most appropriate place to raise that fear. The grounds sought to argue something that had not been advanced before the FtT and had not been mentioned until permission to appeal was sought.
13. Mr Pugh submitted that this was not a Robinson obvious error because the Appellant had never hinted at a risk to the family as a whole. Mr Pugh reminded me of what the Tribunal said at paragraphs [31] to [34] of Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC).
14. Whilst Mr Pugh conceded there was an inconsistency within the FtT decision (see paragraph [20], on subjective fear, and both the subsequent reasoning and ultimate conclusions at paragraph [47]), he submitted that when read as a whole the FtT decision made it clear that the FtT had rejected the entirety of the Appellant's account and intended to find him wholly lacking in credibility.
15. The Appellant had nothing further to add in response to these submissions.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
16. Having heard the submissions advanced by Mr Pugh and considered the papers, I found, for the reasons that follow, that there was no error of law.
17. The sole ground pursued before me was that the FtT failed to assess whether the Appellant would be at risk on return to Afghanistan as a consequence of his family connections to individuals who had served the former Afghan government, namely cousins said to have been police officers and an uncle said to have served in the Afghan army.
18. In my judgment, that criticism is not made out. The issue before the FtT was the claim advanced by the Appellant. The essence of that claim was that he himself had come to the adverse attention of the Taliban because of his alleged service in the police and army. The FtT carefully considered that account and gave adequate and unchallenged reasons for rejecting it. Importantly, the argument that the Appellant would be at risk solely by reason of his relationship to family members associated with the former regime was not an argument which was advanced before the FtT either by the Appellant or his counsel.
19. As Mr Pugh submitted, neither the witness statement nor the decision recorded any submission that the Appellant faced a risk independent of his own alleged activities. Whilst paragraph [19] of the witness statement referred to a visit by Taliban members to the family home, the account given was that questions were asked about the Appellant. There was no suggestion that his father, or the family generally, were themselves being targeted because of the service of other relatives. This clearly indicated that the Appellant’s family were of no interest, and it undermined the thrust of the ground of appeal before me.
20. I accept Mr Pugh’s submission that this is therefore a point being raised for the first time on appeal. The FtT is required to determine the principal controversial issues identified by the parties. This approach was set out in Lata and confirmed by the Court of Appeal in AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370 as follows:
"It is clear from Lata that it is an appellant's responsibility to put all her arguments before the FtT. It is her duty to identify the points which the FtT is required to resolve in order to decide the appeal. The UT in Lata described those as 'the principal controversial issues'. That formula is often used in public law to define the duty of a tribunal or other decision-maker to give reasons … . There is therefore a deliberate symmetry, on the reasoning in Lata, between the parties' duty to identify the main issues for the FtT, and the FtT's duty to explain what it has made of those issues. The FtT must decide those issues, and give reasons for its decision on them. But the FtT can only decide them, and is only obliged to decide them, if the parties expressly identify them."
21. The FtT cannot be criticised for failing to determine an issue which was not presented as part of the case being advanced. Nor do I consider that this was a Robinson obvious point such that the FtT was required to identify and determine it of its own motion.
22. The FtT plainly accepted certain aspects of the Appellant's family background. However, the acceptance that some relatives had worked for the former government did not, without more, require the FtT to undertake a separate risk assessment based upon family association where that was not the Appellant's pleaded or argued case. The existence of relatives who served the former regime did not automatically establish a real risk to every family member.
23. I have also considered the observation made in the grant of permission concerning the apparent tension between paragraph [20] of the decision and the findings subsequently made at paragraph [47]. I agree with Mr Pugh that there is an inconsistency in the wording used. However, when the decision is read fairly and as a whole, it is clear that the FtT rejected the Appellant's account that he had served in the police or army and found him not to be a credible witness. The FtT's extensive credibility findings leave no doubt as to the conclusion reached. The reference at paragraph [20] to a subjective fear does not materially undermine the overall reasoning or outcome.
24. Looking at the decision holistically, the FtT identified the issues that had been raised, made findings open to it on the evidence, and gave adequate reasons for those findings. The challenge advanced in the grounds amounts, in substance, to a disagreement with the scope of the FtT’s assessment rather than the identification of any material legal error.
25. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the decision of the FtT contains no material error of law.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Alis
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
8 October 2026