Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002261
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/69507/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 15th of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEILSON

Between

SH
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Banham, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard in person at Field House on 22 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction & Background
1. The appellant is a national of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The appellant appeals with permission granted on 30 April 2026 against the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) given on 3 March 2026 (“the FtT Decision”) to dismiss the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his protection claim.
2. The appellant applied for asylum on 29 June 2022. The appellant asserted that he feared persecution for his political opinion beliefs (involvement with the Komala party in Iran) and assisting supporters of Kurdish rights in Iran, and his sur place political activities in the United Kingdom (posting on Facebook and attendance at demonstrations). The respondent refused his claim for protection.
3. The appellant appealed the respondent‘s decision to the FtT. The FtT rejected the appellant’s asylum claim because it found his account to be fundamentally lacking in credibility. The judge in the FtT (“the Judge”) did not accept that he had been genuinely involved with the Komala party in Iran, finding that his evidence was inconsistent, had expanded over time, and revealed only limited knowledge of the party’s ideology and activities. The FtT concluded that he had embellished or fabricated key aspects of his claim, including his alleged political work, encounters with the authorities, and family circumstances. It also found that his political activities in the UK, including Facebook posts and participation in demonstrations, were opportunistic and undertaken to strengthen an otherwise weak asylum claim rather than reflecting a genuine political belief. As a result, the FtT was not satisfied that he had ever attracted the attention of the Iranian authorities, would be at risk on return, or qualified for refugee protection, humanitarian protection, or protection under Articles 2 or 3 ECHR.
4. The appellant appealed to this Tribunal.
Grounds of Appeal, Discussion and Conclusions
5. The appellant appeals on four grounds. The grounds are:-
1. The FtT Decision does not provide adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant's sur place activities.
2. The FtT Decision has not considered the “Danian” principles [1999 EWCA Civ 3000] in relation to the risk on return even where they do not find the political activity to be genuine.
3. The FtT Decision has failed to consider material evidence.
4. The FtT decision has failed to take into account judicial notice of “real-world events”.
6. I deal with each of the appeal points below. In considering all the appeal points I have reminded myself of the guidance set out by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201. In particular I bear in mind the Court of Appeal’s guidance at [26] (i) the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently; (ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the First-Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account; (iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the First-Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the First-Tier Tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out; and (iv) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law.
7. It is important to bear these principles in mind when dealing with appeals from the FtT and I note that in allowing this appeal the judge granting permission to appeal has stated “There is an arguable error of law that has been identified which merits further consideration. There is a reasonable prospect that a different tribunal would reach a different decision.” That is of course not the relevant test in determining whether an appeal to the Upper Tribunal should succeed. There must be a material error of law and my sole focus is in determining whether there has been a material error of law in the FtT Decision based upon the four grounds of appeal.
First Ground of Appeal
8. The first ground of appeal is that the judge does not provide adequate reasons for finding that the views underpinning the sur place activities of posting on Facebook and attending demonstrations are not genuine and that in particular there was a failure to properly challenge the appellant as to the genuineness of his political beliefs once he was in the UK.
9. For the respondent Ms Clewley submitted that this issue was clearly identified in the respondent’s review of 28 March 2025 where at paragraph 15 it is stated that the appellant’s views on Facebook are not genuinely held. She further submitted that the Judge did give detailed reasons at paragraphs 30 to 41 of the FtT Decision and that the appellants credibility on the sur place activities is also tied into the findings in relation to what happened in Iran.
10. In relation to the reasons, I do consider that the Judge has set out in some detail the grounds as to why he does not consider that the sur place activities are genuine. At paragraphs 21 through to 29 he sets out in some detail the reasons why he does not accept the credibility of the appellant’s account in relation to his activities in Iran. Whilst this is not directly relevant to the sur place activities it does have a bearing on credibility and as the Judge states at paragraph 39 he does place some reliance upon this lack of credibility in relation to past events to support the lack of credibility as to his political belief now in the UK. However, more specifically, the Judge sets out his grounds at paragraphs 30 through to 39 why he does not accept that the appellant has a genuine political belief in the UK. Specifically, he deals with the Facebook postings and highlights the use of a nickname “Sara” (paragraphs 31 and 32); the delay in setting up the Facebook account; the appellant or someone on his behalf is cutting and pasting generic content and there is no evidence the content was public (para 35); the appellant is unable to give the dates of demonstrations (para 36); the appellant is still vague regarding Komala (paragraph 37). The Judge further specifically addresses the appellant’s political knowledge at paragraphs 45 and 47 and sums up at paragraph 48:-
“Looking at all of the evidence in the round, I am not satisfied that the appellant was ever involved politically activity or wanted by the authorities and that he has fabricated his accounts. I reject the appellant's claims that he has come to the adverse attention of the authorities. The events did not happen and he has no genuine political interest which would put him at risk.”
In my view the Judge has provided adequate reasons as to why he does not accept that the sur place activities are genuine.
11. In considering the need for a specific express challenge to the appellant regarding the truthfulness of his views once he came to the UK, I take into consideration the recent Court of Appeal case of MR Pakistan -v- SSHD 2026 EWCA Civ 473. The issue is essentially one of fairness in determining the need for a specific challenge. The appellant was cross examined regarding the Facebook account (para 35 and 36); the demonstrations (para 36) and was specifically asked if he would delete his Facebook account (paragraph 34). The genuineness of the appellants beliefs was clearly an issue in the case as the respondent had clearly identified that in the respondent’s review. The appellant was legally represented throughout. Even if there was a failure to specifically ask the appellant if his political views were genuine, I am satisfied that there was no unfairness in that, in light of the cross examination that there was around his sur place activities and that it was clearly understood by both parties to be an issue. There was no litigation by ambush taking place.
12. For the reasons set out above I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Second Ground of Appeal
13. The second ground of appeal is that the Judge has failed to consider the Danian principles in relation to the risk on return even where they do not find the political activity to be genuine.
14. The Danian principles come from Danian v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] EWCA Civ 3000. The key principle is that an asylum seeker is not automatically excluded from refugee protection merely because they have deliberately engaged in political activity after leaving their home country in order to strengthen or create an asylum claim.
15. The Judge does not expressly make reference to the Danian case or principle. However, it is clear on reading the FtT Decision that the Judge clearly had those principles in mind. At paragraph 7 and 8 the Judge states:
“There are issues relating to HJ Iran to be considered in terms of whether the appellant is genuinely politically active. If his sur place activities are genuine, he succeeds.
The case may also be allowed under HP Article 3 grounds if the appellant would face a real risk at the pinch point of applying for an ETD and or upon return to Tehran even if the political motivations are contrived.”
16. Clearly the Judge has in mind the potential for the appellant to have a case even if his political motivations are contrived.
17. In addition, the Judge has considered the cases of XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran (CG) [2022] UKUT 23 at paragraphs 38 and 50 and HJ (Iran) -v- SSHD [2011] AC 596 at paragraphs 7, 16, 40 and 51. Both of these cases take into consideration the Danian principle. At paragraph 9 in the headnote to XX it is stated:-
“In deciding the issue of risk on return involving a Facebook account, a decision maker may legitimately consider whether a person will close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account, prior to application for an ETD: HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596. Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions. It is difficult to see circumstances in which the deletion of a Facebook account could equate to persecution, as there is no fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention to have access to a particular social media platform, as opposed to the right to political neutrality. Whether such an inquiry is too speculative needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis.”
18. HJ Iran deals directly with the Danian principle as it considers whether the asylum seeker would live discreetly and the reason for that.
19. At paragraphs 51 through to 53 the Judge applies the rationale of XX and determines that as the appellant does not hold a genuine political belief he will take steps to delete his Facebook account prior to applying for the ETD. In my view the reasoning of the Judge contains no error of law. It is consistent with the jurisprudence of both HJ Iran and XX. I accordingly find that there is no error of law under this ground.
20. Under this ground of appeal the appellant originally sought to advance an argument that the Judge had been wrong to exclude from his consideration the case of D8 v SSHD (Exclusion-Substantive) SCX/179/2020 on the basis that it was a SIAC case from a different jurisdiction (see paragraph 11 of the FtT Decision). Mr Banham confirmed in his submissions that he was no longer advancing this argument.
21. For the reasons set out above I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Third Ground of Appeal
22. The third ground of appeal was that the FtT failed to consider the objective evidence contained within the CPIN: Kurds and Kurdish political groups, Iran, October 2025 (“CPIN: Kurds”) and CPIN: social media, surveillance and sur place activities, Iran, April 2025 (“CPIN:Surveillance”). Mr Banham submitted that there was a failure to properly engage with this evidence. Specifically, Mr Banham referred me to paragraph 8.4.20 of CPIN:Kurds and paragraphs 8.4.15; 10.1; 10.1.12; 10.2.1; 10.2.4; 10.3.5; 10.4.2 and 10.4.3 of CPIN:Surveillance as paragraphs that were all relevant and should have been engaged with by the Judge.
23. For the respondent Ms Clewley submitted that there was no requirement on the Judge to note all the evidence that he considered. The objective evidence referenced by the appellant is not materially different to the country guidance cases that the Judge does refer to, and that there is really no dispute about the country evidence position.
24. It is correct that the Judge does not expressly reference the CPIN:Kurds or the CPIN: Surveillance. I also accept that both CPIN’s provide clear country evidence that the Iranian regime carries out extensive surveillance of its high-profile opponents, both domestically and internationally, and uses advanced technology to monitor communications and social media interactions.
25. The CPIN:Kurds does specifically state in the Executive Summary that whether a person of Kurdish ethnicity is likely to be at risk on return to Iran will depend on a nuanced consideration of factors outlined in the relevant country guidance cases of BA (demonstrations) [2011 UKUT 36] and XX (online) [2022 UKUT 23]. The CPIN:Surveillance also relies expressly on the country guidance cases of BA and XX.
26. In considering the approach taken by the Judge in the FtT Decision it is clear that the Judge has given consideration to country guidance cases. The Judge states that he is very familiar with cases of a type similar to that of the appellant (see in particular the Judges comment at paragraph 9). When dealing with the surplus activity paragraph 42 the judge specifically refers to “recent case law”. The Judge also refers to the cases of HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (paragraph 50); AB and Others (internet activity – state of evidence) Iran [2015] UKUT 0257 (paragraph 52) and as previously mentioned he referred to XX.
27. Mr Banham’s position was that the Judge had failed to engage with country evidence in the CPIN’s that clearly showed the extent of the surveillance carried on by the Iranian State. Whilst he does not reference the CPIN’s I do think it is clear that the Judge is aware of the country background position given his reference to a number of the relevant cases. In any event I do not consider that at any point the Judge is refuting or ignoring the country background position. His decision is based upon the lack of credibility of the appellant and his finding that his political beliefs are not genuine, he will delete his Facebook account and any involvement he has had with demonstrations is at best low level (see paragraph 42).
28. At paragraph 49 the Judge references the country guidance case of SSH and HR (Illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 00308 and states:-
“Given the state of the case law, the appellant is likely only to come to attention of the authorities if there is some other profile. Having rejected his claims, I am not satisfied he has such a profile. I am not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds to show a sufficient objective risk arising from illegal exit for this appellant which merits international protection, based upon my finding above there is no risk of Article 3 ill- treatment. I have rejected his claims about current involvement. There is no evidence of satisfactory probative weight to the lower standard to show the authorities will be aware of what he has undertaken as orchestrated political activity whether through demonstrations or online. He is obliged to mitigate his risk by removing the Facebook account. Despite his protestations, necessity is a sobering factor when faced with the cold truth of an enforced return.”
29. I am satisfied that the Judge did have an awareness of the country background information but that it was not determinative in this case as the Judge found that his profile was not such as to bring him to the attention of the Iranian authorities.
30. For the reasons set out above I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Fourth Ground of Appeal
31. The fourth ground of appeal put forward by the appellant was that the FtT had failed to take into account judicial notice of “real world events”. Mr Banham explained that at the hearing he had made specific reference to the events that were at that point in time (19th January 2026) unfolding in Iran where the Iranian regime was forcibly putting down protests with the use of lethal force such as live ammunition against protesters. In his submissions Mr Banham explain that the relevance of these events was that it demonstrated that people were being killed simply by being present at demonstrations in Iran and it also showed the heightened sensitivity of the Iranian state to those protesting against them. It was his submission that the FtT ought to have had judicial knowledge of these matters and that the Judge failed to take these matters into account. Mr Banham accepted that no documentary evidence had been produced before the FtT to substantiate what was happening in Iran in January 2026.
32. For the respondent Ms Clewley submitted that the Judge had taken into account the submission made by Mr Banham and at paragraph 55 of the FtT decision the Judge specifically stated “Whilst I am aware of recent events in Iran, nothing before me satisfactorily leads me to conclude otherwise than the basis set out above.” In her submission the country evidence already before the FtT clearly demonstrated that the Iranian regime takes a very harsh approach to its opponents (actual or perceived) and the events in January 2026 in Iran did not really add anything material to that.
33. In his written grounds of appeal Mr Banham made a reference to the case of Scott v The Attorney General of the Bahamas [2017] UKPC 15 where Lord Kerr giving the judgement of the Privy Council said at [40]-[41] “Judicial notice - the acceptance by the courts of facts or a state of affairs which are so notorious, or so clearly established, that evidence of their existence is deemed unnecessary.”
34. In considering Mr Banham's submissions I do not accept that the events that were occurring in Iran in January of 2026 can be said to fall within the definition of a state of affairs which are so notorious, or so clearly established, that evidence of their existence is deemed unnecessary. As I recall there was at that point in time a great deal of uncertainty as to actually what was happening in Iran due to an internet and news blackout. It certainly does seem to be the case that the Iranian regime responded in a very aggressive manner against their own citizens but the actual detail of what occurred is, to the best of my knowledge, not fully known and certainly was not fully known back in January 2026. It is difficult to see how those events could fall within the category of facts of which judicial notice could be taken. In saying that I am in no way seeking to diminish the seriousness of what occurred in Iran where it does appear that there was a gross violation of human rights and it would appear significant loss of life among the protesters (there is now a Country Bulletin produced by the Home Office “Iran: Protests of December 2025 to January 2026” but that was not available until February 2026. It does narrate that lethal force was used by the authorities to suppress demonstrations with deaths estimated at 12,000 to 20,000. That Bulletin concludes “All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.”). However, I do not think that the facts, as at 19 January 2026, were clear enough to allow them to be treated as judicial knowledge. Even if I am wrong in that I am satisfied that the Judge has acknowledged the events in January 2026 in paragraph 55 of the FtT Decision and I do not consider that they have any material bearing on the issues that the Judge had to determine. It is not in dispute that the Iranian regime persecutes actual and perceived opponents. It has done so for a very long time. The country evidence clearly establishes that.
35. For the reasons set out above I dismiss this ground of appeal.
Conclusion
36. For the reasons set out above I find that there is no material error of law and the appeal is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the FtT did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

S NEILSON
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
14 October 2026