UI-2026-002388
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-002388
First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/64467/2024
LH/01224/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
3rd November 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD
Between
AT
(Anonymity ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Solomon of counsel instructed by Metro Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Lecointe, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 24 August 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties are entitled to apply on notice to vary this direction.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a national of Albania appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Farmer (“the Judge”) dated 19 November 2025 dismissing his human rights claim connected to deportation.
2. The hearing before me is to consider whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If I find that there is a material error of law in the decision, then the decision will have to be remade. If I find that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision then the decision dismissing the Appellant’s appeal will stand.
The Grant of Permission to Appeal
3. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal Judge by way of a decision sealed on 28 April 2026.
4. Following a renewed application, permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Loughran by way of a decision sealed on 23 June 2026. That grant of permission was in respect of all 3 of the grounds of appeal.
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
5. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
6. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
The Hearing Before Me
7. The Appellant provided a bundle comprising 727 pages.
8. Mr Solomon said that he relied on the detailed grounds which had been drafted by Ms Akhtar of counsel. He said that the overarching criticism of the Judge’s decision was set out in ground 1 and that had thereby meant that grounds 2 and 3 had shown the Judge’s error. Mr Solomon submitted that the Judge had failed to apply the correct legal test of undue harshness and she had instead applied a notional comparator test. Mr Solomon referred to several paragraphs of HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22. Because this was a large part of the Appellant’s submissions, I refer to those paragraphs in this decision:
“First, I consider that far too much emphasis has been placed on a single sentence in Lord Carnwath’s judgment and that if his judgment is considered as a whole it is apparent that he was not intending to lay down a test involving the suggested notional comparator. It is correct that in para 23 of his judgment Lord Carnwath was recognising that the unduly harsh test involves a comparison, but the comparison made was between the level of harshness which is “acceptable” or “justifiable” in the context of the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals and the greater degree of harshness which is connoted by the requirement of “unduly” harsh. As Underhill LJ pointed out, Lord Carnwath was not seeking to define the level of harshness which is “acceptable” or “justifiable”. Had this been his intention he would have addressed the matter in considerably more detail and explained what the relevant definition was and why. Similarly, if he had been intending to lay down a test to be applied in all cases by reference to the suggested notional comparator he would not only have so stated but he would have explained the nature of and justification for such a test. The reference to the harshness which would be involved for “any child” is to be understood as an illustrative consideration rather than a definition or test.”
…
Fourthly, a test involving a notional comparator child is potentially inconsistent with the duty to have regard to the “best interests” of the child in question as a primary consideration in accordance with section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. This requires having “a clear idea of a child’s circumstances and of what is in a child's best interests” and carrying out “a careful examination of all relevant factors when the interests of a child are involved” - see Zoumbas at para 10. The focus needs to be on the individual child, but the discounting of what are said to be the “normal” or “ordinary” effects of deportation by reference to a notional comparator child risks the court or tribunal ignoring the actual impact of deportation on the particular child in a search for features which are outside the supposed norm. As Lord Carnwath stated at para 15 of his judgment in KO (Nigeria), the presumption is that the statutory provisions are intended to be consistent with the general principles relating to the “best interests” of children.
…
Fifthly, the notional comparator approach gives rise to the risk that a court or tribunal will apply an exceptionality threshold. Searching for particular features which take the facts of an individual child’s case outside the ordinary run of cases is Page 14 likely to mean looking for exceptional or rare cases. As Underhill LJ stated at para 56:
“… if tribunals treat the essential question as being ‘is this level of harshness out of the ordinary?’ they may be tempted to find that Exception 2 does not apply simply on the basis that the situation fits into some commonly-encountered pattern. That would be dangerous. How a child will be affected by a parent’s deportation will depend on an almost infinitely variable range of circumstances and it is not possible to identify a baseline of ‘ordinariness’. Simply by way of example, the degree of harshness of the impact may be affected by the child’s age; by whether the parent lives with them (NB that a divorced or separated father may still have a genuine and subsisting relationship with a child who lives with the mother); by the degree of the child’s emotional dependence on the parent; by the financial consequences of his deportation; by the availability of emotional and financial support from a remaining parent and other family members; by the practicability of maintaining a relationship with the deported parent; and of course by all the individual characteristics of the child.”
Sixthly, the Secretary of State’s suggested approach is likely to lead to perverse results. The respondents give the example of a case involving the impact of parental deportation on an eight year old who cohabits and has a very close relationship with the parent. As the norm for “any child” in that qualifying child’s position would be that the effect of separation would be considerable, it would allow the significant effect of that deportation to be treated as acceptably harsh and thereafter discounted from further consideration. This can be contrasted with the case of a 17 year old who lives separately from the parent and whose relationship is at the very lowest end of the genuine and subsisting relationship spectrum. As the norm for “any child” in that qualifying child’s position would be that the effect of separation would be of much more limited significance, it is likely to be easier to satisfy the unduly harsh test because it will be more straightforward to identify particular features that take the case above the much lower baseline level than the higher bar set for the highly dependent eight year old.
Finally, all these highlighted difficulties reinforce the conclusion that Lord Carnwath cannot have been contemplating a notional comparator test. None of them are considered. Had it been intended to introduce such a test there is no doubt that many of these issues would have needed to be and would have been addressed. There is no hint of that in the judgment of Lord Carnwath, or indeed in the arguments before the court.
79. The Court of Appeal highlighted all the findings made by the Upper Tribunal which emphasised the closeness of the relationship between HA and his children, his child Page 30 rearing responsibilities and the complete separation which his deportation would involve. In all the circumstances, it held that the reason that the Upper Tribunal had reached the overall conclusion that deportation would not be unduly harsh was para 71 of its decision, where it said that there was no evidence that the effect of HA’s deportation on NT and his children “would be anything other than that which is ordinarily to be expected by the deportation of a partner/parent” - ie a notional comparator test. The court held that this was an error of law in the light of which the case should be remitted to the Upper Tribunal for redetermination. 80. The Secretary of State’s principal ground for challenging the Court of Appeal’s decision was that the notional comparator test is the appropriate test, as established by KO (Nigeria). For reasons already given, I reject that case. 81. The Secretary of State’s fallback case was that the Court of Appeal was in any event wrong to conclude that the Upper Tribunal had misdirected itself and applied the notional comparator test. The Upper Tribunal had referenced the MK self-direction in both para 67 and in its conclusion at para 78 and this was the test it was applying. If so, I would agree that there was no error of law. On balance, however, I agree with the Court of Appeal that the test which the Upper Tribunal was in fact applying was the notional comparator test. Virtually every finding made in the passages cited above supported a conclusion that deportation on the stay scenario would be unduly harsh on HA’s partner and in particular his children. The only finding of substance going the other way was para 71 and its reliance on the impact which “is ordinarily to be expected” on deportation.”
9. Mr Solomon said that the Judge had referred to the correct test but she did not advise herself against the notional comparator test. He submitted that the Judge had made her findings in respect of the unduly harsh test basis by applying a notional comparator test. He submitted that there had not been specific consideration of the best interests of the children. He referred to the ‘stay’ and to the ‘go’s scenario. Mr Solomon submitted that the Appellant’s wife is devoted to her husband and he referred to the wife’s mental health difficulties. Mr Solomon referred to the Appellant’s wife’s work as a paediatric nurse and which work would have to stop. Mr Solomon referred to the Judge’s decision at paragraph 42 in respect of the very compelling circumstances.
10. In submissions on behalf of the Respondent, Ms Lecointe said she relied on the Rule 24 reply. She took me through that document.
11. Ms Lecointe submitted that some comments by the Judge were observations and discussion rather than a free standing notional comparator test. She said that the Judge had accepted that the children will miss the Appellant and she said that the Judge had considered the practical support that would be available from supportive family members. The best interests of the children and its importance was said to have been taken into account by the Judge. I was invited to dismiss the appeal.
12. In reply Mr Solomon said it was wrong to refer to the Judge’s reference to the notional comparator rest as a ‘discussion’. He submitted that the Judge had applied the wrong test when evaluating the appeal.
13. I had reserved my decision.
Consideration and Analysis
14. It is necessary to consider the Judge’s decision at some length. First, the Judge referred to the correct factual background at paragraph 4:
“The appellant appeals against the refusal of his application to revoke a deportation order on family grounds and under very compelling circumstances. He was the subject of a Deportation Order on 26 February 2014, following a conviction for drugs offences. This was enforced in August 2016 and he was returned to Albania. He had met his now wife in the UK in January 2016 and they married in Albania in November 2016. They now have two children born in March 2018 and February 2021. He applied to enter the UK in 2017 and this was refused. He then re-entered the UK illegally and in breach of his deportation order in 2019. He has remained here illegally since that time and made this application to revoke his deportation order in 2022. He relies on his relationship with his British citizen wife and two British children.. He claims to satisfy Exception 2 on family life grounds, this is because it would be unduly harsh for him to return to Albania whilst his children and partner remain here, and it would also be unduly harsh to expect them to live in Albania with him. He also claims the public interest in deportation is outweighed when taking everything into account.”
15. Then the Judge referred to the Appellant’s immigration history as follows:
“The appellant’s immigration and offending history is agreed between the parties and I make the following preliminary findings of fact: (a) The appellant was born in Albania and entered the UK in 2002. There was previously a dispute as to whether he was a minor when he entered. He claimed to be 14 years of age at the time. (This was found to be false by Judge Troup in a decision dated 16 June 2015, and he was found to be 18 when he entered having been born in 1983). However he now has a passport showing he was born in 1985 and so would have been 16 when he entered the UK. He claimed asylum which was refused on 2 September 2002 but as he was believed to be a minor he was granted exceptional leave to remain. (b) On 18 October 2005 he applied for further Discretionary leave and humanitarian protection but this was refused on 19 October 2005. He has not been lawfully present in the United Kingdom since 2005. (c) On 15 February 2013 he was convicted at Croydon Crown Court for being knowingly involved in the supply/production of drugs and was sentence to two years nine months imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction or sentence. (d) In July 2013 he received a liability to automatic deportation letter and he lodged an appeal. (e) On 28 February 2014 the deportation order was served upon him and on 6 March 2014 he was served with a decision notice to maintain his deportation which he appealed. That appeal came before Judge Troup at Newport and in a decision promulgated on 16 June 2015 his appeal was dismissed [CB 408]. Various adverse credibility findings were made in relation to his claimed nationality (as he had claimed to be a Serbian national) and as to his date of birth as he had claimed to be born in 1987 but was found to have been born in 1983. On 3 July 2015 he became appeal rights exhausted. (f) On 16 September 2015 he made an application based on his family and private life and on 4 August 2016 his human rights claim was refused. He was then detained on 4 August 2016 and removed on 18 August 2016. (g) On 24 November 2016 he married Holly Toskaj in Albania. She is a British citizen living in the United Kingdom. (h) On 12 September 2017 he applied for entry clearance from abroad as the spouse of a settled person and on 15 December 2017 he was refused entry clearance. [CB 436]. That decision makes it clear that he is the subject of a deportation order. (i) In March 2018 his daughter was born in the UK. (j) In May 2019 he returned clandestinely to the United Kingdom in breach of his deportation order. (k) In February 2021 his son was born in the UK. (l) On 5 May 2022 an application to revoke that deportation order was submitted on his behalf by his solicitors. This was refused in October 2024 and it is that refusal that is the subject of this appeal.”
16. At paragraphs 6 to 12 the Judge considered the matters which were before her and that the Appellant was a ‘medium offender’ in that he had received a sentence of imprisonment of between 12 months and 4 years.
17. The Judge correctly identified the issues at paragraph 13 as being:
“(a) Whether the appellant satisfies Exception 2 of the 2002 Act for either or both his children and his partner; and in particular I must look at the “stay” or “go” options namely whether the children and/or his partner relocating to Albania would be unduly harsh or whether it would be unduly harsh for the appellant to return to Albania whilst the children remained in the UK with their mother, and whether it would be unduly harsh for his partner to remain in the UK if the appellant returned to Albania.
(b) If the appellant cannot satisfy either of the exceptions, I must look at whether there are very compelling circumstances that would make the appellant’s deportation in breach of his Article 8 rights under s.117C of the 2002 Act.”
18. The Judge then set out the legal framework at some length thereafter. This included section 117 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The Judge also referred to HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, amongst other authorities.
19. The Judge made favourable findings in respect of the witnesses. Including in respect of the Appellant’s partner “H”.
20. The Judge considered the matter at some length. Including at paragraph 35 in respect of the best interests of the children and then at paragraph 36 in respect of the “stay” and “go” scenarios.
21. Then in a detailed analysis the Judge then set out her findings. I refer to them in full because the Appellant’s grounds are lengthy and refer to only some of those paragraphs. The Judge said:
“When considering the impact on the children emotionally, I have no doubt that it would adversely impact them for their father to be absent. It would clearly be difficult, as it would for any child who is currently being parented by both parents in a loving home, to have one parent removed from it. I have to look at an elevated threshold. Not only must the future be severe or bleak but the word unduly means it must be elevated beyond this. I accept it would be difficult and there would be a period of adjustment but I am also satisfied that they would be able to maintain contact with their father by means of video calls and visits. They have a supportive and loving extended family in the United Kingdom as well as their mother who is entirely committed to their happiness and well-being. There would be a period of adjustment, and it would be difficult, but looking at all the facts of this case, the test of unduly harsh is not met, there is nothing elevated about this case. Therefore when considering the “stay” scenario I am not satisfied that the threshold for exception to is met on behalf of the children.
38. I go on to consider the “go” scenario on the assumption that they would be leaving as a family. I have accepted the evidence as credible. Whilst the appellant was unable to find work in his village between 2016 and 2019, that does not mean that they would have to return to his village and could live in the capital where he is more likely to find employment. The children are still very young and with no special educational needs, I am satisfied that they would be able to adapt to learn a new language and integrate into a new culture. They would be able to visit the United Kingdom to stay with their grandparents and retain a connection to the United Kingdom. They have no other special needs which would not be met in Albania and they would be cared for by their parents together. I find that their parents would do everything they could to support the children in their home environment and make the transition to life in another country is easy as possible for them. There is simply nothing to indicate that a move to Albania for the children would be unduly harsh, the only factor weighing against it is that they are British and would be denied the opportunities of being brought up in the United Kingdom. They would not see as much of their grandparents but I am satisfied this relationship would be maintained as they are all committed to each other. I am not satisfied that these factors alone are enough. Therefore when considering the “go” scenario I find that the threshold of unduly harsh is not met on behalf of the children.
39. I now go on to consider whether or not the threshold of exception to is met on behalf of his partner when considering both the “stay” and the “go” scenario. I have already made a positive credibility finding. I accept that she does a worthwhile and important job as a specialist paediatric nurse for special needs children. She is clearly a valued member of her team. There was some evidence about her previous poor mental health and she underwent some counselling in the latter half of 2023. I further except that she was unwell in 2019 with pneumonia. It was clear from her evidence that she is devoted to the appellant and they continue to have a strong and loving relationship. She does not have any current mental health issues, there is no diagnosis of any medical issues and she is not on medication. She was understandably emotional during the hearing and I accept that this is a stressful situation for her. It is to her credit that she has managed to protect the children from these ongoing proceedings. I accept that when considering the “stay” scenario, that this would make her unhappy as it is clearly not the outcome she would hope for. However, she has a supportive family around her and friends. I am satisfied that she would be able to continue to work, either by adjusting her hours, or by obtaining childcare, or by a combination of this and family and friends support. I am not satisfied there is credible evidence before me that she would not be able to cope as a single parent and she would be able to remain in contact with video calls and visits. She spent three years living apart from the appellant between 2016 and 2019 and made a significant number of visits and the marriage clearly survived the separation. I accept that it is harder now with two children, but despite this, I am satisfied they would still be able to see each other. There is nothing, other than the very strong desire to live together as a family in the United Kingdom, that elevates this scenario into the realms of unduly harsh. I accept it will be difficult, but when looking at the facts as a whole and taking into account her personal circumstances, health, her care of the children, her employment, I am not satisfied that it would be unduly harsh for her to remain in the United Kingdom with the children and for the appellant to be removed to Albania.
40. When considering the “go” scenario, I accept that she does not speak Albanian and the likelihood is that she will not be able to be employed as a specialist paediatric nurse. Mr Solomon that there may be entry Visa requirements which we are unaware of. I attach no weight to this as there is simply no evidence before me that family members of an Albanian citizen would be unable to join him and settle as a family unit. There was no credible evidence before me that she would be unable to learn a new language. She clearly does a difficult and demanding job which would have required her to learn skills. I accept it will be difficult to learn a new language but she is still young and there is nothing to suggest she would not be able to do so in time. I accept she has had previous anxiety for which she required counselling, but I am not satisfied she has any ongoing health needs and she would be supported by the appellant in Albania. Her family have previously been willing to travel to Albania with her and would be able to visit her in Albania and she would be able to return to the United Kingdom to visit them. There was no evidence before me about any job opportunities for her in Albania and it may be that she would be unable to continue her work as a nurse. That is not to say that in time she would not be able to obtain some sort of employment either in a caring profession or otherwise. I accept this is not the scenario that she hopes for but when considering the unduly harsh test I am not satisfied that the circumstances of this case come close to meeting the test. The objections to moving to Albania amount to nothing greater than her very strong desire to remain in the United Kingdom, the fact she does not speak the language and would have to leave her job and that her family and friends are in the United Kingdom. I in no way minimise the importance of these factors to her, but when applying the legal test that I must do, they do not amount to being unduly harsh.
41. It follows from my findings that exception to is not met either in relation to his partner or his children. I must therefore go on to consider whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions which make his deportation a disproportionate interference with his article 8 rights.
Very Compelling Circumstances
42. As the exceptions to deportation are not satisfied, I have considered whether there are very compelling circumstances such that the appellant should not be deported. I find that there is a significant public interest in deporting the appellant due to his conviction as set out above.
43. In order to outweigh this public interest the appellant would need to provide evidence of a very strong Article 8 claim over and above the circumstances described in the exceptions to deportation. The fact that I have found he cannot establish a private life or family life exception is not determinative but I put this into the balance when considering very compelling circumstances.
44. HA (Iraq) and others v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 makes it clear that I must carry out a full proportionality balancing exercise where all the factors in favour of the appellant are assessed and weighed against the public interest in deportation. Mr Solomon recognised that there is a strong public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. However this is not a fixed criterion and I must look at all the circumstances of the case.
45. I accept that the appellant speaks fluent English and he is not a burden on the State and would be able to work and support himself and his family if he stayed.
46. I firstly consider the nature and seriousness of the offence of which the appellant was convicted. He was sentenced to 2 years and nine months imprisonment for drug offences. Mr Solomon relied on the sentencing remarks of the judge. The judge clearly formed a favourable impression of the appellant and noted that she was in no way encouraging deportation proceedings to be brought against him. However I need to look at those comments in light of the comments of Judge Troup. It is clear from that decision that the appellant continued with the lie that he was a Serbian national, he did not know whether his family remained in Serbia. He had lied about his age and said that he was 14 years when he entered the country and as a result was placed in foster care. His explanation for his offence was that he was a drug user as he had fallen in with the wrong crowd. Paragraph 34 of the determination records that it was put to him that he had lied to the Crown Court, to his foster parents and all whom he encountered in the UK about his age and he said that he had not. He denied that he could speak Albanian. Judge Troup recorded the sentencing remarks of the Crown Court judge who said that it was her duty to protect the public from those who decide to make a living out of selling class a drugs. The appellant denied that he had made a living out of selling drugs and stated that the sums of £1,000 and £250 in his possession were his personal savings and not the proceeds of crime. This was not accepted by the sentencing judge. I bear in mind the findings made by Judge Troup that the appellant was convicted of making a living from class a drugs which the public deplores, not only because of the destructive effect of the drugs but also the acquisitive crime is that addiction generates. At that stage the appellant had pleaded not guilty and in 2015 did not appear to accept full responsibility for his crimes. Before me, in 2025, I find that the appellant has taken a different view with hindsight and maturity. I find that he is now remorseful for the crimes that he committed, and of course I bear in mind his good character since that time.
47. Judge Troup also noted that contrary to the public interest, the appellant lived a lie in the United Kingdom as to his age and nationality, and duped the Crown Court, his foster parents and others. He obtained leave to remain in the United Kingdom and obtain financial support by deception, and did not tell the truth to the Crown Court. I find that this increases the weight of the strong public interest in deportation.
48. Against this, I balance the fact that there is a low risk of reoffending. This was also found to be the case in 2015. I accept that the appellant has committed no further offences and has rehabilitated himself. It was recognised in 2015 that he had undertaken courses whilst in prison and was a model prisoner.
49. I accept that he has been in the United Kingdom from 2002 to 2016, a period of 14 years until he was removed. He then re-entered in breach of his deportation order in 2019 and has therefore lived in the United Kingdom for a further six years. I accept that there has been a delay in deciding his revocation of deportation application of approximately 2 ½ years. However I am not satisfied that this is significant and does not significantly dilute the very strong public interest in deportation. I must take into account the length of time he has spent in the United Kingdom but I also temper this by the fact that his initial leave was granted based on the fact he lied that he was 14 years of age when he entered and in fact he was 16 years of age. It is further tempered by the fact that he entered in breach of his deportation order in 2019. He knew that this was wrong and accepted it before me in his evidence. He had attempted to re-enter lawfully but this was refused in 2017, and I am therefore satisfied that he was aware what he was doing was wrong and has shown that he was prepared to disregard the laws of this country. I understand he was motivated by his love of his partner and wishing to be with his child, but that does not dilute the strong public interest in maintaining firm immigration control.
50. I further bear in mind the time that has elapsed since he committed this offence which is a factor I take into account in his favour. He has committed no further offences since 2012 and there is no suggestion that he has gone on to use drugs or involved himself in any criminal activity or that there is a risk that he will do so in the future.
51. I must also look at his social cultural and family ties to both Albania and the United Kingdom. He has his mother and father in Albania and lived in the same village as them between 2016 and 2019. There was no evidence that he does not have a good relationship with them, however he was clear that they are not supportive as his wife’s family in the United Kingdom. He spent the first 16 years of his life in Albania and was educated there. He then spent a further three years there as an adult. He has therefore spent 19 years in Albania and 21 years in the United Kingdom. However only a small portion of the time spent here has been legal, and this is likely to have been shorter had he told the truth on arrival. I am satisfied that he has retained a connection to Albania, he speaks the language and has family there. He understands the social and cultural norms of his country. He also has a strong relationship with his wife and children in the United Kingdom and a good relationship with his parents in law, who are very supportive of him and his marriage. He was educated here and has worked here and speaks fluent English. I have no doubt that if he were allowed to remain he would continue to work as he did prior to his arrest in 2012.
52. I. Have taken into account the four criteria set out in Maslov namely the nature and seriousness of the offence committed; the length he has spent in the UK; the time that has lapsed since the offence was committed and the conduct of the appellant during that period and the solidity of social, cultural and family ties to Albania and the UK.
53. I accept that he has spent a very significant time in the United Kingdom, 21 years as oppose to 19 years in Albania. This carries some weight. His nuclear family are all in the UK. These are factors against deportation. I give them full weight.
54. Against this I put the seriousness of his offence, his deception on entry which he continued for the entire period he lived here prior to his deportation. The fact he has his father and mother in Albania and was able to live there for 3 years, albeit without employment. I take account of the fact he entered in breach of a deportation order. I bear in mind that the public interest in deportation is not based only on the need to protect from further offending, but on wider concerns of deterrence and public confidence.
55. Weighing the factors militating in favour of deportation against those mitigating against it, I find that the factors in favour of deportation outweigh those that tell against it. The public interest in deportation of foreign criminals is a weighty factor.
56. He has no physical or mental health issues. I am not satisfied that returning to Albania would prevent him from finding work or continuing his relationship with his partner and children, for all the reasons I have set out above. I therefore conclude that the public interest in deporting the appellant outweighs his right to a family and private life. I find there are no very compelling circumstances when taking all these factors into account.
22. Ground 1 contends that the Judge did not address the correct legal test. Contrary to the grounds, the Judge unarguably did refer to the correct legal tests. She also applied those correct legal tests. She set out those tests in her decision and she referred to Supreme Court authority.
23. As can be seen above, the Judge unarguably had considered the facts. As is demonstrably clear, the Judge referred to the facts at some length. The Judge weighed the benefits and burdens and the positives and negatives of both the stay and go scenarios.
24. Whilst the grounds refer to half sentences from paragraphs 35 and 36 of the Judge’s decision, such selective reference by the Appellant amounts to looking at matters out of context. The Judge plainly did refer to and then did apply the facts to the law. The Judge was correct in any event that there would be a degree of upheaval in relocation. That does not get close to enabling me to conclude that the Judge applied a notional comparator test. There is no merit to ground 1. When read as a whole there is no material error in the Judge’s decision.
25. In respect of grounds 2 and 3 I agree with Mr Solomon, that their base is reliant on ground 1. Because ground 1 fails then grounds 2 and 3 must also fail. Nonetheless, I consider grounds 2 and 3 independently.
26. Ground 2 contends that the Judge applied a higher threshold test when considering the Appellant’s wife. That submission and ground is plainly wrong. As can be seen from the Judge’s decision, the Judge referred to and firmly had in mind the Appellant’s wife’s mental health issues (noting the limited evidence) and that she would, in effect, be a single parent who worked as a specialist nurse. The Judge also had to take into account the supportive family network. There is nothing to this ground. It is a mere disagreement with the Judge’s fully reasoned decision.
27. Ground 3 contends that the Judge had “materially erred by failing the consider the facts of the Appellant’s family life in the very compelling test”. In my judgment, this submission and ground is wrong. The Judge clearly did consider the very compelling test and she then applied the facts of the family life to the law in a lawful manner. As can be seen above, the Judge in fact provided a sub heading for “very compelling circumstances” in her decision and she then fully and lawfully reasoned why even that test was not met by the Appellant, despite the Appellant’s family life. The Judge had referred to the family life at some length under the exceptions and so she was plainly aware of the family life and the facts.
28. In my judgment, the grounds are a mere disagreement with the Judge’s comprehensive decision and an attempt to re-argue the case.
29. The reality of the factual matrix speaks for itself in my judgment. Whilst the Judge was minded to accept much of the evidence presented to her from the witnesses, that was not sufficient to meet the applicable tests. The Judge plainly knew what the correct legal tests were because she set them out and the Judge did not materially err in law when applying those legal tests to the facts of the case. Rehabilitation and the lack of offending since the last offence is not some panacea in any event.
30. The case law has been affirmed more recently by Court of Appeal in Secretary of State v Lewis [2026] EWCA Civ 879. That case has been cited in a case heard on the same day at the Court of Appeal. It helpfully sets out the applicable legal principles in a succinct and clear manner. Lewis LJ explained in his judgment:
8. Section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971 ("the 1971 Act") provides that a person who is not a British citizen is liable to deportation from the United Kingdom if the Secretary of State deems his deportation to be conducive to the public good. Section 32(4) of the UK Borders Act 2007 ("the 2007 Act") provides that "the deportation of a foreign criminal is conducive to the public good". A foreign criminal is defined, so far as material to this appeal, as a person who is not a British citizen who is convicted of an offence and sentenced to a period of at least 12 months' imprisonment (see section 32 of the 2007 Act and section 117D(2) of the 2002 Act ).
9. Section 32(5) of the 2007 Act imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to make a deportation order unless one of a number of stated exceptions apply. The relevant exception in the present case is where deportation would breach a person's Convention rights. Those are the rights defined in section 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998 ("the 1998 Act") and set out in Schedule 1 to that Act . Those rights include, amongst others, Article 8 of the Convention which provides that:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
Appeals to the First-Tier Tribunal
10. An individual may claim that deportation would be incompatible with his Convention rights. The Secretary of State will need to determine that human rights claim and, in doing so, section 6 of the 1998 Act provides that it would be unlawful for the Secretary of State to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.
11. Section 82(1)(b) of the 2002 Act provides, amongst other things, that a person may appeal to the First-tier Tribunal where the "Secretary of State has decided to refuse a human rights claim". Section 84(2) of the 2002 Act sets out the grounds of appeal and provides that an appeal against a refusal of a human rights claim must be brought on the ground that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the 1998 Act , that is the Secretary of State's decision is incompatible with the person's Convention rights.
12. Part 5A of the 2002 Act applies where a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches a person's right to respect for private and family life, and as a result, would be unlawful under section 6 of the 1998 Act . Section 117A of the 2002 Act provides as follows:
"117A Application of this Part
(1) This Part applies where a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts—
(a) breaches a person's right to respect for private and family life under Article 8, and
(b) as a result would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 .
(2) In considering the public interest question, the court or tribunal must (in particular) have regard—
(a) in all cases, to the considerations listed in section 117B , and
(b) in cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals, to the considerations listed in section 117C .
(3) In subsection (2), "the public interest question" means the question of whether an interference with a person's right to respect for private and family life is justified under Article 8(2)."
13. Section 117B of the 2002 Act sets out a series of considerations which are relevant to the assessment of the public interest in all cases where a court or tribunal is considering whether an interference with a person's right to respect for private or family life is justified under Article 8(2). These include the fact that the maintenance of effective immigration controls, and that a person is able to speak English and is financially independent, is in the public interest. Section 117B(4) and (5) provides that little weight should be accorded to a private life or a relationship entered into when the person was in the United Kingdom unlawfully or when his immigration status was precarious.
14. Section 117C of the 2002 Act sets out a series of additional consideration which must be taken into account in cases involving foreign criminals. Section 117C , in effect, sets out a statutory framework governing the assessment of whether deportation would be a justifiable interference with the right to respect for a person's private and family life. It provides as follows:
"117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal ("C") who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted."
15. Exceptions 1 and 2 apply to, (among others) foreign criminals sentenced to between 1 and 4 years' imprisonment. They are generally referred to as medium offenders. Exception 1 concerns the impact of deportation on the foreign criminal's right to respect for private life. It sets out which foreign criminals may claim the benefit of the exception and when the public interest will not require the deportation of such foreign criminals. A foreign criminal may benefit from the exception if he has been in the United Kingdom lawfully for most of his life and is socially and cultural integrated here (if not he cannot benefit from the exception). The third requirement concerns the ability of the medium offender foreign criminal to re-integrate into his country of origin. If a foreign criminal has been lawfully here for most of his life, and is socially and culturally integrated, but would face "very significant obstacles" to re-integration, then deportation is not in the public interest.
16. Exception 2 concerns the right to respect for family life. It focusses on the impact of deportation on a foreign criminal's partner and children. They must be a qualifying child or partner (which is concerned with their status, or length of time, in the United Kingdom). If so, and if there is a genuine and subsisting relationship with the partner or child and it would be unduly harsh on the partner or child to deport the foreign criminal, then the public interest will not justify the deportation of a medium offender.
17. In NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 707, the Court of Appeal also held that a medium offender may also be able to rely on the provisions of section 117C(6) . The public interest will not require deportation if a foreign criminal who is a medium offender can demonstrate that there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in exceptions 1 and 2: see paragraphs 24 to 27 of the decision in NA (Pakistan). The way in which that subsection operates in relation to medium offenders is discussed at paragraph 32 to 36 of the judgment in NA (Pakistan).
18. A foreign criminal sentenced to imprisonment for 4 years or more (generally referred to as a serious offender) cannot benefit from exceptions 1 and 2. If a serious offender relies on the kind of circumstances described in exceptions 1 and 2 (that is the impact on the foreign criminal, and the impact on his partner or child, respectively), the public interest will still require deportation of the serious offender even if he would have met the requirements of the exception had it applied. The public interest would still require deportation, for example, even if the serious offender has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner or child, and it would be unduly harsh on the partner or child to deport the foreign criminal (subject to the operation of section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act ). In such cases, the public interest will require deportation of the serious offender unless there are "very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2". Such circumstances may outweigh the public interest in deportation (so that deportation would not be a justified interference with the right to respect for private or family life within the meaning of Article 8(2) of the Convention): see section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act .
19. The operation of section 117C(6) was helpfully described in NA (Pakistan). The Court of Appeal said:
"37. In relation to a serious offender, it will often be sensible first to see whether his case involves circumstances of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2, both because the circumstances so described set out particularly significant factors bearing upon respect for private life (Exception 1) and respect for family life (Exception 2) and because that may provide a helpful basis on which an assessment can be made whether there are "very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2" as is required under section 117C(6) . It will then be necessary to look to see whether any of the factors falling within Exceptions 1 and 2 are of such force, whether by themselves or taken in conjunction with any other relevant factors not covered by the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 and 2, as to satisfy the test in section 117C(6) ."
20. That issue was considered again by the Court of Appeal in Kapikanya v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 987 . The Court emphasised that the First-tier Tribunal could not bypass the requirements in the exceptions and go straight to the question of very compelling circumstances, as that would "undermine the Parliamentary intent and deprive the phrase "over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2 of much if not all of its meaning" (see per Bean LJ at paragraph 42 with whom Peter Jackson LJ and Baker LJ agreed). The Court in Kapikanya recognised that there may be cases where the circumstances are unconnected with the matters dealt with in exceptions 1 and 2 and, if they are very compelling circumstances, the public interest will not require deportation. An example given was of a couple with a teenage daughter with Down's syndrome and the father is sentenced to a lengthy period of imprisonment. By the time of his release, the mother may have died; the daughter may no longer be a child and the foreign national criminal may be the only person capable of caring for her. Exception 2 would not apply as the daughter would not be a child but it might be that the circumstances would be seen as very compelling and so the public interest may not apply: see paragraph 27 of the judgment.
21. One question raised in argument was whether the First-tier Tribunal was required as a matter of law to consider expressly whether a serious offender could or would fall within exception 1 or 2 (if they had applied) and then to identify the factors over and above that which amounted to very compelling circumstances. The answer is that a First-tier Tribunal is not required to do that as a matter of law: see Yalcin v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] 1 WLR 1626, at paragraph 59 to 65 .
22. In general, however, it is often sensible first to see whether a case involves circumstances of the kind described in exceptions 1 or 2, and then assess "whether any of the factors falling within Exception 1 or 2 are of such force, whether by themselves or taken in conjunction with any other relevant factor not covered by the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 or 2, as to satisfy the test in section 117C(6) ": see paragraph 37 of NA (Pakistan) . That will promote transparency and reduce the risk of error in applying the statutory framework. Whilst recognising that that was not a legal requirement, Underhill LJ encouraged such an approach: see paragraph 65 of his judgment in Yalcin . If a First-tier Tribunal does not, however, structure its reasoning in that way, it will need to ensure that it is possible to see that it has identified the relevant facts and has properly applied the statutory framework from the way in which it has expressed its decision.
31. The Judge’s decision does not stray outside of any of the caselaw and more recent authority has merely shown that the Judge’s reference to the law and her application of it was lawful.
32. Therefore, despite Mr Solomon’s clear submissions, I am unable to agree with him.
33. Accordingly, I dismiss the Appellant’s appeal. Therefore, the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal stands.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law.
Therefore, the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision which had dismissed the appeal on all grounds stands.
22 October 2026
Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber