Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002359
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/81942/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
6th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

WS
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Khan, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Bradford, Phoenix House, on 13 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’) because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Afghanistan. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.

2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 25 February 2026, of a judge of the FtT (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection grounds.

3. The appeal arose in the context of the appellant's claim to be at risk from the Taliban on account of his father’s work with American forces.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

4. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on the following grounds:

• Ground 1 – the judge failed to take the appellant’s young age into account when assessing his credibility.

• Ground 2 – the judge unlawfully relied on an absence of corroboration in rejecting key aspects of the appellant’s factual claim.

• Ground 3 – the judge did not engage with expert evidence about the risks which might flow from the appellant’s westernisation since arriving in the UK.

5. In a decision dated 5 May 2026, a judge of the FtT granted permission for all grounds to be argued.

6. At the error of law hearing, Mr Diwnycz conceded on behalf of the Secretary of State that the decision involved material errors of law on the strength of all three grounds of appeal.

Discussion

7. The respondent did not seek to resist the appeal and invited me to find that there were material errors of law on the face of the decision. It is, of course, not for the respondent to conclusively decide whether a judicial decision involves a material error of law. I am not bound to accept the concession, but the agreement between the parties is an important indication of the strength of the appellant’s arguments. I have considered the grounds of appeal and the challenged decision with care and agree that the decision involves material errors of law.  

8. While all of the grounds of appeal had force, I was particularly persuaded by the second ground. The judge reached the following finding at [31]:

As to that issue I am bound to note that the case therefore depends entirely on the word of the appellant. Whilst I do not hold it against the appellant that there is no corroboration, it seems to me that it would have been reasonable and useful for the appellant’s representatives to approach VICC and ask them for evidence on the issue that one of their employees had been attacked, if it were true.

9. It is well-understood in this jurisdiction that there is no requirement for an appellant seeking asylum to corroborate his claim. If authority were needed for such a proposition, one need look no further than paragraph [77] of the judgment of Singh LJ in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216; [2023] Imm. A.R. 713.

10. The judge accurately directed himself that an asylum-seeker need not corroborate their claim but then went on to hold it against this appellant that he had not obtained corroborative evidence in support of the contention that his father had been targeted in the manner claimed. The judge did not explain why it would be reasonable to expect the third party, VICC, to release to the appellant information held about his father. On any sensible analysis this was the judge seeking out impermissible corroboration. It plainly went to the heart of the appellant’s core narrative about the events which he claimed caused him to fear persecution. I am satisfied that the decision involved material errors of law and that the errors were of such centrality that no findings of fact can be preserved.

Disposal

11. The starting point is paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal which provides: 
 
7.2. The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to remake the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:  

(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or  
 
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal. 
 
12. I have also considered the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). It was common ground between the parties that the appropriate procedural course was to remit the matter to the FtT because of the full-range of fact-finding which remains to be undertaken. I agree.

Notice of Decision

The decision involved a material error of law and is set aside. No findings of fact are preserved. The appeal is remitted to the FtT to be decided de novo.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 July 2026