Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002312
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56676/2023
LP/04572/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

14TH August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DEAKIN

Between

HH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Stuart Kerr (counsel) instructed by Barnes Harrild and Dyer Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Arifa Ahmed (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 30 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant brings this appeal with permission against the 25 February 2026 decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana to refuse her appeal on asylum and human rights grounds.
2. The background to this appeal can be set out shortly.
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq. She claims that in 2015, while working the for the Turkmeneli Party as a receptionist, she witnessed a shooting. She states that subsequent to this shooting she received threats and that she was instructed not to attend future court hearings in relation to this shooting. The Appellant and her family then left Iraq in 2015. They travelled through various countries until they reached Sweden, where they claimed asylum. That asylum claim was refused and the Appellant and her family travelled to the United Kingdom in September 2020. The Appellant claimed asylum in the United Kingdom under the Family Asylum Claim Process on 3 September 2020. The Secretary of State refused her claim by decision of 8 September 2023. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal.
4. The Appellant’s appeal was heard by the First-tier Tribunal on 4 December 2025. Both the Appellant and her husband relied on witness statements. It was agreed before me that the Appellant’s husband also gave oral evidence at that hearing. The Judge did not accept that the Appellant’s account was credible and, as set out above, dismissed the appeal.
5. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. She advanced six grounds of appeal, each containing several sub-grounds. The Judge considering permission granted permission to appeal on all grounds.
6. Insofar as is material Ground 1 provides as follows (emphasis original):
GROUND 1
Material Misapplication of the Standard of Proof and Flawed Credibility
Assessment

The Judge materially erred in law in the approach to credibility.

1. The correct standard in a protection claim is whether there is a real risk or reasonable degree of likelihood of persecution. The determination does not demonstrate that this lower standard was properly applied.
2. The Judge treated peripheral inconsistencies as determinative of the claim without assessing whether they were material to the core risk narrative.
Examples include:
o Whether the Appellant dropped to the floor or ran into the building;
o Whether a shooting occurred at midday or night;
o Whether she attended work the following day.
These are not central to the essence of the claim (that she witnessed a politically motivated shooting, gave a police statement, and received threats). The Judge failed to consider whether discrepancies were explicable by trauma, passage of time (approximately ten years), and limited education.
3. The Appellant was recognised as a vulnerable witness. However, the decision fails to demonstrate that vulnerability was factored into the assessment of inconsistencies. A mere statement that vulnerability was acknowledged is insufficient; there must be evidence that it informed the credibility assessment.
4. The Judge drew adverse conclusions from the Appellant’s failure to report threats to police without engaging with background evidence concerning fear of reprisals, distrust of authorities, or ineffectiveness of protection mechanisms in Iraq. This amounts to speculation rather than reasoned evaluation.

The cumulative approach taken to credibility is legally flawed and materially unsafe.
7. Before me Mr Kerr, Counsel for the Appellant, noted that he intended to apply to adduce witness statements from the Appellant and her husband going to the issue of whether the Appellant’s husband gave oral evidence at the hearing. Mr Kerr indicated that he intended to argue that the Judge had failed to address the Appellant’s husband’s evidence and that, insofar as it was necessary, he would make an application to amend his grounds accordingly. He formulated the proposed amendment as follows: “That the Judge erred in law in that she failed to consider relevant evidence which potentially corroborates the Appellant’s account and failing to do so undermines her credibility findings”.
8. Ms Ahmed, for the Secretary of State, properly accepted that the Appellant’s husband had, in fact given evidence. There was therefore no need for the further witness statements to be adduced.
9. Having heard submissions from both parties as to whether an application to amend the Grounds was required and, if so, whether such an application should be granted, I indicated that it did not seem to me an amendment was necessary. Ground 1 was concerned with whether the Judge’s approach to the credibility assessment was flawed. It seemed to me that, in addressing this Ground, it was open to Mr Kerr to rely on the fact that the Judge did not appear to have taken any account of the Appellant’s husband’s written or oral evidence.
10. In any event, and as I indicated, had I been required to determine the application for permission to amend the grounds, I would have granted the application. Despite its being raised late, in my judgment the proposed amendment closely tracks the pleaded Ground 1, it could properly be dealt with at the hearing before me without the need for an adjournment (I made clear I was prepared to give Ms Ahmed time to consider the point), and it was potentially highly material to the merits of the appeal. I note that Ms Ahmed, with conspicuous fairness, drew my attention to authority pointing to the importance of properly dealing with witness evidence.
11. Having indicated to the parties that I would permit the Appellant to raise these points, I rose to enable the parties an opportunity to confer. Having discussed the matter Mr Kerr and Ms Ahmed agreed that the appropriate course of action would be for me to allow the appeal, set aside the decision in its entirety, and remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing. (I note that Ms Ahmed indicated that she remained of the view that the other Grounds of Appeal were defensible.)
12. As I indicated at the hearing, I agree that this is an appropriate way to proceed. In my judgment, the Judge’s failure to grapple with the Appellant’s husband’s corroborative evidence plainly undermines her credibility assessments and renders the decision unsafe.
13. I am grateful to Mr Kerr and Ms Ahmed for their assistance in this appeal.

Notice of Decision
1. The appeal allowed.
2. The Decision is set aside in its entirety.
3. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge.

ANDREW DEAKIN

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

31 July 2026