Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002368
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58452/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29th of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GIBBS

Between

DJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. Raza, Counsel instructed by Charles Simmons Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms. Isherwood, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. I have decided to make an anonymity order in these proceedings because the underlying claim involves a child. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of their identity.
2. This is my remaking decision in respect of the appeal by the appellant against the respondent’s decision to refuse his application for entry clearance to the United Kingdom (“UK”). The appellant’s appeal had been allowed by the First-tier Tribunal, but this decision was set aside by myself following my finding that the decision contained an error of law. I attach a copy of that decision as an Appendix to this decision for ease of reference.
3. In accordance with section 12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 I decided to retain the appeal in the Upper Tribunal in order to remake the decision concerning the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his entry clearance application.
4. After careful consideration I have decided that the refusal of entry clearance is in breach of the appellant’s rights under Article 8 ECHR. Accordingly I have allowed his appeal. The full reasons for this decision follow.
Factual Background
5. The appellant is a citizen of India. He is twelve years of age, although at the date of application he was nine years.
6. It is not disputed that the appellant’s biological parents have died. He has been adopted by his maternal aunt and her husband (the sponsors in this matter). The appellant was adopted in India under the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 (“HAMA”) on 17 December 2019. It is not disputed that this is a lawful adoption in India. The sponsors are both British citizens and on 19 June 2024 applied for the appellant to be granted entry clearance to the UK as an adopted child pursuant to paragraphs 309A-310 of the Immigration Rules.
7. The application was refused in a decision dated 19 June 2024. The respondent’s position is that the appellant has been adopted by way of a customary adoption that has not been conducted by the legal authorities in India. The appellant does not therefore meet paragraph 310 (vi)(a) of the Immigration Rules. The respondent is also not satisfied that the decision is in breach of Article 8 ECHR.
The Re-Hearing in the Upper Tribunal
8. In anticipation of the hearing the appellant submitted a seventy four page “Supplementary Bundle”. I also had before me the “Error of Law Bundle”.
9. In my decision to set aside the First-tier Tribunal decision because of a material error of law, I concluded that the appellant’s adoption had not taken place pursuant to a decision taken by a competent administrative authority or court. Mr. Raza therefore acknowledged that the only issue before me at the re-making hearing was whether the decision was in breach of Article 8 ECHR.
10. It has never been disputed that the appellant’s parents are deceased or that the adoption is anything other than genuine; in India it is a legally recognised adoption. The sponsors are the appellant’s legally recognised parents and I am satisfied that there is a genuine bond of love between the parties. Ms. Isherwood did not seek to challenge the existence of family life and I will therefore proceed on the basis that the first four questions outlined in R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2004 UKHL 27 are answered in the positive.
11. The question therefore is whether the decision is proportionate. In considering this issue I place significant weight on the fact that the appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules as weighing heavily in the public interest in maintaining immigration control.
12. I also have regard to the public interest considerations set out in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. I recognise that the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest and I attach significant weight to that consideration, particularly given that the appellant is unable to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules. However, I am satisfied that (for the reasons set out below) the appellant will be adequately maintained and accommodated by the sponsors without recourse to public funds. As this is an entry clearance appeal concerning a child abroad, the considerations relating to private life established whilst a person is in the United Kingdom, precarious immigration status and unlawful residence have little or no relevance. Taking these matters into account, I am satisfied that the section 117B considerations do not add materially to the public interest side of the proportionality balance beyond the substantial weight already accorded to the appellant's inability to satisfy the Immigration Rules.
13. The evidence before me is that since 2019 the appellant has seen the sponsors as his parents. He is aware of their plan to bring him to the UK and he is keen to join them here. The appellant is currently living with his uncle although the sponsors’ evidence is that this is not suitable as long-term accommodation due to the uncle’s personal circumstances. Whilst there is a dearth of up- to- date evidence submitted on behalf of the appellant, I find that the sponsors are credible witnesses and that there is evidence before me of the financial support that they send to the appellant and the regular visits undertaken by them to see him (six visits from the appellant’s father between 2019-2026 and ten visits by his mother in the same time period).
14. Ms. Isherwood appeared to submit that the sponsors’ failure to involve the UK authorities in this adoption (which could have led to an application under paragraph 316A of the Immigration Rules) is a factor which should weigh against any finding that it is in the appellant’s best interests to be granted entry clearance to the UK. In making this submission she relies on TY (Overseas Adoptions – Certificates of Eligibility) Jamaica [2018] UKUT 00197 (IAC) (paragraphs 34-36) as authority for this submission. I am not persuaded by this submission. I find that TY is authority as to the weight that must be given to the Certificate of Eligibility and does not say that a decision not to follow this path to adoption weighs against the appellant or his adoptive parents.
15. I am satisfied that the sponsors gave consistent oral evidence that they were advised by their legal representative to apply under Paragraph 310 of the Immigration Rules. They were aware that an application under Paragraph 316 would be far more time consuming and expensive and that they were in a position where an alternative route was available to the appellant. I am not persuaded that there is anything nefarious in this decision or suspicious. The couple have legally adopted the appellant in India. Additionally they have obtained a support letter from the Central Adoption Resource Authority (“CARA”) and a judgement from the City Civil Court in Ahmedabad. I am satisfied that this is best served by being able to live with the sponsors. This is not however a definitive finding, but I am satisfied that it weighs in the appellant’s favour in my proportionality assessment.
16. I am also satisfied that the appellant’s British sponsors (and the appellant himself) have at no stage sought to circumvent immigration control. The entry clearance application was properly made and paid for and they have pursued their avenue of appeal, as is their right.
17. Prior to the re-making hearing the respondent had never challenged the sponsors’ ability to adequately maintain and accommodate the appellant. Before me Ms. Isherwood sought to raise the issue because she asserted that one of the bank statements indicated a receipt of benefits although she did not highlight where she had found this information and I was unable to locate any such evidence. However, in cross examination the sponsors accepted that the appellant’s father is in receipt of Universal Credit because he has been unable to work due to receiving treatment for cancer. I am however satisfied that his wife is in regular employment, that the bank statements before me show a steady balance and that there is also evidence of the couple having other savings. In addition they send money to India which will cease on the appellant’s arrival. The respondent has never previously raised the issue of maintenance and accommodation, and I am not persuaded that Ms. Isherwood uncovered any reason for me to depart from this. Further, had I decided that there was an issue I would have adjourned to ensure that the appellant was able to fairly present his case.
18. I find that there are no other adverse public interest considerations weighing against the appellant's admission to the UK apart from his inability to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules. Whilst that factor carries significant weight, the particular facts of this case outweigh the public interest. The appellant is a young child who has already endured the trauma of losing both parents. His current living arrangements are temporary. He is aware that he has been adopted, has a genuine and subsisting relationship with the sponsors, and expects to join them in the United Kingdom. His best interests plainly lie in being permitted to live with his adoptive parents, and I attach significant weight to that consideration. The evidence also establishes that the sponsors are able adequately to maintain and accommodate him, such that his arrival will not place a burden on the public purse. In addition, the sponsors do not, and are unable to, have other children, and the appellant's adoptive father is undergoing treatment for cancer. In those circumstances, the maintenance of family unity assumes particular importance. That is especially so given the genuine nature of the adoption, the longstanding parental relationship between the appellant and the sponsors, and the fact that the appellant has regarded them as his parents for many years. The adoption has never been questioned and is recognised as lawful in India. Taking all matters in the round, the factors weighing in the appellant's favour outweigh the public interest in maintaining immigration control arising from his inability to satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules.
Notice of Decision
19. The appellant’s human rights appeal is ALLOWED.

L K Gibbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
25 September 2026

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002368
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58452/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GIBBS

Between

DJ

(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. Raza, Counsel, Instructed by Link Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms. Keerthy, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 July 2026

The Appellant is a child. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal brought by the respondent against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge (the Judge) promulgated on 2 March 2026 who allowed the appellant’s appeal under Paragraph 310 of the Immigration Rules. For ease of reference I will refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of India. He is a child. His parents are deceased. The appellant was adopted in India under the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 (“HAMA”) on 17 December 2019, which is lawful within India. His adoptive parents are both British Citizens and on 19 June 2024 applied for the appellant to be granted entry clearance to the United Kingdom (UK) as an adopted child pursuant to paragraph 309A-310 of the Immigration Rules.
3. This application was refused by the respondent because the adoption is not accepted as one conducted by legal authorities in India. The adoption is not therefore legal in the UK.
4. The judge concluded that the wrong test had been applied by the respondent. The question was not whether the adoption is legal within India, rather whether there is, in the adoption, a decision by a competent authority or court. The judge concluded that the judgement of the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad in 2022 was such a decision, despite the HAMA which took place three years before, and that therefore the appellant met the requirements of the Immigration Rules and the decision was in breach of Article 8 ECHR.
Grounds of Appeal
5. There is essentially one ground of appeal. This is that the judge erred in treated the City Civil Court judgement as a decision which satisfied the requirements of the Immigration Rules. The respondent relies on ST (Adoptions: ‘overseas’ adoptions: para 310) India [2025] UKUT 00352 (IAC).
Grant of Permission
6. Permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Barker in a decision dated 8 May 2026.
Appeal Hearing
7. The respondent did not file a rule 24 response. The appellant submitted a composite bundle. An appellant’s supplementary bundle was submitted in 15 July 2026. Mr. Raza informed me that this was not relevant to the error of law hearing, only for any re-making decision and he did not make any application for the bundle to be admitted.
8. I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
9. I remind myself of the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, particularly where the fact-finding Judge has considered evidence from a variety of sources and has undertaken an evaluation of it, set in the applicable legal framework. Such decisions must be read holistically and sensibly and that there is no requirement to give reasons for reasons.
10. Mr. Raza seeks to distinguish the facts of this appeal from those in ST. His submission is that in ST the only documents were the Deed of Adoption signed on 13 March 2015 and the judgement and order of a Civil Judge Senior Decision dated 4 December 2015 which declared that the Deed of Adoption was a valid adoption under HAMA. In this appeal however Mr. Raza relies on the document issued by the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad dated 2 July 2022. He submits that this document does far more than the court document that was before the Upper Tribunal in ST. The current document is a decision by the Court putting into effect the adoption i.e. the appellant was adopted in accordance with this decision.
11. The judge’s wording in the decision [18] is:
“I accept that the sponsors have not just carried out a HAMA adoption by deed but gone on to obtain a court decision declaring the adoption to be legal. As a result I am satisfied that the appellant has now been adopted in accordance with a decision taken by a court in his country of origin.
12. It is not contentious to say that on 17 December 2019 a HAMA adoption was completed, and that for the purposes of Indian law this is a lawful adoption. Further, it is not contentious to say that a HAMA adoption is not sufficient for the purposes of the Immigration Rules. Mr. Raza’s submission is that the document titled “Civil Misc. Application No.365 of 2022” does more than merely declare the HAMA adoption to be valid. For example Tthe parties are referred to as “Prospective Adoptive Father” and “Prospective Adoptive Mother” which indicates that until the City Civil Court made its decision the adoption was not in effect. Further, the document concludes with an “Order” “declaring” the sponsors as the appellant’s legal father and mother.
13. Having taken all of the evidence into account, and the Upper Tribunal’s conclusions in ST I am not persuaded by Mr. Raza’s submissions. In ST it is clear that once the HAMA adoption has been carried out the adoption is effective for the purposes of Indian law.
“52. What is clear from the expert evidence before the Judge is that there are some general conditions laid down for there to be a vail adoption under HAMA that is effective in India. There was nothing in the evidence before the Judge that any of the conditions involved any oversight or a decision by a competent administrative authority. The expert evidence was that there is no requirement set out in HAMA that a decision was to be taken by a Court and we discern no evidence in the exert report of any similar requirement in HAMA for the decision to be taken by a competent administrative authority.”
14. I therefore find that the judge erred in concluding that the City Civil Court judgement effected an adoption of the appellant. I find that the appellant had already been legally adopted on 17 December 2019. The City Civil Court judgement is not therefore a document evidencing adoption in accordance with a decision taken by a competent administrative authority or court; this had already taken place. The City Civil Court judgement does no more than to confirm what was already in existence. The adoption did not therefore take place pursuant to a decision taken by a competent administrative authority or court.
15. It was agreed between the parties that if I were to find that there had been an error of law then the matter should be retained by the Upper Tribunal for re-making.

Notice of Decision
16. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involves an error of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
17. The matter is retained by the Upper Tribunal to re-make the decision.

L K Gibbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
25 July 2026