Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002358
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/60184/2024
LH/02002/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

FERDINAND TAIWO AMAO
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Shea of Counsel, instructed by Excellum Legal
For the Respondent: Ms K Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dated 15 January 2026 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 13 August 2024 refusing his human rights claim.
2. The appellant had applied for leave to remain on the basis of his private life, and was refused on the basis of suitability and eligibility. He was considered to have made false representations, having obtained a UK driving licence and National Insurance number and having accepted employment. He was not in any event assessed as facing any very significant obstacles to reintegration nor otherwise having exceptional circumstances such as to make refusal disproportionate. The FtT agreed with respondent on all of those issues.
3. The grounds, permission for all of which was given by the Upper Tribunal assert as follows. The FtT failed to assess the appellant's subjective state of knowledge and intention. The FtT treated the appellant’s family’s evidence inconsistently. The FtT gave inadequate weight to the fact that his precarious immigration status arose whilst he was a minor. The FtT’s assessment of the appellant’s ability to integrate into Nigeria was inadequate. Separately or cumulatively, these errors demonstrated a deficient approach to the appeal.
4. The representatives supplemented their parties’ respective written statements of case with oral submissions. Whilst I refer below only to such matters as necessary to understand my reasons, I took those statements of case and submissions, as well as the material to which they referred, into account in their entirety.
Ground 1
5. Ground 1 challenges the FtT’s findings that the appellant knowingly made false representations regarding his right to reside and work in the United Kingdom. The ground does not deny that the representations in question were in fact false, merely that the FtT failed adequately to assess whether the appellant intended to deceive.
6. The representations relied on by the respondent were made when the appellant applied for a driving licence, his National Insurance number and when applying for employment. It was the appellant’s case that he was not asked on the driving licence application form about his immigration status, merely for his United Kingdom birth certificate, National Insurance number and proof of address, and that he acted in good faith, believing when applying that he was genuinely entitled to the document (see paragraph 21 of the appellant’s witness statement). The appellant’s account of obtaining his National Insurance number is that it was issued automatically when he started working, and that he did not realise he needed a lawful immigration status to hold one (paragraph 22). The appellant’s case before the FtT was that he believed that he was entitled to work because he was born in the United Kingdom and had never been told otherwise until adulthood.
7. The appeal before me focussed (perhaps unnecessarily) on the appellant’s belief at the time that he was a British citizen. A weak claim to that effect is made in paragraph 13 of the appellant’s witness statement, which reads in full:
‘13. In 2015, when applying for a travel document, I was shocked to learn for the first time that I did not hold immigration status. Until this point, I had believed I was British or at least had rights through birth in the UK.’
8. Otherwise, the appellant’s witness statement asserts merely that he believed he was entitled to live permanently in the United Kingdom (paragraphs 3, 5, 9, 24, and 39). In fact, the basis on which the appellant might have once believed he was entitled to live and work in the United Kingdom is immaterial given, not only the final sentence in paragraph 13, but also paragraph 14:
‘14. The refusal letter in 2015 was devastating. I was 23 years old, with no legal knowledge. I had no understanding of how to correct the situation.’
9. In short, the appellant accepted that he became aware in 2015 that he had no immigration status in the United Kingdom, that it was a ‘devastating’ situation that needed correcting, but that he did not know how to correct it. On the strength of that evidence, the FtT rejected at [17] the appellant’s claimed belief to be a British citizen, finding instead that the appellant had known since 2015 that he had no lawful status in the United Kingdom. That was a finding entirely permissible, indeed inevitable, to the FtT.
10. At [18], the FtT found that the appellant received job offers in July 2017, June 2022 and April 2022 which refer to the need to evidence a right to work in the United Kingdom. The grounds do not challenge these findings. The evidence also showed that the appellant accepted both of the 2022 offers, in the latter instance signing a statement of terms and conditions expressly stating that employment was conditional on having a right to work in the United Kingdom.
11. The appellant argues in the grounds of appeal that the FtT failed adequately to assess his subjective knowledge and intent, in particular in light of: his having been born in the United Kingdom; his having been led to believe throughout his childhood that he was British; the responsibility for immigration matters having lay with adults; the 2015 refusal having caused shock and confusion; and his subsequent applications representing attempts to resolve his uncertainty. The appellant’s problem is as follows.
12. As found above, the FtT was entitled to reject the appellant’s claim to have believed he was British, noting at [17] also his claim (contrary to paragraph 6 of the grounds) to have been told he was stateless. The FtT noted at [21] that the appellant was 16/17 years old when he arrived, and so it is disingenuous to imply that ‘adults’ were responsible for a matter outside the appellant’s reasonable control beyond those initial 1 to 2 years. Furthermore, the appellant was well into adulthood when he learned of his lack of status, and a further 7 years had passed by the time he accepted employment in June 2022.
13. In short, it was manifestly open to the FtT to find that the appellant had knowingly used deception when accepting work after learning he had no lawful status in the United Kingdom, and certainly when he accepted the position in June 2022.
14. The matter is perhaps less clear cut regarding the appellant’s National Insurance number. There is evidence of the appellant being offered employment in 2014. If it true that he was issued with his National Insurance number when he first worked (a claim the FtT does not appear to deal with) then it is possible that he did not use deception in its issue. However, the FtT makes clear at [19] that it did not accept the truth of the appellant’s evidence. That was a well-reasoned decision open to the FtT. Ultimately, therefore, I agree that the FtT was entitled to find that he had obtained his National Insurance number through deliberate deception.
15. The grounds do not challenge the premise that an applicant must have at least some lawful immigration status to apply for a United Kingdom driver’s licence. The FtT records at [18] that the appellant’s provisional licence was issued in 2018, some 3 years after he discovered he had no such status. It was open to the FtT to require an innocent explanation from the appellant. His claim that the form he completed to apply for a driving licence did not require proof of any particular immigration status, was unsupported by evidence (such as the form in question and/or the published guidance for completing the form). The FtT was entitled to reject the appellant’s explanation and to find instead that the appellant had represented himself as British when making the application.
16. Ground one consequently fails.
Ground 4
17. Even if I had accepted that the FtT had erred in assessing suitability, the appellant would still have to succeed in his assertion that it erred in concluding that there were no very significant obstacles to reintegration into Nigeria. Consequently, it is convenient to take ground 4 next. The FtT’s consideration of that issue can be found at [23], which reads in full:
’23. The appellant speaks English, the main language in Nigeria, he will therefore not face a communication barrier on return. He is well and able bodied and has a working capacity. It being his evidence that he is now working towards being a DJ and music producer. On his own account the has demonstrated resilience living in the UK. The appellant visited Nigeria as child aged 6/7 years. He remains in contact with this mother, a Nigerian national with whom he lived during this formative years. The appellant claimed he had no contact with his father but I have found that he is an unreliable witness, so I place little weight on his evidence. I consider it likely that he has retained some cultural understanding. Even if the appellant does not have family support on return as a well, young man I am satisfied that he is in a position to integrate into society in Nigeria and has capacity to do so. The appellant claimed in his statement that he had support from family in the UK, there was nothing to show that they would not provide short-term financial assistance whilst he settled. I accept that return to Nigeria may be challenging initially but find that the higher burden of very significant obstacles to integration is not met.’
18. The grounds complain that the FtT erred in failing to give adequate reasons for how reintegration would realistically occur. However, the only factors identified in ground 4 are the appellant having lived in the United Kingdom since 2008, never having lived independently in Nigerian society, never having lived there as an adult, and there being no concrete support network.
19. The FtT directed itself at [11] to Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813, and manifestly had in mind the test set out therein by Sales LJ when considering the issue of very significant obstacles. The judge was aware that the appellant had only visited Nigeria when a child [23], that he had lived in the United Kingdom on and off since 2008 ([16], [21] and [22]). The FtT reached its decision on the alternative basis of his not having family support on return [23], despite that clearly being a matter which was doubted.
20. In short, the FtT took into account the matters raised by the grounds when considering the point. The appellant is, therefore, left with an implicit assertion that FtT’s conclusions were perverse. However, he falls well short of that high bar. The finding that there were no very significant obstacles to reintegration fell well within the range of reasonable conclusions.
Ground 2
21. Ground 2 complains that, having attached little weight to the supporting evidence of family members, because it had not been tested in cross-examination, it was inconsistent to find that those relatives could provide financial support to assist in the appellant’s re-integration into Nigeria. However, the grounds misunderstand the FtT’s reasoning on the point.
22. The relevant finding is made at [23]:
‘The appellant claimed in his statement that he had support from family in the UK, there was nothing to show that they would not provide short-term financial assistance whilst he settled.’
23. The finding of present support was made on the strength of the appellant’s evidence, not that of his family. The ASA asserted at paragraph 31 that returning him to Nigeria would result in destitution. Therefore, the absence of future familial support was a matter for the appellant to prove. It was open to the FtT to conclude that he had not done so; furthermore, the conclusion did not involve inconsistent treatment of his family’s evidence.
Ground 3
24. The grounds allege that the FtT failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that the appellant’s precarious immigration status arose when he was a child and was ‘already entrenched’ by the time he reached adulthood.
25. As stated above, the FtT noted at [21] that the appellant was 16/17 years old when he arrived. Furthermore, the appellant was well into adulthood when he learned in 2015 of his lack of status. Even if the FtT should have given more than little weight to the appellant’s private life during the initial 1 to 2 years whilst he was a minor, it was open to the FtT to give little weight overall, especially when no proper basis had or has been given for doing otherwise. That is even more the case given that the appellant has remained unlawfully in the country throughout his adult life and knowingly so for over 10 years.
Ground 5
26. Ground 5 argues that the matters identified in grounds 1 to 4 taken cumulatively show that the FtT attributed knowledge without sufficient analysis, treated family evidence inconsistently and failed fully to examine the impact of childhood dependency on culpability. However, I have considered and rejected each of those criticisms above. The FtT undertook an adequate and legally sound analysis. Consequently, there is no legal error in its proportionality assessment.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law and stands undisturbed.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 October 2026