Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002337; UI-2026-002338
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/02277/2024; HU/02284/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9 October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE P LODATO
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE R FRANTZIS

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (‘SSHD’)
Appellant
and

FILIMON TEWELDE KIDANE
BISRAT TEWELDE KIDANE
Respondents

Representation:
For the Appellants: Ms M Cleghorn (Counsel on a Direct Access basis)
For the Respondent: Mr A McVeety (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 5 October 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“the FtT”), dated 13th January 2026, to allow these two linked appeals on human rights grounds.
2. For ease, I shall refer below in this decision to the Parties as they were before the FtT.
Background
3. The broad factual background to the appeal is not in dispute. The Appellants are siblings. Filimon was born on 3rd January 2008 and Bisrat on 5th February 2010 They are nationals of Eritrea, currently residing in Uganda. They applied on 2nd May 2024 (when Filimon was 16 and Bisrat 14) for entry clearance by way of family reunion as the children of a refugee, namely Awet Tewelde, who was born on 26th October 2005. Those applications were considered and refused by the Respondent under Appendix Family Reunion (Protection).
Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. It is common ground that the Immigration Rule applicable to the Appellants’ applications both at the time of application and the Respondent’s decision was contained in Appendix CNP: Appendix Child staying with or joining a Non-Parent Relative (Protection). That is because Awet is the Appellants’ older brother, not their parent.
5. Following an adjourned hearing before the FtT, at which the issue of the applicable Immigration Rule was considered, the Respondent uploaded a Review dated 28th October 2025, dealing with her position both under Appendix Child Relative (Sponsors with Protection) and Appendix Family Reunion (Protection). The former was the applicable Rule at the time of the Review, Appendix CNP having been deleted.
6. In allowing the appeals, the FtT made the following findings of fact:
“4. The burden of proof is on the Appellants on the balance of probabilities. The relevant immigration rules are set out in CRP 3.2, and [297 (i)(f)] of HC 395 Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules (“the rules”).
6. I bear in mind Siddiqa v ECO [2024] EWCA Civ 248 but note that it was obvious from the application that the wrong form was used and the Respondent did not need “to chase shadows” to ascertain what the application was for.
…
20. I do not accept they have other close family who could reasonably be expected to care for them in Uganda as I accept that they have lost their parents and grandparents, and there is no evidence of them having any other relatives in Uganda. It is not reasonable to expect Awet to move to Uganda to be with them as he is a refugee and has settled here and is making a life for himself and can work and provide for them here whereas there is no evidence he will be able to in Uganda.
21. Whilst there were no bank statements or employer’s letter to support his payslips, I have no reason to doubt their authenticity. They establish he has a net income that fluctuates around £550 per week, from which I accept at the date of decision and now he can pay his rent and other living essentials and transfer £200 to £300 per month to the Appellants for their living requirements which he will not have to do if they are here.
22. Whilst there is no confirmation form the landlord that he consents to the Appellants sharing Awat’s 2 bedroom flat (which I have no reason to doubt is large enough for them all) the tenancy agreement refers to him being able to live there with his dependents which the Appellant are, and it does not say that the landlord’s consent is required. I am satisfied it is therefore available and suitable.
23. Accordingly, they have established that there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make there exclusion undesirable and [297(i)(f)] is met, and as at the date of application both were under 18, were not living an independent life, and could be adequately maintained and accommodated without recourse to public funds.
24. Their primary family life is with each other and Awet given their particular circumstances even though that was interrupted when he had to flee to seek international protection. Keeping them separated can have consequences of gravity given the low threshold. The interference is not lawful as the rules were met, or pursuing the legitimate aim of maintaining the integrity of immigration control as they met the rules.
25. In relation to proportionality, even though Filimon is now 18 years and 1 week old, there is no bright line in establishing he has the maturity or ability to care for his adolescent sister, and it is in all their best interest to be together. Bisrat is only 15. They are living in exceptional and compassionate circumstances, and there are unjustifiably harsh consequences to them in not being granted entry clearance as they will remain separated. Their ability to speak English has not been established and counts against them. I accept they can be provided for at no extra cost to the public purse for the reasons already given and this is therefore a neutral factor. There is a real risk to Bisrat’s personal and physical integrity as a 15-year-old girl without adequate male patronage (Filimon only just having tuned 18). The balancing exercise falls with them for all these reasons.”
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The SSHD’s Grounds for Permission to appeal are succinctly pleaded as follows:
“Misdirection in law/Failure to give adequate reasons
1. The Tribunal have allowed this appeal “under 297(i)(f) (23)”. 2. The Respondent submits this should only have been considered under Para 297 if the sponsor was present and settled in the UK. The Respondent submits that as the sponsor is in the UK with asylum leave until 2028 he is not currently settled. In allowing this appeal under 297(i)(f) the Tribunal has clearly erred in law.”
Discussion
8. During the course of discussions, Mr McVeety accepted that the findings made by the FtT met the substantive requirements of the Immigration Rule applicable at the time of the Appellants’ application to enter the United Kingdom and at the date of the hearing before the FtT. Specifically, the unchallenged findings of the FtT that (i) the Appellants and Sponsor are related as siblings as claimed and there is family life between them [24] (ii) there is no other close family who could reasonably be expected to care for the Appellants [20] (iii) the Appellants will be maintained and accommodated by the Sponsor in the United Kingdom without recourse to public funds [23] and (iv) there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make exclusion of the applicant undesirable [23].
9. In light of the unchallenged findings, we asked Mr McVeety if his position was that the error of law by reference to paragraph 297 of the Immigration Rules was, whilst technical, not material. Mr McVeety stated that he could not argue that the error was material in light of the fact that (i) the Respondent had considered and reflected on the Immigration Rule applicable at the date of the hearing (Appendix Child Relative (Sponsors with Protection)) and dealt with the same in her Review (ii) the FtT had allowed the appeal on human rights grounds following a proper proportionality analysis wherein it was found that the Appellants were “living in exceptional and compassionate circumstances, and there are unjustifiably harsh consequences to them in not being granted entry clearance as they will remain separated” and (iii) the findings of fact were not challenged.
10. In those circumstances we did not need to hear from Ms Cleghorn. Whilst the concession on the part of the SSHD was not determinative of the appeal before us, we took the view that it was properly made in the circumstances of this case and supported our view that any error could not be regarded as material. We announced our decision to dismiss the appeal.

Notice of Decision
The Decision of the FtT did not involve the making of a material error of law and shall stand.

Roxanne Frantzis
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8th October 2026