Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002353
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/53465/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA

Between

Rafal Andrzej Krasinski
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J Heybroek, counsel instructed by Kitty Falls Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Secretary of State has been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal allowing the appellant’s deportation appeal following a hearing which took place on 2 March 2026.
2. However, for ease of reference hereafter the parties will be referred to as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.
Anonymity
3. The First-tier Tribunal did not issue an anonymity order. I have considered the principle of open justice and see no reason to make an order, so none is made.
Factual Background
4. The appellant is a national of Poland now aged thirty-five. He first arrived in the United Kingdom during 2007 and last arrived here in May 2013, along with his partner. The appellant was granted leave to remain under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) on 29 February 2020. On 27 June 2023, the appellant was arrested for offences including possession of a Class A drug. Thereafter he was convicted of several driving offences including dangerous driving, driving while disqualified and driving without insurance.
5. On 1 May 2024, the appellant was sentenced following a further conviction for dangerous driving and driving while disqualified, for which he was sentenced to 1 year and two months’ imprisonment in total, following a guilty plea.
6. A decision to make a deportation order was made on 14 May 2024. The appellant appealed that decision but subsequently withdrew the appeal.
7. The appellant subsequently made representations on human rights grounds, based primarily on his family life with a child and partner. The partner is the appellant’s former wife and mother of his twelve year old daughter. Those representations were refused by way of a decision dated 28 February 2025. A deportation order was signed the same day.
8. In refusing the human rights claim the respondent did not accept that the appellant had a genuine and subsisting relationship with his child nor partner. The respondent noted that the child was settled in the Uk and that she was neither “compelled to leave the UK,” and nor was it “anticipated she would leave the UK as her primary carer is her mother.” It was not accepted that it would be unduly harsh for the child nor partner to remain in the UK were the appellant to be deported. It was noted that the appellant could not meet the requirements of Exception 1 as he had not been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life and nor was it accepted that there were very compelling circumstances which outweighed the public interest in his deportation.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
9. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the judge was informed that outstanding drugs offences were no longer showing as pending on the Police National Computer records. The issues in dispute were whether the appellant could meet the requirements of Exception 2 to deportation in relation to his minor daughter or partner, or whether there were very compelling circumstances which outweighed the public interest in his deportation.
10. The appeal was allowed on the basis that it would be unduly harsh for the appellant’s partner and child to remain in the United Kingdom without him.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. In the sole ground of appeal, it is argued that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for findings on a material matter. In essence, the respondent argues that the judge’s reasons to support the conclusion that it would be unduly harsh for the child or partner to live in the UK without the appellant, in relation to Exception 2, did not establish that the high threshold had been made out.
12. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis sought.
13. A Rule 24 response was filed, dated 2 June 2026, in which the appeal was opposed.
The error of law hearing
14. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. A bundle was submitted by the Secretary of State containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
15. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
16. Mr Nappey’s submissions strayed beyond the grounds in that he submitted that the judge had failed to address to go scenario in relation to the child. This complaint did not form part of the grounds and there was no application to amend them. Mr Nappey was content to accept that this was the case
Discussion
17. The grounds consist of a series of disagreements with discrete findings made by the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Nappey’s submissions were of the same ilk.
18. In examining the decision under challenge I am guided by what was said in Kapikanya [2025] EWCA Civ 987, which sets out the correct approach to appellate scrutiny of the reasoning of specialist FTT decisions. At paragraph 20 a number of propositions are set out with approval, which I reproduce here.
"(1) The FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, and the UT should not rush to find an error of law in its decisions simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently, as the appeal is available only on a point of law: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UK HL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678, at [30];
(2) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010 UKSC 49 [2011] 2 All ER 65, at [45];
(3) When it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 [2013] 2 All ER 625, at [25];
(4) The issues that the FTT is deciding and the basis on which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [27], and
(5) The judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so: see A4 (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 [2020] 4 WLR 145, at [34]."
19. With such judicial restraint in mind, I now examine the grounds in detail.
20. The respondent takes issue with the fact that the judge accepted the oral and written evidence of the appellant’s partner in the absence of corroborating evidence such as the report of a social worker or a letter from the school which addressed the behaviour of the appellant’s child, which was said to have deteriorated when the appellant was serving his sentence.
21. The judge refers to oral evidence from the appellant’s partner on this point at [15] and records that the child had stopped participating in school activities and isolated herself in her bedroom as a result of her parents’ separation. The judge found the partner to be a credible witness. It was not argued either before either the First-tier Tribunal nor Upper Tribunal that the judge was wrong to reach such a conclusion. I heard that the respondent’s submissions before the First-tier Tribunal focused on relevant the legal tests. In the absence of any challenge to her credibility, the judge was entitled to rely upon her testimony without further corroboration. In any event, this matter formed a very small part of the judge’s reasons for finding that Exception 2 was met.
22. Also criticised was the judge’s finding that the appellant’s absence would lead to a fall in the household income. The respondent’s submission being that this “in itself” would not lead to unduly harsh circumstances because of the availability of benefits. This complaint amounts to little more than disagreement. The judge’s conclusion that the absence of the appellant’s contribution to the household expenses from his employment would lead to a fall in household income was not wrong or irrational. While benefits could be claimed, I was referred to no figures to demonstrate that this would meet the shortfall of approximately £2,000 per month.
23. Mr Nappey argued that the judge did not take into account that the partner had close relatives in the United Kingdom which could help mitigate the financial aspects. There is no reason to conclude that the judge was not cognisant of this fact, after all there is reference to these relatives in the partner’s witness statement. Indeed, at [2], the judge confirmed that she had taken all the documents into account. It is not necessary for the judge to refer to every aspect of that evidence.
24. Mr Nappey further submitted that the appellant’s partner and child managed without his financial contribution when he was imprisoned. What this submission overlooks is that the partner’s medical condition is a recent event, as shown in the fairly recent award of PIP in late 2025. The result of the partner’s medical condition is that she is now only able to work part-time. Again, the judge did not consider this matter in isolation but along with a series of other relevant matters which were considered cumulatively.
25. The respondent complains that the judge ‘refers’ to the partner’s medical condition and that there was no evidence that the assistance of the daughter would be required nor that the partner could not continue to provide adequate care for the daughter.
26. While the grounds refer to [20 b)] of the decision, much of the detail considered by the judge is overlooked, which I set out here:
“There is documentary evidence that the Appellant’s former wife suffers from a chronic condition, granulomatosis. I heard oral evidence, which I accept, that one of the reasons she does not earn more is due to the impact of her illness. The impact of the illness on her daily life has been ‘scored’ for the purposes of a Personal Independence Payment assessment (pp.179 – 180). The tally shows that she needs an aid or assistance with several aspects of daily life. I accept the evidence, in the statement (p.198) that the symptoms fluctuate; this is consistent with an article about the condition (from p.188). I deal with this appeal on the basis that if the Appellant is deported, his daughter would be living alone in a household with a sick adult and that she would be called upon to assist her mother at times when the latter’s symptoms deteriorate. It is a factor which in my view, aggravates the other challenges the child would face following the Appellant’s deportation.”
27. The PIP assessment shows that it was awarded for assistance with the partner’s daily living needs including preparing food, washing, toilet needs, dressing and moving around. The judge’s finding that the daughter would be called upon to assist during episodes when the symptoms flare up is little more than a common sense finding given that in the absence of the appellant, the daughter is the only other person in the household.
28. It is argued, at paragraphs 8-14 of the grounds, that the judge failed to have regard to the established case law in considering the meaning of the term “unduly harsh.” That contention is not borne out by a consideration of the judge’s decision. At [11] the judge directed herself correctly in that she set out the formulation approved in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22:
“Unduly harsh does not mean uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. It is a considerably more elevated threshold. “Harsh” denotes something severe, or bleak and the addition of the adverb "unduly" raises the already elevated standard still higher.”
29. At [21, the judge considered her findings cumulatively and made no error in concluding, that together, the circumstances would make it unduly harsh on the appellant’s partner and daughter to remain in the United Kingdom without him. There is no basis for saying that the judge failed to apply the binding case law which she had cited earlier in the decision.
30. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was replete with reasons and therefore the headline complaint in the grounds, of inadequacy of reasons, is simply not made out. In reality, the respondent’s challenge goes to perversity, in that it was not open to the judge to make the finding she did. On this point, I bear in mind the judgment in MM (Lebanon) [2017] UKSC 10 at [107]:
“tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case … The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what may seem an unusually generous view of the facts of a particular case does not mean that it has made an error of law.”
31. To conclude, the judge arrived at her decision having correctly directed herself, applied that self-direction and having provided full and sustainable reasons.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 August 2026