Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002263

First-tier Tribunal No: DC/50085/2023
LD/00115/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 19th of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McWILLIAM

Between

MAXINE HAPI
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: LIP
For the Respondent: Mr E Terell, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a British citizen who sought to appeal against a decision by the SSHD to issue a notice under s.40(5) of the BNA 1981 to make an order to deprive him of his citizenship on the grounds that it had been obtained by means of fraud (s.40 (3)). The SSHD was granted permission to appeal against the decision of the FTT to allow the appellant's appeal. I found that the FTT erred in law and set aside the decision to allow the appellant’s appeal. The appeal came before me to determine.
2. On 25th January 2007 the appellant was issued with a certificate of naturalisation as a British citizen following an application in June 2006. In the application from he said that he was a French national and produced a French passport. He was asked whether he had ever been convicted in a court of law in the United Kingdom or outside the United Kingdom. The appellant scored lines through the relevant box in answer to this. He was asked whether he had engaged in any other activity which might be relevant to the question of whether he is a person of good character and he left this box unticked. He signed the form to confirm that the information was correct.
3. In a French court in 2004 and the appellant was found guilty of an offence involving the falsification of a birth certificate and sentenced to 8 months imprisonment. The next time he came to the attention of the French authorities was on 12 September 2012 when he was detained boarding the Eurostar at Gare du Nord. He was detained and appeared before a court in Paris the next day and he was found guilty of offences involving fraudulent identity documents including the applicant’s French birth certificate. The French informed UKBA that the applicant had in 2001 obtained French nationality by fraud. The appellant's case was referred to the status review unit (SRU). The SRU investigated. In March 2014 the appellant was issued with a decision letter advising him that the SSHD had decided that he had obtained British citizen fraudulently and that he should be deprived of British citizenship. The appellant appealed. The appeal was treated as withdrawn in 2015 because the SSHD said that they wished to obtain further evidence from the French authorities.
4. The SRU wrote to the appellant on 20 May 2022 advising him they had now received confirmation that he had used a forged birth certificate claiming that he had been born in French Guyana which enabled him to claim French nationality.
5. The appellant was given the opportunity to provide his genuine identity and any information that he wished to be taken into account to justify the reason for making false representations. His solicitors responded on 10 June 2022. The appellant’s case was that he was born in French Guyana and was therefore entitled to a French passport. He was adopted and his adopted parents applied for a passport for him. He has never had his birth certificate. He was unaware of the circumstances in obtaining a French passport.
The error of law decision
“9. The judge should have considered (i) – (iv) with reference to Chaudhry. I accept that the judge addressed (i) and (ii). However, when addressing (iii) the decision does not support that the exercise of discretion was reviewed on public law grounds.
10. In the Rule 24 response the appellant says that the judge was entitled to consider “the exceptional procedural history of the matter, including the withdrawal of the earlier deprivation proceedings in 2015, the substantial delay prior to the fresh deprivation decision in 2023, the respondent’s lengthy residence in the United Kingdom and the private life accrued during that”. It is contended that “those were plainly relevant considerations in the proportionality assessment”. However, this misunderstands the approach to the exercise of discretion. The judge was not supposed to be assessing proportionality of the decision when considering (iii). The judge conflates the third and fourth questions in Chaudhry.
11. I accept that delay in decision making could potentially support that the exercise of discretion was irrational or Wednesbury unreasonable. However, the judge found that the “delay” itself was unreasonable and unfair. The issue before the judge was whether the SSHD when exercising discretion has “acted in a way in which no reasonable Secretary of State could have acted, or has taken into account some irrelevant matter, or has disregarded something to which he should have given weight or has been guilty of some procedural impropriety”. Moreover, it is not clear whether the judge’s finding that the delay is unreasonable was an application of the Wednesbury test or the judge’s view of what is fair. In respect of the unfairness issue, it is not clear how these amounts to a public law error. The judge did not identify any clear public law error in the SSHD’s exercise of discretion.
12. The judge should have considered (i) – (iv) with reference to Chaudhry. I accept that the judge addressed (i) and (ii). However, when addressing (iii) the decision does not support that the exercise of discretion was reviewed on public law grounds”
6. I adjourned the matter to be re-heard in the UT. I preserved the findings of the judge set out at [76] to [82]. I concluded that there was no need for the Tribunal to interfere with the findings in respect of Chaudhry (i) and (ii). I said that the Tribunal will determine (iii) and (iv) at a resumed hearing in the UT.
The preserved findings
7. The preserved findings are as follows:
76. I therefore find as a matter of fact that the Appellant was fully aware that he had been convicted and imprisoned in France in 2004.
77. The significance of this finding is that I conclude that he was fully aware that he was convicted and imprisoned in France when he submitted Form AN in 2006. He was totally silent about his conviction in that Form and I conclude that the omission was deliberate. He then obtained his naturalisation in January 2007.
78. The factual scenario therefore is that by January 2007, the Appellant was in possession of a false French passport, was convicted before a French court that he had not declared and had obtained naturalisation in the UK. That clearly should not have happened as first, his French passport was obtained by deception and his naturalisation was obtained in the full knowledge that he had been convicted in France in 2004. I do not accept for one moment that the Appellant was innocent in this process and that he was unaware of the conviction recorded against him in 2004.
79. To that extent, I find that there was deception in relation to the obtaining of his naturalisation in January 2007. The obligation was on him to record his conviction on Form AN and he did not do so.
80. The fact that his form was not returned to him is immaterial since the obligation was on him to provide correct details on the form. In addition, I find that he must have been aware after his conviction in March 2004 that his birth certificate was false – as that was the very basis of the conviction.
81. If any of what has been represented by the Appellant was plausible, even on his case, he was notified after his 2012 conviction that the birth certificate was false. In 2026, and by the time of this hearing, he has done nothing to show, correct or otherwise prove that his claimed birth in French Guiana actually occurred. In reality, there is nothing other than his say so and a false birth certificate to show that it did. I conclude that the Appellant has been fully complicit in ongoing identity fraud and, at best deliberate obfuscation.
82. Therefore, I find that both the condition precedent and causation issues with regard to the deprivation decision are fully justified and well evidenced in this case. The decision to revoke his citizenship is therefore fully justified in this case and I dismiss the appeal on those two bases. He was totally silent about his conviction in that Form and I conclude that the omission was deliberate. He then obtained his naturalisation in January 2007.
The Legal Framework
8. The SSHD’s exercise of discretion can only be interfered with on public law grounds: Chaudhry v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 16. The proper approach is to be found at [54] of Chaudhry per Dingemans LJ:
“54. For these reasons in my judgment the proper approach to an appeal under section 40A of the BNA 1981 from decisions of the Secretary of State made pursuant to section 40(3) of the BNA 1981 is: (i) it is for the FTT to find, in the event of a dispute, as a fact whether there was fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact for the purposes of section 40(3) of the BNA 1981; (ii) the decision of the Secretary of State on the causation issue whether the registration or naturalisation was obtained by the impermissible means is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds, in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1); (iii) the exercise of the Secretary of State's discretion to make an order depriving a person of citizenship status is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in Paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1); and (iv) it is for the FTT to consider whether the Secretary of State had acted in breach of other relevant legal obligations, including those arising under section 6 of the Human Rights Act. Although due weight would need to be given to the findings, evaluations and policies of the Secretary of State, the decision was for the FTT.
9. At [71] of his judgement in R (Begum) v SIAC [2021] AC 765 (Begum (No 1))Lord Reed identified the functions of SIAC, which, apart from the national security considerations mirror the functions of the FTT, on an appeal under section 40(2) saying:
"First, it can assess whether the Secretary of State has acted in a way in which no reasonable Secretary of State could have acted, or has taken into account some irrelevant matter, or has disregarded something to which he should have given weight or has been guilty of some procedural impropriety. In doing so, SIAC has to bear in mind the serious nature of a deprivation of citizenship, and the severity of the consequences which can flow from such a decision. Secondly, it can consider whether the Secretary of State has erred in law, including whether he has made findings of fact which are unsupported by any evidence or are based upon a view of the evidence which could not reasonably be held. Thirdly, it can determine whether the Secretary of State has complied with section 40(4), which provides that the Secretary of State may not make an order under section 40(2) "if he is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless". Fourthly, it can consider whether the Secretary of State has acted in breach of any other legal principles applicable to his decision, such as the obligation arising in appropriate cases under section 6 of the Human Rights Act".
The hearing before the UT
10. The appellant attended the hearing before me. At the start of the hearing, he told me that his solicitor was unable to attend because of ill health. I brought to his attention that Tennyson Monroe Solicitors informed the UT on 17 September 2026 that they were no longer acting. The appellant indicated that he was surprised by this because he had paid them a lot of money. The appellant did not make an application to adjourn.
11. In response to my directions following the error of law hearing, the appellant filed a further witness statement of 13 August 2026. The SSHD responded and indicating which parts of the appellant's evidence were. The appellant gave oral evidence at the hearing before me adopting the contents of his witness statement.
12. I explained to the appellant at the start of the hearing that many of the findings of the FTT were preserved. I explained to him that the Article 8 assessment is limited in the context of deprivation of citizenship. I explained to him that much of his evidence contained in his most recent witness statement was not material to the issues that I had to consider in the light of the preserved findings.
Discretion
13. The first issue that I must consider is whether there is public law error in the SSHD’s exercise of discretion.
14. The respondent was entitled to attach significant weight to the appellant's conviction in France in 2004 which the appellant failed to disclose and the nature of the offences committed. The SSHD was entitled to conclude that the appellant had submitted a false birth certificate with his application for a French passport which he used to apply for naturalisation. The SSHD considered the representations that were made by the appellant. The appellant said that his genuine identity is Maxim Hapi and he was born on 10 October 1975. The appellant said in his representations that he was under eighteen years old when he applied for his passport and that his parents applied on his behalf. The SSHD was entitled to reject this explanation bearing in mind that the appellant’s French passport was issued on 21 December 2001 and therefore given the date of birth relied on by the appellant he would have been aged 26 at the time the passport was issued. In any event, it would not mitigate the appellant’s failure to disclose a conviction upon which the SSHD was entitled to attach significant weight.
15. The SSHD took into account that there had been a delay (paragraph 38 of the decision); however, took the view that there is no reasonable expectation that the matter had been closed following the withdrawal of the appeal in 2015. The appeal in 2015 did not proceed because the respondent withdrew that decision in effect to obtain more evidence from the French authorities. The FTT accepted that the basis of the withdrawal was communicated to the appellant at the time and there is no reason for me to go behind this finding. The SSHD was entitled to reject that the appellant had a reasonable expectation that the matter had been closed. The appellant had never received notification from the Home Office that the matter had been concluded. The SSHD was entitled to take the view that the appellant and his representatives were aware that the case was ongoing.
16. When considering delay the SSHD was entitled to conclude that the facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Laci v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 769. In Laci the appellant was contacted by the UK Border Agency on 17 February 2009 and told that the SSHD had reason to believe that he had obtained his status as a British citizen by fraud. The appellant’s solicitors replied on 17 March 2009. In this correspondence the appellant admitted the fraud and advanced mitigating circumstances. The appellant did not hear anything further for nine years. The delay was unexplained. Underhill LJ said that it was important in that case to appreciate that this was not simply a case where the SSHD could have taken action but did not do so. It was a case where she started to take action and invited representations but then having received them did nothing for over 9 years. He said that the understanding by the appellant that the SSHD had decided not to proceed with depriving him of his citizenship was not unreasonable and moreover in that case this would have been further confirmed by the renewal of the appellant's passport. While there has been delay in this case, the appellant has never made an admission. He continues to deny any wrongdoing. It would not be correct to say that the SSHD has been inactive during the period of the delay. While this does not justify the entire period of the delay, the situation was complicated by having to obtain evidence from France.
17. The SSHD engaged with the appellant's claim that deprivation will render him stateless however in contrast to deprivation when deemed conducive to the public good, there is no statutory requirement upon her to consider statelessness. In any event, it was open to the SSHD took the view that notwithstanding that the decision may render the appellant stateless it was reasonable and proportionate to deprive him of citizenship given the seriousness of the fraud. Moreover, it was reasonable to take the view that it was open to the appellant to engage with the relevant authorities in his country to seek reinstatement of his original citizenship if it has been lost.
18. On the facts in this case the exercise of discretion by the SSHD to deprive the appellant of British citizenship was entirely rational. The SSHD correctly attached considerable weight to the public interest that lies in the deprivation when British citizenship has been dishonestly obtained. The decision was one that was open to the SSHD.
Article 8
19. In a deprivation of citizenship appeal when considering Article 8 (2) ECHR, judges should usually avoid proleptic analysis of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation and exposure to the “limbo” period without more cannot possibly tip the proportionality balance in favour of an individual retaining fraudulently obtained citizenship: Muslija (deprivation: reasonably foreseeable consequences) [2022] UKUT 00337 (IAC).
20. I have considered the appellant's witness statement and his oral evidence. I have no doubt that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated and to the UK. He has lived here for many years. He has not committed any offences whilst he has been in the UK. I have no doubt and indeed it was not challenged that the appellant is hard working. He has an exemplary work record as set out in his witness statement and supported by the evidence in the bundle which was prepared for the hearing before me.
21. I accept that the appellant is single. He is employed and he will not be able to continue to work lawfully working during the limbo period. I accept that he has a daughter who is a British citizen and lives in France with her mother. The latter has cancer. This was not an issue that was raised in the appellant's witness statement; however, despite the limited evidence, there is no reason not to believe the appellant on this issue. It was not challenged by Mr Terrell in any event. I also accept that the appellant may well have had a very difficult childhood as explained by him in his witness statement.
22. The reasonably foreseeable consequences for the appellant in this case are being subjected to a period of approximately 8 weeks between the signing of a deprivation order and the making of a further decision on whether to grant leave or to pursue removal/deportation (see [48] of the decision notice). Whilst I accept that the appellant will experience some difficulty because he will not be lawfully employed during the limbo; exactly how this will have an impact on his daughter and her mother is not properly explained. There is no evidence relating to their income in France or indeed the level of support which the appellant gives to them. While the appellant says that his only source of income is from employment and he does not own any assets or property, in oral evidence he explained that he owned a piece of land in Croydon on which he hoped to build a property. While the appellant says that he will be destitute, the evidence was not sufficient to establish this. There were no adequate details of the appellant's income and expenditure to make an informed decision of the impact of not being able to work. The oral evidence in relation to whether the appellant has savings or could borrow from friends was ambiguous.
23. The starting point is the considerable public interest that lies in the deprivation of dishonestly obtained British citizenship. The appellant’s dishonesty led to him being allowed to remain in the country and ultimately to obtain British citizenship to which he was not otherwise entitled. As it was put in Hysaj (Deprivation of Citizenship: Delay) [2020] UKUT 128 (IAC) at [110]:
“There is a heavy weight to be placed upon the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the system by which foreign nationals are naturalised and permitted to enjoy the benefits of British citizenship. That deprivation will cause disruption in day-to-day life is a consequence of the appellant's own actions and without more, such as the loss of rights previously enjoyed, cannot possibly tip the proportionality balance in favour of his retaining the benefits of citizenship that he fraudulently secured.”
24. The paragraph was approved in Laci at [80];
“I respectfully agree with that passage, which is entirely in line with the overall approach to cases where an applicant has obtained British citizenship by fraud. But it is important to note the ‘without more’. Where there is something more (as, here, the Secretary of State's prolonged and unexplained delay/inaction), the problems that may arise in the limbo period may properly carry weight in the overall assessment.”
25. In this case I have considered the “without more” caveat. I find that there is no “more”. While I do not condone the delay, it is not of the nature of that in Laci so as to outweigh the public interest. Moreover, the appellant’s evidence about the consequences for him following not being able to lawfully work in the UK was lacking in detail and ambiguous.
26. As I have stated, there is no reason not to accept that the appellant is a hardworking and a diligent individual or that he has been law abiding since his arrival in the UK. I accept that not being able to work in the UK will cause him some distress. I have made no findings concerning his early life and ill treatment at the hands of his adoptive parents because it is not necessary for me to do so. These factors may assist the appellant in any future claim.
NOTICE OF DECISION
27. The appeal is dismissed.

Joanna McWilliam
Upper Tribunal Judge McWilliam
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
16 October 2026