Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002328
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63390/2024
LP/00873/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
10th of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING

Between

LS
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Not legally represented
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals with permission a decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss his appeal against the decision of the respondent to refuse to grant him asylum.
2. I have not found an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge's determination and therefore uphold that decision.

Background
3. By way of background, the appellant is a Bangladeshi national. He claimed asylum because he was a member of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and undertook various activities for them. In 2018 the appellant said that he was physically attacked by members of the Awami League. Later in the same year they filed false charges against him. The police came to arrest him and the appellant's father sent him to live in Dhaka. Further false charges were filed in 2021. The appellant fears further persecution in Bangladesh because of his faith. He is Monipuri Hindu.
4. The appellant's appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal. The Judge did not accept that the appellant was a member of the BNP or that he had received adverse attention from the Awami League. The Judge did not accept that there were false charges against the appellant. The Judge in any event found that even taking the appellant's claim at its highest he was nothing more than a low-level supporter of the BNP and given the change in country conditions this would not place him at real risk on return.

The hearing
5. The appellant confirmed at the outset of the hearing that he did not have a lawyer representing his interests. I went through the paperwork that I had and he confirmed that he was aware of this. I explained to the appellant my role and explained that the hearing would be to consider whether the First-tier Tribunal Judge ("the Judge") had made a mistake of fact or law which meant her decision needed to be set aside and a decision in his appeal remade. I explained that even though it was his appeal and I would ordinarily ask him to make his submissions first, I would invite Ms Ahmed to make submissions first so that he could see how this was done, albeit I would not expect him to do this with her level of experience. I explained that I might ask him questions to try and assist him in properly presenting his appeal. I heard helpful submissions from both Ms Ahmed and the appellant.
6. I should record at the end of his submissions the appellant said he would like a lawyer to help him. I clarified what he meant by this. He confirmed that he was not seeking an adjournment to secure legal representation but that after today he would like assistance in the future.
7. The appellant advanced seven grounds of appeal:
Ground 1 - Procedural unfairness arising from the refusal of an adjournment.
Ground 2 - Procedural unfairness/irregularity arising from the failure to consider a "new matter".
Ground 3 - Credibility findings being made without oral evidence.
Ground 4 - Failure to consider material evidence.
Ground 5 - Failure properly to consider the impact of changed country conditions.
Ground 6 - Failure to assess cumulative risk arising from the appellant's BNP activities and religion.
Ground 7 - Failure properly to assess Article 8 ECHR.
8. In granting permission to appeal, the Judge granting permission did not restrict the grant. However, it is clear from the grant that the focus was centred upon Grounds 1 and 3.

Analysis
9. I turn first to Ground 1. Ground 1 also has a direct bearing upon Grounds 3 and 6.
10. The Judge sets out the procedural background to the appellant's case at paragraphs 6-19 of her determination. The chronology relevant to the adjournment application begins at paragraph 11. The appellant applied for an adjournment on 5 September 2025 because he asserted that his case involved a new matter. On 8 September 2025 that application was refused. I will return to the new matter issue in due course because it is relevant to other grounds advanced. Remaining with the procedural fairness of the refusal of the adjournment request, I turn to the next step of the chronology.
11. The Judge records that at 23:51 on 8 September 2025 the appellant made a further application for an adjournment on health grounds. He explained that he had attended a GP appointment but did not have a formal fit note and would only be able to obtain one after 9 September 2025.
12. The Judge then recorded the sequence of events on the day of the hearing:
13. At 10.17, the Tribunal clerk emailed the Appellant: “Judge [] has considered your application to adjourn on ill-health grounds and has noted that you do not have a fit note that confirms you are unable to attend. However, noting that you have been prescribed amoxycillin for your cough and that there is a Tube strike which might render it difficult for you to attend in person, she has decided that in the interests of fairness you may attend by video link ("CVP") so that you have the opportunity to present your case. As to the "new matter", Judge [] notes that this was in fact discussed at the previous hearing on 28 August and can be raised against as a preliminary issue with the Home Office Presenting Officer once you join the hearing remotely. The interpreter is present at the centre but you will be able to use their services as previously discussed. Please provide a phone number so that the clerk will be able to contact you.”
14. The Appellant replied at 11.01: “I am writing to inform you that I am unable to attend the scheduled video hearing for my asylum appeal due to circumstances beyond my control. Firstly, I am currently unwell, suffering from a severe cough and headaches, which makes me unable participate in the hearing. In addition, I am facing significant technical issues, including problems with my mobile device and an unstable internet connection, which prevent me from joining the video session. As i previously said in my last hearing date that i do not have Laptop/pc or intenet connection to properly access this things. I attached a copy of condition of my mobile. I kindly request your understanding and assistance in rescheduling the hearing after allowing me time to recover from my illness.” He attached a screenshot of a mobile phone with a cracked screen. He did not provide a phone number as required.
15. The clerk replied at 11.56 saying that the Hearing would go ahead at 12.20 and suggesting that the Appellant should join using the device on which he had taken the photograph of his damaged phone. The Appellant replied at 12.23: “The device i took the picture of my damaged smartphone was not mine, one of my friend visited my place this morning to ask about my sickness. He left my place already. Plus i cannot borrow his device for my hearing. However, i am physically not fit to attend this interview both face-to-face and remotely. I’m barely speaking and having several headaches. Kindly allow me time for recovery.”
13. The Judge then went on to explain her reasons for refusing the adjournment request at paragraphs 16-19 of her determination. I shall turn to those shortly. However, it is material that the Judge subsequently received a fit note from the appellant on 15 September 2025 and concluded that it made no material difference to her assessment.
14. The power to adjourn a hearing falls within the Tribunal's case management powers, specifically Rule 4(3)(h) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. That power must be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective.
15. Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 418 (IAC) provides guidance as to the correct approach when exercising that power. It holds that where an adjournment refusal is challenged the question is not whether the First-tier Tribunal acted reasonably. Rather, the issue is one of fairness: whether the refusal deprived the affected party of a fair hearing.
16. Rule 28 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 further provides that the Tribunal may proceed with a hearing in a party's absence if it considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so. The exercise of that power must give effect to the overriding objective, including avoiding delay so far as is compatible with the proper consideration of the issues.
17. The question therefore is not whether I would have granted the adjournment. Nor is the question whether the Judge acted reasonably in refusing it. The question is whether the appellant was deprived of a fair hearing.
18. Turning to the Judge's reasons, these are contained at paragraphs 16-19 of her determination.
19. The Judge explained that she considered it fair, appropriate and consistent with the overriding objective to refuse the adjournment and proceed in the appellant's absence. She noted that an adjournment would result in significant delay before the matter could be relisted. The Judge therefore applied her mind to the correct test. The issue of delay was also a matter she was plainly entitled to take into account pursuant to Rule 2(2)(e).
20. The Judge was not satisfied that there was adequate medical evidence demonstrating that the appellant was incapable of participating remotely, nor was there sufficient evidence that he lacked access to the necessary technology. The Judge noted that the appellant had entered the United Kingdom as a student and had demonstrated an ability to communicate extensively with the Tribunal by email, including the transmission of lengthy written representations and supporting evidence. Again these were all matters that the Judge was entitled to take into consideration when reaching her decision.
21. Of particular significance is that the Judge did not simply refuse the adjournment request and proceed. Rather, she considered whether the appellant could participate by alternative means and expressly facilitated attendance via CVP. The appellant was provided with joining instructions and invited to provide a telephone number so that arrangements could be made for his participation. It was therefore open to the Judge to conclude that reasonable steps had been taken to secure the appellant's participation before proceeding in his absence.
22. The Judge further found that there was no new matter requiring consideration by the respondent and that the appellant had been provided with the hearing bundle and joining instructions. The Judge concluded that the appellant was able to participate in the hearing but failed to do so despite being afforded the opportunity.
23. Having delayed proceedings to allow further time for the appellant to attend, the Judge proceeded to hear submissions from the respondent and reserved her decision.
24. The Judge also considered a fitness for work note produced after the hearing but concluded that it did not alter her assessment that the appellant was capable of effective participation on the hearing date. The Judge expressly directed herself to Nwaigwe and concluded that it was fair to proceed in the appellant's absence.
25. What fairness requires is context dependent and the courts have recognised that the highest standards of fairness apply in asylum appeals: SH (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 1284. However, in the particular circumstances of this case, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal did not act unfairly by refusing the adjournment.
26. The Judge directed herself correctly to the applicable legal principles both in form and substance. She was entitled to take into account the procedural history of the appeal and the delay which would arise from a further adjournment. She was also entitled to attach limited weight to the Statement of Fitness for Work. It is a retrospective document completed by a nurse. It does not state that the appellant was incapable of participating in a remote hearing on 9 September 2025.
27. I am mindful that the Judge granting permission considered it arguable that the fit note subsequently produced by the appellant might call into question the fairness of proceeding in his absence. However, the issue is not whether such a document was later obtained but whether, viewed objectively and by reference to the information available at the time of the hearing, the Judge acted unfairly in refusing the adjournment application. The Judge expressly considered the fit note once it was produced and gave sustainable reasons for concluding that it did not demonstrate that the appellant was incapable of participating effectively in a remote hearing on 9 September 2025. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that the later production of the fit note renders the proceedings unfair or undermines the Judge's conclusion that it was appropriate to proceed.
28. Ground 1 is not made out.
29. Turning to Ground 2 and the issue of the new matter.
30. A new matter is defined at section 85 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. In essence, a matter will amount to a new matter where it raises a ground of appeal falling within section 84 and has not previously been considered by the Secretary of State, either as part of the decision under appeal or in response to information provided by the appellant pursuant to section 120. Put another way, a matter is not "new" if the substance of it has already been considered by the Secretary of State in the immigration decision-making process.
31. The appellant had benefitted from a Case Management Review Hearing ("CMRH"). The Judge who heard the appeal was the same Judge who conducted the CMRH. She sets out that procedural background at paragraphs 9 and 10 of her determination. For ease:
9. At the CMRH, the Appellant also raised the issue of his religion. This had been addressed in his witness statement in general terms. The Respondent (then represented by []) confirmed that while this was a new issue, it was not a “new matter”. It had been raised in the reasons for refusal letter, and the Respondent had enough detail to be able to cross examine the Appellant on it at the Hearing without the Appellant having to upload a further statement, and there was no requirement for a further Respondent review.
10. I referred the Appellant to a number of CPINs and gave him the online links to those. This included the CPIN “Bangladesh: Religious Minorities and Atheists” from June 2025. Again, I set these out in the case management summary and directions following the CMRH
32. The Judge was plainly alive to the issue. There had already been agreement that there was no new matter requiring consideration by the respondent. Furthermore, the appellant's religious claim was considered substantively, as is apparent from paragraphs 53 and 54 of the determination. Therefore ground 2 is not established.
33. In relation to Ground 4 and the complaint that the Judge failed to consider extensive documentary evidence, it is trite that there is no obligation upon a judge to refer to every piece of evidence. A determination must be read fairly and as a whole.
34. The Judge undertook a detailed credibility assessment at paragraphs 34-52. She found the evidence to be vague, identified inconsistencies within the appellant's account and considered the apparent tension between aspects of BNP ideology and the appellant's claimed faith. She also considered the documentary evidence in some detail.
35. The Judge specifically addressed the documentation at paragraphs 43-51 and provided sustainable reasons for attaching little weight to it. She also explained at paragraph 52 why she did not accept that the appellant had come to the adverse attention of the authorities as claimed.
36. Ground 4 discloses no material error of law.
37. The Judge went on to explain why she did not accept that false criminal proceedings had been brought against the appellant at paragraphs 39-51.
38. Ground 5 asserts that the Judge failed properly to consider the consequences of the fall of the Hasina government and evidence concerning the targeting of Hindus by non-state actors.
39. The submission is not made out. The Judge undertook a detailed analysis of country conditions at paragraphs 32 and 33 of her determination. Her assessment of risk on return, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation is contained at paragraphs 55-64. At paragraph 54 she specifically analysed the country evidence concerning Hindus in Bangladesh. In reality Ground 5 amounts to disagreement with findings which were properly open to the Judge rather than the identification of a legal error.
40. Ground 6 is likewise not made out. The Judge made adverse findings concerning the appellant's claimed political profile, the authenticity and reliability of the supporting documentation and the existence of any arrest warrant. The Judge separately considered the religious claim at paragraphs 53 and 54.
41. The difficulty for the appellant is that the Judge rejected the factual foundations underpinning each component of the cumulative risk argument. There was therefore no accepted combination of risk factors requiring a further cumulative assessment beyond that already undertaken by the Judge.
42. Turning finally to Ground 7. The Judge's analysis of Article 8 is contained at paragraphs 67-73 of her determination. She carefully explained why, applying the private life provisions of the Immigration Rules, there would not be very significant obstacles to the appellant's integration in Bangladesh.
43. The Judge found that he would have the benefit of support from family members and/or friends on return and therefore would not be without a support network. The Judge further considered that the appellant speaks the language, is familiar with the culture and society of Bangladesh, and would be capable of re-establishing himself there on a day-to-day basis. The Judge also found that he would be capable of obtaining employment, noting his previous work experience in a shop and identifying no reason why he could not undertake similar work upon return.
44. Those findings were plainly open to the Judge and reflect the broad evaluative assessment required by the authorities.
45. There is nothing within Ground 7 that demonstrates that the Judge made a legal error in her approach to Article 8. Whilst the appellant submits that the Judge failed properly to apply the approach in Razgar, that submission is not borne out by a fair reading of the determination. The Judge explained at paragraph 71 why she was not satisfied that Article 8(1) was engaged. Strictly speaking, that finding was sufficient to dispose of the claim.
46. However, even if the Judge was wrong in that regard, she proceeded to consider the matter in the alternative and undertook a full proportionality assessment. The Judge set out the public interest considerations, considered the appellant's immigration history and private life, and conducted a balancing exercise at paragraph 72. No challenge is advanced to the factual findings underpinning that alternative assessment. In those circumstances, even if the Judge's conclusion regarding Article 8(1) were arguably open to debate, the alternative proportionality assessment provides a complete and sustainable answer to the appellant's Article 8 case.
47. There is nothing within Ground 7 which demonstrates a material error of law.
48. Standing back and considering the grounds both individually and cumulatively, I am satisfied that the appellant has not identified a material error of law in the Judge's decision. The determination demonstrates careful engagement with the procedural history, the documentary evidence, the country evidence and the applicable legal framework. The findings reached were adequately reasoned and were properly open to the Judge on the evidence before her. The grounds amount, in substance, to disagreement with conclusions that were available to the Judge rather than the identification of any material legal error.
49. Accordingly, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

Conclusion
50. None of the grounds of appeal discloses a material error of law in the reasoning or conclusions of the First-tier Tribunal. I decline to set the decision aside.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law.
The appellant's appeal is dismissed.

RA Pickering
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
10 September 2026