Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002374
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59412/2024
LP/00655/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28 August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JARVIS

Between

EB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. Murphy, Counsel instructed by MBM Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S. Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant and her family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify her (or any member of her family). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. This order is made due to the previous international protection issues in the appeal.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant has appealed against the decision of Judge Rae-Reeves (hereafter “the Judge”) promulgated in March 2026; permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 8 May 2026.

The grant of permission

2. In the grant of permission, First-tier Tribunal Judge Barker acknowledged the Appellant’s complaints that the structure and layout in the decision did not make for easy reading which may have arguably led to a lack of clarity in the findings.

3. Judge Barker otherwise considered that there was arguable merit in the assertion that the Judge had impermissibly failed to consider the relevant factors against the Appellant’s reintegration in the Philippines in totality, and the challenge that the Judge had failed to make adequate findings as to the nature of any ongoing threats in the Philippines as well as the Appellant’s willingness to register in her local area.

The error of law hearing

4. In response to Mr Murphy’s reliance upon the pleaded grounds, Ms Keerthy argued that the ultimate conclusions reached by the Judge were open to him and that the reasoning was legally adequate. Ms Keerthy emphasised that the overall decision showed that the Judge had considered each relevant matter including the Appellant’s fear of moneylenders, her length of residence in the UK, her mental health issues, her family circumstances and her work history.

5. Ms Keerthy also argued that the Judge’s repeated use of the word ‘alone’ was not an indication that the Judge had failed to take into account the broader picture.

6. Furthermore, in respect of ground 2, Ms Keerthy submitted that the Appellant’s claim that she would not be able to register in the local area was not a matter that was identified in the skeleton argument or in any great substance in the Appellant’s witness statement. Ms Keerthy took the Tribunal through the various parts of the skeleton argument, the amended skeleton argument and the supplementary evidence; she contended that the Appellant had not identified the issue and had in fact not provided evidence that she was not able to register elsewhere.

7. In respect of ground 3, Ms Keerthy acknowledged that the Judge had accepted that the Appellant had a genuine subjective fear of moneylenders in the Philippines but had gone on to refuse to accept the extent of the moneylenders’ influence and the level of the threat at the date of hearing. Ms Keerthy emphasised the Judge’s conclusion that there was no evidence of an escalation of the situation in the Philippines and that the Appellant’s family had not suffered any harm as a result of the issue.

8. In any event, Ms Keerthy pointed out that the Appellant had not in fact challenged the Judge’s conclusion that she could return to her family and that there was a sufficiency of protection available in the Philippines. Ms Keerthy submitted that therefore any error, if there was one, was not material.

9. In response Mr Murphy again criticised the formatting of the decision and its subsequent impact upon the clarity of the decision.

10. Mr Murphy further emphasised that the Appellant had been residing in the United Kingdom for 18 years and 10 months of the date of hearing, that there was a finding that she had a genuine subjective fear of the moneylenders in the Philippines but that the Judge had impermissibly sought to isolate relevant factors rather than consider them cumulatively.

11. Mr Murphy also submitted that the Judge had failed to give sufficient reasons to explain what level of threat had in fact been accepted bearing in mind the positive conclusion that the Appellant’s subjective fear was genuine.

Findings and reasons

12. I certainly agree with the parties, and the observations of Judge Barker in the grant of permission, that the obvious lack of proofreading and formatting in this decision make it far more difficult than it should have been to understand precisely what the Judge decided.

13. I do not however accept Mr Murphy’s submission that problems in the layout and formatting of this decision have a bearing upon the lawfulness of the conclusions reached by the Judge. I have had regard to the Tribunal’s view in SA (Clarificatory questions from IJs – best practice) [2006] UKAIT 00017 at §9:

“The grounds also criticised the adjudicator's determination. It was described by the appellant's representative as poorly drafted with numerous spelling errors and unnecessary repetition. All judges should proofread their decisions in any case with care. It is important to avoid bad grammar, poor drafting and spelling mistakes. But only in the most exceptional of circumstances could a determination which fails these tests be properly described as showing error of law still less material error of law. The determination in this case should have been more carefully proofread. But it is clear what the adjudicator was saying and deciding. He made no error of law in relation to this aspect of the matter.”

14. I also certainly accept in respect of Ground 1 that the Judge’s use of the term “these facts alone” gives the impression that the Judge may have considered the factors relevant to the assessment of very significant obstacles in isolation and not holistically.

15. In my view even if this is an error, it is not a material one. Ultimately, as Ms Keerthy pointed out, there has been no challenge to the Judge’s conclusion that the Appellant would be able to access a sufficiency of protection in respect of any threat arising from the moneylenders taking the case at its highest.

16. Equally there is ultimately no challenge by the Appellant to the Judge’s adverse findings from the middle of page 5 onwards having taken into account the submitted medical evidence and concluding that the Appellant had a genuine subjective fear.

17. There has equally been no challenge to the Judge’s conclusion that an adverse credibility point should be drawn from the Appellant’s delay in claiming asylum amounting to 14 years. There is equally no challenge to the Judge’s conclusion that the barangay documents were not genuine. The Judge also rejected the Appellant’s claim to have ended contact with her family because she did not want to worry them (the second paragraph of page 7 of the judgment).

18. Furthermore, the Judge also rejected the Appellant’s claim as to the level of debt that she was in with the moneylenders in the Philippines (again at page 7). At the top of page 9 of the decision the Judge rejected the Appellant’s claim to have received threats.

19. Furthermore, the Judge gave detailed reasons for concluding that the Appellant could seek the protection of the authorities and also for concluding that the evidence did not establish, in the alternative, that the moneylenders had any kind of national reach. The Judge went on to later conclude that the Appellant’s work history in the UK and the Philippines would help her in obtaining work in the Philippines even as an older person and that there was no evidence to suggest that the mental health medication the Appellant is taking in the United Kingdom would not be available to her in the Philippines. The Judge also concluded that the Appellant could draw upon the support of her family.

20. Overall then, whilst the Judge should have indicated that he had taken into account the factors holistically and been clearer in respect of those findings, I nonetheless conclude that any error, at its highest, is not a material one when looking at the findings in totality which remain largely unchallenged by the Appellant.

21. In respect of ground 2 and Mr Murphy’s assertion at paragraph 17 that the Appellant had stated that she would not, on return, report to her barangay because of her subjective fear and therefore would not be able to obtain employment, I accept Ms Keerthy’s submission that this does not appear to have been advanced in the evidence or in the argument before the First-tier Tribunal.

22. I therefore conclude that the Judge did not materially err when the issue was not argued or evidenced before them. In any event any such error could not be material because the Judge made the unchallenged finding that the Appellant could seek protection from the Philippine authorities and would be able to return to her family.

23. In respect of ground 3, I accept Ms Keerthy’s submission that the Judge’s findings are sufficient to understand why the Appellant would not face a real risk of persecution or serious harm despite having a subjective fear of the moneylenders.

24. As I have recorded earlier, the Judge expressly found that there had not been threats to the Appellant but, in any event, I reiterate that the Appellant has not challenged the Judge’s conclusion that she could seek effective protection from the Philippine authorities.

Notice of Decision

25. The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

I Jarvis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 August 2026